Is it conceivable that you could have a President operating through a recognized political structure that doesn't have the main manipulator sitting down there at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue?

Mr. BURNS. I think the relation between a President and a strong party-and a strong party chairman-would always be a rather delicate one. The President, after all, is the elected leader of the country and if there is any contest between the two, it is the President who should be supreme. But I think the party leader has to do two things; one is to serve as a leader of the shadow government. Second, to get back to something this subcommittee is concerned about, the party chairman, as being one of a number of people around the President, would act both as a support to the President and as a controlling element on the President.

What I mean is this, I don't think mechanical devices to control presidential power would be very effective because they will not work. The real restraint on the President is not so much criticism by the Congress or even by the New York Times or the Washington Post. I think what really restrains the President are the men who are close to him, the men who are really with him, the men who broadly support his point of view but have somewhat independent positions of power.

What I would like to see a party chairman do is join with a small group around the President and support him but who also at critical moments could act as a source of restraint on him so that we do not put too much power into the single hand of the President of the United States.

Senator BAYH. Well, I think you have answered all of the questions I have with great clarity and insight. You have been very helpful and certainly you studied this proposal with great detail; yours has been a truly significant contribution.

I appreciate very much your helping us on this matter.

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, I must again say thank you.

I said earlier I think your committee has established a great record in dealing with these problems. I would like to add that I think you personally have shown what imaginative ideas can do in this terribly complicated and difficult field of constitutional change. I would like to add that I think the decade ahead of us will call for even bolder and more imaginative ideas both from you personally and from the whole committee.

Senator BAYII. Thank you. I hope you will give us the benefit of your continuing advice and counsel on what those bold changes need to be and I appreciate your being here today.

Thank you very much.

We will recess the committee pending the call of the Chair.

(Thereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was recessed pending the call of the Chair.)

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

A SINGLE, 6-YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE

STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN, REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, recently I have become persuaded that we would be well advised to amend the Constitution to limit our Presidents to a single, non-renewable six-year term of office.

Consequently on July 15, 1971 I introduced H. J. Res. 783 which is an identical companion measure to S. J. Res 77, the principle subject of these hearings. At the outset I first of all wish to commend the Subcommittee for holding hearings on this very fundamental constitutional question, and I particularly appreciate the opportunity to present testimony in support of such a modernization of our system of government.

In 1947 Congress passed the 22nd amendment, ratified in 1951, to limit our Presidents to being twice elected to that office. I believe passage of that amendment was wise, both for the sake of representative democracy and for the wellbeing of the man who must shoulder the burdens of that office. Yet, our experience of the past 20 years suggests to me, and others as well, that we need to go further.

One of the popular ways of viewing the President is to think of him as a leader of all the people, that of administrative head of the Government, that of legislative leader, that of chief foreign policymaker, that of Commander in Chief, and that of party leader. In considering these multifarious areas of responsibility, which directly affect world peace and the domestic well-being of every American citizen, the legitimate question has been raised as to whether a President can devote the fullest measure of his time and talent to the pressing duties of state if he must be preoccupied with concerns of reelection.

While the demands on the modern Presidency make the need for a change in election procedure that much more pressing, interest in a six-year term for the Chief Executive actually dates back to the early days of our Republic. Considerable discussion of a six-year term took place at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and well over 100 amendments have been offered to achieve that purpose since the Constitution became operative. During his Presidency, Thomas Jefferson declared himself in favor of a single eight-year term, while Presidents Jackson, Polk, William Henry Harrison, Andrew Johnson, Cleveland and Taft, at one time or another, advocated the six-year, non-renewable term.

In 1912, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported a resolution to amend the Constitution to provide for a single, six-year term. In its report to the House the committee stated:

"The President should be ineligible to a second term, because being ineligible there will be no temptation improperly to use the powers and patronage of that exalted office."

And further:

"It will make the President the Chief Executive of the whole people and not the leader of a mere faction or the chief of a political party." Considering four years an inadequate period of time in which a President may act to realize the goals of the platform on which he was elected, the committee felt that "6 years coupled with the freedom from anxiety for reelection, would give sufficient opportunity to the President to properly organize his administration and to bring about real accomplishments within the bounds of his duties and powers under the Constitution." In conclusion the committee wrote:

"This amendment, if submitted and ratified, will increase the efficiency of the administration of the President; will remove the temptation to build up a political machine by the abuse of patronage and power; and will save the President from the humiliating necessity of going to the stump to repel assaults made upon him."

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It is equally interesting to note that in 1913, the Senate actually approved a proposed constitutional amendment for a six-year term, but since President Woodrow Wilson objected, the measure died in the House Judiciary Committee. With the passage of time, the powers and responsibilities of the Presidency have, of course, increased dramatically. If there were reason and justification for considering such a course of action almost 60 years ago, how much more justified are we in proposing a six-year term today when the burdens of that high office have multiplied to previously unimagined complexity? As Washington Columnist Marquis Childs has written:

"The difficulties facing a President today are so enormous, so complex, so riddled with partisanship that no Chief Executive can emerge at the end of four years with the prospect of a majority of the electorate.”

I think that judgment to be a sound one. The reality of it suggests that the President would be better able to direct his energies both toward the administration of the Government and the implementation of his programs were he accorded a longer term and relieved of the partisan political concerns involving reelection to office. The pressures on a President are tremendous. I do not suggest that the office of the Presidency be made immune to the legitimate problems of state, but I do think that removal of that concern over reelection would permit a President to act more efficiently in terms of what is best for the country. I fully realize that the proposal for a six-year term for the President is not without risk or reasons for doubt, and certainly there are pertinent questions to be considered with respect to any new limitations placed upon that office. But we have already accepted a time limitation with the passage of the 22nd amendment, and arguments against creating a “lame duck" Presidency lose much of their validity when we realize that a President is already a "lame duck" for his entire second term of four years.

Mr. Chairman, the six-year term is no panacea, for there are none. However, after reflecting on the matter at length I am satisfied that, on balance, it has much to recommend it.

STATEMENT ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 77, U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

(Thomas E. Cronin, Research Political Scientist, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.)

I thank Senator Birch Bayh for the opportunity to submit a brief statement on Senate Joint Resolution 77. Prior commitments made it impossible for me to accept your cordial invitation to appear as a witness at your hearings in late October. Your committee has rendered outstanding public service in the past few years and I am sure this series of hearings will clarify many of the misunderstandings about limiting presidential reelections.

Your hearings have already gathered a variety of supporting and dissenting opinions toward Senate Joint Resolution 77. Several of the hearing statements have come to my attention, and I agree with the trenchant views expressed by Clark Clifford and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. In short, the presidency is a highly political office and it cannot be otherwise; its political character is for the most part desirable. Efforts to remove it from politics are naive and potentially harmful: an apolitical presidency, uninterested in reelection, and aloof from concerns of our great political parties would probably be a highly irresponsible presidency. The present system has generally served us well. The American people usually reelect presidents who serve wisely and, in one way or another, extricate those presidents who have not risen to the challenges and tests of the office.

Your hearings come at an important time, because we are now undergoing, particularly among young Americans, an escalating crisis of confidence in the institutions of national leadership. People are beginning to be more skeptical about their previously learned textbook expectations toward the American Presidency. More and more people, or so it seems to me, question the capacity of the presidency to govern in the public interest, to live up to presidential campaign rhetoric, and to fulfill the trust which the American people have usually accorded this highest office in the nation.

Simultaneously, there appears to be a considerable chorus of observers and participants contending that the American Presidency is just too big a job for

any one person. The most recent graduate of the Presidency, Lyndon Johnson, has recently argued that it is too big a job for anyone to hold for more than one term (one six year term), thus making him a distinguished advocate of Senate Joint Resolution 77, along with Senators Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and George Aiken (R-Vt.). Johnson's views are placed within the context of proposals for modernizing the machinery of government, and making the federal government more responsive to the people:

One way would be to extend the term of the Presidency from four to six years and make the incumbent ineligible for reelection. This stipulation almost became a provision of our Constitution when it was originally written. The case for it is even stronger in modern times. The growing burdens of the office exact an enormous physical toll on the man himself and place incredible demands on his time. Under these circumstances the old belief that a President can carry out the responsibilities of the office and at the same time undergo the rigors of campaigning is, in my opinion, no longer valid.-Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 1971, p. 344.

Johnson's former White House aide, Joseph A. Califano, develops the argument in his testimony before you that our contemporary presidents, from the day they assume office, are racing against an almost impossible time schedule. He points out that because national budgets are made a year and a half in advance, a newly elected president cannot reorder national priorities by significantly shifting the expenditure of federal resources in a single four-year term. Califano then cites examples of projects that take at least four years to formulate, pass, and implement. The problem, as he sees it, is that major policy change takes time; we expect our president to engineer major changes, hence the four year time limit is inappropriate.

Though important national policy change is seldom swift in the making, and almost always complicated in application, it does not necessarily follow that a six-year term is an appropriate remedy. On many occasions, the policy changes which have frustrated the White House have come slowly, or not at all, because the programmatic changes have been highly controversial and a viable coalition of support has not yet been put together. Mobilization of support for important policy reform is just as much a presidential responsibility as proclaiming the need for policy reform.

Often, too, the proposed changes have not been adequately planned and tested. In the case of the Johnson Administration it is now well known that too many policies were pronounced prematurely; sometimes policy was "made" by press release; and the Administration acted as though the culmination of the policymaking process takes place at the bill-signing ceremonies. The Johnson Administration was often frustrated in its attempt to implement sweeping domestic policy changes precisely because too much emphasis was placed on "getting the laws on the books" to the neglect of developing the managerial and bureaucratic organization necessary for the implementation of these laws.

A White House too much beguiled with a boxscore orientation or with an unquenchable thirst for quick symbolic political credit will probably always want more and more time. Translating symbolic or paper victories into accomplishments will always be frustrating. But knowing what the nation can do, and cannot do, remains an essential requisite for effective national leadership; and that type of sensitivity need not in the least diminish a leader's commitments to educational and moral leadership.

One of the most important and frustrating tasks of modern presidents is to gain control, or at least establish influence, over the vast federal executive departments. Few recent presidents have made substantial impact on the existing bureaucracies; most presidents don't have confidence in the bureaucracy. They resist it, and in turn, beget resistance; and with some regularity presidents go around it by assigning their prized priorities to specially established agencies of their own creation. It has to be recognized that presidents are first and foremost national security managers and foreign policy overseers. These tasks cannot be delegated; they are presidential in character and in practice. It is not now uncommon for our presidents to spend as much as 60 percent of their time on foreign affairs responsibilities. The next largest portion of their time is spent on economic policy issues. It is impossible for a president to hide from the highly visible quantitatively hard economic indicators: when the stock market drops, when unemployment rates rise sharply, or when the cost of living index soars. Americans now expect the White House to cope with economic distress, to offer

workable economic game plans and, however unfairly, to tune the economy in such a way that the results are acceptable and positive for everyone.

Beyond foreign policy and economic issues, we also want our presidents to serve as teachers, as moral leaders, and occasionally as folk heroes-as symbolic leaders-summoning us as a society to higher achievements. What time remains for thoughtful formation and implementation of presidential domestic policies? Very little. Domestic policy leadership has become the orphan of contemporary presidential attention. Apart from domestic emergencies (major strikes, riots, natural disasters) the work of domestic policy is delegated among relevant cabinet and Executive Office lieutenants.

But there is little reason to believe that a 6 year term would alter the apparent fact that modern presidents have preciously little time remaining in their schedules for detailed participation in domestic policy developments. With rare exception in the twentieth century, presidents become increasingly preoccupied and burdened down with foreign policy responsibilities in the latter part of their terms, whether these be of three, four, five years or longer. Moreover, the percentage of time made available by a six year term would still be small proportionate to the domestic policy demands which obviously will not remain static over the additional two year period. And in this sense, Senate Joint Resolution 77 would be a poor substitute for the type of improvements that are needed. There are many other ways for the Congress and for the public to improve the way national policy is developed and administered and these are clearly preferable to constitutional restrictions. Among these are a more assertive Congress and a more articulate and responsive opposition party. As for needed improvements in the Executive Branch, better means of and more attention to personnel recruitment must head the list. Precisely because presidents have so little time to give to the conduct and administration of domestic policy it becomes all the more vital that a more imaginative job be done to match talented men possessed of policy vision and organizational skills with strategic executive department positions. More systematic attention might also be invested in better policy planning, and improved policy communication and evaluation systems. A president elected to a six year term with reelection forbidden is a president who will find the bureaucracy even less responsive to his staff and cabinet aides than is presently the case. When it is known that a chief executive is to leave by a date certain bureau level officials can engage in occasional delays amounting to outright resistance on policies they don't like. Reeligibility is, whether used or not, always an additional resource in the hands of a president. Senate Joint Resolution 77 would deny this resource to presidents, making them still more dependent on the permanent government than is already the case. For the same reason, the 22nd Amendment will in all likelihood diminish the leadership capabilities of future presidents who choose to be activist policy initiators.

One may sympathize with President Johnson's predicament in 1968-when he was losing popularity, when the American public was disillusioned with his war policies, and when domestic programs were running into a myriad of implementation difficulties. Many of the domestic policy efforts of the Johnson Administration had become controversial, many were underfunded or not funded at all, and those which received funding often suffered on the shoals of a Vietnam generated inflation or on intergovernmental obstacles which had not been appreciated or anticipated by the otherwise good intentioned White House policy architects. But one cannot casually assume that much would have been different if there had been a six year instead of a four year term then in operation. Would two more years of that presidential term, two years in which the president was a certain "lame duck," have demonstrated "Johnson's" policies could stand on their merits, or that the presidential performance warranted extension in the form of electing his party's successor, or holding the next president to continue his programs? Would the "model cities" strategy have been any more effective? Would federal aid to education have had any more impact? Would the welfare system, the environment or job retraining programs been subject to any more intensified presidential reform and management?

In the end we were left with a Johnson Administration domestic policy performance that was simultaneously impressive and yet often ineffective. Much was begun and much became undermined.

Though there are numerous lessons to be learned from the fascinating and complex Johnson Administration experience, I fail to see the plausibility that a six year term with reelection forbidden is among them. A 6 year term might