The Twenty-Second Amendment is a mixture of political motivations, partisan and personal. It was a posthumous revenge against Franklin Roosevelt for breaking the two-term tradition. It was a desperate attempt to push back the rushing flood of executive authority. It was a psychological release for legislators who find joy in curbing the executive. And to the career politician it was an assurance that the foremost prize of American politics would be available at regular intervals.

The amendment also instills certain weaknesses into the office of the Presidency, however. It can gravely weaken the President's influence during the entire span of his second, and final, term. In 1957, the first year of Eisenhower's second term, the President was hampered by a noticeable weakening of his grip on Republican legislators and a softening of his hitherto staunch support from the press and business. Yet Eisenhower had been returned to power only a year earlier with a fresh and overwhelming mandate. Even worse is the amendment's potential mischief in a foreign affairs crisis. The nation could conceivably be deep in war, or on the brink of it, when the tenure of its chief executive was suddenly cut off. The amendment would require the nation to violate that wise old adage warning against changing horses in midstream. The electorate would be wrenched into choosing new leadership at a time when national unity was imperative, deprived of a chief executive whose experience and knowledge of the ongoing crisis could not be duplicated. The crisis of war kept Franklin Roosevelt in office because the electorate concluded that the continuity of leadership and policy could not be safely shattered midway without peril. Had the Twenty-Second Amendment then been in force, Roosevelt would automatically have been disbarred and new leadership imposed contrary to the electorate's judgment. The Twenty-Second Amendment, whatever may be said in its favor, is antidemocratic in spirit, a frustration of the will of the people out of fear that the people might choose unwisely.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER-THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP

(By Richard E. Neustadt, Columbia University)

A President's opportunity to change his reputation is not unlimited. The circumstances of this Eisenhower transformation will suggest the limits. For one thing his display of will and skill was managed from the strongest ground a President can occupy late in his final term: the ground of opposition to congressional initiatives when Congress does not bear his party's label. Upon this ground his vantage points of "powers" and of status suffered nothing from the Twentysecond Amendment. For another thing, when Eisenhower occupied that ground his setting lent his actions weight in Washington. From early 1959 production and employment indices rose rapidly; his popularity appeared to move in train. By May he spoke and acted in a setting reminiscent of 1957. Psychologically, and in most economic terms, the recession was over. Sputniks had long since become routine. Popular concern about inflation and taxation reappeared as fears of a depression vanished. Eisenhower's legislative program had seemed laughable to congressmen in 1958; it was no laughing matter in 1959. The congressional elections of 1958 had produced heavy Democratic majorities, but with the economic upturn these majorities were as susceptible to pressures for economy as Democrats had been in 1957. Besides, throughout the spring of 1959 a threat of Soviet action in Berlin warned Washingtonians that they might have to rally around the White House on short notice. Eisenhower's critics grew relatively quiet as the year advanced. His new look was the product, partly, of the quietude around him. It left him free to stand on the offensive and it limited awareness of the flaws in his performance. A President can change the way he looks, but first he has to find some actions suited to the purpose, and then he has to hope that other men respect the change. His action does not dictate their reaction. His situation and their own, as they interpret both, decide what they will think of his new look. These are the limits on his opportunity.

Granting the limits, acknowledging the risks, how does a President exploit his opportunity? How does he make the most he can of his own reputation? The answer returns us to his choices. His general reputation will be shaped by signs of pattern in the things he says and does. These are the words and actions he has chosen, day by day. His choices are the means by which he does what he can do to build his reputation as he wants it. Decisions are his building-blocks. He has no others in his hands. The point we reached in Chapter 3 we reach again.

The President of the United States can rarely make a choice with nothing more in mind than his professional reputation. Franklin Roosevelt sometimes asked his aides for "something I can veto" as a lesson and a reminder to congressmen. But chances for decision in these terms alone will not come often to a President. Most choices will involve him also in the institutional imperatives of being President, in the extensive duties of his clerkship. Through the first half of 1957 Eisenhower's troubles turned upon the fact that whatever he might want to be or seem, he could not escape authorship and advocacy of a budget. Both were required of the President-as-clerk in order that congressional and agency officials could carry on their jobs. Moreover, many choices will involve the President's own sense of right and wrong. Eisenhower, as we have seen, argued for economy amidst the outcry over sputniks and recession; Truman stuck to advocacy of his Fair Deal measures in the hardest months of the Korean War. Besides, each choice involves not only general reputation but particular relationships.

The two considerations often clash. Although a President lacks other means to guard the way he looks, his choice-making involves him in competing considerations. The choice that started Eisenhower's reputation toward its downward slide in 1957 was his personal approval of a Treasury press conference on Budget Day. The grounds for that approval illustrate the competitions in a presidential choice. The story of that choice is told in Chapter 6.

At the start of this discussion of professional reputation I postponed consideration of choice-making. Now let me postpone it once again. The men who judge a President in Washington watch more than his performance and their neighbor's reaction. They also keep an eye upon reactions from his audience outside their own community; they watch the way he looks to that residual cross-section of constituents, his public at large. His power stakes are not confined to his relationships and reputation inside Washington; his influence depends, as well, on his apparent popular prestige. This factor in his influence remains to be explored.

STATEMENT OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON, IN THE VANTAGE POINT, PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY (1971), p. 344 RELATING TO THE 6-YEAR TERM OF THE PRESIDENT "The same overlapping is true of the federal government, and there are many ways in which the federal machinery could and should be strengthened. One way would be to extend the term of the Presidency from four years to six years and make the incumbent ineligible for reelection. This stipulation almost became a provision of our constitution when it was originally written. The case for it is even stronger in modern times. The growing burdens of the office exact an enormous physical toll on the man himself and place incredible demands on his time. Under these circumstances the old belief that a President can carry out the responsibilities of the office and at the same time undergo the rigors of campaigning is, in my opinion, no longer valid."

(Interview with former President Lyndon B. Johnson concerning presidential power and the 6-year term :)

CBS NEWS SPECIAL

(LBJ: "Lyndon Johnson Talks Politics" as broadcast over the CBS Television Network, Thursday, January 27, 1972)

Reporter: Walter Cronkite.

Producer: John Sharnik.

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS

Executive Producer: Burton Benjamin.

All copyright and right of copyright in this transcript and in the broadcast are owned by CBS. This transcript may not be copied or reproduced or used in any way (other than for purposes of reference, discussion and review) without the written permission of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

CRONKITE. The campaigns of Lyndon Johnson, as recalled in an exhibit at the library that bears his name. Politics has been his life-story—a biography written in campaign issues . . . from the New Deal to the Great Society, from

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the war against Hitler to the war in Vietnam. Its illustrations are the trophies of three decades of elections-to the Congress, the Senate, the White House. Now, in retirement from politics, Lyndon Johnson anticipates the campaign of '72.

LBJ: The people have an idea, I think, that a man who gets to be President is just interested in himself and just wants to advance his own political fortunes, and just interested in getting re-elected. Well I wouldn't say that all of us are not interested in getting re-elected. Self-preservation is the first law of nature. But I don't believe a man that I've known that wouldn't have given up his reelection rather than do something that he thinks is wrong.

And election year we'll all have a knock-down, drag-out, and everybody will get up and stand for what he believes in and what his party and everything else. But 1 hope that we don't have to become more divisive and we don't have to get personal and we don't have to question men's motives and their patriotism in doing so.

ANNOUNCER. This is the fourth in a series of special broadcasts in which former President Lyndon Baines Johnson discusses the events and issues of his career with Walter Cronkite. It was edited by CBS NEWS from two hours of filmed conversation. This portion is sponsored by

CRONKITE. (The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, on the University of Texas campus in Austin, houses the official archives of the thirty-sixth Presidency of the United States. It also contains a working office for the ex-President, who frequently drives in, or flies in, from his ranch about 65 miles away. the ranch where he has lived since his retirement from the White House in 1969.

...

On the eve of this Presidential election year, Mr. Johnson discussed the art, science and business of politics, as he has observed it and practised it since his early twenties . . as a Texas Congressman's aide, a New Deal administrator; in the Congress, the Vice-Presidency, and as President. As we talked in a large reception room adjoining his office, I asked him about an issue now facing candidates and taxpayers alike—the high cost of running for office.

LBJ. I think it's one of the most serious problems we have. I think every candidate for public office is beholden to groups and people with means. And they may feel that they're not going to be influenced by the necessity of getting campaign funds, but they are one way or the other, consciously or subconsciously, sometimes both.

CRONKITE. Has the problem of raising money ever affected your decision of how you conduct a campaign or whether you'd run or not?

LBJ. Sure, sure, it played a part in practically every campaign that I've ever run. I don't guess it did much in '64 because I was President and it was not an expensive campaign for me and we had adequate funds. But in my first race for Congress I had to borrow ten thousand dollars from my wife. I didn't have near enough money then. I'd have to borrow ten times that much now if I ran for Congress in the same district.

CRONKITE. To what do you ascribe your rapid rise in Congress? You were the youngest Minority Leader in the Senate. You did it faster-in your first termthan anybody had ever done it before.

LBJ. I don't know it was very rapid, Walter; I was there a long time. I was in the House of Representatives twelve years, and I didn't rise to any eminence in the House of Representatives. I tried to be a good Congressman but I was not a national figure at all.

Mr. Rayburn was a great leader and he was from our state and they weren't going to have two or three men in the three or four leadership posts from the same state. In the Senate that was not true. And the very productive periodand a very enjoyable period-of my public life was when I was in the Senate and had some responsibilities for leadership.

CRONKITE. It takes a man a long time, doesn't it, to get into a position where he can really throw some weight around in the House of Representatives-and isn't that bad? Shouldn't the young man with bright ideas coming up from Texas or wherever, be able really to move?

LBJ. It does take a long time for him to start at the bottom of the line and get to be the chairman of the committee, where the real power lies. And I'd like to see something done that would give a younger member of the House more rapid advancement, and I think that some steps have been made in the right direction by the Reorganization Act in creating a number of sub-committees. And now a young man can become a chairman of a sub-committee in a reasonable length of time, if he specializes and is equipped to handle the responsibilities and

take some leadership. That was not true so much when I served there because we didn't have any sub-committees.

CRONKITE. Well now, when you got there you must have said, "Sam Rayburn, how do I move ahead here? I've got some things I want to do." What was his advice? Because he was a great believer in the seniority system at that time, wasn't he?

LBJ. Yes, I asked President Roosevelt to help me get on a committee I wanted to get on. Mr. Rayburn told me to attend the committee sessions regularly, try to learn all I could about every bill that committee handled, and always be there and be dependable. And I did that. But I didn't influence much legislation except by my individual vote. On one occasion when I sought to influence some legislation, I remember my chairman banged the gavel on me and said, "We're going to have to report this bill; we don't have any time to go into any more questions," and just in effect Chairman Carl Vinson of Georgia just said, "Pipe down there; quit irritating me with your questions." And I had-was restless and impatient and I spoke up rather heatedly and I said, "I've been on this committee four years, and you haven't let me ask a half a dozen questions, and I've got at least two questions I'm going to ask, and I want you to give me that privilege before we report this bill. Chairman Vinson listened, somewhat irritated by what I said, but a very wise man, and he saw the confrontation that was occurring, and he said, "All right, go ahead, Lyndon. You say you want two questions. Ask two, but not any more."

Everyone in the room laughed, and I asked my two questions and got the item in the bill that I wanted. He took a vote on it and that put it in the bill and that ended it. But a great many freshmen are frustrated by experiences of that kind, having to sit and wait their turn. That has somewhat been remedied, but not completely at all. Very few of us are willing to say, "I want to yield to some man that can do it better than I can," and so on and so forth. I felt that way when I left the Presidency. I didn't feel that because of my age, but because of the situation in the country at that time, that I thought a new face-whoever that face might be-would have a better chance of doing the thing that I wanted the nation to do than I could, because I had become quite controversial and identified and a symbol.

CRONKITE. Let me ask you about some other people in the Senate with whom you've served. I wonder what the particular kind of form or basis of their power was. Robert Taft, for instance.

LBJ. I had a high opinion of Senator Taft. I never really felt that the American people had the true appreciation of Senator Taft that he deserved. A lot of them thought he was a cold, hard, tough, reactionary, conservative Republican. And he was a prudent man. But the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Bill was one of the most advanced measures ever to be introduced in our Congress.

When the Congress met after the Eisenhower landslide over Stevenson, I was elected leader of the Democrats, and I had to pick up the broken pieces of the Party. He was elected leader of the Republicans. And he had a problem with committee assignments, and he decided that he was going to take some committee assignments away from the Democrats that we were entitled to. So we debated it for a day or two, and then he said, "Well, let's resolve it by going before the committee and explaining it to the Rules Committee." We went before the Rules Committee, and I made my speech and he made his. And we retired and the committee voted unanimously for Taft. Well that was a blow for me: I launched my great leadership by losing thirteen to nothing. Couldn't even get a Democrat to support my viewpoint. Well, President Eisenhower wanted his Cabinet confirmed the day that he took the oath, and to do that we had to agree to some unusual Senate procedures and I decided I wouldn't agree to them, that I wasn't elected to liquidate the Democratic Party in the Senate.

So every time Taft would make his move, I'd object, and I became as obstinate the first few days of the session as Taft was reputed to be. And so the Senate was tied in a knot. And finally Senator Clements, a great Senator from Kentucky-he was the Democratic Whip-worked out a compromise plan where Taft could still exercise control of the important committees, but on one or two of the minor committees the Democrats could have the majority. And it resulted in saving face for me and saving face for him, and we brought about an understanding.

CRONKITE. What about Richard Russell?

LBJ. I thought he was the giant of the Senate, the most influential man in it, the most respected man in it, the most experienced and perhaps the best qualified

Senator. He rarely spoke in the Senate; but when he spoke he was always listened to, and he was very, very generous and understanding of me and all my weaknesses. And I never had a parliamentary fight that I didn't hope Senator Russell was on my side. Of course he was, in a good many of them, but some of the measures I advanced were just too strong for Senator Russell and he just didn't feel that was good for the country, and he couldn't support me, and when he couldn't he told me so, and I always knew when he wasn't supporting me because I felt it.

CRONKITE. Well, when that happens, is anything lost in your personal relationship with the man, or does sometimes it happen that it is lost, that there are some people who take parliamentary defeat harder than others?

LBJ. Yes, yes, I think you never have a man oppose you and oppose you effectively or oppose you as Senator Russell opposed you without your feeling it and without it wounding you and hurting you and perhaps wounding him. Strong men when they differ, they feel it. And I remember I told, I believe it was Senator Javits of New York, that I would bring up the Civil Rights Bill on a certain day and he could take my word for it. That was the end of one session, and I told him I'd bring it up in the next session at a certain time. As that day approached I told Senator Russell that this was going to be the twelfth of the month or whatever the day was, and he was rather cool, aloof, and said, "Yes I understand that you let them jockey you into that position. I understand." And a little later I was looking for some help. I reminded him again, hoping he wouldn't hit me too hard, and really fearful of how he could handle me because he was so experienced and so able. And he said, "Yes I know that. Go ahead, do whatever your judgement tells you that's your business, your responsibility, I'm not the leader.

So at the appointed day and the appointed hour, I got up and made a motion that we proceed to consideration of the Civil Rights Bill. And as soon as I sat down, Senator Russell addressed the chair and got recognition and said, “You have just heard a motion that I thought would never be made in this Senate by the leader of my party. He said, "This motion, if adopted, will result in legislative lynching." Every headline in America that afternoon-he just took off there, he rose as he went along; he spoke for an hour or so-"Russell Charges Johnson With Legislative Lynching." And lynching was a very ugly, nasty word, and particularly in certain parts of the country. Well, we fought for weeks and weeks and weeks and finally passed the first Civil Rights Bill, but not with Senator Russell's vote and not with his support, and not without what you say, Walter, both of us feeling it.

CRONKITE. What kind of a Senator was Kennedy-Senator Jack Kennedy? LBJ. A cooperative one. He specialized. Most of his work was in the Labor field. He sat on the investigating committee that his brother was a counsel for. He worked in the field of foreign relations. He was respected. He was liked. I'm not sure that he would have made the Senate a lifelong career. I really don't know whether he liked the Senate as much as most of the members did or not. He worked with the leadership and was very helpful. I remember when I was elected Leader he had not committed himself and I-at that time it looked like maybe someone would oppose me and I hadn't heard from his, and he'd been elected to the Senate, and I wondered what was going to happen. And I got word one day that he said he'd be down in two or three days to see me. So I said, "fine." But that very afternoon he called me and he said, "I understand that this thing is going to be decided before I ever get down there, and I just want to pledge you my support, whoever runs against you and pledge you my cooperation as Leader." And I don't think that story's been told many times, but people are too busy writing about the differences between the Kennedys and the Johnsons to point up those things.

CRONKITE. Lyndon Johnson dates his emergence as a national figure with his rise to party leadership in the Senate, that place of great tradition and strong fraternal ties. I asked him if Senators ever managed to achieve great prominence without being members of the so-called "club."

LBJ. Oh yes, yes. Hiram Johnson. Borah. George Norris. Huey Long. Some of the more outstanding public figures of our time have been rugged individualists that wore no man's collar and made a specialty of their own individualism. And the Club is something that is greatly overrated. I think a man's judgment is no better than his information. And once you're Senator and you understand what the Senate is all about, what it can do and what it can't do and what it should do and what it shouldn't, you're more understanding. And yet some of them don't want to be a member of the Club, they thrive on martyrdom and they