cerned because I think that cooperation is necessarily one of the basic arguments against limiting a President to one 6-year term-my concern is that this will diminish his ability to influence the Congress to follow his leadership.

Now, let me offer a hypothetical case in which one of you gentlemen is seated in the White House and the other is in a position of leadership in the Congress and the one who is in the White House wants to get certain action out of the other one who is a leader in the Congress. What are the ingredients of that power?

Let me go back to the suggestions I mentioned a moment ago, is it the fact that the President is going to be reelected that popular, that he can be a political asset to the Congressman or the Senator, that there is patronage or spoils involved that can entice that individual to follow his leadership?

You hear so much about arm twisting. I must say, perhaps I am so junior in the packing order around here that my influence isn't sought very much by the White House. My arm has never even been pinched, let alone twisted.

So. I don't know if you are here long enough if you get that kind of calisthenics or not, but I would like to have for the record your opinions, opinions of how a President really does exercise influence on a Congressman, Senator, or the body generally.

Senator AIKEN. Temporarily at least, the power comes from making a favorable impression on public opinion.

Every President and every Member of Congress wants to make a good record, I am sure of that. Presidents particularly want to because they are often jealous of the other branch.

The President makes recommendations which he thinks are good for the country and he hopes the public will respond favorably and if they respond favorably, his popularity goes up. If it doesn't work out so well, his power goes down.

Now, we have many, many new proposals for various agencies of the Government that have been made in the last 3 years. In fact, there are so many of them we can hardly find time to act on them. But the public is favorably responding to some and less favorably responding to others.

So, in the long run public opinion does count.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, I want to agree with Senator Aiken and in response to your question, Mr. Chairman, there is nothing to stop a President from calling a Member of Congress down to discuss a matter with him whether he be the newest Member or the oldest chairman. There is nothing to stop a President from calling a group of the Members of the Congress down either on a party basis or on a two-party basis and that has been done by the Presidents: President Johnson and President Kennedy and President Truman.

But I think we ought to understand that we are members of a branch equal to the executive branch. I think that the biggest mistake made by Presidents in recent years, who have come from the Senate or from the Congress, has been to draw away from their old friends with whom they served for years who want to see them succeed regardless of their party and who, if called upon, would give them the best advise available and they would do so on the basis of the responsible jobs that they

hold. But what you have is the beginning of intercircles, and kitchen cabinets, and the like.

The Presidents in recent years have become more and more isolated and the people who influence the President most-I think, and I am not referring to any particular President-are those who are around him the most, those who have his ear, and those who have contact with him daily; day in and day out.

A Member of Congress doesn't have that contact. The last three Presidents served in the Congress, all of them served in the House, all of them served in the Senate and I think they would have been better off had they maintained closer contact with their friends in the Congress rather than to become isolated as they did with the passage of time.

I understand why it happens because they are down there at 1600Pennsylvania Avenue and they are entering into a new and greater responsibility, they have an awe-inspiring position. They have to create new advisers and they depend on people like the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of course, they used to depend more on the Cabinet but not so much any more as far as the recent Presidents are concerned. They depend on the individual advisers. They are stationed in the White House and were stationed there under the last three Presidents. Their staffs have increased until they have a tremendous influence but they are responsible to no one but the President.

So as far as the Members of Congress are concerned, the old friends whom the President knew and has known for many years and who could give him honest, unbiased, advice, they wouldn't be afraid to say "No." they seem to fall by the wayside and the result I think is that the Presidents on occasion have made mistakes which could well have been avoided.

Senator Cook. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one more question.

Senator, equate that to the resolution and tell me, with the passage of this resolution why you think that that theory need no change at all but will continue?

Senator MANSFIELD. I don't get the point of your question.

Senator Cook. The point of my question is are you saying by passage of Senate Joint Resolution 77 into a constitutional amendment that the complaint we have just heard very well and put very well is going to change or is it conceivable it could continue in the same vein?

Senator MANSFIELD. It could continue in the same vein. The question asked by the chairman was not, I don't think, in relation to the resolution and the answer was not given on that basis either. But it was just an opportunity to expound a bit of personal philosophy of what I have observed down through the years and to express a position which I think could have been beneficial to the last three Presidents, including the present one, because of the type of advice he would have gotten and the fact that it would have been given freely and honestly and openly with no strings attached.

After all, the President does lose contact with the people, but the Members of Congress in the Senate and the House cannot afford to lose that contact and because of that, we are closer than he is. Regardless of who the President is, we want to see him become a good

President because if he does well, we will all benefit. If he is a poor President, we will all pay part of the price.

Senator Cook. My only point, Senator, in all fairness was an attempt to equate it to the subject matter of Senate Joint Resolution 77 and it really cannot be equated. Even if we had a 6-year term, the same situation could occur, the same lack of cooperation as you put it, the same failure to advise, the same failure to seek judgment could occur. This would have nothing to do with changing the basic philosophy of Presidents or the attitude that they may take when they go from the Senate or not go from the Senate into the Presidency.

Senator MANSFIELD. Not at all. It would apply just as it does now, in my personal opinion, as it would under another system with a 6-year term limitation. But the only reason I made these observations. is that I think it would have been helpful to the Presidents in the past and the present—and I am not speaking of the Senator from Montana in that respect, I am speaking of friends in his own party and the other in both Houses who have known him for more than two decades and who want to be helpful, whose advice would be sound if it would be sought and if it would be taken-because the advice they would receive would be away from the "atmospherics" and down to the realities.

Senator Cook. I couldn't agree with the Senator more. There are many people who are presently down at the White House that I wish had to seek some election so they could find out what it is like to have that particular attitude or to have that type of direct association. Thank you.

Senator BAYH. Gentlemen, you have been very kind in giving us your time and expertise. We will look forward to continuing this dialogue as we consider this resolution.

Thank you very much.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you.

Senator BAYH. I have been advised that the committee staff forgot to do the proper weather advance and thus Mr. Hagerty is fogged in in New York City or out of Washington as the case may be and we are still trying to see whether it is possible for him to be here later or whether he will come tomorrow.

Inasmuch as he is not here, our next witness is Mr. Clark Clifford, who has been an adviser to several Presidents and former adviser to President Truman and I am sure had significant impact in the Kennedy administration. He was Secretary of Defense under President Johnson and he is now one of the prestigious members of the bar in Washington as he has been in the past.

Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your taking the time to let us have the benefit of your opinion on the subject before us.

STATEMENT OF CLARK M. CLIFFORD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF THE BAR

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must compliment the chairman upon his scheduling of the witnesses. Either by design or as a result of the fog, you have achieved most of the elements of an adversary proceeding.

I disagree on almost every point raised by the two distinguishe Senators who preceded me, and I come out with exactly the opposit conclusion.

Senator BAYH. Mr. Clifford, if I might just interrupt, I am su that our distinguished witness knows that dichotomy or differen of opinion is not necessarily one that is confined to the differences b tween the executive and legislative branch. Sometimes that different of opinion exists on our side, too.

Excuse me. Go right ahead.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate yo gracious invitation to appear before this committee to present 1 views on Senate Joint Resolution No. 77, the proposed constitution amendment providing for a single 6-year presidential term. In t most direct sense, constitutional limits on a President's tenure in of affect both the character and the power of the Presidency and t are of pivotal importance to our entire system of government.

Let me state at the outset that the current controversy center around the warmaking power and the respective responsibilities the Executive and the Congress in committing our military for should have nothing to do with the issue of constitutional change our form of government. I continue to favor a strong and vital pr dency just as I favor a strong and effective Congress and a strong independent judiciary. Those who created our Constitution wis provided for a separation of powers as among the three branches government but with equal wisdom they sought to insure and prot the power of each branch, including the presidency. It is, I beli the special obligation of the Congress and of an informed public preserve the basic constitutional structure that has served us T since 1787.

The need for a strong presidency can, in my opinion, be cles documented from our history. The men who have been able to m our country forward, to hold it together in the face of the most crit social, economic, and international crises have been strong, act and innovative. They have been men who know how to stretch resources of the presidency in seeking to bring about social cha and reform. They have been men who enjoyed both political ba and the responsibilities of party leadership. They have embodies their persons and in their time the visions and the hopes of the A. can people.

We should not, of course, consider the provisions of the Cons tion with respect to the election and tenure of our governing offi as sacrosanct and beyond review. Not even the original clauses ro ing to the election of U.S. Senators have been treated as immut: The 17th amendment revised them drastically, in the interests of popular participation in the election process. But in any reexam. tion, and even more in any revision, we should be sure that any changes are in the interests of a political system that will provide most able and the most responsive leadership.

As I see it, the work of this subcommittee, both in this present of hearings and in its review of proposed constitutional changes the past few years, is work of cardinal importance and work that

been done with imagination and responsibility. I was therefore pleased, but not surprised, at the chairman's suggestion that my testimony need not be confined to Senate Joint Resolution 77 but would also be welcome on the general subject of restrictions on presidential terms, such as that presently embodied in the 22d amendment. I therefore propose to address myself to this issue as well.

As the committee is well aware, the concept of a single presidential term with reelection precluded has attracted adherents throughout our history. Many of the participants in the Constitutional Convention strongly advocated a single term. Between 1789 and 1947, when the 22d amendment was approved by Congress, at least 270 resolutions were introduced in the Senate and the House to limit eligibility for reelection. Proponents of a fixed single term have included several of our Presidents, among whom were Jefferson, Jackson, Hayes, Cleveland, and Taft. At one time or another, men of such diverse views as William Jennings Bryan, Horace Greeley, Everett Dirksen, Emanuel Celler, and the present Majority Leader, Senator Mike Mansfield, have expressed support for a single term for Presidents. The notion was embraced in the Democratic Party Platform of 1912. It continues to enjoy substantial and distinguished support today-in the Senate, among newspaper columnists and among former White House aides. A former close adviser of President Franklin Roosevelt, Rexford Tugwell, has proposed that we elect our Presidents for a single 9-year term subject only to the ability of a President to secure a 40-percent approval rating in a referendum at the end of his 3d year.

As I understand the support for restrictions on a President's right to stand for reelection, it derives from two basic motivations. The first is the continuing apprehension that a Chief Executive may find some means to perpetuate himself in power and thus assume the role of a dictator to the destruction of our liberties. This, it seems clear, was the motivating drive and political argument that led to the passage of the 22d amendment in the aftermath of Franklin Roosevelt's election for four consecutive terms. As I will develop further, I regard this as an unfounded fear in view of the constitutional distribution of powers and the certainty that a strong Congress and an informed electorate could and would protect themselves from any Executive abuse.

The second argument is that a single presidential term without the possibility of reelection would free the President from political and partisan considerations and would enable him to devote his full energies to our vital concerns in the fields of national security, economics, and social progress and improvement in the quality of life. Senator Aiken of Vermont, which State he also served as Governor, has ob

served that:

Within months after an elected President takes office, he is under attack not only by those who never wanted him to be President in the first place but also by those who may have voted for him but find themselves neglected in the distribution of the political spoils or upset by their inability to make decisions for him which coincide with their own philosophies. . . A major purpose behind the attacks on the President is to put him in such a bad light that he cannot hope for reelection...

The contention is that a single term would discourage such harassment and free the President from the millstone of partisan politics.

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