preferable, moreover, to postpone the discussion of any single aspect of postwar international organization until this matter could be taken up in its entirety.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

IN PROJECTING the organization of the Advisory Committee, a single group had at one time been envisaged for the consideration of both political and territorial problems because of the interwoven character of such problems. The final decision, however, was for a separate Subcommittee on Territorial Problems composed of a few members who would also be members of the Political Subcommittee.

This, it was believed, would permit specially qualified members to concentrate on a detailed study of all territorial problems and thereby provide a core of sifted views and judgments for subsequent discussion in the Political Subcommittee. Such an arrangement would offer a means to test and re-test views on principal issues of policy regarding countries, which would help to make the ultimate recommendations as free from error as possible. Furthermore, considering the emotionally explosive nature of the territorial problems of countries and peoples, as the peace settlement after World War I had demonstrated and as all historical experience so amply revealed, it was thought advisable to have a thorough study of each foreseeable territorial problem made by a highly restricted body. Such a small group could be kept informed of all relevant current developments without the limitations otherwise necessary to maintain the secrecy obviously imperative in these matters during the war. Since the only assurance of military victory lay in unity and since military actions. and old or new conflicting interests in the areas concerned had to be taken into account in the subcommittee's work, even the problems studied had to be kept secret in order to avoid the risk of misunderstanding and of facilitating divisive enemy propaganda.

The original membership of the Territorial Subcommittee was constituted of Messrs. Bowman, Chairman, Armstrong, Berle, Feis, and MacMurray, and Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick, with Leo Pasvolsky member ex officio. Myron C. Taylor became a member effective August 28, 1942. Cavendish Cannon of the Division of European Affairs represented Ray Atherton in the capacity of a specially designated Departmental participant beginning late in December 1942, and at various times, in accord with the areas being considered, Messrs. Dunn (Europe), Hornbeck (Far East), and Murray (Near East) were invited to take part. Mr. Notter was the research secretary during the first five months of work, following which Philip E. Mosely, who by then had joined the research staff, carried this responsibility. Almost

from the outset, this subcommittee also required the assistance of a secretary to take notes on its discussions. This work was undertaken during the first two months also by Mr. Notter and then, in succession, by Mr. Rothwell, Paul B. Taylor, William Koren, Jr., James Frederick Green, John W. Masland, Jr., and Cyril E. Black, all of the research staff.

Since the membership of this subcommittee and those on economic and security problems overlapped, formal requests by the former to the latter were rarely made. Coordination in this regard took place rather on the working level and in the Political Subcommittee itself.

The Territorial Subcommittee met on Saturdays for the first four months, and thereafter on Friday afternoons. Aside from the original joint organizing session with other subcommittees, it held 59 meetings covering the period from March 7, 1942, to December 17, 1943, inclusive. The last eight of these were held after the suspension of the other subcommittees in the political fields of the preparation.

Because of the almost complete dependence in the territorial field of discussion upon research, the subcommittee adopted a proposal made by its Chairman and the Director to alternate its meetings with special or technical meetings devoted to research preparations. This was an effort to expedite the work of the regular meetings through a prior selection and analysis of the problems to be considered. Regular meetings were biweekly while technical meetings were being held. The technical meetings were attended by Mr. Bowman, the Director, the research secretary, and the research specialists on the problems next on the agenda of the subcommittee. When first instituted, April 18, 1942, this procedure was followed only until requests from the Political Subcommittee necessitated regular weekly meetings, starting May 23. The technical meetings were resumed briefly in the early part of September, again being suspended because of the need to dovetail the agenda of the Territorial Subcommittee with that of the Political Subcommittee. However, by March 4, 1943, with various changes in the work of the Political Subcommittee and its subsequent concentration on international organization, the Territorial Subcommittee was free to determine its own agenda, and the practice of holding technical meetings in alternate weeks became fixed. These meetings, apart from the three held in the first period and one in September for which minutes were kept, developed along informal, consultative lines, with only the basic questions selected for definite consideration by the subcommittee and the resulting research assignments recorded. In addition to these meetings, ad hoc informal conversations between the Chairman and various individual specialists occurred throughout the subcommittee's work, becoming an accepted practice after June 1942. Most of these conversations related to the presentation of experts' papers in the subcommittee and to plans for future studies.

In the earliest meetings, the subcommittee's proceedings were exploratory, and did not involve substantial participation by the attending staff specialists on the several problems. As discussion became increasingly specific thereafter and as the staff was expanded and maps and studies became available, attending specialists began to be invited to discuss the points at issue. Further development of methods ensued. Beginning July 31, 1942, discussion was inaugurated with an oral statement by a staff specialist. After September 18, the subcommittee itself undertook to identify the problems it wished studied, often defining the basic issue that had eventually to be faced. Starting December 11, meetings were opened with an introductory exposition of a policy problem, the essential background involved, the alternative solutions or courses possible in the circumstances, and an analytical evaluation of each of these solutions in as strictly objective a spirit as possible. In the subsequent discussion technical questions were put to the specialists, and as a rule their personal opinion was also requested on this or that possible solution.

Participating specialists, although mainly from the staff specially recruited for postwar policy preparation, eventually also included experts from the operating divisions of the Department. Attendance of officers dealing with political, security, economic, and social problems reflected the integration of all substantive lines of thought involved in territorial problems.12 Close and continuous relationship between research and the subcommittee's discussion thus characterized the work in this field from the outset and deepened progressively. On only one occasion, April 16, 1943, did the subcommittee members convene by themselves alone. That meeting con

"In addition to the staff specialists serving the subcommittee as named above, the additional ones who attended as problems in their fields arose were Miss Evelyn M. Acomb, Miss M. Margaret Ball, George H. Blakeslee, Hugh Borton, Ralph H. Bowen, John C. Campbell, Waldo Chamberlin, Norris B. Chipman, Shepard B. Clough, Richard Eldridge, Robert A. Fearey, Holden Furber, Leon W. Fuller, Benjamin Gerig, David Harris, Harry N. Howard, Philip W. Ireland, Grayson L. Kirk, Melvin M. Knight, C. Hawley Oakes, Thomas F. Power, Jr., George L. Ridgeway, and Andreas G. Ronhovde, Miss Julia E. Schairer, Walter R. Sharp, Leroy D. Stinebower, Robert Terrill, Amry Vandenbosch, H. Julian Wadleigh, Wilbur W. White, Jesse Van Wickel, Frank S. Williams, Bryce Wood, and William Yale.

Operating officers attending in the same manner were Charles E. Bohlen, James C. H. Bonbright, W. Percy George, L. Randolph Higgs, J. Wesley Jones, Perry Laukhuff, and Robert B. Stewart of the European Division; Maxwell M. Hamilton, Kenneth P. Landon, Joseph W. Ballantine, H. Merrell Benninghoff of the Far Eastern Division and Alger Hiss of the Office of the Political Adviser on Far Eastern Problems; Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Foy D. Kohler, Charles W. Lewis, Jr., Henry S. Villard, and Paul H. Alling of the Near Eastern Division; and Samuel W. Boggs and Otto Guthe of the Office of the Geographer.

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sidered future plans of work in the light of developments in the Political Subcommittee noted above.

Meetings were held around a table, with papers on it and maps facing it. Studies were concerned with either factual background information or analysis. The former were used for the initial stage of problem exploration on the basis of existing facts so far as they could be ascertained, while the latter papers contained alternative courses of action and were used in considering the solution of given problems. These policy problem papers developed during the autumn of 1942, and out of them, commencing in this field in February 1943, grew finally the most matured research papers used, called policy summaries or handbooks-in the territorial field, called country handbooks.13 It was only in these "handbook documents" that the views of the subcommittee were embodied, since by a decision made in the interest of security July 31, 1942, the minutes in the form weekly circulated were not permitted to state the views of the subcommittee.

·Papers written by the Chairman and other individual members were also employed occasionally as starting points for discussion. These were of a different nature, however, than the handbook documents, being appraisals and proposals concerning principles to be followed or points to be stressed in the work or conclusions of the subcommittee. The maps were of two principal kinds : reference or data maps and "application" maps. The latter type was used to illuminate specific considerations in connection with a problem and the alternative proposals for its settlement. They were also used to record graphically the various views developed at the meetings.

The scope of the fields of preparation for which the Territorial Subcommittee was responsible required it to consider almost every part of the globe. It began with the Near East and Eastern Europe and covered all the countries of Europe, Asiatic and African problem areas, colonies and mandates throughout the world, territorial settlements in the case of all enemy states, the areas of the Arctic and the Antarctic, and, especially in the autumn of 1943, the future settlement in the Far East and the Pacific. Problems that cut across countries and areas, such as those involving possible transfers of population or resettlement, also were taken up. Various problems were considered time and again as studies were matured or difficult aspects had to be reviewed. Furthermore, the march of events caused some problems to be considered out of planned order. The North African invasion, the Soviet break with the Polish Government-inexile, the situation in Italy as the American and British forces attacked, all had such effect upon the agenda.

The subcommittee's initial question was: "What do we need to

13

For examples of these three types of papers, see appendixes 16, 17, and 18. 24 For an example, see appendix 19.

know" about the problems ahead? It concluded that for each foreign country it would need factual studies and analyses of its population; the groups, movements, and leaders in the country; its resources, including the probable effects of the war on major resources and activities; and the probable character of its relations with other nations after the war. It would also need maps and charts portraying boundaries, significant historical changes in and among states, transportation routes, communications, industries, agriculture, ethnic and other groupings, religious factors, resources, and geographical strategic factors. Finally, it would need analyses of the official views on territorial questions held by all governments and of the views of groups within countries.

When the subcommittee came to the problems of dependent areas it adjusted this approach. These areas varied widely in their capacity for self-rule. Hardly a single principle was applicable to all. The required studies were first in terms of questions: What constitutes a dependent area? Which areas are dependent? What is their relative status? Which will require consideration owing to Allied victory? Which have resources needed in the economic activities of great powers and other industrial states? Which have strategic significance for general international security? What are the comparative longrange effects of the several existing and likely colonial policies? What are the relations among the metropolitan countries themselves attributable to their colonial possessions? In addition, the mandates system had to be analyzed in full, and each of the dependent areas had to be studied factually to reveal the nature, availability, and extent of exploitation and conservation of its resources, the status and potentialities of transportation including aviation, the economic development and opportunity for the local inhabitants, political institutions, the degree of direct and indirect rule and local political participation, health and sanitation conditions, and possibilities of settlement.

The subcommittee determined to have its thought prepared on all problems of possible concern up to the point where the policy choices and their consequences with respect to these problems were clear so far as the circumstances of the war permitted. It sought to avoid any attempt to provide encyclopedic studies built on the assumption that the exact nature of postwar political problems could be accurately determined. The subcommittee's endeavor to study problems in terms of alternative policy decisions, with the final choice among these alternatives left to be made in the light of conditions at the time of settlement, was a conscious departure from the practice of The Inquiry twenty-five years earlier.

The subcommittee dealt in tentatives. It felt that every major