problems. This was reflected in one of the general contributions expected from this special subcommittee when it was created, namely that it would be able to further the work of the other subcommittees toward determining whether a regional approach might have sufficient merit to fall back upon in the event the plan for United States entrance into a universal international organization failed of fruition. The new group was formed practically on an ad hoc basis. It had the status of a subcommittee of the Political Subcommittee in order to give it the central position necessary for study of problems that touched upon all aspects of the Advisory Committee's inquiries. Its first meeting was held on June 4, 1943. Its sixteenth and last meeting was held March 31, 1944. The Subcommittee's membership of eleven was drawn largely from the membership of other subcommittees, thus providing an integrated body for the study of one set of questions faced in common by all. Its nine members who served on other subcommittees were Messrs. Armstrong, Atherton (represented after the first meeting by Cannon), Berle, Bowman, Cohen, Feis, Hawkins, Myron C. Taylor, and Pasvolsky ex officio. The remaining members, Percy W. Bidwell and Jacob Viner, were drawn from outside the subcommittee structure for reasons of special technical competence. The participation of the research staff in the work of this subcommittee was especially active since it was never possible for more than a small number of the subcommittee members to attend meetings. Ralph H. Bowen from the economic side of the staff was secretary. The continuing nucleus of participating staff members was headed by Messrs. Stinebower and Melvin M. Knight for the economic field and Messrs. Mosely and Harris for the field of political territorial problems, and included particularly Homer P. Balabanis, Shepard B. Clough, Vernon L. Phelps, and Alexander M. Rosenson in the former field and Cyril E. Black, John C. Campbell, Harry N. Howard, and Amry Vandenbosch in the latter.32 Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Carl F. Norden of the Foreign Service, and William C. Trimble of the Division of Exports and Requirements, also attended on occasion. The subcommittee confined its considerations to Europe west of the Soviet Union. It began with an examination of over-all European organization, specifically the political and economic functions that could be performed by such a continental structure. While past ex 33 'In addition, a considerable number of the staff took part in individual meetings, especially Miss Elizabeth Armstrong and Donald C. Blaisdell, Waldo Chamberlin, Eugene Chase, Norris B. Chipman, Clyde Eagleton, Richard Eldridge, William Fowler, Merrill C. Gay, Benjamin Gerig, Grayson Kirk, William Koren, Jr., Harley Notter, Durward V. Sandifer, Smith Simpson, Howard Trivers, Harold C. Vedeler, and Arthur P. Whitaker. perience was drawn upon, reliance was mainly upon new analysis. Discussion was largely in terms of questions, such, for example, as "what aspects of European economic life could benefit from closer collaboration among European countries?" In discussing the over-all type of European organization, various well-known suggestions of the past were studied, and German plans for the unification of Europe so far as ascertainable were examined. Among the possibilities considered, for illustration, was a full European customs union, which was examined to determine whether it would necessarily be either advantageous or detrimental to the long-run interests of the United States, depending on economic developments within its scope and the type of external commercial policy pursued by such a union. When considering the achievement of closer economic and political collaboration in Europe under a continental regional organization, an effort was made to ascertain from a security standpoint the potentialities of such collaboration toward peace or war depending upon the terms of organization, the type of policy pursued, and the degree of independence that such organization left the participating member states. Unification of technical services such as transport and communications among European countries so far as the countries directly affected deemed feasible was another possibility explored. Such questions as the possible domination by any one country of a regional structure, the relationship between the continental organization and the great powers after the war, and the dependence of Europe on external economic relations were given much attention. Subsequently, bilateral or other smaller regional groupings were taken up, including the possibilities, whether likely or unlikely, of Balkan federation, federation of the Low Countries, and other political and economic associations. The functioning of multinational states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was examined in connection with the foreseeable problems involved in such neighborhood groupings. The subcommittee also appraised possible Soviet programs and attitudes with respect to Eastern Europe so far as they were then known or could be conjectured. The subcommittee made no report at the time of its adjournment. Its thought had largely been introduced by its individual members and the staff into the other meetings they were attending and into the staff papers, which remained available for use as policy needs arose. This subcommittee was the last subcommittee directly a part of the Advisory Committee structure. It operated almost wholly in the period of transition from this structure to the new Governmental and Departmental machinery by which final decisions were made and operations undertaken. The developments in this regard will be found in Part III. T CHAPTER VI The Research Staff HE WORK and structure of the Advisory Committee and its subcommittees were interwoven with the work and structure of the research staff. All the Committee's discussion was intended to rest, and in large measure did rest, upon policy studies of postwar problems by a staff of specially qualified experts. The staff was engaged solely in research and policy studies. The scope and character of the preparation developed by the Committee accordingly not only extended the Committee's original structure in the ways described above but likewise affected the composition, organization, and work of the research staff. THE INITIAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, 1941-1942 THE DIVISION Of Special Research continued to be the research staff for the Advisory Committee during 1942.1 Throughout the first round of the policy-level discussions, therefore, the research staff functioned within the framework originally projected for it, accommodating itself to the Committee's requirements without major reorganization for approximately a year. As the research staff, the first responsibility of this Division was to analyze and appraise developments and conditions arising out of the war and requiring special study for the formulation of policy and to prepare the studies found to be necessary for discussion of postwar problems. This was in essence a duty to anticipate study needs and to initiate policy suggestions to superiors regarding postwar matters. It was this function that had dominated the work prior to the establishment of the Advisory Committee and that was continuously the prime function thereafter. The earliest studies of the Division were mainly confined to such analyses of international developments and their long-range implications and to exploratory studies of the problems that might arise immediately after the war and at longer range in bringing about 1 See appendix 22. conditions of political stability, sound international economic relations, and enduring peace. The purpose was to obtain as complete a picture as feasible of the conditions that would have to be faced at the time of postwar reconstruction and to state the questions and present the considerations that would have to be taken into account in making policy decisions and in formulating a program of international action. Each question was canvassed from the viewpoint of objectives, of alternative types of machinery or processes appropriate to the attainment of the objective desired, of alternative methods of creating such international machinery as would be needed, of past and current experience, and of the effects of any given policy decision upon related matters. In anticipation of the convening of the Advisory Committee, a study, which stemmed from the earlier analysis of official views on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, was begun early in 1942 of all public and confidentially expressed official commitments and views concerning the postwar settlement as expressed by the Allied and neutral governments from the outbreak of the war in Europe. The purpose of the study was to show the aspects of postwar settlement thus affected so far as discernible in the reports accessible in Washington. The study of "official commitments" thus begun was maintained on a current basis at all times and was used henceforth in all other research, committee discussions, and international negotiations stemming from the Department's preparatory work. The intent of such study was not unlike that expressed by President Wilson in regard to The Inquiry when on September 2, 1917, he requested Colonel House to "prepare our case with a full knowledge of the position of all the litigants." As an adjunct to the political memoranda series and the economic memoranda series, into which the research was divided for purposes of orderly presentation and filing, the necessary map construction was carried on simultaneously through the Office of the Geographer. Special maps adapted to policy discussions began to be available in the spring of 1942, although on a critically scant basis. Recruitment of added cartographic staff and the essential research for map construction required time and new arrangements, as in the case of the policy research itself. The pressing proposals of the policy research staff for maps and charts, needed in connection with the new types of postwar policy studies being developed, stimulated a cooperative interdepartmental program and also required various contractual relations with the American Geographic Society and some commercial cartographic companies. The result was that, after the summer of 1942, the map program, which had greatly matured under the direction and advice of the Territorial Subcommittee as noted above, was increasingly able to satisfy the needs of the Advisory Committee. The fund of research studies made before February 1942 was swiftly exhausted after the Advisory Committee met, and new requirements immediately began to pile up. The necessary studies therefore had to be prepared on a basis of day and night work—a condition which unfortunately prevailed, though to a lessening degree, throughout the war, since qualified experts and assistants could never be recruited fast enough to meet the need. These early preparations resulted in the determination of basic methods of study which, while they increased the exactions on the professional staff, at least enhanced the direct usability of the resulting papers. The question method was used in approaching every study. This evolved during the autumn of 1942 into a more matured method called "problem papers," which began with a statement of the precise practical issue to be faced so far as it could be defined and then proceeded to an analysis of all alternative solutions that might be considered in choosing a course of policy designed to settle the issue or at least to put it on the way toward settlement, with the foreseeable consequences of each of these possible choices carefully reasoned in every case. Such studies embodied expert judgment of past policies, but they at first avoided explicit judgment on the best course to adopt. However, an indication of the preferred alternative could hardly be avoided and this rapidly became the practice. The staff at all times sought to consider problems from the standpoint especially of the long-run national interest of the United States: "What does the United States want? What do other states want? How do we obtain what we want?" The question that staff members then posed to themselves was "what do we need to know?" in order to answer these questions. Such questions appeared to offer the most practicable method by which the staff could steer its course in the vast uncertainties that then prevailed regarding the war and the postwar period. At that time, the chief certainties were merely the anticipated fact of victory and the consequent fact that this country-emerging from the victory with tremendous power-would have profound new responsibilities in connection with practically all vital problems of world affairs and would have to state a policy or at least express an attitude on such problems. The remaining principal responsibility of the Division was to constitute the secretariat of the Advisory Committee and its component subsidiary bodies. This function was exceptional in that the personnel performing the secretariat duties were the professional research officers themselves, by reason of the policy character of the meetings and the preparatory role of the staff. Thus the supplying of agenda and taking of minutes were performed directly by responsible heads 'For example of "problem paper," see appendix 17. 843388-5011 |