features. It was the inflexibility of action under this legislation regardless of circumstances, and the lack of discrimination in the treatment to be accorded victim and aggressor that were opposed by the executive branch.1

Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Franklin D. Roosevelt began in 1935 to give emphatic warning to the country that Americans could not "look without concern on the darkening clouds around" and that danger confronted the future of mankind as a whole."

In 1936 the President emphasized that the situation facing the "peace-loving nations" was one of gravity "which has in it many of the elements that lead to the tragedy of general war." The Secretary stated the view "that the fabric of peace has been worn perilously thin" and that "the dominant trend" was "full of menace." 3

In 1937, as international anarchy spread in Europe and the Far East, Secretary Hull on July 16 issued a statement on the "Fundamental Principles of International Policy", which he communicated to all other governments in an effort to obtain universal acceptance of these principles. In this statement, the Secretary said:

"This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated."

1 Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), Department of State publication 1983, pp. 266-72, 313-14, 355-65.

2 Addresses by the Secretary of State, June 17, 1935, and by the President, Nov. 11, 1935, ibid., pp. 259, 289.

The President's address to the Congress, Jan. 3, 1936, and the Secretary's addresses of Sept. 7 and 15, 1936, ibid., pp. 305–7, 332, 334.

Although sixty nations, including Germany, Italy, and Japan, accepted these principles without reservations, the trend of events was such that Secretary Hull felt obliged to conclude by August 1937 that Japan sought to dominate Eastern Asia and to extend her "control through the Pacific islands to the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere" and that Germany was "equally bent" on dominating Continental Europe. "If those days are not to come to pass-" the President stated in October, "if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear-the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure." He warned that "the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation is today being threatened".5

Grave concern was being felt whether in coming months the Western Hemisphere could remain free from aggression. In December 1936 foundations for a common neutrality policy among the American republics in the event of war had been laid at the Buenos Aires Conference, where the principle was enunciated that any act susceptible of disturbing the peace of any one American republic affected all the American republics. At the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima agreements were made on December 24, 1938, to give effect to the continental solidarity of the American republics in defending themselves if necessary and to provide for meetings of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs informally, and if need be, swiftly. Earlier that year, on August 18, President Roosevelt had assured Canada that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire." 6

The ability of nations desiring peace to protect themselves against attack was also put in question. In the United States, a building program to bring the American Navy up to treaty strength had been begun in 1933, and furthered by the passage of the Vinson naval bill in 1934. A slight expansion of the Army was authorized in 1935. Germany, however, was rearming feverishly; Italo-German ties were being strengthened; and at the end of 1934, to be effective in two years, Japan had denounced the Washington and London naval treaties. After Japan's refusal at the Brussels Conference in November 1937 to cooperate in finding a satisfactory peaceful settlement for the conflict in the Far East and after the sinking of the United States gunboat Panay on December 12, concern over the adequacy of the American capacity for defense led in 1938 to further strengthening of the armed forces. This was only a minimum program, however, which did not

* Ibid., doc. 111, p. 424.

Address Oct. 5, 1937, ibid., pp. 383-84, 387; cf. also statement by Secretary Hull, July 16, 1937, ibid., pp. 370-71.

* Address at Kingston, Ontario, Department of State Press Releases (Aug. 20, 1938), XIX, 124.

keep pace with mounting needs as crisis ominously piled on crisis

abroad.

The crisis occasioned by the German occupation of Austria in March 1938 was followed by the Munich crisis in September, when the weakness of peaceful efforts toward just settlements in the face of determined aggression was unmistakably demonstrated. Appeal after appeal was made at that time by this Government to Germany but without result. Tension between the United States and Germany was further heightened by the expression, through the recall of Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson in November, of American moral condemnation of the anti-Jewish program of Nazi Germany. In the Far East, where the Sino-Japanese conflict continued, Japanese interference with American rights and interests increased. As the last year of the period between the wars approached, it appeared to the United States Government that the world stood "at a crossroads" but with "its power of choice. .. not lost.” 7

By the opening of 1939, it became clear to the President that, in view of the prevailing undeclared wars, the threats of new aggression, and the inroads being made on the basic institutions of religion, democracy, and international good faith, greater measures of defense were vital to the United States. Such measures, as seen by the President and other responsible officials concerned, included a further strengthening of the armed forces, the building of reserves of strategic raw materials, the preparation for increased industrial production to meet defense needs, and the modification of the neutrality legislation. Both the President and the Secretary of State informed the Congress that experience had shown that the rigid arms embargo provisions of the neutrality legislation, concerning which they had long expressed their doubts, encouraged a general state of war by operating to the advantage of aggressors and to the weakening of the victims, and that changes in the act, especially to eliminate the arms embargo, were urgently needed. Legislative opinion, nevertheless, remained unfavorable in the spring and summer of 1939 to amendment of the neutrality legislation, though steps were taken by Congress to meet American needs with respect to the armed forces, strategic raw materials, and defense production.

Concurrently in Europe the spirit of resistance began to revive, despite the Blitzkrieg that threatened as the price of resistance. The last uncontested aggressions were in March 1939, when all of Czechoslovakia and Memel were occupied by Germany, and in April, when

'Address by the Secretary of State, Nov. 1, 1938, Peace and War, p. 435.

Messages to the Congress, Jan. 4 and 12, 1939; letter from the Secretary of State to the President, Oct. 12, 1938; letter from the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 27, 1939; ibid., pp. 62-63, 431-32, 447-54, 461-64.

Albania was invaded by Italy. The tolerable limits of retreat without resort to armed defense were being reached. On March 31, 1939, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced that Great Britain and France had given a military guaranty to Poland, the next probable victim of the Nazis.

On April 14 the President, seeking reciprocal pledges of nonaggression, asked Germany and Italy for assurances that no additional attacks on the remaining independent states of Europe and the Near East were contemplated. In the same message he invited the German and Italian Governments to international discussions that would be promptly held with these thirty-one states, and with United States participation, to "attain progressive relief from the crushing burden of armament" and to open "avenues of international trade." This message was not answered except in a radio speech of April 28 by Hitler rejecting the proposal.

On this same occasion, Hitler denounced the German-Polish nonaggression declaration dated January 26, 1934, and referred to German claims affecting Danzig and the Polish Corridor, which were to be pressed in succeeding months with the support of the now usual "war of nerves" and "fifth-column" activity. Germany's reply to the President's appeals in behalf of peace made late in August 1939 came on September 1, after the German land and air forces had crossed the frontier of Poland, seized Danzig, and bombed Warsaw. By noon of September 3, Great Britain and France had declared that a state of war with Germany existed. By that night, India, Australia, and New Zealand had declared war. The Union of South Africa entered the war September 6, and Canada, September 10. The general war had come as the culmination of an Axis policy of planned aggression.

At that crucial juncture, the facts and the lessons of experience with insecurity between the wars had been but partly assessed by the American people and the rest of mankind. One instant meaning of the war, however, was clear: American efforts, the League's efforts, and all other efforts to prevent it had utterly failed. To think out the lessons of that experience and to conceive a way to restore and keep international peace were vital future tasks. The immediate compelling need in America was to formulate the program of action for a neutral people whose own peace was endangered.

IMPLEMENTATION OF NEUTRALITY, SEPTEMBER 1939 UNITED States neutrality was proclaimed by President Roosevelt September 5. The provisions of the Neutrality Act were at once applied. The arms embargo became effective with regard to all bellig'Ibid., pp. 457-58, 477.

erents, and their use of the Panama Canal was regulated. On that same first day of adjustment to neutral status, September 5, the United States joined with seven other American republics in requesting all the twenty-one American republics to consult at Panama on measures to protect the peace of the Western Hemisphere. On the 8th, the President proclaimed a national emergency-limited to the extent necessary for enforcing neutrality and strengthening national defense.

These were but the initial broad actions as, with public opinion still divided on policy, the nation confronted the problems resulting from declared war in Europe, undeclared war in the Far East, hostilities on the great seas, and the manifold penetrations of foreign espionage and subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere. As the President stated to the Congress in special session: ". we find ourselves affected to the core; our currents of commerce are changing, our minds are filled with new problems, our position in world affairs has already been altered." 10

Within two months, basic steps to preserve national safety had been taken. The necessity for these steps stemmed from the corollary: "When peace has been broken anywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger." " The President ordered increases of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps within the statutory limitations. And, since in the judgment of the President and a majority of the Congress the neutrality act of 1937 was visibly operating in ways dangerous to American security and peace, the act was revised on November 4, 1939. This terminated the arms embargo in favor of "cash-and-carry" purchases, which permitted Great Britain, France, and their allies access to American supplies and, among other provisions, sought to prevent the involvement of American citizens or ships in defined combat zones.

The basic steps taken by this Government in the first two months of the war were also designed to preserve inter-American safety and stemmed from the strategic fact that United States safety "is and will be bound up with the safety of the Western Hemisphere and of the seas adjacent thereto." 12

Since April 26, 1938, a Liaison Committee, composed of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, had been meeting on call for coordination of policy of common concern to the Departments of State, War, and Navy. The Committee in the autumn of 1939 was composed of Sumner Welles, General George C. Marshall, and Admiral Harold R. Stark. The establishment under Mr. Welles of an office of Under Secretary-Liaison 10 Sept. 21, 1939, ibid., p. 488.

"Radio address by President Roosevelt, Sept. 3, 1939, ibid., pp. 484–85. 12 Idem.