with broad objectives and had not involved the presentation of specific proposals. The one exception had been the draft of a proposed United Nations declaration on dependent peoples, referred to above,2 which had been given to Mr. Eden at the time of his visit, not as a definitive proposal, but informally to obtain the general British reaction to our developing thought on this problem. This step had been taken after the receipt in February 1943 of a British draft of a corresponding declaration.

Apart from these informal exchanges at Cabinet level and above, exchanges of ideas and, in some fields, of factual research papers had been instituted on British initiative as early as April 1942. Such informal exploratory exchanges were chiefly at an expert level and continued at intervals throughout the war in Washington and, to some extent, in London. There were also many conversations, both of a diplomatic and technical character, between individual American officials and those of other Allied governments on postwar problems. It was in part through such exchanges that the Department gathered the information on the views of other governments essential to its preparations for the conferences that followed.

THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE

THE MEETING of the President and the Prime Minister at Quebec August 11-24, 1943, provided the first occasion for the presentation by the Department of definite policy recommendations based on the preparatory work done on postwar problems. While this meeting between the two heads of government was concerned in the first instance with military matters, it was also, unlike their conference at Casablanca earlier the same year, concerned with a wide range of political and economic problems, and both Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden were present.

The change in the course of the war was bringing to the fore the question of the postwar world. The Italian surrender appeared imminent. The liberation of French North Africa had intensified the problem of the status of the French Committee of National Liberation. Internal political developments with respect to Greece and Yugoslavia already foreshadowed the difficulties that were to be encountered in reestablishing acceptable governments in these nations upon their liberation. The rising sense of United Nations power to force a victorious conclusion of the war gave urgency to such questions as the treatment to be accorded Germany after her defeat and postwar international economic policy and arrangements. It now appeared imperative that, if United Nations collaboration were to continue after the war, some way be found to ascertain the attitude of 2 See p. 109.

'Formerly the French National Committee.

the Soviet Government toward postwar cooperation and to obtain the participation of the Soviet Union in preparations for the peace. Marshal Stalin had been invited to the Quebec Conference but had replied that it was not possible for him to attend.

Following the meeting on August 10 of the Secretary and Messrs. Welles, Bowman, Davis, and Pasvolsky with the President to discuss recommendations for the forthcoming negotiations and to receive the President's views and instructions, the research staff, and members of the Informal Agenda Group, drew together the required policy summaries and supporting papers for the Quebec meeting. These included a redraft of the papers for a Four Power agreement in the ✓form of a declaration, and, for background purposes should these issues arise, a series of problem papers on such questions as future boundaries of Germany and of Italy, the partition or unity of Germany, the future of the Italian colonies, and methods of dealing with the internal political situation in Italy following its surrender. A map of the problem areas of Europe was included, as was also a memorandum outlining Soviet views on postwar problems so far as these views were known. Some of these documents had already been prepared by the research staff, while others were specially drafted.

4

The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the discussions of the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec referred to the meeting as an "Anglo-American war conference." It stated that, in addition to the necessary military decisions, agreements had been reached "upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military operations," and specified that consideration had been given to the question of relations with the French Committee of National Liberation. The communiqué specified that the Soviet Government would be informed of decisions reached by the Conference affecting the war against Germany and Italy and also referred to the possibility of a tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union before the end of the year. After the meeting adjourned, President Roosevelt, in an address at Ottawa on August 25, 1943, said: "It is no secret that at Quebec there was much talk of the post-war world."

Secretary Hull had joined the Conference on August 20 and met with Foreign Secretary Eden and with the President and the Prime Minister for the intensive discussions of international political problems commencing the same day. Also present at these discussions were James C. Dunn, Political Adviser and a member of the Informal Agenda Group; the United States Minister to Canada, Ray Atherton; the British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan; and on occasions, Harry L. Hop

See appendix 26.

'Department of State Bulletin, IX, 122–24.

kins. The discussions ranged from exchanges of tentative views on such problems as the treatment to be accorded Germany and the draft United States proposal regarding dependent peoples to the formulation of a draft statement on Allied policy in liberated countries. The United States draft of the Four Power Declaration was introduced and agreed upon as a basis for further negotiation, and the possibility of obtaining Soviet and Chinese participation in future conferences was explored. Most of the discussion of long-range subjects was preliminary and inconclusive, however, and was to be carried further at subsequent meetings.

Following the Conference, on September 12, Secretary Hull delivered a major policy address,' which was drafted in a long series of working sessions with him by most of the high officers of the Department, including those taking part in the Agenda Group, with assistance from the research staff. In it the Secretary reported the progress that had been made in our preparations for the peace and discussed the basic✔ objectives of this Government in such conferences among the major powers as that just held at Quebec and the forthcoming one at Moscow, to be described shortly.

Stating that the "foreign policy of any country must be expressive of that country's fundamental national interests," he defined our own as being "the assuring of our national security and the fostering of the economic and social well-being of our people." The maintenance of these interests, he said, required not only that our foreign policy deal with the current situation, where our paramount aim was final victory, but that it "plan for the future in the light of the concepts and beliefs which we, as a nation, accept for ourselves as the guiding lines of our international behavior."

The Secretary pointed out that while there were differences among nations "as regards their respective aims and purposes and as regards the means of attaining them," there were also "immense areas of common interest." By cooperation within these areas, he said, "nations not only can advance more effectively the aims and purposes which they have in common, but can also find increased opportunity to reconcile, by peaceful means and to mutual advantage, such differences as may exist among them." The United Nations had recognized this area of common interest in the Atlantic Charter and in their joint Declaration of January 1, 1942. Therefore, the Secretary declared, it was our task and the task of our Allies "to utilize this common interest to create an effective system of international cooperation for the maintenance of peace."

The Secretary made specific reference to two of the major policies he had discussed at Quebec and toward the furtherance of which his

"For text of this draft, see appendix 27.

* For full text, see Department of State Bulletin, IX, 173–79.

L

efforts at Moscow were to be directed-"our desire and our settled policy" that collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union should "steadily increase during and following the war" and recognition of the role of China both in the war and in the "achievement of a stable peace." He expressed his confidence that the United States, as well as the other nations associated with us in the war effort, would "do its part, after the victory of the United Nations, in meeting the immense needs of the post-war period," which he defined as follows:

"Those needs will embrace the task of taking practical steps to create conditions in which there will be security for every nation; in which each nation will have enhanced opportunities to develop and progress in ways of its own choosing; in which there will be, for each nation, improved facilities to attain, by its own effort and in cooperation with others, an increasing measure of political stability and economic, social, and cultural welfare."

Reiterating the position he had first enunciated on July 23 of the previous year, the Secretary declared that "a system of organized international cooperation for the maintenance of peace must be based upon the willingness of the cooperating nations to use force, if necessary, to keep the peace." He then discussed in greater detail than before the functions of an organization for the maintenance of peace, and he again stressed the dependence of such a system of organized international cooperation for its success on conditions of economic and social well-being throughout the world.

The Secretary concluded by referring specifically, for the first time, to the Department's preparations for the peace and to the discussions of postwar problems that had been inaugurated with the British and that were soon to be extended to the Russians. He said, in part:

"The form and functions of the international agencies of the future, the extent to which the existing court of international justice may or may not need to be remodeled, the scope and character of the means for making international action effective in the maintenance of peace, the nature of international economic institutions and arrangements that may be desirable and feasible-all these are among the problems which are receiving attention and which will need to be determined by agreement among governments, subject, of course, to approval by their respective peoples. They are being studied intensively by this Government and by other governments. They are gradually being made subjects of consultation between and among governments. They are being studied and discussed by the people of this country and the peoples of other countries. .

"ARTICLE VII" DISCUSSIONS

In November 1942, this Government had apprised the British that we looked forward to the informal and exploratory talks with them and other powers envisaged in Article VII of the Mutual Aid or Lend

Lease Agreements, and on August 4, 1943, the British had informed us of their desire to send a delegation of senior officials to Washington in the first half of September to initiate these discussions. In order to insure that the projected exchange of views would be informal in character, the Secretary had raised with Mr. Eden at Quebec the question of the Anglo-American economic discussions to take place shortly in Washington.

Work in preparation for the projected discussions was being carried forward by the special committees established under the Taylor Committee and was subject to the direction and review, following the recess of the main Committee, of the informal group that later became the Committee on Coordination of Economic Policy Work. The British had expressed the view in their aide-mémoire of August 4 that conversations should begin on the whole field covered by Article VII, and had specifically referred to the questions of commercial policy, monetary policy, international investment, and the regulation of primary products and related topics. The Department, in its reply, indicated its readiness to discuss commercial policy and the regulation of primary products and related topics but suggested that monetary policy and international investment be handled through the Treasury, where discussions with the British on the first of these questions were already in progress.

The Treasury, in May 1943, had obtained from the President primary authority in this field, and at Quebec the Secretary emphasized to Mr. Eden the desirability of having the financial discussions, to quote the memorandum of conversation, "treated as a continuation of conversations which were already in course with the United States Treasury." He also took the position that the projected discussions with the Department should be directed toward drawing up an agenda of topics to be discussed rather than toward reaching agreement on the topics themselves, on the ground that it would be unfortunate "to give the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming to previous agreement on these matters before other governments were brought in and acquainted with the progress of the discussions."

The Anglo-American economic conversations that began in Washington on September 17 were in two parts. The American Group in charge of that part of the discussions held in the State Department was drawn primarily from the Advisory Committee, particularly the Taylor Committee and its special committees. There was no need, therefore, for extensive briefing before, or elaborate clearance of policy views during, the conversations. The Group was composed of Myron C. Taylor, Chairman; Messrs. Pasvolsky, Hawkins, Stinebower, and Hickerson of State; Mr. White of the Treasury; Messrs. Clayton and Taylor of Commerce; Messrs. Appleby and Wheeler of Agricul