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ture; and Messrs. Ryder and Edminster of the Tariff Commission. This part of the conversations, which began on September 20 and continued until October 16, covered the general topics of commercial policy, international commodity arrangements, cartels, and coordination of measures to promote employment. The second part was conducted at the Treasury, under the chairmanship of Mr. White and with participation of several members of the Group conducting the State Department phase but with broader interdepartmental representation otherwise. The Treasury part, which opened on September 17 and continued until October 9, was devoted to probing the questions of monetary stabilization and the promotion of international investment.

In keeping with the position taken by the Secretary at Quebec, no effort was made during the conversations to arrive at any definite conclusions "but rather," in the words of a United States memorandum presented shortly thereafter at the Moscow Conference, "to prepare an orderly agenda for further study by each of the respective governments and for possible further informal joint conversations." The Anglo-American conversations, an accompanying memorandum stated, had provided "an opportunity to discover the extent to which there is common ground and the extent to which there are differences of importance in the points of view of those whose expert advice may frequently be utilized in the formulation of policy."8

Besides developing various alternative formulas for the reduction of tariffs and examining such problems as quantitative restrictions on imports, export taxes and restrictions, subsidies, and state trading, the conversations in the field of commercial policy had involved extensive consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the multilateral as against the bilateral method of reducing tariffs, on which there was considerable difference between the American and British views. They had also involved extensive consideration of the question of preferences-the same problem that had arisen in the earlier negotiations with the British of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement and in connection with the fourth paragraph of the Atlantic Charter and that was to continue to be a basic issue between the two Governments in the later conversations under Article VII which culminated in the formal Anglo-American discussions in this field in the autumn of 1945.10

The conversations in the field of commodity policy had examined the problems of short-term price fluctuations in primary products, periodic slumps in demand and prices in relation to the business cycle,

8 See appendix 30.

⚫ See p. 50.

10 See p. 361.

and excess capacity arising out of past stimulation of high-cost production and because of the war. They had also examined such methods of meeting these problems as the maintenance of buffer stocks, quantitative regulations, and subsidies, and considered the possibility of setting forth principles to govern arrangements in this field, together with the possible relation of such arrangements to the international economic system generally. There was agreement that international commodity arrangements should be in harmony with the general developmental or "expansionist" economic policy that it was hoped would be adopted by the nations after the war.

The conversations with respect to the problems of cartels and employment were of a less extensive and specific character. The British were not prepared to discuss the former in any detail, while the latter, being subject to the influence of a complex of economic policies, both national and international, was therefore approached primarily from the standpoint of the coordination of these other policies.

The agenda resulting from these exploratory conversations projected the possible establishment of an international commercial-policy organization, an international commodity-policy organization, and an "Advisory Economic Staff" to study international economic questions, particularly the coordination of international measures for the maintenance of high levels of employment. The discussions of this latter problem had pointed to the need for coordinating economic policy generally, with particular reference to the separate international organizations existing or projected in specialized fields. To meet this need the creation of some over-all economic body, possibly within the framework of a general political organization, had been suggested.

The documentation embodying the thought developed in these conversations was to prove fundamental in the continuing consideration given to these problems by the United States Government in the following two years.

Further conversations under Article VII, this time with the Canadians, were held in Washington, January 3-7, and in New York, February 12–13, 1944. These conversations followed the pattern of the earlier Anglo-American discussions except that they did not include consideration of monetary and international investment policy and were conducted by the State Department alone. The President, on December 20, 1943, approved the use in the projected conversations with the Canadians of the same group, under the chairmanship of Myron C. Taylor, that had been in charge of the State Department phase of the Anglo-American discussions. At the same time he approved this group for subsequent conversations with other countries. It eventuated that this series of exploratory economic discussions ended with the Canadian conversations. Both the Soviet Union and China had been apprised on September 3, 1943, of our readiness to

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undertake similar conversations with them, and discussions had originally been projected with additional countries if satisfactory progress was made in the initial exchanges of views. No further bilateral conversations could be arranged, however, before developments in related fields called for a change in approach. The further discussions of the questions arising under Article VII took place, as will be seen in the following pages, on a multilateral basis at the Bretton Woods Conference, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations later in 1944, at the San Francisco Conference, and at conferences held after the end of hostilities.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

ON AUGUST 24, 1943, Marshal Stalin had replied favorably to AngloAmerican overtures looking toward an early meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three major powers, and on September 11, the President agreed to the Soviet suggestion that this meeting should take place at Moscow in October. The meeting was to go beyond an exploratory exchange of views and lay the ground for definitive Three Power decisions. The agenda included military, political, and economic topics, those of its points attributable to United States initiative having postwar significance primarily.

The preparations for the Moscow Conference were begun in the Department immediately upon the Secretary's return from Quebec. The scope of the problem papers drawn together for use in negotiation or as background material at Quebec was enlarged, and, in the case of Germany, the papers were supplemented by definite recommendations arrived at in the newly created interdivisional committee on Germany." Also a comprehensive memorandum on the "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Collaboration," reflecting the experience of the Anglo-American economic conversations then in progress, was written. The appropriate operating divisions and the relevant postwar groups and staff worked jointly in readying these materials, although for papers dealing with current issues the geographic divisions and advisers exercised the paramount responsibility. The materials bearing upon the proposed Four Nation Declaration were reviewed and amended by the Agenda Group. In addition, thorough consideration was given in the Department to the topics proposed by the Soviet and British Governments for inclusion on the agenda of the conference and to our own proposals, which were the draft Four Nation Declaration previously presented at Quebec, the treatment of Germany and other European enemy states, economic reconstruction, and methods of dealing with current political and "For example of papers on Germany, see appendixes 28 and 29.

economic issues and those arising as the war progressed. Just prior to his departure for Moscow, the Secretary, on October 5, as noted above, accompanied by Under Secretary Stettinius and Messrs. Pasvolsky, Dunn, Hackworth, and Matthews visited the White House to obtain the President's directives and views on questions that had been, or might be, raised in connection with the forthcoming conference. The further aspect of preparation for the Conference concerned American support of a world security organization. Thought had been given to this matter by the Political Subcommittee. The Secretary gave attention to it in his address of September 12 12 and it was the object of the Fulbright resolution passed on September 21, 1943.18 In outlining to the Nation our objectives in the consultations with other governments on postwar problems and arrangements that had begun at Quebec, the Secretary said in that address, "In the final analysis, it is the will of the peoples of the world that decides the all-embracing issues of peace and of human welfare."

He then commented:

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"We have now reached a stage at which it becomes possible to discuss in greater detail some of the basic problems outlined in this address and in my previous statements. I hope to be able to underレ take this from time to time in the early future.

"The supreme importance of these problems should lift them far above the realm of partisan considerations or party politics. It is gratifying that both in the Congress and elsewhere great numbers of thoughtful men have so approached them. A heavy responsibility rests upon all of us to consider these all-important post-war problems and to contribute to their solution in a wholly non-partisan spirit."

The subcommittee discussions had early taken into account the fact that one of the principal elements of uncertainty in our preparations for the peace was the question of how far public opinion in this country would be willing to go in international cooperation after the war. The experience of 1919-20 with the Treaty of Versailles and especially the League of Nations was much in mind. United States participation in any postwar system of organized international cooperation was dependent on congressional approval, which would be jeopardized by an antagonistic, or even an apathetic, public reaction to such a policy. It was thought that the position of our Allies on postwar problems, particularly that of security, was strongly influenced by their doubts that this country would assume a responsibility for the maintenance of peace after the war commensurate with its position as

"Department of State Bulletin, IX, 173–79.

"H. Con. Res. 25, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec., vol. 89, p. 7729; H. Rept. 553, serial vol. 10762. The Senate acted upon S. Res. 192 (the Connally resolution), Nov. 5, 1943, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec., vol. 89, p. 9222; S. Rept. 478, serial vol. 10757.

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a great power. It was further recognized that our own negotiating position in any discussions with our Allies was weakened by their fear that our proposals, even if accepted by them, might later fail to obtain the endorsement of the American people and the Congress.

It was therefore considered essential, both to insure that the United States would accept its full responsibilities for the maintenance of the future peace and to facilitate acceptance by our Allies of this Government's views on the organization of that peace, that widespread understanding and support of our objectives for the future and of our plans to achieve these objectives be obtained both in the Congress and among the American people. A mounting public interest in our preparations for the peace was noted, and it was thought that sentiment favorable to United States participation in postwar international arrangements was growing throughout the country. At the same time, it was realized that excessive public discussion of our plans while they were still in the formative stage might lead to their premature crystallization and might arouse friction and animosities, both at home and abroad, harmful to the war effort.

These were the aspects of the problem discussed at two meetings of the Political Subcommittee in February 1943, and at greater length when the subcommittee, late in April under the chairmanship of Secretary Hull, began its analytical consideration of the problems of international organization. In this connection, the desirability of a congressional resolution in support of United States participation in postwar international arrangements for the maintenance of peace was favorably studied by the subcommittee at meetings in which members of Congress from both parties took part. A number of resolutions had already been introduced in Congress toward this end, and the Secretary throughout the spring and summer of that year held informal consultations with members of Congress from both parties on these resolutions. He also conferred with the President and other political leaders.14

Preliminary to his consultations with members of Congress, the Secretary of State asked his advisers for information concerning public and official attitudes during the years from the outbreak of war in 1914 until 1941. The research staff with the cooperation of several officers in other parts of the Department made a series of analytical studies, between January 12 and March 2, 1943, of party platforms, various phases of isolationism, the activities and effects of pressure groups, and public opinion in relation to the policies of the interwar period.

On September 7, 1943, a conference of Republican leaders at Mackinac Island, Michigan, endorsed United States participation in a post

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