war international organization. Two weeks later the House passed the Fulbright resolution "favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein." Similar Senate action had been under contemplation during this period, although it was not until November 5, 1943, that a comparable resolution, introduced by Senator Connally, was passed by the Senate. Nonpartisan support for this Government's advocacy of organized international cooperation after the war in which the United States would take part had, therefore, been strongly and unmistakably evidenced prior to the Secretary's departure for the Moscow conference, and, in his address of September 12, the Secretary had laid the public basis for the Four Power Declaration that he was to present there.

The Conference met at Moscow October 19-30, 1943. It was the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and was designed primarily to prepare the ground for a meeting of the heads of government of these three states. Its major substantive objective from the standpoint of the United States was to determine the Soviet position on postwar cooperation with a view to holding the three powers and China together after victory in policy and action on matters concerning international peace and security.

Secretary Hull was accompanied to the Conference by a number of political and technical advisers, among whom were two Department officials who had participated in the Political Subcommittee and the informal Agenda Group, Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Dunn, and one member of the research staff, Philip E. Mosely, senior assistant chief for studies in the territorial field. The Foreign Ministers met daily in regular session, at which Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, and Messrs. Hackworth and Dunn were also present for the United States, with Charles E. Bohlen acting as interpreter. In addition, the Conference provided opportunity for the Secretary to have informal discussions with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden and, on two occasions, with Marshal Stalin.

The deliberations of the conference covered many problems. The discussions were often inconclusive, sometimes involving no more than an exchange of views, as in the case of the question of Soviet-Polish relations, or reference of the problem elsewhere for further consideration, as in the case of a proposed resolution on Iran. In certain instances, however, fundamental decisions of primary importance were taken. Those that were to have determinative influence on the Department's future work in preparation for the peace were (1) the adoption, with minor amendment, of the United States draft of the Four Nation Declaration on General Security with China as one of the signatories

of the Declaration as released; (2) the decision to create the European Advisory Commission to consider European questions connected with the termination of hostilities; and (3) the agreement on the basic policies set forth in the Declaration Regarding Italy, the Declaration on Austria, and the Declaration on German Atrocities.

The Secretary pressed for action at the Conference on only one United States proposal-the draft Four Nation Declaration, on which there had been some prior negotiation by cable with the Kremlin since the Quebec Conference. He circulated the United States proposal concerning dependent peoples previously discussed with the British, but this question was not included on the agenda. He also circulated papers on two other subjects to show the trend of our thinking on these matters but not as concrete proposals requiring decision. One paper was on the treatment of Germany after the war, which reflected the recommendations of the newly created interdivisional committee on Germany and was referred by the Conference to the European Advisory Commission for consideration. The others were four economic documents considering, respectively, cooperation in the rehabilitation of war damage in the Soviet Union, joint action for assistance to other countries in the long-range work of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the bases of our program for international economic cooperation, and reparations.

The paper on economic cooperation included a supporting memorandum on the recent Anglo-American economic conversations in Washington and expressed the "earnest hope," reiterated by the Secretary personally, that the Soviet Union would "find it possible to arrange for such an interchange of views in the near future." It also referred to the obvious "need for organized discussions among the United Nations, both informal and in formal conferences," of basic international economic problems, and suggested the establishment of a Commission comprised of technical economic experts from the principal United Nations and possibly certain others to plan the best procedures toward obtaining international economic collaboration after the war.15

A Civil Affairs Agreement for France, jointly presented to the Conference by the United States and the United Kingdom, was referred to the European Advisory Commission for further examination.

Upon his return from Moscow, the Secretary addressed a joint session of Congress on November 18 to report on the Conference. Stressing the necessity, if the fruits of victory were not to be lost, of agreement among the major powers and other United Nations on "those basic principles and policies which will render impossible a repetition of our present tragedy" and of the prompt creation of the 15 For text of this memorandum, see appendix 30.

"machinery of action necessary to carry out these principles and policies," the Secretary stated:

"The attention of the Conference was centered upon the task of making sure that the nations upon whose armed forces and civilian efforts rests the main responsibility for defeating the enemy will, along with other peacefully minded nations, continue to perform their full part in solving the numerous and vexatious problems of the future. From the outset, the dominant thought at the Conference was that, after the attainment of victory, cooperation among peace-loving nations in support of certain paramount mutual interests will be almost as compelling in importance and necessity as it is today in support of the war effort.

"At the end of the war, each of the United Nations and each of the nations associated with them will have the same common interest in national security, in world order under law, in peace, in the full promotion of the political, economic, and social welfare of their respective peoples-in the principles and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations. The future of these indispensable common interests depends absolutely upon international cooperation. Hence, each nation's own primary interest requires it to cooperate with the others."

After discussing in detail the various achievements of the conference, beginning with the Four-Nation Declaration, the Secretary defined its significance as follows:

"Of supreme importance is the fact that at the Conference the whole spirit of international cooperation, now and after the war, was revitalized and given practical expression. The Conference thus launched a forward movement which, I am firmly convinced, will steadily extend in scope and effectiveness. Within the framework of that movement, in the atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence which made possible its beginning in Moscow, many of the problems which are difficult today will as time goes on undoubtedly become more possible of satisfactory solution through frank and friendly discussion." 16

THE TEHRAN AND THE TWO CAIRO CONFERENCES AT Moscow, the Secretary obtained Marshal Stalin's 16a assent to the projected meeting with the President and Prime Minister Churchill, which it was subsequently agreed among the three heads of govern ment should take place at Tehran. This Government had first proposed a meeting between the President and Marshal Stalin shortly after American involvement in the war. When Ambassador Standley, Mr. Harriman's predecessor, arrived in Moscow in April 1942, he had instructions to inform the Marshal of the President's desire to meet with him in order to coordinate Soviet-American efforts in

16

For full text, see Department of State Bulletin, IX, 341-45.

16 He was Premier Stalin at that time; he received the title "Marshal" in March 1943.

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bringing about the collapse of Germany. The Ambassador had delivered this message on April 23, but neither this nor subsequent approaches had been successful. Marshal Stalin had indicated that he regarded the military situation on the eastern front as too critical to permit his attendance at either the Casablanca Conference or the Quebec Conference. The conference that met at Tehran, November 28-December 1, 1943, was the first meeting between the President and Marshal Stalin. It was also the first of the two meetings of the heads of government of the three major powers before the German surrender. The Tehran Conference had no such immediate effect as the Moscow Conference on the Department's preparations for the peace, nor was the influence of the work already done in this field so clearly discernible. Although at the request of the President, who wished to discuss the matter with Prime Minister Churchill, a memorandum was prepared early in November by officers from the Division of Political Studies, the two geographic divisions concerned with Europe and with the Far East, and the Geographer's Office on the question of trusteeship for certain islands in the Pacific, no other special preparations for the forthcoming discussions were made by the research staff. The Department was not represented among the advisers, most of whom were military, taken by the President to Tehran. The Secretary, however, had conferred with the President upon his return from Moscow, and en route to Tehran, the President was joined at Cairo by Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Bohlen, as interpreter, both of whom had been present at the Moscow Conference. Furthermore, as already noted, the President had been kept currently informed of the trend of the Department's thinking on postwar problems from the inception of its preparatory work.

The three heads of government explored a wide range of political and military questions in their conversations at Tehran. These discussions resulted in certain concrete military commitments, notably that to launch the Normandy invasion in May 1944, and other military offensives relating to that invasion. Marshal Stalin on his own initiative reaffirmed at this conference his intention, which he had already asked Secretary Hull at Moscow to convey to the President, that when Germany was finally defeated the Soviet Union would join in the effort against the Japanese.17 The Marshal placed no conditions on this intention, and the fragmentary discussion of this matter was confined to mention of the possibilities of preliminary military planning.

The discussion of political questions was essentially introductory and exploratory. The three heads of government reaffirmed the principle set forth in the Four Nation Declaration of continued collabora17 Cf. Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1309.

tion among the major powers after the war. The Declaration of the Three Powers issued December 1, 1943, stated in part:

"We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

"And as to peace-we are sure that our concord will win an enduring Peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

"With our Diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations." 18

The structure and character of the general international organization projected in the Four Nation Declaration was discussed in broad terms, the President stressing the desirability of a world-wide rather than a regional approach, particularly from the standpoint of American participation. The President also referred favorably on several occasions to the concept of international trusteeship already presented by Secretary Hull at the Moscow Conference. Other problems such as strategic bases, the treatment of postwar Germany, the future boundaries of Poland, and the traditional Russian desire for warm water ports were explored. These discussions were significant in that they threw light on the individual objectives of each of the participating powers and on the policies that each might be disposed to pursue, but with one exception they involved no commitments. The exception was the Declaration Regarding Iran, in which the three major powers asserted "their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran" and agreed that Iran's economic problems should receive full consideration both during and after the war-concluding thus the discussion of this question that had been begun at Moscow.19

Before their meeting at Tehran with Marshal Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister had conferred in Cairo, November 22-26, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and after the Tehran Conference, they returned to Cairo for discussions with President Inönü of Turkey.20 The second of these meetings, December 4-6, involved

20 There was no representation of the Department of State as such at these Cairo meetings. Willys Peck of the Foreign Service was on the American staff as a Chinese language expert at the first.