no developments of significance to postwar problems except insofar as the conversations, in the words of the communiqué issued at their conclusion, were "most useful and most fruitful for the future of the relations" between Turkey and the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The latter had joined in the invitation to hold the Conference.

The meeting with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, however, which followed by almost a year the British and the American relinquishment, on January 11, 1943, of their extraterritorial rights in China, produced the agreement on war aims in the Far East announced in the tripartite statement issued on December 1, 1943. At Tehran, Marshal Stalin, on November 30, had given this statement his unqualified endorsement, although he said he could make no commitment. The definition of Anglo-Sino-American policy in the statement of December 1, which strongly influenced the Department's subsequent work on the Far Eastern peace, declared:

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." 21

In

On his return, the President, in a radio address on December 24, emphasized the need for unity among the four major powers and their cooperation with "all the freedom-loving peoples" after the war.22 his annual message to Congress on January 11, 1944, he summarized the objectives and accomplishments of his recent conversations with the heads of government of the three other major Allied powers as follows:

"When Mr. Hull went to Moscow in October, and when I went to Cairo and Tehran in November, we knew that we were in agreement with our Allies in our common determination to fight and win this war. But there were many vital questions concerning the future peace, and they were discussed in an atmosphere of complete candor and harmony.

"In the last war such discussions, such meetings, did not even begin until the shooting had stopped and the delegates began to assemble at the peace table. There had been no previous opportunities for

21 Department of State Bulletin, IX, 393.
"Ibid., X, 3-7.

man-to-man discussions which lead to meetings of minds. The result was a peace which was not a peace.

"That was a mistake which we are not repeating in this war.

"The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: Security.

"And that means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks by aggressors. It means also economic security, social security, moral security-in a family of nations.

"In the plain down-to-earth talks that I had with the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, it was abundantly clear that they are all most deeply interested in the resumption of peaceful progress by their own peoples-progress toward a better life. All our Allies want freedom to develop their lands and resources, to build up industry, to increase education and individual opportunity, and to raise standards of living.

"All our Allies have learned by bitter experience that real development will not be possible if they are to be diverted from their purpose by repeated wars-or even threats of war.

"China and Russia are truly united with Britain and America in recognition of this essential fact:

"The best interests of each nation, large and small, demand that all freedom-loving nations shall join together in a just and durable system of peace. In the present world situation, evidenced by the actions of Germany, Italy and Japan, unquestioned military control over disturbers of the peace is as necessary among nations as it is among citizens in a community. And an equally basic essential to peace is a decent standard of living for all individual men and women and children in all nations. Freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from want." 23

THE FIRST SESSION OF THE UNRRA COUNCIL

THE AGREEMENT for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration signed at the White House on November 9, 1943, was a product of thorough discussion both within the United States Government, including informal consultations between the Department and the Congress, and among the forty-four United and Associated Nations that eventually became the signatories of the Agreement.24 These consultations had resulted in the modification of the draft agreement published on June 11, 1943, primarily to relieve the apprehensions of the smaller states that the organization would be dominated by the four major powers and to meet congressional de

"H. Doc. 377, 78th Cong., 2d sess., serial vol. 10878.

"For text of this Agreement, see First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Selected Documents, Atlantic City, N. J., Nov. 10-Dec. 1, 1943, Department of State publication 2040, Conference Series 53, pp. 7–15.

sires to have provided a means of withdrawal for member states and to have assurance that the financial contributions of these states to the organization would be subject to their respective constitutional procedures.

These consultations had also resulted in a decision that both the life and the scope of the organization should be limited. There had been two definite schools of thought in the United States Government on this question throughout the period of preliminary discussion and negotiation, but the Agreement signed on November 9 made it clear that UNRRA was designed to be an emergency organization and that it would not function in the field of postwar reconstruction as such. The view that prevailed was that the problem of reconstruction should be considered in relation to the broad and long-range problems of postwar economic policy generally rather than to the more immediate and narrower problems of relief and rehabilitation. Moreover, the difficulties of obtaining appropriations on a scale and over a period that would permit an effective handling of the problem of reconstruction were recognized.

This limitation on the scope of UNRRA and its emergency character were stressed by the President in requesting, on November 15, 1943, congressional authorization of funds to permit United States participation in UNRRA.25 The President defined the purpose of the organization as "to give first aid in the liberated areas," and its task as "to assist in furnishing the medicine, food, clothing, and other basic necessities and essential services which are required to restore the strength of the liberated peoples." The President then stated: "UNRRA will not, of course, be expected to solve the long-range problems of reconstruction. Other machinery and other measures will be necessary for this purpose. What UNRRA can do is to lay the necessary foundation for these later tasks of reconstruction." Secretary Hull in a letter on December 7, 1943,26 to Chairman Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, endorsing a resolution introduced by Mr. Bloom in accordance with the President's request, recalled that the "UNRRA Agreement itself was carefully worked out after consultations with members of Congress, and especially with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees." He further said:

"The broad plans growing out of the Moscow Conference, which Congress has so warmly endorsed, will need the work of this great organization to ensure, in the words of the Four Nation Declaration, 'a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace' so that we may proceed to our announced purpose of 'maintaining international

peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments.'

"It is as essential to be prepared for the emergency which will follow the end of the war as it is to be prepared for the great operations which will bring the victorious peace.

The day after the UNRRA Agreement was signed, the Council provided for in the agreement convened at Atlantic City for its first session, which lasted until December 1, 1943. The preparatory work for this meeting as well as that leading to the conclusion of the agreement itself, had been primarily the responsibility of the Department of State operating through the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations under Governor Lehman 27 and through an informal group under Assistant Secretary Acheson. The Division of Economic Studies had participated in this work through its chief, Mr. Stinebower, who was a member of Mr. Acheson's group and later one of the United States advisers at the Atlantic City Conference.28 The United States was represented at the first Council meeting by Mr. Acheson, with Francis B. Sayre, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, as alternate.

At its first session the Council, under the chairmanship of Mr. Acheson, elected Governor Lehman Director General of the new organization and provided, through a series of resolutions, for the actual establishment of the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and laid down the broad policies and procedures to be followed in its operations. One of these resolutions (no. 12) further defined the scope of UNRRA as follows: 29

"The task of rehabilitation must not be considered as the beginning of reconstruction-it is coterminous with relief. No new construction or reconstruction work is contemplated, but only rehabilitation as defined in the preamble of the Agreement. Problems, such as unemployment, are important, but not determining factors. They are consequences and, at the same time, motives of action. The Administration cannot be called upon to help restore continuous employment in the world."

27

See pp. 137 and 156. By Executive Order 9380 of Sept. 25, 1943, OFRRO was absorbed into the newly established Foreign Economic Administration.

"The other advisers were: Mrs. Elizabeth Conkey, Commissioner of Public Welfare, Cook County, Illinois; Max Gardner, former Governor of North Carolina (who did not attend); Harold Glasser, Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department; Roy Hendrickson, Director, Food Distribution Administration; Murray Latimer, Chairman of the Railroad Retirement Board, Assistant Director, Liberated Areas Branch of Foreign Economic Administration; Abbot Low Moffat, State Department; Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service; Herman Wells, State Department; Mrs. Ellen S. Woodward, Member, Social Security Board.

"For the text of these resolutions, see First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Department of State publication 2040, Conference Series 53, pp. 27-81.

The Congress in its joint resolution making possible United States participation in UNRRA specifically approved this statement and incorporated in the joint resolution four reservations. These related to the interpretation of "rehabilitation," UNRRA's power to incur obligations, amendment of the agreement of November 9, and the determination by the Congress of the United States contribution. The Congress limited its authorization of appropriation to June 30, 1946. The Council of UNRRA at its second session in Montreal, September 15-27, 1944, accepted the reservations laid down by the Congress.30

" H. J. Res. 192, 78th Cong., 2d sess., approved Mar. 28, 1944; 58 Stat. 122. The action taken by UNRRA was naturally silent on the time limit of June 30, 1946, this date being a matter wholly within American determination.