Western Allies in order that they might currently coordinate their policies in this important strategic area. The progress of the war made it expedient to hasten the work of the European Advisory Commission and to advance the international consultations on postwar problems and policy as initiated the previous year. It was therefore agreed between the President and the Secretary in March that the Under Secretary, Mr. Stettinius, should undertake a special Mission to London. These London conversations began on April 7 and lasted until April 29, 1944.

The Under Secretary was accompanied on his mission by Isaiah Bowman, who was a member of the Informal Political Agenda Group and of the Secretary's "consulting group"; Wallace Murray and H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, respectively; John L. Pratt, Consultant on Commercial Affairs; Robert J. Lynch, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, who served as executive secretary for the Mission; and Louis J. Hector, Assistant to Mr. Stettinius. Both Mr. Bowman and Mr. Murray were members of the Post-War Programs Committee, and Mr. Matthews attended the meetings of this Committee as alternate for Mr. Dunn. Discussions in the first instance were between Mr. Stettinius and, where postwar problems were concerned, Mr. Bowman and Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, and other high officials of the British Government. The Under Secretary undertook to keep the Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors in London informed of the course of these discussions, and also to talk with members of the governments-in-exile. Messrs. Murray and Matthews met principally with officials of the British Foreign Office, while Mr. Pratt was in touch primarily with British officials in the economic field.

Insofar as these conversations were concerned with the postwar period, they related in the main to the work of the European Advisory Commission, the occupation of Germany, continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, the projected world security organization, the "World Court," colonial policy, resumption of the Anglo-American economic conversations, the proposal for the establishment of a United Nations economic steering committee, postwar shipping policy, and the establishment of a "European Inland Transport Organization.”

The Under Secretary was not authorized to go beyond an informal exchange of views with the British, and the discussions did not, therefore, result in positive commitments on postwar policy by either of the participating Governments. They did, however, serve to clarify the position of each on the problems presented. Those concerned with general international organization, the World Court, and colonial policy were of particular importance in the subsequent study and discussion of these questions within the Department.

Upon his return, the Under Secretary submitted a detailed report of his conversations in London to the Secretary and on May 8, summarized the discussions of current problems for the Policy Committee. Two days later, Mr. Bowman reported to a meeting of the Post-War Programs Committee on the discussions in which he had participated relating to the organization of the peace.

POLICY ADDRESS OF APRIL 9, 1944

WHILE Mr. Stettinius was in London and while the Post-War Programs Committee was working intensively on the entire range of problems on which recommendations were being submitted for decision, the Secretary, on April 9, 1944, delivered the third of his major addresses designed to explain current policy and to inform the public on impending steps in our preparations for the peace. Defining United States foreign policy as "the task of focusing and giving effect in the world outside our borders to the will of 135 million people through the constitutional processes which govern our democracy," the Secretary first drew attention to "three outstanding lessons" of recent years, which he described as follows:

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In the first place, since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, we and those nations who are now our allies have moved from relative weakness to strength. In the second place, during that same period we in this country have moved from a deepseated tendency toward separate action to the knowledge and conviction that only through unity of action can there be achieved in this world the results which are essential for the continuance of free peoples. And, thirdly, we have moved from a careless tolerance of evil institutions to the conviction that free governments and Nazi and Fascist governments cannot exist together in this world because the very nature of the latter requires them to be aggressors and the very nature of free governments too often lays them open to treacherous and well-laid plans of attack.”5

V

In this connection, the Secretary referred to our decision after the fall of France in 1940 to defend ourselves and to assist those resisting aggression. He termed this "a major decision of foreign policy." The American people have since shown not only a determination to win the war but also a determination "to go on, after the V victory, with our Allies and all other nations which desire peace and freedom to establish and maintain in full strength the institutions without which peace and freedom cannot be an enduring reality." This country could not, he declared, "move in and out of international cooperation and in and out of participation in the responsibilities of a member of the family of nations," since the "political, material, and

'Department of State Bulletin, X, 335–42.

spiritual strength of the free and democratic nations not only is greatly dependent upon the strength which our full participation brings to the common effort but is a vital factor in our own strength."

On the basis of this fundamental development in United States foreign policy, the Secretary first discussed certain aspects of current policy with specific reference to the neutrals and to France and Italy, stressing in connection with the two latter states our national interest in a stable Europe after the war and in the development of democratic institutions there. He then turned to the "more far-reaching relations between us and our Allies in dealing with our enemies and in providing for future peace, freedom from aggression, and opportunity for expanding material well-being." He warned that solution of these problems required "the slow, hard process

of full dis

cussion with our Allies and among our own people." Stating that such discussion was then in progress, he declared that the basis of our policy was soundly established, the direction clear, and the general methods of accomplishment emerging.

This basis, the Secretary said, lay in the lesson of recent history that "agreed and united action" among the free nations is "fundamental" and "must underlie the entire range of our policy." He asserted:

"However difficult the road may be, there is no hope of turning victory into enduring peace unless the real interests of this country, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China are harmonized and unless they agree and act together. This is the solid framework upon which all future policy and international organization must be built. It offers the fullest opportunity for the development of institutions in which all free nations may participate democratically, through which a reign of law and morality may arise, and through which the material interests of all may be advanced. But without an enduring understanding between these four nations upon their fundamental purposes, interests, and obligations to one another, all organizations to preserve peace are creations on paper and the path is wide open again for the rise of a new aggressor.

"This essential understanding and unity of action among the four nations is not in substitution or derogation of unity among the United Nations. But it is basic to all organized international action because upon its reality depends the possibility of enduring peace and free institutions rather than new coalitions and a new pre-war period. Nor do I suggest that any conclusions of these four nations can or should be without the participation of the other United Nations. I am stating what I believe the common sense of my fellow countrymen and all men will recognize that for these powers to become divided in their aims and fail to recognize and harmonize their basic interests can produce only disaster and that no machinery, as such, can produce this essential harmony and unity."

Having thus described the basis of our policy, the Secretary reviewed the stages of agreement already reached in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration and at the Moscow, Tehran, and Cairo Conferences, but remarked upon their limitations in providing "a detailed blueprint for the future," and cautioned that the objectives set forth in the Atlantic Charter provided direction of policy but not specific solutions. He discussed in some detail, as will be seen later, the progress that had been made in our "work upon the form and substance of an international organization to maintain peace and prevent aggression and upon the economic and other cooperative arrangements which are necessary in order that we maintain our position as a working partner with other free nations." He concluded this address, as he had that in the previous September, by emphasizing the need for a nonpartisan approach to foreign policy. He stated:

"All of these questions of foreign policy are difficult and often involve matters of controversy. Under our constitutional system the will of the American people in this field is not effective unless it is united will. If we are divided we are ineffective. We are in a year of a national election in which it is easy to arouse controversy on almost any subject, whether or not the subject is an issue in the campaign. You, therefore, as well as we who are in public office, bear a great responsibility. It is the responsibility of avoiding needless controversy in the formulation of your judgments. It is the responsibility for sober and considered thought and expression. It is the responsibility for patience both with our Allies and with those who must speak for you with them. Once before in our lifetime we fell into disunity and became ineffective in world affairs by reason of it. Should this happen again it will be a tragedy to you and to your children and to the world for generations."

CONFERENCES ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

ALTHOUGH the Department was not successful in its efforts to bring about an early resumption of the Anglo-American economic conversations and the establishment of a United Nations economic steering committee, a series of conferences of a specialized character in the economic, social, and cultural fields were held during the spring and summer of 1944 that led to important developments in postwar arrangements.

Social and Cultural Problems

Exploratory work in the field of postwar cultural relations, as noted earlier, had been initiated in the Department as early as the autumn of 1941. The possible need for an international agency in this field had early been recognized both by the Special Subcommittee on International Organization and the research staff and by the Division of Cultural Relations, where primary responsibility for the Department's

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cultural work rested. In connection with the meeting of the General Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations in February 1943, Under Secretary Welles had raised specifically the question of the desirability of the "possible establishment and operation of an international cultural organization." That Committee the following June had stated its belief that "an international agency for educational relations and cooperation is an essential part of any provisional or permanent world organization," recommending that the Department of State "actively explore the possibility of the early organization of such an agency.” By this time, the establishment of such an agency as part of the organization of the peace was being widely advocated in this country and abroad by educational leaders and by private organizations, some of the work of which stemmed from the earlier League of Nations activities in the furtherance of intellectual cooperation.

Although the outlines of a permanent organization in this field were being projected at an expert level, no specific proposal had as yet been developed in the preparation. Moreover, from the summer of 1942, emphasis began to shift in the Department's thinking from the general long-range problem of international cultural relations to the more immediate and specific one of postwar educational and cultural reconstruction, where it remained until after the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. This development came in part from the realization of a practical and pressing need in this field to be met at the conclusion of hostilities; in part from the impetus given the planning to meet this need by the British-sponsored Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, which began on November 16, 1942, to convene periodically in London; and in part from the thought that out of the international machinery required to handle this particular problem and the experience thus acquired would develop more comprehensive and permanent arrangements for international collaboration in this field. Work was continued on this basis throughout 1943 and the first half of 1944 by the Division of Cultural Relations in collaboration with the Division of Political Studies, much consideration being given to related developments in connection with the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, at whose meetings this Government was represented by an observer from May 1943.

The Conference of Allied Ministers of Education took steps in October 1943 to broaden the base of its membership, to strengthen its structure, and to explore the possible creation of an inter-Allied bureau of education that might become the permanent international agency in this field. Following this decision, favorable consideration was given in the Division of Cultural Relations to the possibility of transforming the conference into a United Nations cultural agency. That Division,

"Cf. p. 53.