timing, scope of subjects, and representation in such discussions. Further discussion between Ambassador Harriman and Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky ensued on the 16th. On the 17th unqualified Soviet approval of the proposed announcement was given. Since meanwhile both the British and Chinese Embassies had agreed to it, the following announcement by the Secretary was released to the press immediately:

"The four governments signatory to the Declaration of Moscow are agreed that informal conversations and exchanges of views on the general subject of an international security organization will soon begin in Washington, probably early in August. It has been decided, following discussions with the other governments, that the first phase of the conversations will be between representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union and that conversations on the same subject between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China will be carried on either at the same time or shortly thereafter. These conversations will be followed by discussions with the other United Nations." The essential arrangements had been so far advanced by these developments through July 17 as to make possible the exchange of papers. Accordingly, copies of the "Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization," dated July 18, were handed in strictest confidence to the British, Soviet, and Chinese Embassies and also sent to London, Moscow, and Chungking on the same date. Hope was expressed that copies of any similar proposals the others might have would be given to this Government for study prior to the meetings.

While the desired exchange was thus again urged, the questions of exact opening date and of whether the meetings should be in concurrent or successive series remained the immediate matters to resolve. These were considered further in an instruction from the Secretary to Ambassador Harriman late on the 18th, in which the opening date of August 2 and the plan to hold the two series concurrently continued to be favored.

con

The Soviet Government by aide-mémoire on July 20 proposed to start "approximately on August 10" and stated that it desired to have the two series in succession, expressing willingness to see either series come first. It did not think prior exchanges of papers necessary, sidering that the purpose of "the informal discussions" themselves was to reach "a common point of view" on the main questions of the organization of security. It favored acceptance of a less binding basis of discussion in the beginning. It felt that such a preliminary discussion of views would possibly contribute to a more rapid arrival by the Allied Governments at drafts on the world security organization—such drafts would serve afterward as the basis on which an agreed draft by 8 See appendix 38.

the three Governments could be worked out. After interchange of views in Washington, it concluded, the participating parties could present their proposals in written form.

In the American reply sent on July 22, similarly made by aide-mémoire, the suggested date of August 10 was accepted. Preference was expressed for holding the first cycle of meetings with the Soviet Dele gation, which would be followed as soon as possible by the second cycle with the Chinese, provided this were satisfactory to the British. It was stated that we were prepared to consider in the forthcoming discussions any or all parts of the United States Tentative Proposals.

While efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on arrangements rested briefly at this point, the British views, in the form of five memoranda on major aspects of general international organization, were received on July 22. Actual exchange of documents was thereby effected as among two of the parties to the scheduled "conversations."

The Chinese Embassy was informed by the Department two days V later of the status of arrangements and that we proposed to keep the Chinese apprised of developments during the cycle of discussions with the British and Soviet representatives. In light of this intention, the hope was expressed to the Chinese that in the second cycle an accord could be reached without great delay. The Chinese Embassy had no objection to the proposed procedure, which had recently been suggested orally to the Department by the British Embassy in the interest of shortening the length of time the British officials participating in the "conversations" would have to remain in Washington, and this desideratum was again stressed by the Embassy on July 26. On that date, the British, in view of the Soviet desires, acceded to the delay of talks with the Chinese until after the first cycle. By this time, the British had also agreed to accept the latest proposed opening date of August 10.

Doubt of the Soviet ability to arrive so soon, however, had set in by July 26. The British Embassy pointed out to the Department on that day that their group would also find it difficult to arrive from London quite so early, unless their officials were to come by airplane. August 14 was then suggested in telegrams from Mr. Stettinius, Acting Secretary, to the United States Ambassadors in London and Moscow, July 28, and the new proposed date was immediately agreed upon by all and shortly announced.

However, late in the evening on August 4, Mr. Vyshinsky requested Ambassador Harriman to come to the Foreign Office. He there explained that the Soviet Government wished more time to study our Tentative Proposals, with a view to instructing the Soviet representatives on the American points, and consequently asked for postpone

ment of meetings until August 21, 1944. The Ambassador commented in his cabled report that the Soviet representatives had been able to receive the draft proposals, which had been sent by courier, only on August 2 and were still translating them the next day. President Roosevelt was consulted concerning the request, and the British were immediately apprised of it. On the 7th, we telegraphed our acceptance of August 21 as the opening date and so informed the Chinese Embassy by telephone and announced it publicly that same day.

No further change proved necessary on this matter, the most procedural of those involved, which had taken five weeks to arrange. Ambassador Harriman received from Mr. Molotov on the 12th a note of appreciation for the postponement.

A full exchange of papers prior to the meetings, beyond that with the British, was delayed for some time further but, despite earlier indications to the contrary, was eventually accomplished. The Soviet Memorandum on the International Security Organization was presented to the Department on August 12. The Chinese paper on Essential Points in the Charter of an International Organization was received August 22. An earlier suggestion of Soviet views, moreover, had been received and considered in the Department. This was in the form of an article by "N. Malinin" in an issue of Zvezda, a Soviet literary publication. The article had been reported by Ambassador Harriman on July 24 to be of direct interest in reflecting official Soviet views, since the attention of the American Embassy in Moscow had been drawn to it, as worth special notice, before its publication. There was, of course, no certainty that the views in it would turn out to be those of the Soviet Government.

The negotiations concerning the main aspects of arrangements described above were supplemented by messages of an informational nature concerning the representatives being designated by each of the four Governments. The high level of the "informal conference" as envisaged from the outset was reflected in these designations. The exchanges of information on them were initiated formally by a cable from Secretary Hull to the American Ambassadors in London, Moscow, and Chungking on July 18, 1944. This cable requested that the Foreign Minister be informed that Secretary Hull would be the senior United States representative and would take part in consideration of basic policy, and that Under Secretary Edward R. Stettinius, would head the American Group in the more technical and detailed discussions. The list of representatives it contained, totaling seventeen, was tentative and was to be somewhat enlarged before its completion.

Information had already been received informally through conversation with British Embassy officials as early as June 26 indicating who several principal members of the British Group might be and

naming Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as the leader of the delegation. The Soviet aide-mémoire of July 9 had informed the Department that the participation of Ambassador Andrei A. Gromyko in the negotiations had been authorized. On July 12, conversations with officials of the Chinese Embassy showed that the Chinese Government was giving thought to the composition of the Chinese Group. After further information from all three arrived, though still not complete, the announcement of the American Group was made, August 1, 1944. The statement emphasized that the meetings opening at Dumbarton Oaks would be "informal conversations" and repeated that they would be exploratory in

nature.

Although a few more conversations were held between the Department and the Embassies of the three Governments in connection with the details of arrangements and additional informational telegrams on the several delegations were received, no further major matters arose before the "conversations," with one exception. This was the information conveyed orally by the British Embassy to Acting Secretary Stettinius, August 8, 1944, that, on instructions, the head of the British Delegation would be prepared on his arrival to discuss with the Secretary the possibility of a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the four major powers in September. After the arrival of the British Delegation, the Secretary, in a talk with the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Sir Alexander Cadogan on August 14, suggested that "before" a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries "on international matters and especially to decide on any formal agreement possibly in September, it would be very important first to discuss steps toward conferring with the small nations." Secretary Hull added that if the four nations "should go on until they turned out to the world a completed document" and then sent "copies to the small nations in a ‘take it or leave it' manner, as the whole movement would be construed, it would be difficult to avoid serious attacks" from various quarters. He asked that this suggestion be raised in the British Government for consideration.

No separate meeting of Foreign Ministers of the major powers occurred that was of the nature under discussion between August 8 and 14, 1944. The same question of the role of the smaller states raised by the Secretary in this regard, however, was the proximate cause for the new series of consultations within the United States on the Tentative Proposals, which developed in connection with a statement by Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York five days before the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations opened.

The full listing of the American and other groups is deferred to the next chapter on the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.

NONPARTISAN SUPPORT OF "TENTATIVE PROPOSALS"

At the time of the consultations with the senatorial group and the three eminent jurists late in April and in May 1944,10 and hence several weeks before the Republican Party Convention, steps were initiated to ascertain the prospects of a favorable statement by Governor Dewey, widely regarded as the leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, on international security organization. These steps were undertaken on the initiative of Myron C. Taylor and approved by Secretary Hull and by the President, with a view to assuring nonpartisanship on this matter in the approaching political campaign. After consulting with several eminent Republicans long active in Party positions, who, in turn, conferred with Mr. Dewey, and one of whom conveyed, in confidence, a copy of the April 29 draft of the "Possible Plan" to Governor Dewey, Mr. Taylor reported to the Secretary by memorandum. The memorandum, dated June 8, 1944, and thus sent prior to the nomination of a candidate by the Republican Convention, stated that "a direct approach" had not yet been made "in the matter we discussed." Caution in doing so, this memorandum continued, had been "dictated, on second thought, by the doubt whether a definitive statement might not be under some circumstances misused, and that he is only one of several in the field up to the moment." The memorandum concluded: "I am following the matter closely but do not want to make a wrong move at this time which might injure the project." No further developments in this direction were reported by the time Mr. Taylor wrote, on June 15, 1944, that at the President's request he was leaving for Rome, now that the German forces had evacuated that city, to resume his mission for the President to Pope Pius XII. Mr. Taylor was therefore unable to take any further direct part in the preparation, but on this trip he informed the Pope of the lines of American thought concerning the proposed general international organization.

The Republican Party Convention at Chicago, which nominated Governor Dewey for the Presidency and Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio for the Vice Presidency, adopted on June 27 a plank in its platform favoring

"... responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world.

"Such organization should develop effective cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repel military aggression."

The Democratic Party Convention at Chicago, which nominated Franklin D. Roosevelt for a fourth term as President and Senator 10 See p. 263 ff.