General Grove-White, and Professor Webster, with Messrs. Gage and Mackenzie as combined advisers and secretaries. The acting Chairman of the American members throughout these meetings was Mr. Pasvolsky, the other members being Messrs. Dunn, Grew, and Hackworth and Admiral Train. The advisers and secretaries, aside from Messrs. Notter, Gerig, and Yost who continued as in the earlier phase, included Mr. Sandifer, Miss Fossdick, and Mrs. Brunauer. In the meetings of the 6th, however, most of the representatives, advisers, and secretaries of the American Group were present to hear the explanation and discussion undertaken that day of the provisions of the Proposals in their entirety.

The Group of Military Representatives of the Delegations held its single meeting on October 6. General Strong was its presiding officer, the members being Generals Shang and Mow, Admiral Liu, and Mr. Pu Hsueh-feng with Dr. Tan and Dr. Chen as counselors and secretaries, for China; Air Vice-Marshal Willock, Commodore Clarke, and General Grove-White for the United Kingdom; and Generals Strong and Fairchild and Admiral Train, with Messrs. Blaisdell and Eagleton, Colonel Caraway, and Captain Creighton as advisers and secretaries for the United States. This was the last of the organized committees used in the Chinese Phase.

The delegations carried on their work much as in the earlier phase. However, the American Group met but twice, October 3 and 7. It used no committees except the so-called "Fletcher Committee," which continued working on the questions of the possible location of the new organization and its organs and on the languages that should be given official status in their conduct of work. While reports to the American Group on these subjects were not completed at Dumbarton Oaks, the papers developed were used in the subsequent preparation in the Department. These two matters were not considered with the Chinese except to inform them that in the Soviet Phase postponement of discussion had been agreed upon informally. As before, Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt were kept informed of the progress of the Conversations by memoranda from the Under Secretary. However, Secretary Hull had been compelled by illness to leave his desk three days after opening the Chinese Phase, and it was no longer possible to discuss matters with him as fully or as frequently as heretofore.

The Conversations proceeded steadily and without encountering serious obstacles. The Joint Steering Committee tentatively decided on October 2 not to attempt to change the proposals and adopted the alternative procedure of placing in a separate document the additional points that China, the United Kingdom, and the United States believed should be included in the charter when drawn up. Two prin

cipal considerations were taken into account in this decision. The first was that the proposals, as written in the Soviet Phase, had been deliberately limited to the machinery and procedure considered essential for the organization and to statements of principle for the implementation of which machinery was provided. The second was that any changes in the proposals as drafted would require referral to the Soviet Government and therefore involve delay.

Discussions of a substantive character commenced in the Steering Committee the same day. A large number of questions were presented by the Chinese and examined on October 2 and during the next four days. Among the earliest of these was whether the use of force in self-defense was to be regarded as consistent with the purposes of the レ organization. Much consideration was given to the question of voting in the Security Council, though all in terms of analysis and possibilities for solution and without any further attempt to resolve the issue at this time.

Specific points to consider for inclusion in the proposals arose in the Joint Formulation Group on October 3. Aside from those postponed for study in connection with the statute of the court, withdrawn after analyzing the existing provisions of the proposals, or left for later consideration at the general United Nations conference where a complete charter would be written, three points led to the formulation of joint suggestions that day. These were that the charter should provide for settlement of disputes "with due regard for principles of justice and international law"; that the assembly should be responsible for studies and recommendations concerning the development and revision of the rules and principles of international law; and that the articles on the economic and social council should specifically provide for the promotion of educational and other forms of cultural cooperation. In the view of the Joint Steering Committee, these three suggestions were essentially clarifications that gave desirable emphasis to important aspects of the proposals or represented development of broad provisions already set forth in that document.

It was agreed at the Steering Committee's meeting the next day that these three matters should be discussed later with the Soviet Government in the hope of incorporating them in the charter at the general United Nations conference. For the present, they would be considered as additional to the questions left open at the close of the Soviet Phase and would accordingly not be presented with the joint proposals when issued.

In the same meeting, October 4, Mr. Stettinius referred to certain remarks made by the President the day before concerning the sugges-\ tion of the Soviet Delegation to extend membership to the Soviet Republics, which the President had characterized as "absurd." Ambas

sador Koo was then informed of the developments on this "very delicate question" and the opposition that had been expressed to the suggestion during the Soviet Phase. He was told that "in all probability it will never be possible to agree to the Soviet proposal," which the President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo at "some later time" would probably have to take up with Marshal Stalin. The members of the Committee were urged to keep the matter in strict confidence. The view was expressed that "the whole civilized world would be shocked by such a proposal," which "if not handled properly" and if it became "a matter of gossip," would lead to violent criticism of the Soviet Union and "might jeopardize the success of the movement for an international organization."

After the meetings between October 4 and 6, during which the thorough examination made of the joint proposal as a whole was completed, an additional problem in establishing the new organization was considered. This problem was the transition from the League of Nations to the new organization, involving the liquidation of the League, the transfer of some of its continuing functions, and also the problem of membership for the United and Associated Nations that were members of the League. Of the League's forty-five members at this time, twenty-eight were United or Associated Nations. Of the forty-four United and Associated Nations, 15 were not members of the League, including of course the United States and the Soviet Union. While the initiation of action with respect to the League would rest with those nations that were members of the old organization and would enter the new, all the members of the new would be called upon sooner or later to have an opinion on this matter. In an informal gathering of the Joint Formulation Group early on October 7, this problem was explored and arrangements were made for an early exchange of "research papers" preparatory to an eventual Four Power proposal to the general United Nations conference.

PUBLICATION OF THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS

APPROVAL OF the "Proposals For the Establishment of a General International Organization" and of the plans for their publication was given by the Secretary of State and the President on October 7, 1944. At that time-the last day of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations-the next steps had not been fully considered. The American Group in its final meeting at 11 a. m. that day was informed of the President's thought, which had been developing for some weeks past, that a meeting should be held between himself, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin and that in the long run it would be best to have the question

of voting in the Security Council dealt with "at the top level." 0 If such a meeting among these Heads of Government were not held soon, the Group was told, a meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries might be arranged.31

The British, Chinese, and American approval of the Proposals was announced in the closing plenary session just before noon, October 7, and the communiqué to close this phase was then agreed upon. In the concluding remarks, gratification that so much progress had been made in this phase and in the entire Conversations was expressed. On that day also a message of appreciation of the hospitality extended to the Soviet Delegation was sent by Ambassador Gromyko to Mr. Stettinius.

The Proposals were published on October 9, 1944, annexed to a communiqué issued simultaneously by each of the four Governments, which stated:

"The Governments which were represented in the discussions in Washington have agreed that after further study of these proposals they will as soon as possible take the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations conference."

Copies of the Proposals were transmitted by this Government, shortly in advance of their general release, to the congressional consulting groups, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Justices of the Supreme Court, Mr. Dulles, and to all American diplomatic missions.32

The Chairman of the American Group described the Proposals as "the unanimously agreed recommendations of the four delegations" that had taken part in the Conversations and as comprising "substantial contributions from each" delegation. "The few questions which remain for further consideration, though important," he said, "are not in any sense insuperable.

...

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30 Since a meeting of Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin in Moscow was imminent, President Roosevelt on Oct. 3 suggested to them that Ambassador Harriman be present as an observer, without power to commit this Government relative to any important matters that might be discussed and said that the President viewed this meeting as preliminary to a conference of the three Heads of Government to be held any time after the national election in this country. Telegram published in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 834.

"In this regard, see above, p. 285. A further British suggestion, Oct. 4, that the Foreign Ministers of the participating governments hold a follow-up meeting is referred to in Memoirs of Cordell Hull, H, 1708. A meeting of Foreign Ministers eventuated only in connection with the Heads of Government conference at Yalta, four months later.

In a statement issued on October 9, Secretary Hull commented that the Proposals were "neither complete nor final" and that "much work remains to be done," but he stated that they were "sufficiently detailed to indicate the kind of an international organization" that in the judg ment of the four Governments "will meet the imperative need of providing for the maintenance of international peace and security." Reviewing then the American preparation in this respect, he said:

"We in this country have spent many months in careful planning and wide consultation in preparation for the conversations which have just been concluded. Those who represented the Government of the United States in these discussions were armed with the ideas and with the results of thinking contributed by numerous leaders of our national thought and opinion, without regard to political or other affiliations."

His "earnest hope" for the period ahead was that "discussion in the United States on this all-important subject will continue to be carried on in the same non-partisan spirit of devotion to our paramount national interest in peace and security which has characterized our previous consultations." In his concluding comments the Secretary said:

"It is, of course, inevitable that when many governments and peoples attempt to agree on a single plan the result will be in terms of the highest common denominator rather than of the plan of any one nation. The organization to be created must reflect the ideas and hopes of all the peace-loving nations which participate in its creation. The spirit of cooperation must manifest itself in mutual striving to attain the high goal by common agreement.

"The road to the establishment of an international organization capable of effectively maintaining international peace and security will be long. At times it will be difficult. But we cannot hope to attain so great an objective without constant effort and unfailing determination that the sacrifices of this war shall not be in vain." The President, in a statement also on October 9, commented that his impression of the Proposals was one of satisfaction "that so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time." He stated that "from the very beginning of the war, and paralleling our military plans, we have begun to lay the foundations for the general organization for the maintenance of peace and security," and that this represented "a major objective for which this war is being fought . . ."35 Three days later the President expressed the feeling of urgency that continued to mount after the close of the Conversations:

"We must press forward to bring into existence this world organization There is no time to lose.

"It is our objective to establish the solid foundations of the peace

"Ibid., p. 366.

35 Ibid., p. 365.