of Territorial Studies, who were also ranking members of the Department's interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East, George H. Blakeslee and Hugh Borton. Among the representatives of the War and Navy Departments on the Subcommittee during the period of concern here were General Strong and Admiral Train, each of whom had long been associated with the preparation in the Department of State. The basic instruments and directives drawn up in the Far East Subcommittee had undergone a lengthy process of review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the full State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and consequent revision, before approval by the President. Allowing for the adjustments required by developments since the autumn of 1944, the basic policy decisions directly concerning the problems of surrender and occupation of Japan reflected in these papers and in the Potsdam Proclamation involved no radical departure from the policy recommendations made on these problems by the Post-War Programs Committee. This Committee had explicitly recognized in making its recommendations that future developments might make some of the procedures and policies advocated not "entirely applicable." The Yalta Agreements on the Far East made in the same intervening period related only indirectly to surrender and occupation policies and procedures and did not derive from the preparation. As noted above, the problems of liberated areas so far as they concerned individual countries had become matters for day-by-day decision and action by this final period of the war. The more general question of major-power policy raised by these problems, however, was still to some degree within the scope of the preparation because of its far-reaching implications regarding continued cooperation among the major Allies and of its relationship to the plans, now in their final stage of development, for a general international organization. The question arose specifically from the circumstances developing in Eastern Europe, particularly in connection with the re-establishment of governments in Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia and in the exsatellite states, as already noted, where a marked divergence had appeared in the policies of the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and of the Soviet Union on the other. Preparatory to the Crimea Conference and on the basis of suggestions made by the Office of European Affairs on January 8, 1945, proposals were drafted for the immediate establishment, as a joint temporary agency, of an emergency high commission for liberated Europe, together with the issuance of a Four Power declaration of policy toward liberated areas by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union and the Provisional Govern ment of France. The purposes of these proposals, in the words of the recommendation formulated, were to meet the urgent need for these four nations to achieve unity of pol icy, and joint action, with respect to: "1. Political problems emerging in the former occupied and satellite states of Europe, such as the return of certain exiled governments, the setting up of provisional regimes, the maintenance of order within countries, and the arranging of early elections where necessary to establish popular and stable governments; "2. Immediate economic problems such as the care for destitute populations and the restoration of functioning economic life of particular countries." An initial discussion of these problems and their relationships to the plans for international security organization and to the winning of the war itself was held on January 10, 1945, between Assistant Secretary Dunn, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Bohlen, and the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews and John D. Hickerson, respectively. Subject to the review of the above-named superior officers, drafting was placed in the hands of an ad hoc group from the Office of Special Political Affairs and its Divisions, composed of Messrs. Wilson, Notter, Sandifer, Gerig, and Joseph E. Johnson and Miss Fosdick, working with the collaboration of Robert W. Hartley of Mr. Pasvolsky's office. The recommendations and papers on a joint declaration and an emergency high commission were completed January 16, 1945. After approval by Secretary Stettinius, in discussion with his ranking associates in the Department, they were transmitted by him to the President, together with the papers on other questions within the concern of the Department of State in connection with the Crimea Conference." The continuing work on the treatment of Germany and Japan, described above, and the formulation of proposals for major-power agreement on Allied policy in liberated areas were the last activities. in the territorial field that were in any measure identifiable with the special preparation on postwar policy problems. 'See appendix 51. See p. 394. CHAPTER XIX Continuing Preparation for General A LTHOUGH THE proposals resulting from the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations encompassed most of the fundamental aspects of the international security organization, the remaining preparatory work was prolonged and some of it was difficult. An appreciable amount of this work was done in anticipation of the Crimea Conference to which the preparation looked for the decisions essential to further progress in creating an international security organization. While policy recommendations on the questions pending were being determined, further congressional consultations were held and participation in public discussion undertaken. These activities are discussed immediately below, but description of the exploratory talks with representatives of the other American republics, which took place concurrently, is deferred for presentation in connection with the Mexico City Conference, to which they were related. THE "OPEN QUESTIONS" IT WILL BE recalled that when the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were published, October 9, 1944, not only the voting question but several other questions had been left "open" and that a full United Nations Conference was contemplated as soon as agreement had been reached on certain of these questions among the governments that had taken part in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. It was to the six open questions that Under Secretary Stettinius referred in a memorandum to Secretary Hull, October 14, 1944, commenting that the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations had reached "only ninety percent" agreement. The "open" status of these questions had resulted from failure to agree in the case of two questions considered intensively in the Conversations, from agreement to postpone several questions not regarded as immediate, and in the case of trusteeship from unreadiness to hold discussion. The two questions that had been the most difficult in the Conversations were also the most urgent: voting in the Security Council and initial membership of the organization. Location of the organization's headquarters was a question that had been foreseen in the Conversations but, aside from sporadic private talks, had not been discussed; with this question was associated the matter of official languages to be used in the organization, which did not appear to present critical difficulty. Territorial trusteeship had not been taken up in the Conversations, apart from informal expression of interest by each of the foreign governments at Dumbarton Oaks in its future consideration with a prior exchange of papers. A consensus had rapidly been reached in the discussion at Dumbarton Oaks bearing on the statute of the court to defer its drafting to a meeting of jurists. The last question was the transition from the League of Nations to the new organization, which had only been raised informally and outside the agenda in the Chinese Phase of the Conversations. Aside from these questions there were also, of course, the three additions to the Proposals on which the Governments represented in the Chinese Phase had agreed to consult the Soviet Government in due course, but on these no special preparation was required. Although work on the six open questions began promptly after October 9, no organized procedure of preparation was instituted then. Superior structure was soon created, on a temporary basis, but no fixed group or committee at a working level was developed. Frequent drafting meetings, however, were held by the Special Assistant to the Secretary in charge of the substantive work in this field. The superior committee was composed of Acting Secretary Stettinius, presiding, and Messrs. Hackworth, Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Wilson, with the executive assistance of G. Hayden Raynor as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary. Its purpose was to guide the "follow-through" work on the open questions, with a view to conferring with the President as soon as possible in regard to the policies to be adopted on these questions and to determining the further steps to be taken toward the eventual United Nations conference to write the Charter. Mr. Stettinius was able to report in the first meeting of this committee on November 1, 1944, that the President's general plan was to cover all the open items requiring decision in a conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin but that arrangements for such a conference were not completed. On the same occasion, the committee agreed upon the importance of having, after such a meeting of the three heads of government, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics. 1 Mr. Raynor became Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after Dec. 20, 1944. Mr. Stettinius was Acting Secretary of State Oct. 21-Nov. 30, 1944, becoming Secretary of State Dec. 1, 1944. 843388 49 25 In the second meeting, November 2, the possibility of exchanging, among the Dumbarton Oaks conferees, papers on international trusteeship was suggested, and it was decided to ask for a naval representative and a military representative to join in the next meeting to consider this matter. There was also agreement that, in the absence of Secretary Hull, Acting Secretary Stettinius should undertake after the election to resume consultations with the congressional groups. Admiral Willson representing the Navy Department and General Strong temporarily representing the War Department attended the third meeting on November 8, bringing the total group to seven. This meeting touched on several of the pending questions, but especially on two. On one of these, trusteeship, consideration was inconclusive. The other, voting, was discussed on the basis of a memorandum written by a small number of experts drawn from among the senior officers of the Office of Special Political Affairs and its Divisions, working with Mr. Pasvolsky and his Executive Assistant, Mr. Hartley. This group consisted largely of the same experts who had been concerned with this complex problem during the life of the earlier Informal Political Agenda Group. The memorandum under consideration embodied the conclusions reached in a discussion held on the previous Saturday by Messrs. Dunn, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky and attended by the drafters. The issue continued to appear precisely as it had during the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. It was not the requirement of unanimity among permanent members in reaching decisions on substantive matters in the Security Council. Full agreement existed in that respect. The issue was whether any permanent member when party to a dispute before the Council would be denied a right to vote in reaching the decisions on that dispute during the time its peaceful settlement was being sought by the Council-namely, while the Council was performing its conciliatory and quasi-judicial functions in behalf of pacific settlement of disputes. When, however, the Council's functions of determining the existence of a threat to or breach of peace and of suppression of such a threat or breach were called into play, this issue was not involved, since these functions were of an enforcement character and need of unanimity among the major powers was regarded as controlling. The paper of alternatives considered at the meeting on November 8 supported the above limitation on the unanimity requirement where peaceful settlement was concerned. Such a limitation was regarded as a "compromise," since under it no state would be able to be a judge in its own case when pacific settlement of that case was at issue, and yet the unanimity requirement would not otherwise be affected. This was the basis of the compromise formula that had been conceived at |