posals being put forward from various quarters as to ways and means of handling the many and complex problems involved.

"The Department is concerned with defining and formulating the broad objectives of desirable post-war policies, comprising the restoration of order under law in international relations; the elimination of the crushing burden of competitive armaments; and the creation of the kind of international commercial and financial relations which are essential to the preservation of stable peace and to the promotion of economic welfare for the peoples of all nations. The Department is likewise concerned with studying the various alternative methods of moving toward, and eventually attaining, these broad objectives, in order to be able to apply the basic considerations thus developed to specific situations as and when occasion arises for meeting specific problems.

"For the purpose of facilitating this work, there was established, in January, 1940, a departmental Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. More recently, in order to systematize more effectively the assembling and analyzing of the necessary data, there was created in the Department of State a Division of Special Research, which is charged, among other duties, with the conduct of appropriate studies in the field of post-war problems.

"Studies relating to various specialized phases of the subject, especially as regards problems of economic policy, have also been and are under way in several other interested departments and agencies of the Government, notably the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, the Tariff Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board. The experts of the several departments and agencies working in this field are in contact and consultation with each other, thus making it possible to utilize for the purpose in view the resources of the entire executive branch of the Government."

Concurrently, the events growing out of the war were etching a more portentous picture of national concern. An American ship, the S. S. Robin Moor en route to South Africa, was sunk without warning on May 21 by a German submarine. In June, Axis funds in this country were frozen, and the withdrawal of German and Italian consular staffs because of improper activities was requested. Germany and Italy retaliated, asking the withdrawal of American consular staffs from territories under their control. The United States and Canada set up joint economic committees to coordinate defense production and to reduce economic dislocation after the war.

Then, on June 22, 1941, the German Government launched its attack against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The war picture altered swiftly, as the Soviet Union massively defended itself on the Eastern Front, as in the north Soviet-Finnish hostilities were renewed, and as Rumania and Italy entered the struggle in the East. Prime Minister Churchill immediately pledged aid to the Soviet Union. The United States released Soviet credits and promised American aid under its policy of giving assistance to any country fighting aggression. These decisions were basic both to the war and

to subsequent Allied policy and, after United States entrance into ✓the war, led to the collaboration of the major powers of the world in defeating the Axis and in creating the international organization of the United Nations after victory. At the moment, it was a matter of question in most quarters, and disbelief in some, whether the Soviet Union could successfully withstand the German attack.

While the Germans pressed ahead in the Soviet Union during July, United States forces, acting pursuant to an exchange of letters between the United States and Iceland July 1, replaced British forces there in order to prevent a possible German occupation of an outpost of fundamental strategic importance to American security. This Government expressed to the Japanese Government its hope that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union and received the reply that no change of policy was then contemplated.10 A few days later, Japan occupied Indochina. This Japanese action had the immediate effect of removing the basis for continuing the conversations between the United States and Japan that, with exchanges of proposals for a possible general Far Eastern settlement, had been proceeding in Washington during the past several months. Moreover, it threatened essential supplies of American defense materials from the South Pacific. President Roosevelt at once proposed the neutralization of Indochina." While a reply was awaited, the United States froze Japanese assets in this country, July 25, and put petroleum products under embargo with respect to Japan on August 1.12 The reply of the Japanese Government on August 6 side-stepped the President's proposal. Two days later Ambassador Nomura suggested a meeting of the responsible heads of the two states to discuss means of adjusting the relations of their countries.13 Exploratory talks concerning that suggestion began later in August.

POSTWAR STEPS BY MAJOR POWERS

IN AN ADDRESS at the Norwegian Legation in Washington, July 22, 1941, the Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles, suggested "that the free governments of peace-loving nations everywhere should even now be considering and discussing the way in which they can best prepare for the better day which must come, when the present contest is ended . . .” He emphasized that an "adequate instrumentality must unquestionably be found" to achieve peaceful and equitable international adjustments and advocated international control of armaments with a view to "real disarmament," and establishment in the

10 Peace and War, pp. 685, 686–87, 691–92.

future peace of the right of all peoples to equal economic enjoyment. This address directed attention once again to security as the basic objective in the future."4

Two further steps of significance for the postwar preparation were occurring at approximately the same time. The first was the laying of the foundation, during consultations held in London and Moscow by Harry Hopkins as the President's personal representative, for the future system of great power conferences. This took place as the second was being arranged, namely, the cooperative development of postwar policy among the major powers begun by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill at a conference, held in August off the little coastal settlement of Argentia on the Avalon peninsula, Newfoundland, on the current and prospective problems of joint concern arising out of the war.

Mr. Hopkins, in conversation with Premier Joseph Stalin during July, sought information concerning the Soviet military position in relation to the problem of supplying the aid urgently needed on both fronts in the struggle against Germany. Since planning for a long war was necessary and since the relative strategic weight of each front as well as the interest of each country had to be considered in allocating resources, he unofficially suggested the possibility of a conference of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at the conclusion of the current battle on the Eastern Front. Premier Stalin replied that, if officially requested, he would issue invitations for such a meeting. Mr. Hopkins then returned to London and accompanied Prime Minister Churchill to the Atlantic Conference, where his report on his Moscow conversations was considered. The President and Prime Minister Churchill agreed on a joint message to Premier Stalin, sent August 15, officially suggesting a meeting on apportionment of joint resources. The meeting, held at Moscow in September, facilitated the early provision of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union. At the close of this first "Moscow conference," W. Averell Harriman, Chairman of the American Mission, indicated on behalf of all participants that "the conference declares that it is the determination of the three Governments to establish, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, a peace which will give all countries an opportunity to live in security on their own territory without knowing either fear or want." 15

The President and the Prime Minister agreed in their meeting off Argentia upon the issuance of a declaration of common principles on which they based "their hopes for a better future for the world." Agreement was facilitated at the start by the British offer to make available the texts of their wartime agreements and by their assurances "Department of State Bulletin, V, 75–76. 15 Ibid., pp. 134, 180, 276, 365–66.

that no secret commitments stood in the way of the contemplated declaration. Recalling the influence of such commitments on the peace that followed the first World War, the President had been particularly desirous of information on this point.

The declaration known as the Atlantic Charter was written, on the basis of a British draft, by the President and the Prime Minister with the assistance, respectively, of Under Secretary Welles and Harry Hopkins and of Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It was not a formal, signed document, but a statement agreed upon by the two Heads of Government. Two of the "Four Freedoms", freedom from want and freedom from fear, were explicitly included, while freedom of religion and freedom of information were, President Roosevelt subsequently stated, implicit. The Charter, announced August 14, 1941, contained eight points:

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; "Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

"Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

"Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

"Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

"Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

'Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments." 18

16 Ibid., pp. 112, 125.

Although refinements in the text had been made in the proce drafting and redrafting, the substance of the declaration had been readily agreed upon. Only the fourth and eighth points presented difficulty. In the fourth point the clause "with due respect for their existing obligations" was inserted when the Prime Minister stated that, without that clause, the broad postwar economic objectives of the United States draft might conflict with the Ottawa agreements for imperial preference within the British Empire and would have to be submitted to the Commonwealth Governments. The clause was accepted by the United States in order to avoid the delay that would otherwise have been entailed. This discussion reflected the same problem that had been presented earlier and which was to exist for some months thereafter in connection with the drafting of what became Article VII of the Mutual Aid-commonly called Lend-Lease— Agreements. Throughout, the United States insisted on multilateral as opposed to bilateral trade practices and pressed for collaboration in solving postwar world economic problems based on a policy of nondiscriminatory treatment. On the eighth point, the British had preferred in place of "a wider and permanent system of general security," the words "an effective international organization"-a concept about which the President then had some misgivings arising out of the League experience and which he felt might not be fully supported by American public opinion at that time.17

The President in his report to the Congress August 21 termed this declaration "a goal." It provided a broader and more definite basis for comprehensive preparation of postwar policy within the United States Government than had existed heretofore, as well as a statement of basic principles and fundamental policies to which international opinion could rally.

The Soviet Government expressed agreement with the principles of the Charter through its Ambassador to Great Britain in a statement to an Inter-Allied Meeting in London on September 24:

"Considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries, the Soviet Government can state that a consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the Government and peoples of the Soviet Union." 18

This was the second such meeting in London of the Allied Governments. At the first, on June 12, 1941, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the

17

On this point, see Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York, 1946), pp. 6-17.

18 World Peace Foundation, Documents on American Foreign Relations, IV, 214-16. For the resolution adopted, referred to below, see ibid., p. 219.