sideration of alternative solutions for these problems, weighed in terms of how well each solution would accord with all United States immediate and long-range interests. The selection of the preferred alternative solution and its formulation as a policy recommendation followed. In the next-the fourth-stage, decision on the policy recommendation was reached, constituting the position to be taken by the United States in international negotiations on the problem. Where the formulation of joint policy proposals among the major powers was involved, as occurred in several fields, the preparatory work as such was completed only in a fifth stage, which comprised the negotiations among those powers. In such negotiations, initial policy was refined and developed in the light of the positions taken by other governments. These negotiations, from the standpoint of the preparation, were a part of the process of reaching an agreed position in which United States policy was expressed jointly with that of other major powers. This volume describes such negotiations to the extent that they were integral to the process of preparation. Negotiations for final international agreement, and the subsequent process of national decision on the agreement reached, were otherwise steps outside the scope of this study. These other steps, like those by which policy decisions were made and applied in specific current and day-to-day situations, constituted operations and were a part of the usual processes of government. The preparation described here took full account of such current developments as they would or might affect the situation to be faced after the war, but it was on this postwar situation and its problems that the preparation was concentrated. This volume primarily answers the question: How was postwar foreign policy formulated? It is a record of the special structures, methods, working relationships, and other germane aspects of the extraordinary process instituted by the Department of State and the President during the war for the specific purpose of preparing for the peace. The presentation of the substantive ideas and views on foreign policy thus developed has not been attempted except where these are essential to an understanding of the various stages through which the preparation as a whole passed. Furthermore, this volume, while it reflects to some extent both the conduct of United States foreign relations during the war and the events with which the preparation was in some ways interwoven, is neither a study of such relations nor a history of the period. It includes an account of the many interdepartmental activities of importance in the preparation, though without attempting to portray the individual postwar efforts of the several other Departments and agencies of the Government, or the relationships between domestic and foreign policies in such work. Similarly, it does not attempt to cover in detail the consideration of future policy undertaken in the Department of State itself as a normal part of the operating responsibilities of its regular divisions and offices. Since the extraordinary preparation was extensive and inherently complex, the record is set forth in narrative form. It is written on the basis of the relevant documents-thousands of minutes of meetings, memoranda, reports, telegrams, drafts and revisions of studies, notes on personal ideas and suggestions, as well as matured papers containing recommendations and proposals-and does not constitute an edition of the documents themselves. So far as documents publicly available are quoted, they are cited in footnotes; citation of unpublished documentary materials has been considered impractical. Obviously in some instances documents of such recent date continue to be within the scope of current international relations and of peace settlement negotiations not yet completed, and their publication is therefore precluded. Illustrative and other selected papers emanating from the preparation, or bearing directly on it, appear however as appendixes to the text. The first effort of preparation for the postwar period was begun during the late autumn of 1939 in the realization that the war would profoundly affect the fundamental interests of the United States. This preliminary preparation, described in Part I, was conducted largely by operating officials of the Department of State working as an Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into the war, special arrangements both as regards personnel and organization were decided upon for intensive exploration of the problems that would have to be dealt with at the conclusion of hostilities. The new instrumentality for this basic preparation was the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, established by direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt with Secretary of State Cordell Hull as Chairman. The Advisory Committee was composed of members drawn from private life, the Congress, the Department of State, and other Departments and agencies of the Government, and was assisted by a specially constituted research staff. The Advisory Committee's work constituted a unique national endeavor directed toward the determination of the future course of the United States in world affairs. Its influence and many of its methods continued throughout the remainder of the preparation. The main period of its activity, 1942-summer 1943, is described in Part II. The multiple processes used for advanced preparation and its progress between the summer of 1943 and the autumn of 1944 are described in Part III. The completion of the unfinished business of the preparation in the closing months of the war is described in Part IV. Because of the informality and flexibility of the preparatory effort during most of its course, unusual measures have been taken to assure the inclusiveness and accuracy of this record through its review by a large number of the superior officials, private citizens, and staff members who took part in the effort itself. Aside from present officials of the Department of State, these reviewers included former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Ambassador Myron C. Taylor, Isaiah Bowman, Leo Pasvolsky, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Ambassador James Clement Dunn, Judge Green H. Hackworth, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Benjamin V. Cohen, and from the former research staff for the preparation, George H. Blakeslee, William Adams Brown, Jr., Bernard F. Haley, and David Harris. Copies of the manuscript were also sent to former Secretary Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and to former Under Secretary Sumner Welles, whose health, however, did not permit them to undertake detailed review. The book was written by Harley A. Notter, Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. Research and editorial assistance was given by a small staff comprised of Mrs. Virginia Fox Hartley of the same Office, Denys P. Myers of the Office of the Legal Adviser, and George Verne Blue of the Division of Historical Policy Research. Miss Edna R. Fluegel, Mrs. Alice M. McDiarmid, and William Diebold, Jr., also assisted in the early research. All of these had previously participated in the extraordinary preparation itself. Further research aid in selected fields was contributed by cooperating officers in various parts of the Department, particularly by Daniel M. Braddock of the Foreign Service, J. M. Colton Hand of the Division of Commercial Policy, John Parke Young of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, and Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Relations Staff of the Department of State. June 26, 1949. Part I THE BEGINNING OF PREPARATION 1939-1941 If the warfare now in progress on other continents becomes intensified, its effects will fall more and more heavily upon us, as well as upon those directly engaged. If peace should come, we shall be confronted, in our own best interest, with the vital need of throwing the weight of our country's moral and material influence in the direction of creating a stable and enduring world order under law, lest the relations among nations again assume such a character as to make of them a breeding ground of economic conflict, social insecurity, and, again, war. "It is a comforting thought that since the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, our people have shown a remarkable degree of unity in meeting the vast complexity of problems thrust upon us by that catastrophe. Only thus can we keep strong within, insure the safety and security of our own Nation, and make our appropriate contribution toward helping the world as a whole to seek and find the road of peace and progress. Never before was there greater need in this country for resoluteness of spirit, clear thinking, breadth of vision, and willingness to deal with the grave problems before us in the light of those basic and crucial considerations which affect the lives of each and every one of us today, and which will be decisive in shaping our Nation's future." -Excerpt from statement by Cordell Hull, 5 |