C. Line "C"

This line follows the eastern boundary of the province (województwo) of Bialystok from the former Polish-Lithuanian border to the Bug River, and the Soviet-German partition line of 1939 thereafter.

D. Line "D"

This line is identical with line "C" as far as the northern boundary of Eastern Galicia; from that point it continues along the Bug River upstream to the city of Kamionka Strumilowa, whence it runs due south and follows the eastern boundary of the province of Lwów to the point where it meets the BóbrkaPrzemyślany road; it then turns west to run south of the city of Bóbrka to the point common to the three districts (powiaty) of Lwów, Bóbrka and Zydaczów, and follows, with slight deviations, the eastern boundary of the province of Lwów to the former Polish-Czechoslovak frontier. This line follows an alternative western boundary of Eastern Galicia proposed by the British Delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919.

E. Line "E"

This line follows the eastern boundaries of the following districts leaving them all within Poland: Swięciany, Wilno-Troki, Oszmiana, Lida, Szczuczyn, Wolkowysk, Bielsk; it then follows the Soviet-German partition line of 1939 from Niemirów (the point where the administrative boundary between the districts of Bielsk and Brześć-nad-Bugiem meets the Bug River) to the former frontier between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

F. Line "F"

This line is identical with Line "E" as far as the point common to the three districts of Bielsk, Brześć-nad-Bugiem and Pruzana; it then follows the eastern boundaries of the following districts, leaving them all within Poland: Brześćnad-Bugiem, Luboml, Wlodzimierz, Sokal, Zolkiew, Lwów, Bóbrka, Zydaczów and Kalusz.

G. Line "G"

This line follows the eastern boundaries of the provinces of Bialystok and Lublin, then the southern boundary of Wolyn and the eastern boundary of Tarnopol thus leaving to the Soviet Union the four eastern provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek, Polesie and Wolyń.

H. Line "H"

This line is identical with Line "G," except for the attribution to Poland of the three districts of Brześć-nad-Bugiem, Luboml and Wlodzimierz.

I. Line "I"

This line is identical with Line "F" from the border of Lithuania to the border of Eastern Galicia, whose northern and eastern boundary it follows to the point common to the pre-1939 frontiers of Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union. J. Line "J"

This line is identical with Line "B" (Curzon Line) as far as the northern border of Eastern Galicia, then continuing along the Bug River upstream to the city of Kamionka Strumilowa, and running south along the boundary between the provinces of Tarnopol and Lwów, then along the boundary between Tarnopol and Stanislawów, to terminate at the former Polish-Rumanian frontier near Zaleszczyki.

1. Soviet Strategic Aims

II. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The territory between Line "A" and the former Polish-Soviet frontier provided a cushion for absorbing the German attack in 1941; the time which the Soviet armies won by fighting delaying actions in former Polish territory may have been a crucial factor in saving Moscow and Leningrad from capture in 1941. On the other hand, it is sometimes maintained that the severe losses suffered by the Red Army in battles of encirclement west of the main line of fortifications along the old Soviet-Polish frontier were too high a price to pay for the time gained. Whatever the military value of this territory to the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet Government will probably see strategic advantages in recovering it. Following rivers for most of its length and anchored on the Carpathian Mountains at its southern end, the line of 1939 (Line "A") could be fortified and made more defensible than the frontier of 1920-1939. From the Soviet viewpoint, all the alternative boundaries to the east of this line would be less satisfactory, since they reduce the width of the protective area which could be used for defensive fighting.

Should the Soviet Union desire to play an active role in Central Europe, it would prefer Line "A" to the other suggested boundaries. Central and Western European nations may look with some apprehension on the extension of Soviet [territory] so far to the west.

2. Polish Strategic Aims

Poland will be in a difficult military position, no matter where the boundary is drawn, and will have to depend for security upon allies among the Great Powers or upon a collective security system. Insofar as Poland's strategic interests are served by keeping the eastern boundary as far as possible from Warsaw and the heart of Poland, Line "A" is the least favorable, and the former PolishSoviet boundary the most favorable.

3. The Northern Sector

The strategic problems in the northern sector are connected with the question of the future disposition of Lithuania. If Lithuania again becomes a Soviet Republic, the Wilno region would probably go to the Soviet Union; otherwise it would be a thin and highly exposed Polish salient projecting into Soviet territory. Lines "E," "F" and "I" would thus be eliminated from consideration.

Line "A", which at one point runs within one hundred kilometers of Warsaw, would put Poland in a difficult strategic position. The "Curzon" line (Lines "B" and "J") would be less objectionable to the Poles on this score, and those which follow the eastern border of the province of Bialystok (Lines "C", "D", "G" and "H") are even better.

If Lithuania becomes independent and enters into close association with Poland, lines "E", "F" and "I", which leave the city of Wilno and five additional districts to Poland, would give Poland a larger block of territory in the north but no special strategic advantages. Wilno, though an important point in any Polish-Lithuanian plan of defense, would be in a very vulnerable location. 4. The Central Sector

There are only two alternative boundaries in the central sector, where seven of the lines (“A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “G”, “J") follow the course of the Bug River, and the other three ("F", "H", "I") follow a line parallel to the Bug about forty kilometers to the east. The Bug makes a fairly good geographic boundary, although it is not a formidable barrier to military operations. The

Poles consider the line of the Bug to be uncomfortably close to central Poland. They would probably feel a greater sense of security if they held Brest-Litovsk, on the eastern bank, and an additional forty-kilometer-wide strip of territory. The Pripet marshes would not serve Poland as a defensive barrier if the Soviet Union held Brest-Litovsk, which lies immediately to the west of the marsh area and is connected by double-tracked strategic railways with Minsk and Kiev. 5. The Southern Sector

The strategic significance of the alternative boundaries in Eastern Galicia lies in their location with respect to the Carpathian Mountains. Those lines which terminate at the former Polish-Czechoslovak border near the source of the San River (lines "A", "B", "C", “E”) bring the Soviet Union to the crest of the Carpathians along the whole northern border of Ruthenia. The most easily traversible passes through the northern Carpathians lie along this border. Three minor railways running through these passes connect the former Polish and Czechoslovak railway systems.

Possession of this Carpathian frontier would probably assure the Soviet Union of a large voice in the affairs of Central Europe. Bordering on the disputed territory of Ruthenia, which is inhabited by a Ukrainian-speaking population, it could make its influence felt in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. Poland and Rumania would be deprived of the common frontier they possessed between 1920 and 1939. The strategic position of the Soviet Union in the face of a potentially hostile Polish-Rumanian bloc or larger East European grouping would be very strong. The possibility that any of the nations of Eastern Europe, singly or in combination, could defend themselves against the Soviet Union, would be small. Lines "D" and "F" partition Eastern Galicia from north to south; they are slightly more favorable to Poland than the San River line. The Soviet Union would still have a Carpathian frontier, but it would be shorter, and the wedge of Soviet territory between Poland and Rumania would be narrower. Under Line "D" the Soviet Union would have access to two Carpathian passes; under line "F" to but one, the Jablonica Pass.

Lines "G", "H" and "I" leave the whole of Eastern Galicia to Poland. The Soviet frontier would be about one hundred miles distant from the Carpathians, as before 1939. If Rumania should retain Bukovina, Poland and Rumania would have a common frontier, and the Soviet pressure upon Central Europe would be somewhat less than if Soviet territory extended to the Carpathians. Poland and Rumania would be directly connected by the strategic Lwów-Cernăuţi railway.

Line "J" is a compromise line running through Eastern Galicia roughly along the administrative boundary between the provinces of Lwów and Stanislawów, on the one hand, and Tarnopol on the other. This line leaves to Poland the crest of the Carpathians all the way to the border of Bukovina. Again, in the supposition of Rumania's retaining Bukovina it would give Poland and Rumania a common frontier and a belt of territory about one hundred kilometers in width east of the Carpathians. The Lwów-Cernăuți railway, which would run within Polish territory at a distance of a few miles from the frontier, would probably be of little use to Poland in a defensive military campaign against the Soviet Union.

The territory lying east of the Soviet-German line of September 28, 1939, (including the district of Suwalki, which was then annexed to East Prussia) had about twelve million inhabitants in 1931, according to the Polish census of that year. Forty percent were listed as Polish-speaking, 34 percent as Ukrainianspeaking, 8.2 as White Russian-speaking, and 1.1 percent as Russian-speaking, The Soviet Union could lay claim, on ethnic grounds, to 49 percent of the population of this area; this figure includes the White Russians, who are concentrated in the northern provinces, the Ukrainians, who inhabit the southern provinces, the Russians, who are scattered throughout the whole area, and the "local" inhabitants of the province of Polesie. The "local" languages of this last-named group are variations and dialects of White Russian and Ukrainian, which the census-takers chose not to classify with those two main language groups.

The Polish-speaking population in the area east of the line of 1939 (Line "A") numbered 4,833,918 in 1931 and over five millions in 1939, according to official Polish figures. The Poles are the majority nationality in the Bialystok, Wilno and Lwów areas, and they represent a substantial element in the population elsewhere. Although the upper and middle class Poles, who made up the greater part of the landlord and professional classes before 1939, will be greatly reduced in number at the close of the war, the Polish peasantry will probably remain as a numerically important minority in both the White Russian and Ukrainianpopulated regions."

2. Political Aspirations of the Different Ethnic Groups

The language statistics, even if assumed to be one-hundred percent accurate, cannot be accepted as an infallible index of the aspirations of the various ethnic groups inhabiting Eastern Poland, particularly when they are limited to a choice between Polish and Soviet rule. It is probably safe to assume that the overwhelming majority of those whose mother-tongue is Polish would favor the restoration of Polish sovereignty. The aspirations of the non-Polish-speaking inhabitants are not so clear.

a. The White Russians.-The White Russian-speaking people of the northern provinces are a culturally backward peasant population, with no coherent political groupings or programs. They had both national and social grievances against the pre-1939 Polish regime; there was some sympathy with the Soviet Union and with Communism. Generally speaking, the White Russians seem to have welcomed the Soviet occupation in 1939, for it meant liberation from their Polish landlords and the distribution of land to the peasantry. Under Polish rule their living standards were so low that there could hardly be any strong objection, on economic grounds, to incorporation in the Soviet Union, despite the adjustments involved in the process of "Sovietization". In the cultural sphere the White Russians of former Poland would probably have greater opportunities for development in association with Soviet White Russia than as citizens of a reconstituted Poland.

b. The Ukrainians.-The case of the Ukrainians is somewhat different. They are more advanced, culturally and politically, than the White Russians. Especially in Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainians had developed both economic and political organizations intended to further the welfare and aspirations of the

19 See T Document 218, "Eastern Poland: Ethnic Composition of the Population." [Not printed.]

17 See Tables I and II for statistics on the ethnic groups on each side of the ten alternative boundaries. [Not printed.]

national community. The prevalence of individual peasant farms in this area has contributed to the growth of a strong feeling of Ukrainian nationalism directed against both Poland and the Soviet Union. Although the Ukrainians of Eastern Poland are divided by religion (some are Orthodox, some Uniate), by differing historical experience (some under Austria, some under Russia), and by varying shades of political opinion, they have been more or less united in their opposition to the Polish state. Very few, in the 1918-1939 period, favored incorporation in the Soviet Ukraine. Given a choice, the majority would probably favor an independent Western Ukrainian Republic, which might include Carpathian Ruthenia and northern Bukovina as well as Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. This solution seems politically impossible now, as it was in 1919.

The year and a half of Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland was not a happy experience for many of the former leading elements among the Ukrainian and White Russian population. The nationalist political parties were liquidated. The intelligentsia and "kulak" elements, and even some Communists, were persecuted. The collectivization of agriculture, gradually introduced in 1940 and 1941, can hardly have been welcomed by the peasants. Generally speaking, however, the elimination of the Polish ruling class and the fact that a distribution of land to the peasants preceded collectivization (which could then be introduced slowly and without the use of force), compensated for the “invasion" of Communist Party men and G. P. U. agents, the absence of political freedom, and the campaign against religion.18

The Ukrainians of this area, for the most part, consider the choice between Polish and Soviet rule as a choice between two evils. Union with the Soviet Ukraine would seem to be a more natural association for them than a return to Polish rule, which has a long record of bitterness and failure.

3. Northern Sector

While in the central and southern sectors Line "A" roughly follows the line of ethnic division between the predominantly Polish area and the area of mixed population, in the north it runs far to the west of any plausible ethnic line. It leaves outside Poland all but a fraction of the province of Bialystok and also the Wilno region (the five districts of Swięciany, Wilno-Troki, Oszmiana, Lida and Szczuczyn); in both these areas the Poles had a 70 percent majority in the census of 1931. This ethnically Polish territory, which contains one and one-half million of the nearly five million Poles living east of Line "A", is contiguous to the purely Polish territory west of Line "A".

The "Curzon" Line (Lines "B" and "J") more nearly approaches the line of division between strongly Polish and mixed territory, although in the absence of statistics on individual communes, it is impossible to tell how nearly they coincide. That part of the province of Bialystok which lies to the west of Lines "B" and "J" (including the Suwalki district) is overwhelmingly Polish. The only districts which have a substantial White Russian population are Grodno, Bielsk and Wolkowysk, which lie, wholly or in part, on the eastern or Soviet side. Lines "C", "D", "G" and "H", following the eastern boundary of the provinces of Bialystok, are slightly more favorable to Poland. They leave to Poland an area with a large Polish majority and with a White Russian minority of about 200,000 living in the area adjacent to Soviet territory. A large Polish population, living in the provinces of Wilno and Nowogródek, would be left within the Soviet Union. The Poles in these two provinces outnumber the White Russians by a margin of nearly two to one (1,315,500 to 703,000) according to the Polish census statistics.

18 See T Document 228, "Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland, 1939-1941." [Not printed.]