This line separates ethnically Polish territory from territory of mixed population. It would leave to the Soviet Union an area of 68,400 square miles, or all but a fraction of the territory in dispute. The population of this area, in 1931, was 10,575,000, of whom 53 percent were Ukrainians, White Russians, or Russians, while 36 percent were Poles. Nearly four million Poles would come under Soviet jurisdiction, while less than one million Ukrainians and White Russians would be left in Poland. Poland would lose the cities of Wilno and Lwów and the greater part of the petroleum, natural gas, and other mineral resources of Galicia. The Soviet frontier would follow the Carpathians along the entire length of the border between Ruthenia and Eastern Galicia. 1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee The discussions of the Political Subcommittee showed a general willingness to accept the Curzon Line if it proved impossible to secure a boundary more favorable to Poland. The continuation of the Curzon Line in Eastern Galicia, though not definitely rejected, was not favored. 2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee The Territorial Subcommittee considered the Curzon Line to be the maximum concession that should be made to the Soviet Union after negotiations. It rejected the continuation of the Curzon Line in Eastern Galicia, recommending that the Soviet frontier should not reach the Carpathians. F. Establishment of the Soviet-German Partition Line of 1939 as the PolishSoviet Frontier (Line “A” on Map 13) This solution is the least favorable to Poland. It would bring the Soviet frontier to within one hundred kilometers of Warsaw and to the crest of the Carpathians along the northern border of Ruthenia. It would leave to the Soviet Union solidly Polish-populated territory in the province of Bialystok as well as all the areas of mixed population. Nearly five million Poles (census of 1931) would be left on the Soviet side of the frontier. 1. Discussion of the Political and Territorial Subcommittees Neither the Political nor the Territorial Subcommittee favored this solution, although it was mentioned in both that the situation in this area at the close of formal hostilities might be such that this line would have to be accepted. III. DOCUMENTATION A. Available Memoranda [research paper numbers omitted] Polish-Soviet Frontier: Alternative Boundaries (Mar. 26, 1943). An analysis of ten alternative boundaries in their strategic, ethnic and economic aspects. [Appendix 17] Poland: Ethnic Composition of the Population East of the Soviet-German Demarcation Line of September 28, 1939 (Jan. 12, 1943). Conclusions based on the mother tongue statistics of the Polish census of 1931. [Appendix 16] A Note on the Eastern Provinces of Poland (June 26, 1942). Statistics on the four provinces of Bialystok, Nowogródek, Polesie and Wolyń, with comments on the relationship of that area to Poland and to the Soviet Union. The Curzon Line (undated). An account of the negotiations of 1919 concerning Poland's frontier with Russia, emphasizing the nart played by the American delegates. An Historical Note on the Republic of the West Ukraine (June 26, 1942). The Role of Eastern Galicia in Transportation and Defense (July 10, 1942). Political Consciousness and Experience of the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, Ruthenia (June 27, 1942). Official Russian Statements (July 1941–November 1942) (Nov. 11, 1942). Soviet War Aims (Dec. 19, 1942). A summary of opinions expressed in Soviet publications in 1941 and 1942. Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland, 1939–1941 (Jan. 23, 1943). The Niemen River (Jan. 23, 1943). B. Maps Polish Series [research paper numbers omitted] Eastern Poland: Distribution of Population According to Mother Tongue; Curzon Line and its Continuation; Hypothetical Lines. Poland: Eastern Frontier. Poland: Distribution of Peoples. Minorities in Poland, 1931. Number of Persons in Main Language Groups, by Provinces. Language Groups East and West of Curzon Line. Sources of Livelihood, East and West of Curzon Line. Employment in Industry, East and West of Curzon Line. Estimated Mineral Resources and Production in 1937. Poland separated from Russia by recommendation of “The Inquiry”, Jan. 21, 1919. Poland, as recommended by “The Inquiry” on basis a) of indisputably Polish population, and/or b) union with Lithuania. Boundary Recommendations of the Commission on Polish Affairs, April 22, 1919. Final Line as approved by the Supreme Council, December 8, 1919. C. Committee Discussions Political Subcommittee: Nov. 28, 1942; Dec. 12, 1942. Territorial Subcommittee: June 13, 1942; June 27, 1942; July 10, 1942; Oct. 9, 1942; Jan. 29, 1943. Security Technical Committee: Jan. 20, 1943. IV. PLANS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Population Changes in Eastern Poland since 1939. Attitudes of Polish Political Groups on the Question of the Eastern Frontier. Political Movements among the White Russians, 1918-1943. Political Movements among the Ukrainians in Poland, 1918-1943. Polish-Lithuanian Relations and the Wilno Question, 1918-1943. Eastern Galicia as an International Problem, 1918-1943. The Importance of the Mineral Resources of Eastern Galicia to Poland. The Origin and History of the "Curzon Line" (to supplement Document [on Curzon Line, undated, above]). APPENDIX 20 May 24, 1943 [Letter From Chairman of Subcommittee on Territorial Problems (Bowman) to Executive Director of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy (Pasvolsky)] On Monday, May 17, I was asked by telephone to Baltimore (General Watson) to call on President Roosevelt the following day at 12:30 to confer with him on a matter that "had arisen in connection with the conferences we are having with our distinguished visitors (Prime Minister Churchill and his party)." As you now know, the question which the President raised with me in this private conference was Libya. . . . At the close the President asked me if it would be possible to prepare a memorandum on the subject for his personal use before his second conversation with Mr. Churchill on Sunday evening, May 23, and have it in his hands by Saturday afternoon, May 22. In making the request he asked for "the results of research on this question." The assignment was given to a group of qualified men on the Research Staff of the Department of State on Tuesday afternoon with general instructions on contents and form as follows: 1) a main text with facts and an analysis of them; 2) a summary not to exceed two pages; 3) a set of interpretative maps. Short conferences between me and the research specialists followed on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday morning. References were assembled from the Library of Congress and the American Geographical Society of New York, as well as the Department of State. The Geographer's Office of the Department handled the map construction. By four o'clock on Saturday, May 22, the final text was revised and final typing done. By seven-thirty Saturday afternoon I delivered the whole of the material, together with a covering letter from me, to the White House usher, Mr. Claunch. When I expressed anxiety over the delivery at such an hour on Saturday, Mr. Claunch replied: "The President has gone into the country. Before departing he left word that the memorandum which Dr. Bowman would deliver was to be given to two secret service men who are now waiting to receive it. They have been instructed to take it by motor car at once to its destination. I can assure you that within an hour it will actually be in the hands of the President." Good organization, sound scholarship, and close teamwork are required to do a job like this. It is unnecessary for me to dwell on the importance to the President of an immediate and reliable response to a matter on which he himself can spend only a few hours at most and which involves consultation and agreement with the head of another government, and especially Mr. Churchill and Great Britain. The Research staff still lacks manpower but it has demonstrated in this instance as in so many others that it is an indispensable agency in the responsible discussion and decision of questions of policy before our government. |