ternational political, territorial, economic, and social affairs and in an organized world order, studies requiring an immediate assumption, one way or another, concerning United States participation were not stressed. Rather, materials needed in any event for policy consideration were made ready, in anticipation of a decision to establish the necessary superior structure for arriving at policy recommendations. It was also one of the principal functions of the Division during this initial period to assist in evolving that superior structure. Uncertainty with respect to organizational plans, as well as the urgent problems developing in connection with the war, continued to block all attempts to institute an effective committee structure for consideration of postwar problems. Other nations now began to approach this Government to ascertain the nature of American postwar preparations. On September 25, a despatch was received from our Legation at Canberra enclosing a document on Australian preparations with respect to "reconstruction," with a request for any similar material on United States "Post-Defense Planning." The British Government in October raised the question whether this Government desired to take part in a joint study with the Allied Governments concerning future international juridical organization. To this, only a reply indicating interest in receiving further information was made. Since a position on any one aspect of future policy was impracticable until fundamental questions concerning related aspects were clarified, the need for prepared American views on all major postwar problems was becoming pressing.

Although a reorganization of the former Advisory Committee was contemplated during the early summer, to be effective by September 1941, no action was taken. Questions concerning the scope and feasibility of such a structure were arising especially because of the prospective postwar responsibilities of the new wartime agencies being established under broad executive orders. Until the early autumn the Office of the Coordinator of Information, established July 11, seemed likely to undertake large-scale preparation in the postwar field. The main question regarding the scope of such responsibilities, however, arose in connection with the Economic Defense Board, established July 30 under Vice President Henry A. Wallace, inasmuch as its functions included advising the President on the relationship of defense measures to postwar economic reconstruction and on steps to expedite the establishment of sound, peacetime. international economic relationships. In a period when defense preparation had paramount claim on attention in all superior posts of the Government, the extent to which such responsibilities could actually be carried out naturally remained unsettled for some time.

Meantime, the fields that would present postwar problems continued to expand, and the need for an organized committee actively to consider them became more urgent. Various possibilities were Vexplored. One was whether some part of the need could be satisfied by the organization of a group of highly qualified persons outside the Department, who could consult in the Department approximately two days a week. As memoranda prepared in the Division of Special Research pointed out, however, The Inquiry under President Woodrow Wilson had worked as effectively as it did only by overcoming many difficulties that, in considerable degree, were attributable to the lack of regular responsibilities and relationships within the Government by the members of The Inquiry. It was believed in addition that postwar preparations must be carried out within the Department in accord with its constitutional responsibility for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy under the President.

Another possible course was to divide postwar economic preparations within the Government, leaving only political problems for consideration by the Department of State. This solution, however, was highly questionable from the standpoint of effective policy formulation and administration. By September 1941 when many of the agencies of the Government had manifested interest in postwar economic policies, it was evident that, unless some integrative plan could be evolved, the individual agencies might each consider war and postwar policy in intermingled fashion, with postwar policy inevitably subordinated to wartime policy and with confusing and time-wasting results. Complete handling of the problems by a single organization was clearly necessary.

On September 12, Mr. Pasvolsky advanced for the consideration of the Secretary a new proposal, supported by a study of developments prepared by the political research staff.25 He proposed that the President be requested to authorize the creation of an advisory committee for preparatory work on all phases of postwar foreign policy. The committee would be appointed by the Secretary of State and work under his chairmanship, or alternatively, the President might himself appoint the committee and designate the Secretary of State as Chairman. In either case, its membership would include Vice President Henry A. Wallace, and a number of prominent persons outside the Department as well as a number of officials of the Department. The Under Secretary of State would be Vice Chairman. One of the Department members would be designated its executive officer. Subcommittees were envisaged for political and territorial problems, armament problems, and economic and financial problems. They would

be composed partly of members of the main committee and partly of representatives of other interested Departments and agencies of the Government. The Division of Special Research and other appropriate divisions of the Department of State and of other Departments and agencies and cooperating nongovernmental organizations would prepare research studies and draft memoranda. All work would be under the authority of the advisory committee, and its recommendations would be made to the President through its chairman.

This proposal for drawing together the resources of the entire Government and the ability outside the Government constituted the basis of the plan finally adopted. Conversations for the purpose of perfecting a recommendation to the President ensued between the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and Mr. Pasvolsky, whom the Secretary desired to have serve as executive officer of the proposed committee. The main outlines of the plan were readily agreed upon, as was also the suggestion that the Division of Special Research should be the secretariat as well as the principal research agency for the main committee and its subcommittees.

Early in October the Secretary and the Under Secretary took up the proposal with the President orally and in general terms, and shortly thereafter a definitive recommendation covering all principal arrangements was drafted. The necessity of defining more specifically the President's general arrangements for the conduct within the Government of economic defense work having postwar implications remained. At that point, however, the world situation was moving into the final throes of crisis that preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Secretary suspended further action on the recommendation.

The crisis was an enveloping one. It heightened during the summer and the autumn simultaneously on sea and land, in the East and in the West. The war was spreading outward from the initial centers of combat. In the Near and Middle East, first Syria and Lebanon and then Iran had become involved in the hostilities. Free French and British forces had invaded the two Levantine states in June in order to prevent their being used, with the acquiescence of the Vichy French, as a base for Axis operations. In August, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran to check Axis infiltration there as the German offensive drove toward the adjacent Soviet oil fields. With the German advance east in Europe and in North Africa and the evident Japanese disposition to move south and west in Asia, the possibility grew of an eventual juncture of these two aggressive powers.

After the U. S. S. Greer had been attacked by a German submarine in American defense waters and after several American merchant ships had been sunk, the President announced on September 11, 1941,

↓

an order to the U. S. Navy to shoot on sight German and Italian vessels of war entering the waters within the limits of the Western Hemisphere. On October 9 he requested Congressional action to amend the neutrality act so as to permit the arming of American flag ships engaged in foreign commerce, and to permit them to carry cargoes to belligerent ports.28 Shortly thereafter, American lives were lost in a submarine attack on the U. S. S. Kearny. The "shooting," the President said, "has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot." " In November the neutrality act was amended as the President and the Secretary of State had recommended, although by a close vote. United States forces, acting upon agreement with the Netherlands and Brazil, occupied Dutch Guiana. Lend-lease aid was extended to the Free French.

27

In an urgent message to President Roosevelt delivered August 28, Premier Konoye invited the President to meet with him to discuss all important problems between Japan and the United States in the Pacific area and to explore means of saving the situation. The President and Secretary Hull considered that a prior meeting of minds on basic principles was necessary to assure success in such a meeting.28 Four principles, in particular, were emphasized by the United States throughout the negotiations with Japan as fundamental to good relations among states: inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations; noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; and reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies.29 In the course of the negotiations that had continued intermittently from the spring of 1941 onward, proposals were exchanged and views were clarified, but the conflicting positions originally asserted by the two participants were not reconciled.

In October 1941 the United States inquired of the Japanese Government its intentions with respect to withdrawal of its troops from China and French Indochina. This point was crucial, but the answer was evasive. On November 7, Secretary Hull warned the Cabinet that relations with Japan were extremely critical. After a Japanese proposal failed to show a clear intent by Japan to pursue a peaceful course, a counterproposal was made by the United States for a broad settlement covering the entire Pacific area. This proposal was considered by the special Japanese emissary, Saburu Kurusu, to

29

President Roosevelt's Message to Congress Dec. 15, 1941, Department of State Bulletin, V, 533-36.

be tantamount to the end of negotiations, though conversations continued. When reports indicated that Japanese forces were being increased in Indochina, the President on December 2 directed that an inquiry be made concerning the reasons. Following the receipt on December 5 of an unsatisfactory reply, the President in a personal message to the Emperor of Japan, December 6, urged withdrawal of the Japanese troops in Indochina; said that the large increases in Japanese land, sea, and air forces there had created a reasonable doubt of the defensive character of the continuing concentrations; and declared that the United States had no other than a peaceful intent toward Indochina and was prepared to seek the same assurances from other states concerned.

DECISIONS ON WAR AND PEACE

DIPLOMATIC negotiations were continuing when Japan without warning attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, at 1:20 p. m., Washington time. Negotiations were formally terminated by Japan fifty-five minutes later.

The following day Congress resolved that "the state of war which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared." Beginning the same day, through other declarations of war or severances of relations by Allied and Axis countries, most of the world became aligned in the decisive struggle. On December 11 Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, and on the same day the existence of a state of war with those countries was recognized by the United States. Further declarations of war or severances of relations followed on both sides. Of the forty-seven neutrals approached by the United States in February 1940 in connection with the proposed conference of neutrals, less than one-half remained disassociated from the war by the end of 1941. After twenty-seven months of uneasy neutrality the United States was committed to world-wide warfare, and the American people immediately attained unity of purpose and action.

The President affirmed to the nation, in an address December 9: "We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows." 30

Diplomatic actions toward both objectives were taken at once and almost simultaneously, first to attain victory, second to prepare for the day when victory had been won.

In the week following the attack on Pearl Harbor, this Government initiated a proposal, embodying earlier steps toward Allied unity of view and action, which became the Declaration by United Nations. 30 Ibid., pp. 476-80.