Part II THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1942-SUMMER 1943 "The outbreak of war made it clear that problems of crucial importance in the field of foreign relations would confront this country as well as other countries upon the termination of hostilities. It became the obvious duty of the Department of State to give special attention to the study of conditions and developments relating to such problems. As the war spread over the earth, the scope of these studies was extended and work upon them was steadily increased, so far as was compatible with the fullest possible prosecution of the war. "By direction of the President and with his active interest in the work, the Department of State undertook, through special groups organized for the purpose, to examine the various matters affecting the conclusion of the war, the making of the peace, and preparation for dealing with post-war problems. In doing this work, we have had collaboration of representatives of other interested agencies of the Government and of many national leaders, without regard to their political affiliation, and the assistance of a specially constituted and highly qualified research staff. We have been aided greatly by public discussion of the problems involved on the part of responsible private individuals and groups and by the numerous suggestions and expressions of opinion which we have received from all parts of the country." -"Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests," radio address by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, September 12, 1943, Department of State Bulletin, IX, 173-179. T CHAPTER IV Organization and Meetings of the HE ADVISORY Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy was a working instrument, national in scope, and composed of specially qualified public officials and individuals from private life. Its purpose was to study world problems of concern to the United States and to submit recommendations for American postwar policy, through the Secretary of State, to the President. It was created in time of grave danger to the country. It was a practical method to clarify the nation's thinking on the problems and issues that lay beyond victory. Victory itself could settle but the first issue, survival. A host of problems, many growing out of the war and others with longer roots in the past, would then have to be faced. The Advisory Committee carried on its work under circumstances in fundamental contrast to those prevailing during the earlier organization for consideration of postwar problems, described in the preceding Part. The most basic uncertainty about the outcome of the war was gone: victory could be assumed. The nature of American participation in the creation of the international order after hostilities no longer gave rise to questions concerning the influence that a neutral United States could or should exert. We, as a principal power among the victors, would share the heavy responsibility of all the victors in determining the character of the postwar world; we would participate in the war settlements; we would decisively influence the nature of any organization of international peace to follow. The opportunity—in recognition of the imperative need-to build a just and enduring peace would assuredly be forthcoming. With these fundamentals clear, but with every question of what, how, when, and where unanswered, the necessity to prepare as fully and wisely as humanly possible was unmistakable. Though the war would be long, the preparation for peace would also need much time. The constantly felt sense of urgency in making the preparation came from a realization of the immensely difficult and basic tasks to be done and of the possibility that postwar policy might have to be implemented in part before hostilities ended. The general national ✓ policy of isolation, reflecting the general temper of the country and its viewpoint during the past two decades, had left the nation unready for action on many world problems, especially those of a political character. The fluidity introduced into world affairs by the revolutionary course of events in those decades, by the changing character of thought and action everywhere since the war had begun, and by the anticipation that this process of change would continue after the war, made necessary a thorough study of the entire emerging scene. The future of states as separate and sovereign entities and the character of their rights and relationships were unsettled. The position, nature, and number of great powers were in flux. Beliefs and desires of whole peoples and areas were being shaped anew. The destruction of resources and the disruption of economic life were already so vast because of the war-and were probably to become so critical-that the prospective postwar economic situation gave rise to profound anxiety. Foremost was the cry for security. Already the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held at Rio de Janeiro, January 15-28, 1942, to permit the consultations projected in resolution XV of the Habana Conference in the event of an act of aggression against any American state by a non-American nation, had adopted a resolution directed specifically toward preparations for the peace. The Rio Meeting asserted in resolution XXV: "1. World peace must be based on the principles of respect for law, of justice and of cooperation which inspire the Nations of America and which have been expressed at Inter-American Meetings held from 1889 to date; "2. A new order of peace must be supported by economic principles which will insure equitable and lasting international trade with equal opportunities for all Nations; "3. Collective security must be founded not only on political institutions but also on just, effective, and liberal economic systems; "4. It is indispensable to undertake the immediate study of the bases for this new economic and political order. The resolution entrusted to the Inter-American Juridical Committee "the formulation of specific recommendations relative to the international organization in the juridical and political fields, and in the field of international security" and to the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee a "similar function in the economic field." The resolution further requested the Pan American Union to call an Inter-American Technical Economic Conference "charged with the study of present and postwar economic problems," the necessary preparations for which would be the responsibility of the InterAmerican Financial and Economic Advisory Committee.1 1For full text of resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, VI, 134–35. In Europe, moreover, the question of the postwar settlement, particularly with respect to boundaries, had been brought to the fore at the time of Foreign Secretary Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941. On that occasion Premier Stalin had suggested, in connection with a projected Anglo-Soviet treaty, British recognition in a secret protocol of the Soviet frontiers of June 22, 1941 (the date of the German invasion), with some possible modification in the case of the frontier with Poland. The Premier had also made several other suggestions affecting the postwar settlement, some of them concerned with the treatment of Germany after the war. While Mr. Eden had felt himself unable to make any commitments of this nature without further consultation with his Government and with the United States, the question of the character of the proposed Anglo-Soviet treaty was now a matter of serious concern.2 The United States Government continued to adhere, in its reaction to the Soviet claims, to the policy set forth in Secretary Hull's December 5 message to Mr. Eden in opposing any commitments concerning postwar territorial settlements during the war, in the interest of both wartime unity and the achievement of a durable and just peace. The emergence of this question in specific form, however, emphasized the need for the preparation of definite plans and proposals to permit general agreement as soon as possible on the organization of the future peace, to serve as a framework within which specific settlements would be made. The preparation necessary for effective American participation in the solution of international problems after the defeat of the enemy obviously had to deal with the most fundamental issues of future national policy both of a general nature and of a specific character, and had to cover a vast range of specific problems. For this a united effort by the whole nation was required. The results, though they would have to be adjusted to the needs and circumstances that would mark the immediate scene at the time of decision, must be such as could lead to practical action. It followed that the work must be done directly with the Secretary of State and for the President. The Advisory Committee was constituted accordingly. MEMBERSHIP WHEN THE Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy began its meetings, its composition and its structure of subcommittees were established in principle but not fully elaborated. Its organization was not an action completed on a given day but was rather a process 'Cf. Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1165-67. 'See above, pp. 62–63. 843388-50- -6 |