resentatives of the armed services were assisted throughout by specialists on given problems or by other aides. Among these assisting officers were Brig. Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, Col. Thomas J. Betts, Col. James F. Olive, Jr., Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier, Capt. H. L. Pence and Capt. V. E. Korns, who attended without being members.

Representation of several wartime agencies was rendered highly desirable by the postwar bearings of their emergency functions. Outstanding among these was the Board of Economic Warfare, of which Vice President Henry A. Wallace was Chairman. Since Mr. Wallace himself could not attend, he was represented from the beginning by an appointee of his own choice, Milo Perkins, Executive Director of the Board. Mr. Perkins also was unable personally to attend meetings, and accordingly the further exception was allowed to the general rule against alternates by permitting William T. Stone, Assistant Director of the Board, and also Louis H. Bean, to attend for him, effective with the first meeting on February 12, 1942. Subsequently, on June 6, 1943, Mr. Stone himself was designated as the member for participation in the fields of economic problems of concern to the Board, while Mr. Bean continued thereafter to attend as observer.

Various other emergency agencies were eventually represented. Chester C. Davis, Administrator of the Food Production and Distribution Administration, became a member early in April 1943, though his regular duties shortly proved too heavy to permit his attendance. On April 9, 1943, Marvin Jones, Judge of the United States Court of Claims, was invited to membership, at first personally but subsequently in his capacity as War Food Administrator. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, was invited to membership on April 9, 1943.

It was recognized at the outset that the economic and social problems to be considered by the Advisory Committee would involve at various stages the work of a number of the permanent Departments and agencies of the Government. Preliminary studies in connection with such problems in their respective fields had been begun or projected by a number of the Departments, but, in several instances, time was required to arrange for the representation of these Departments and agencies on the Committee because of the many readjustments of function and responsibility then being undertaken to place the Government on a war footing. Furthermore, there was need of prior exploration by the Committee to clarify the policy problems presented before all the Departments most concerned could be determined.

Harry D. White, Director of Monetary Research and Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, was designated April 15, 1942, to represent Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in the case of economic and financial problems. Paul H. Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture, was invited to membership on February 9, 1942, representing Claude R.

Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones, was represented by Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce, beginning the following July. William L. Clayton, then Assistant Secretary of Commerce, served for a time commencing June 21, 1943, as chairman of a special economic committee, though he did not become a member of the Advisory Committee. Invitations to membership were extended on April 9, 1943, to Miss Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, and to Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Subsequently, officials of other agencies were asked to undertake special responsibilities in the work, though not formally as members of the Advisory Committee. As Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman of the Tariff Commission, could not attend, Lynn R. Edminster of the same Commission participated in his stead beginning June 15, 1943. Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and Hugh Cox, Assistant Attorney General, took part in the consideration of economic problems commencing June 4 and July 2, 1943, respectively. Many other officials in various Departments and agencies of the Government took part in discussions or assisted otherwise in the conduct of the Committee's work. In view of the scope and character of the problems at issue, the number of these officials progressively increased. However, because such participation was pursuant to official duty and accordingly was subject to the frequent changes of personnel or assignment in the Government, the separate identification of all these individuals is not undertaken here. The participation of those active on one or another related committee in the Advisory Committee structure and of those specially placed at the service of the Committee in a professional research capacity is indicated below.

FIRST MEETING AND ORGANIZATION OF SUBCOMMITTEES THE ADVISORY Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy convened in the Department of State on February 12, 1942, at 3:00 p. m. Secretary Hull being absent for a brief period of rest, the group met in the Under Secretary's office, with Sumner Welles presiding. All its members at that date, except Messrs. Acheson, Berle, and Feis, and the Treasury representative (still to be appointed), were in attendance, namely, Mrs. McCormick and Messrs. Appleby, Armstrong, Bowman, Cohen, Davis, Long, MacMurray, Niles, Stone (for Milo Perkins), Myron C. Taylor, Hackworth, Hawkins, and Pasvolsky (Director). Harley Notter was the Executive Secretary.

Clarification of the Committee's purpose and of its working arrangements were the principal subjects of discussion in this organizing meeting. The acting chairman explained that, by direction of the President, only this Committee and, in a more limited field, the group of

officials gathered under Vice President Wallace as Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare were making authorized preparations concerning postwar foreign policy, and the recommendations of both were to be channeled to the President through the Secretary of State. The President desired to be able later to reach in his basket and to find there whatever he needed in regard to postwar foreign policy and meanwhile wished to devote himself wholly to ways and means of winning the war. It was left to the Committee itself to determine the problems ahead and to provide the information and recommendations needed in dealing with those problems.

The Committee agreed that its work should be approached from the general standpoint of the kind of world that the United States desired after the war. It also took the position that the President, in view of his executive responsibilities, would need to have recommendations for action as well as information on all problems on which a national position would have to be taken or an attitude expressed.

Thought was given to the possibility of informing the public immediately of the establishment and work of the Committee. It was felt that circumstances at the moment, when the United States was being driven back in the Pacific and the United Nations cause was suffering on every front, rendered secrecy imperative until a favorable turn in the war. Publicity on current study of postwar policy might lead to impairment of the war effort by placing in possible question the fact that sustained and prolonged struggle would be required before victory could be won. Accordingly, the Committee's existence and work were kept secret.

The discussions of this matter raised the question of whether the work of the Committee should be confined to the postwar field or should also have to do with current policy and action, in the interest of demonstrating the relationship between wartime developments and the postwar situation and thereby of justifying postwar study at that early and critical time. It was decided by Secretary Hull a few weeks later that, since the Committee's purpose was to advance preparations on the entire range of postwar problems as expeditiously as possible for readiness in case of need, the Committee should devote itself strictly to these problems. Current matters were thus left to the regular operations of the State Department and other parts of the Government. However, because developments of the greatest postwar significance occurred in the form of current decisions and actions and because in many fields action on a postwar problem was begun or carried out before hostilities ceased, the distinction between current and postwar policy remained always a matter of relative definition and degree. The guiding rule was that the Advisory Committee would take day-to-day current policy problems into account in its work, but

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would not debate them or assume responsibility in connection with them.

On arrangements for the conduct of the work, it was agreed in the opening meeting that the Committee would divide itself for working purposes into subcommittees, three in political fields, two in economic fields, with a sixth to coordinate the work and to provide contact with private organizations actively discussing postwar problems. The Advisory Committee as a whole would deliberate on the recommendations prepared by these subcommittees and would then forward to the President through the Secretary of State the views of the full Committee. The conception was that these subcommittees would constitute the main committee itself meeting in fractions, and would be composed only of members of the Advisory Committee. Subcommittees thus constituted sections of the Committee and not appendages or related autonomous bodies.

At this meeting the chairmanships and the proposed membership of the subcommittees, together with their respective fields of work, were announced, subject to the personal views of the members as considered below in connection with the organizing sessions of the subcommittees. It was felt that on the whole these subcommittees should each meet once weekly, on Fridays and Saturdays, while the full Advisory Committee should meet biweekly or at longer intervals.

It was agreed that each subcommittee would have a research secretary, who would head the staff of specialists being gathered in the Division of Special Research for the respective fields of work and who would supervise the preparation of research studies and policy papers and their circulation to members one or two days in advance of meetings. Summary minutes would be taken by the same officer or an assistant and distributed to members of the subcommittee concerned. Necessary coordination would be provided by the fact that Mr. Pasvolsky served both as Executive Director of the Committee and Chief of the Division of Special Research.

The question arose concerning the discharge of that part of the Committee's general responsibility for encouraging public study of postwar problems by interested American citizens and for taking into consideration the views developed by such private groups, among them specifically the Council on Foreign Relations. The Committee decided to receive these views and studies and accepted the suggestion of the members who were also officers of the Council that the small but selective research staff of the Council be brought into direct contact with the work of the Committee through service in the Division of Special Research.

The subcommittees were requested to lay out their work programs and to establish, subject to review by the Committee, priorities for consideration of problems. For this purpose it was agreed that the

subcommittees in the political fields would initially convene together and that the subcommittees in the economic fields would do likewise for their first session. These meetings occurred during the next week.

ORGANIZING MEETINGS OF SUBCOMMITTEES

THE TWO Subcommittees in the economic field were the first to meet― on February 20, 1942. Although they were separate bodies meeting under different chairmen, their membership purposely was made largely common. This unusual structure was intended to assure due and coordinated consideration of the ten separate, though related, fields of economic problems, one subcommittee concentrating on short-run and the other on long-range aspects. The more immediate problems that would confront the United States after the war were assigned to the Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction, whose membership was Mr. Berle, Chairman, Messrs. Acheson, Appleby, Davis, Feis, Hawkins, Niles, Pasvolsky, Myron C. Taylor, and Stone (representing Milo Perkins). Longer-run basic problems were made the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, comprised of Mr.\ Acheson, Chairman, and Messrs. Appleby, Berle, Cohen, Feis, Hawkins, Pasvolsky, Bean (for Milo Perkins), and a representative of the Treasury (later White). Participation of representatives of labor groups as advisers was broached in this connection and was subsequently arranged. H. Julian Wadleigh was the first research secretary for both subcommittees.

It was agreed that the Reconstruction Subcommittee would consider and make recommendations concerning problems of relief; restoration and reconstruction of production facilities, including nutrition; the immediate aspects of demobilization of persons and movements of populations; labor conditions, social security, and voluntary migration; and transportation and communications, including the economics of aviation and of broadcasting. The longer-range aspects, after reconstruction, of problems in the several latter fields were assigned to the Economic Policy Subcommittee, together with those of commercial policy and relations, monetary relations, credit and investment, commodity agreements and cartels, and international economic sanctions (after their consideration from the political standpoint). Since economic phases of international organization would be studied in conjunction with political phases, there was no need to burden the agenda of this subcommittee with these matters. The interrelation between these international problems and their domestic counterparts was stressed in the discussion.

A detailed exploratory analysis of problems and questions, prepared by the research staff, was accepted as an over-all agenda. The