Acheson, Armstrong, Berle, Bowman, Cohen, Davis, Feis, Hackworth, Hawkins, Long, Niles, Pasvolsky, Stone and Bean (for Milo Perkins), Myron C. Taylor, and White, Admiral Hepburn, and General Strong, together with Messrs. Atherton, Daniels, and Notter.

The Secretary expressed to the members his cordial appreciation of their spirit in undertaking this important work and emphasized that the contribution of all informed and competent groups and persons, both outside and inside the Government, would be needed to build a sound peace and to carry out the construction of a better world order. He expressed anxiety over the interest groups and opposing ideological influences that would inevitably bring their strength to bear against the constructive views on peace settlement and world improvement to be developed by the Committee. Such interest groups and influences constituted perhaps the greatest threat that the work would face; he anticipated that the best document and program that could be devised would be attacked. He was convinced of the necessity of making better preparation for world peace than had been made in the course of the first World War. The chances nevertheless were about one to two or three whether a soundly conceived peace could be carried to fruition. The consequences of the Committee's work were vital, and it was necessary to consider in the work how to help public opinion to educate itself. In his judgment, to have the informed support of American public opinion was of the utmost importance.

The Secretary indicated that arrangements were being made to provide the Committee with more extensive research assistance in studying the implications and the manifold problems of the three periods, into which the work ahead had been divided. He himself wanted to participate so far as possible, and he asked members to call directly on him for any cooperation on matters in which the Department had so far been found wanting. In conclusion, he thanked the chairmen of the subcommittees for their organizational work. He himself felt encouraged regarding the eventual outcome of the effort in which the Committee was engaged. Adjournment followed after various comments on the progress of organizing the work.

No further full meetings were held. The discussion had already involved a number of considerations that it was imperative from the standpoint of future policy and of current war effort alike to keep within strict confidence. This was emphatically the case in the delicate and controversial political fields, and future reliance upon the small subcommittee meetings in these fields was therefore considered desirable. This decision, never formally conveyed to the Committee, did not at the time preclude full meetings later.

That the Committee never met again as a whole was chiefly due to doubt that secrecy on policy recommendations could be assured pending their final review by the Secretary and the President if meetings

with such large attendance continued to be held. This, however, was not the sole reason for avoiding such meetings. The plenary meetings had already focused on crucial issues involving major international negotiations during the course of the war itself. Such meetings by nature tended to arrive at immediate recommendations, whereas the postulate basic to the conception of the preparation, insistently maintained by the Secretary of State, was that the use of precious time to mature views and plans outweighed in value the rapid reaching of decisions, which might involve fatal gambles. It was felt that only through adequate analysis and consideration of all the available alternative courses of policy could dangerous error be avoided. Under the impact of events and individual preferences, continued pressure for swifter decision made itself felt from time to time thereafter within the various subcommittees, but the desire to have thorough consideration before arriving at recommendations and final decisions was in the main controlling.

While prevention of unauthorized disclosure was felt to be obligatory, the corollary duty of providing authorized information was also borne in mind. The Secretary of State therefore presented several of the lines of thought developed during the period of full Advisory Committee meetings and by the subcommittees over the next three months in his radio address, "The War and Human Freedom,” on July 23, 1942. The writing of this carefully considered address was the object of collaboration for more than two weeks among officials of the Department, several individual members of the Advisory Committee, and the research staff. Its text was approved in advance by the President. It was the first of the series of formal and informal efforts by both Secretary Hull and the President to keep the American public informed of the agreed points of postwar policy as they were evolved in the preparation.

Starting with the assertion that the war was not a war of nation against nation, not a local or regional war or series of such wars, but one war waged against enemies intent on enslaving the entire world, the Secretary discussed the causes of the war and the events leading up to it." Pointing out that war began in 1931 when Japan invaded China and that the United States was an ultimate target of the Tripartite Pact among Axis countries in 1940, he stated that we Americans were "forced to fight because we ignored the simple but fundamental fact that the price of peace and of the preservation of right and freedom among nations is the acceptance of international responsibilities."

The Secretary then discussed postwar matters. "With victory achieved," he said, "our first concern must be for those whose suffer

'The full text is contained in the Department of State Bulletin, VII, 639–47.

ings have been almost beyond human endurance." Immediate problems of transition from war to peace would confront all countries— problems of conversion of production to peacetime needs, rehabilitation of agriculture, industry, and homes. "During this period of transition the United Nations must continue to act in the spirit of cooperation which now underlies their war effort to supplement and make more effective the action of countries individually

. in

meeting the manifold problems of readjustment." He said that beyond these problems would "lie before all countries the great constructive task of building human freedom and Christian morality on firmer and broader foundations than ever before." This too would "of necessity call for both national and international action." The conception of liberty under law as "the only real foundation of political and social stability" and "an essential requirement of progress" was emphasized by the Secretary, who then said:

"Liberty is more than a matter of political rights, indispensable as those rights are. In our own country we have learned from bitter experience that to be truly free, men must have, as well, economic freedom and economic security-the assurance for all alike of an opportunity to work as free men in the company of free men; to obtain through work the material and spiritual means of life; to advance through the exercise of ability, initiative, and enterprise; to make provision against the hazards of human existence. We know that this is true of mankind everywhere. We know that in all countries there has been-and there will be increasingly in the future demand for a forward movement of social justice. Each of us must be resolved that, once the war is won, this demand shall be met as speedily and as fully as possible.

"All these advances-in political freedom, in economic betterment, in social justice, in spiritual values can be achieved by each nation primarily through its own work and effort, mainly through its own wise policies and actions. They can be made only where there is acceptance and cultivation of the concepts and the spirit of human rights and human freedom. It is impossible for any nation or group of nations to prescribe the methods or provide the means by which any other nation can accomplish or maintain its own political and economic independence, be strong, prosper, and attain high spiritual goals. It is possible, however, for all nations to give and to receive help."

Following a statement that the pledge of the Atlantic Charter implied an obligation on each state in several essential respects, the Secretary described the effects of the fear of war, under which all nations had lived for decades, upon the world's progress and declared: . It is plain that some international agency must be created which can-by force, if necessary-keep the peace among nations in the future. There must be international cooperative action to set up the mechanisms which can thus insure peace. This must include eventual adjustment of national armaments in such a

manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged and that the burden of armaments may be reduced to a minimum.

"In the creation of such mechanisms there would be a practical and purposeful application of sovereign powers through measures of international cooperation for purposes of safeguarding the peace. Participation by all nations in such measures would be for each its contribution toward its own future security and safety from outside attack.

"Settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and indeed all processes of international cooperation, presuppose respect for law and obligations. It is plain that one of the institutions which must be established and be given vitality is an international court of justice. It is equally clear that, in the process of re-establishing international order, the United Nations must exercise surveillance over aggressor nations until such time as the latter demonstrate their willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations."

The Secretary then turned to the necessity for economic and social betterment. He spoke of problems of employment, rising standards of living, removal of trade barriers, and currency stabilization. He referred to the need for "machinery through which capital may-for the development of the world's resources and for the stabilization of economic activity-move on equitable terms from financially stronger to financially weaker countries" and possibly for "some special trade arrangement and for international agreements" to handle problems of surplus commodities and special economic situations. "These," he said, "are only some of the things that nations can attempt to do. There are bound to be many others."

The Secretary warned: "Neither victory nor any form of postwar settlement will of itself create a millennium." There would be opportunity, rather, to improve world conditions. To use this opportunity, he said, "we must be resolved to find the mechanisms" for most fully and speedily attaining and effectively safeguarding the benefits desired.

There will be need for plans, developed with careful consideration and carried forward boldly and vigorously. The vision, the resolution, and the skill with which the conditions of peace will be established and developed after the war will be as much a measure of man's capacity for freedom and progress as the fervor and determination which men show in winning the victory.

"Without impediment to the fullest prosecution of the warindeed for its most effective prosecution-the United Nations should from time to time, as they did in adopting the Atlantic Charter, formulate and proclaim their common views regarding fundamental policies which will chart for mankind a wise course based on enduring spiritual values."

For the "support of such policies," the Secretary called for development of "an informed public opinion."

CHAPTER V

The Subcommittees of the Advisory

T

Committee

HE MEETING of the Advisory Committee on April 4, 1942, demarcated the completion of the organizing phase of the Committee. The changes that took place later were adjustments or developments in response to the needs of the work within the main lines determined upon during the period of the full Committee meetings. Effort in the subcommittees now concentrated on their agreed fields of problems.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON POLITICAL PROBLEMS

THE STRUCTURE and functioning of the Subcommittee on Political Problems during its lifetime of a year and a half underwent considerable expansion. From the beginning it was regarded as the principal subcommittee, and its judgment, even while the full Advisory Committee met, was sought as essential by the other subcommittees. The political problems in its charge comprised the over-riding issues of the future confronting the United States. By reason of its chairmanship by the Under Secretary of State and later by the Secretary himself, this subcommittee was the only one that could by right assume the active responsibilities, and therefore in large degree the status, of the Advisory Committee itself after the cessation of plenary meetings of that Committee. In addition, this subcommittee contained among its members a greater number of eminent persons from private life and the Congress than other subcommittees and, since most of the chairmen of the other subcommittees were included in its membership, they tended from the outset to report in its meetings.

Mr. Welles continued as the active chairman of the subcommittee from February 21, 1942, until January 23, 1943. During the rare absences of Mr. Welles for all or part of a meeting, Mr. Berle or Mr. Bowman assumed the chair, depending on the subject under discussion. As had been contemplated since mid-October 1942, however, Mr. Hull himself assumed direct charge on January 30, 1943, and, while