tive administration of the Services. I want to go on record again in support of a stronger CJCS, but his role as the principal military advisor must be on behalf of the JCS. Only in this way, in my view, can we assure that the national security decision-making process benefits from the corporate experience of Service Chiefs. Warmest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely,

JOHN A. WICKHAM, Jr., General, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, General Wickham. I appreciate a very good statement, and appreciate the sincerity which you presented.

Admiral Watkins, I guess you are next, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES WATKINS, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My fellow Chiefs and I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in December on this same subject. On receipt of a copy of the so-called draft Senate bill, I wrote Senator Goldwater, as General Wickham just pointed out, and I told him of my concerns. With your permission, I would also like to enter into the record that formal statement provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as my letter to that committee's chairman. I would like them put in the record of today's proceedings, because their content is very germane and may be of use to you and your staff as you continue to address the issue.

I will use my time to discuss what I believe to be critical factors to be considered in any changes anticipated to the existing national security organization. I would also like to provide views on the key provisions of the already-passed H.R. 3622. Finally, I will cover areas mentioned in your letter of February 11 to Secretary Weinberger.

First, I would like to say that I am not against change. I am for change, and I am for change that makes sense. With a previous tour as Vice Chief and with my tenure as Chief of Naval Operations nearly over, I have observed, and have been a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for some time. I have seen it work well under this President and Secretary of Defense. Prior thereto, I have also seen it work not as well.

Personalities do make a predominant difference, in my opinion, and not organizational diagrams. Nevertheless, a considerable number of organizational changes have been made by General Vessey and Admiral Crowe, and these have clearly helped make a difference.

More importantly, however, there is another factor which has come into play that is critical, for good military advice is as much a function of the receiver as it is of the provider. This President and Secretary of Defense have valued our advice, aggressively sought it, and have acted upon it. They have been willing to listen to divergent views when the Chiefs disagree, as professionals often do on important issues.

They have been willing to consider military advice that may not match their own initial thoughts on what might be in the best interests for the country. This close, healthy, and frequent interchange of views has not always been the case within prior adminis

trations. In fact, as I pointed out once before, we have met 13 times with the President on important issues, which are more meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this President than in the prior 12 years combined.

As a result, I am not surprised to note that many of the most vocal advocates for radical surgery are those who seem to have suffered difficult times when they were in positions of responsibility within the national security organization, perhaps in the last decade or before. I do not say this to discredit anyone. I only ask that you consider each source carefully, so as not to solve yesterday's illness with a dose of medicine that will prove fatal to today's patient, who is now well on the way to recovery.

I will now limit my remarks to issues that pertain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the service chiefs and the unified commanders. I believe there are two essential attributes of our national security structure that must survive the contemplated change. They are closely related.

First, military advice must not be provided by a single individual without clear provision for forcing conflicting views of those who also share related responsibilities under law. These views need to be aired, and this is true regardless of the known competence or professional integrity of this single individual. The JCS should not be allowed to become monolithic. Most issues of importance are not decided 435 to 0 in the House of Representatives, nor should we expect the Chiefs to come down 5 to 0 on complex military matters. It is a mistake to think, as I fear some of the so-called reformers do, that disagreement among the Chiefs is a product of lack of decisiveness or interservice rivalry. These same individuals would espouse a perpetual 1-to-0 vote for all issues. My experience convinces me that the Chiefs bring a wealth of joint and service-specific experience to each debate, offer fruit of that experience to their fellows, and they argue their points openly and frankly in sincere search for best answers. In doing this, they give the chairman a critically important helping hand. There must be no apology for this open debating process, even when it becomes heated and somehow even leaks into the local news, as it has. It represents the best of our system.

The Congress should not legislate this process away or dilute its quality or depth. Whatever your final product may be, for the good of the Nation it should contain provisions which demand Joint Chiefs of Staff corporate review and debate on issues, and force exposure of residual divergent view to the National Command Authority that they serve. Only in this manner can our civilian leadership be given a balanced baseline on which to form best decisions.

This leads me to my second point. The national security organization must remain firmly under civilian control. We must take care to avoid the temptation to create a military organization that works so well, so smoothly, that it functions without controversy and does so at the expense of precepts of a democratic process that we are trying to protect.

House bill 3622, with modifications, could provide a foundation for strengthening the national security structure. For example, the bill formalizes the Chairman's position as principal military advis

er. He essentially performs this function today because of daily access to the Secretary of Defense, his regular attendance at NSC meetings, and his participation in interagency discussions on behalf of the Chiefs.

So, it makes sense to codify this relationship. It is, however, important to retain this bill's most important, and amended provision, which requires the Chairman to inform the Secretary and the President when other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with the advice that he is providing. I have already discussed in some detail the reasons for such a provision.

During the past 4 years, we have streamlined many of the procedures used by the Joint Staff. There is more to be done. Giving the Chairman responsibility for Joint Staff operations and tasking will help, and will also give him better support. In that regard, I agree with removing the ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff, although I do not agree that any growth is needed at this time.

The current Chief and CINC's have recognized the need for special chain-of-command arrangements for special types of missions. When apprehending the Achille Lauro hijackers, for example, a streamlined chain-of-command concept was adopted and tailored to the circumstances. Inflexible adherence to the well-laid wartime chain of command would simply not have been responsive in this and other fast-moving crisis instances. So, any bill that attempts to improve command relationships needs to reflect the vast difference between command arrangements optimized for day-to-day military operations in peace and in crisis events, against those for war-plan execution.

Having acknowledged the need for flexible command arrangements, I have no problem with the Chairman being placed in the chain of command, providing that is what the Secretary and President desire, as is reflected in the House bill, and by providing that it is clearly specified that the Chairman shall do so on behalf of the other Chiefs. I also have no difficulty with making the Chairman the supervisor of the CINC's, as well as their spokesman. The CINC's, in turn, must continue to maintain their principal focus on war-fighting their forces efficiently. I support provisions that strengthen such emphasis. Additionally, the CINC's should retain authority to communicate directly to the Secretary of Defense without filter, if they so desire.

My major area of disagreement with the House bill involves the terms of reference for establishment of a Deputy Chairman. I am against terms that would weaken the corporate body concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing the best independent military advice possible. I believe that the position of Deputy Chairman as now contained in the bill would effectively emasculate the corporate body effectiveness. The collegial nature of the Chiefs as a corporate entity is this body's most important strength. Placing another four-star officer on the Joint Chiefs, making him, in fact, the second of six Chiefs, while eliminating the other Chiefs from performing duties as Acting Chairman, would create, in my opinion, a serious setback to the proven and successful thrust toward jointness achieved over the past 4 years.

On the other hand, I do believe the Chairman needs and deserves the kind of help another four-star can provide. Particularly, he

needs help in the internal management of the Joint Staff, in the interagency process, and in day-to-day dealings with the unified commanders and the OSD staff. These functions are terribly timeconsuming and can detract from the Chairman's other heavy responsibilities, particularly if those responsibilities are even further enhanced, as now envisioned in House bill 3622.

My objections can be satisfied by changing from terms of reference in the House concept of "Deputy" to our concept of "Vice Chairman," explicitly stating that the Vice Chairman is not senior to the Joint Chiefs nor does he perform as Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. At the same time, the very successful procedure of having individual service chiefs serve for mandatory 3month periods as Acting Chairman should be codified. This procedure ensures continuity, with the same Chief taking over Acting Chairman duties repeatedly during any given quarter. It keeps each service chief fully involved in the joint process, but most importantly it improves the breadth and joint sensitivity in each of our performances as service chief.

With regard to issues outlined in your letter of February 11, I do have a few general comments. I think it is very important to avoid shifting the unified commander's focus from planning for war or regional crisis, or peacetime optimization of military force employment to bureaucratic concerns. Under Secretary Weinberger's leadership we have greatly improved the unified commanders' role in the programming and budgeting process. They make important inputs. They review service programs to see if their needs are met, and they participate in deliberation leading to budget decisions.

Some of the reorganization proposals go much further than that, and would, in effect, make each unified commander the near equivalent of a service chief, with most of the administrative requirements and bureaucratic complexity that go with equipping, training, and maintaining forces. On the face of it, such a major shift in responsibility could seem attractive to some. To the uninitiated it appears that such an approach would, for example, simplify matters, and align responsibility for preparing for conflict with a duty of efficient employment of forces.

But, nothing could be further from the real world situation that would ensue. What would result is creation of a large bureaucracy at each unified commander level. For example, in the Navy, and I suspect in the other services as well, special problems would result as forces move around the globe performing emergent tasks. How would one unified commander budget for, train and maintain the USS Saratoga carrier battle group of a dozen ships and 8,000 sailors now operating under the European Commander? Well, let me expand on the thought. During her present 6-month deployment, this particular battle group has performed duties for Commander in Chief Atlantic, Commander in Chief Europe, Commander in Chief Pacific, in the Indian Ocean, and now back under Commander in Chief Europe, and in a few days she will be sailing back under the command of Commander in Chief Atlantic.

Command arrangements that work for fixed-resource management simply do not apply when working with complex shifting of forces as is so frequently the case within the Navy. Such training, equipping, maintaining and shifting of key units will be no less

prevalent if involved in global conflict. This responsibility in the Navy should remain fully vested in the current centralized Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations arrangement.

Of course, the CINC is concerned about the degree to which we carry out our responsibilities. He has access to the Secretary of Defense and at any time he feels it necessary to complain to the Secretary of Defense about our inefficiency in preparing the forces properly to deliver to him for use, he has that authority and responsibility today.

Your letter correctly recognized the importance of quality of officers who perform joint military duties. Organizational reform will not compensate for poor people. I firmly believe, however, that a key strength any officer can bring to a joint assignment is a strong operational background within his own service. It would be a mistake to create a rigid structure that would, in the end, weaken the military competence of the Joint Staff, even were it to improve its ability to carry out joint administrative functions. This is a poor tradeoff and one which should be carefully avoided.

Mr. Chairman, I have restricted my remarks to matters pertaining directly to my duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a Service Chief. I do, of course, have views on a few of the other DOD organizational issues discussed in your letter and am prepared to discuss them, if you desire, during the time for questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Admiral.