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PREPARED STatement of ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear today to share my views on the important issue of the nation's organization for national defense.

In my thirty-six years of commissioned service in the defense of our country, I have witnessed the ebb and flow of our U. s. military capability. Recently, I have also witnessed the resurgence of pride in our military, largely due to the wisdom of congressional decisions in the recent past and the strong leadership of this decade's Commander-in-Chief. I also wholeheartedly agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that your examination is likely to be one of the most important undertakings by Congress in our lifetimes. Therefore, I applaud the openness, as well as the caution and care, you are maintaining in your deliberations.

I am here today in my dual role as Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Chief of Naval Operations, I have served two Chairmen and have been Acting Chairman myself on many occasions. I also served as a member of the JCS in Admiral Hayward's temporary absence during my two year tenure as his Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 1979-1981. Further, I speak from my years of operational and staff experience and as one, in the past decade, who was a critic of the system as it operated in those years.

I have read the Staff Report prepared for this Committee. Like many members of the Committee and most of your previous witnesses, I can agree with a large number of the report's observations, but I do not agree with most of the study's radical recommendations. The recommended cure is far more dangerous than the diagnosed symptoms warrant. Can the functioning of the JCS and its contributions to the making and carrying out of national defense policy be improved? Yes without doubt. legislation to codify those improvements be a positive, even necessary, factor? Again yes. But, are major changes in the JCS system required? Absolutely not.

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I submit that Admiral Crowe, previously General Vessey, and we four Service Chiefs have been working effectively to make many needed reforms from within the national defense system in order to make it better serve our nation. In fact, it is those of us who serve today in the national security organization who should be and are the real reformers. In this regard, however, perhaps we can be criticized for failure to give our reforms over the past several years an appropriate level of public breast-beating.

Before making specific comments, I will share my general thoughts on what I consider essential requirements for any national security structure for the United States.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

There are two essential attributes in our national security structure. The first, and most important, is that it, like the democracy it serves, must not be monolithic. Our process provides for a clash of competing views as we search for the best approach to solving complex challenges we face. The American system of checks and balances, and protection of dissenting views, is essential and is our national strength whether in Congress, the judiciary, business or national security.

DIVERSITY OF OPINION

The JCS provide military advice to the civilian leadership and develop the military strategy in concert with presidential

directives on national policy. While many of your witnesses have focused on the fact that we don't always agree among ourselves, I contend that this is a fundamental strength of the JCS, not a structural weakness. Our American system provides for the diversity of opinion and we must ensure that all voices continue to be heard. The current law, for example, states that the Chairman shall..."inform the Secretary of Defense, and when the President or the Secretary of Defense considers it appropriate, the President, of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed." The framers were wise in so ordering, as was the House of Representatives by recently retaining this strength in amendment to their recently passed bill on this

matter.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their dual capacity as uniformed heads of their Services and principal military advisors to the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense, are the essential link between the formulation of strategy and the procurement and readying of combat forces to meet demands of that strategy. Finally, the Unified and Specified Commanders must operate and employ forces, state essential requirements for warfighting in their areas of responsibility, and develop regional plans. Each of these players has a separate role to play; and our system, strengthened over the past three years, allows for their voices to be heard. Many of the Staff Report recommendations would silence dissenting views if safeguards were not provided.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The second fundamental attribute of our national security structure is that it must remain under civilian control. I agree with the Senate staff report about the importance of this issue and the need to preserve it. Unitary advice offered by a single military individual, no matter how competent, with a single Service background and a single point of view, will not ensure the quality and objectivity of civilian control that a democracy demands and that our history demonstrates is both necessary and feasible. In fact, the potential is there for undesirable politicization of any sole military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, an advisor who has been both selected and appointed by these same individuals. The other Joint Chiefs and their legal right to dissent and be heard help to balance out such potential.

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These two points diversity of opinion and civilian control are, of course, directly related. Strong Congressional support for the first has, throughout our history, helped ensure the second. There are no side benefits in any reorganization act that would compensate for the tragedy resulting from tampering with these two fundamental elements. Our unique American system has these important strengths and safeguards in many areas of Government. They have served us well in the past and should

remain sacrosanct in any Defense reorganization.

JCS AS ADVISORS

I should now like to focus briefly on the role of the JCS. The JCS and their supporting organization have been criticized over the years for their committee approach to defense problems, for perceived Service biases, for the quality of advice provided to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, and for the slowness of the joint process in decision-making. Critics propose a stronger role for the Chairman and enhancement of the Unified Commanders' participation in strategic planning and resource allocation. I have read the proposals and listened to

the critics.

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I believe much of the criticism is born out of the postWatergate, post-Vietnam period of overall public distaste for national and military leadership. It was also born out of a time when we had negative real growth in defense and rationalized that negative growth by a flawed national military strategy which rejected the concept of peace through strength and replaced it with such concepts, for example, as the fuzzy, non-global, one and one-half war; or the 14-day duration conflict with a Central Europe-only focus. Either of these budget-driven strategic concepts failed to address their relationship to the real world of global U.S. commitments to over 40 friendly foreign nations as well as to our own national defense in an increasingly unstable world. It was born out of a time when Presidents seldom sought direct participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in militarilyrelated decision making. Unfortunately, many of the critics you have heard in recent testimony have blurred the past with the present. So, I say we should put criticism of last decade's approach to national security in proper perspective and ask, "Is criticism born of the last decade relevant now?" "Do the proposed solutions address real issues extant today?" "Most importantly, do they improve our warfighting capability in either times of violent peace or global war?"

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There are those who have stated that under the present system "advice is no good," "advice is not useful, or "advice is often ignored." Perhaps this was true at the time a number of the critics served within the DOD. But, I say this is just not so today. As Secretary Weinberger has testified, he found JCS advice "to be consistently timely and accurate...competent and innovative ...my own experience with these gentlemen...has been extraordinarily good." During the 1970s, the civilian leadership wanted to cut back the military, and did -- the JCS opposed those cutbacks. In the past, perhaps the Joint Chiefs weren't listened to because they could not support a flawed national military strategy which justified inadequate support for a modernized and strong military posture. Therefore, that JCS advice was seen as neither "good" nor "useful" by those serving at that time...perhaps a thorn in the political side. Advice of the JCS is military, and is, therefore, sometimes politically unpopular. Congress must ensure that any reform finally legislated allows unfettered military advice to continue to flow from the JCS to the National Command Authority.

Let's take a close look at the current record. President Reagan says we are serving him well, and so does Secretary Weinberger. We have given frequent advice to this President advice he has both sought and acted upon. This situation has not necessarily occurred because the advice was better

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but because

the President, himself, was receptive. We have discussed such matters as strategy, military readiness, arms control, and even JCS organization with him, at his request, on about a dozen occasions. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative was prompted in part by one of these sessions. This interaction, the President's forceful leadership on defense matters and the support of the Congress has propelled this nation back into its rightful place of international prominence. Our strategy as a world power has come into focus once again and the JCS now provides advice to a President who values our opinions. The lesson I draw from all this is that the quality of JCS advice is in large degree related to the attentiveness of and participation with the Secretary of Defense and the President.

DUAL-HATTED SERVICE CHIEFS

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Some critics have also said that "Service parochialism" dominates the system and to avoid conflicts of interest, JCS members should not be Service Chiefs. They remind me of those who claim that all members of Congress are incapable of voting

wisely on important national issues because they cannot look beyond the interests of their districts, states, or special interest groups. Just as this broad-brush criticism is a disservice to members of this committee, so it is a disservice to members of the JCS.

As the Chief of Naval Operations, I have the responsibility to equip, organize, and train our Navy to be ready to support national military policy and strategy. This responsibility forces me to become the expert on all facets of maritime strategy and operations. I must know what the fleet can and cannot do. I must have a feel for developments on the waterfront. I must remain on top of changing technological, political, and operational developments.

It is our dual role as Service Chiefs that makes us uniquely qualified to provide advice on matters of warfighting and strategy. As Service Chiefs, we frame our annual budget proposals based on our experience in strategy development as members of the JCS and with the full knowledge of the regional requirements of the Unified Commanders. There is a tremendous two-way benefit in our dual role as Service Chiefs and JCS members. This arrangement has made me a better Service Chief -- I can say unequivocally that I have become more "joint" particularly during my role as Acting Chairman for four three-month periods during the Chairman's absence over the past 3 1/2 years. In this role, I have spent over one hundred actual days as Acting Chairman, during which attendance at congressional hearings and numerous National Security Council meetings has been required.

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No other body could provide the depth of military experience or the thorough understanding of the current capabilities and limitations of the U. S. Armed Forces than the body represented by the five JCS members. I firmly believe that the present dualhatting arrangement is a tremendous strength of the system that offers little of the disadvantage alleged in the staff report.

FOCUS ON STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

As the JCS, we continue to focus on strategy. As individual Chiefs we submit memoranda which force innovative strategic ideas into the joint process. For over three years, for example, I have proposed initiatives on such diverse topics as counter-terrorism, nuclear force modernization, drug interdiction, Latin American policies and other matters that affect military force application. Similar proposals come from the other Service Chiefs. Such initiatives are neither parochial nor petty; rather, they force decision makers to address issues which each of us thinks important to the nation, issues which in most cases could be otherwise smothered by the bureaucracy or lack the sense of urgency we may feel they warrant.

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Some complain that, under the present system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot develop a proper total force structure themselves. While, in a sense, the critics are correct, they err in thinking this is a major flaw or that some alternate organization will perform better. What we can do and have done -- is develop the military strategy which drives resource choices in framing the total force. Our military strategy is a coherent, joint strategy based on deterrence, forward defense and global coalition warfare. That strategy underlies the entire resource allocation process, and the total force product it produces needs no apology.

Development of total force structure is the end product of resource allocation -- deciding what to spend our money on. This is one of the most important policy decisions made by the Department of Defense. Far too often those who complain about the process

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or hope

really are complaining about the result. They believe that a different process would lead to a lower force structure more in tune with their reduced-defense preferences.

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In determining how best to allocate resources, Secretary Weinberger needs our military advice - and he gets it. He needs

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to hear from the advocates of high tech R&D -- and he does. He needs (and now he gets) the views of the Unified Commanders during a minimum of four formal sessions per year, with their principal focus on regional requirements and current readiness, sustainability, command and control, and efficiency of forces assigned. He needs and receives the views of the Services with their emphasis on force modernization, training, and research and development essential to meeting evolving threats of the future. He needs and receives the views of the JCS which must focus on global requirements in support of the national military strategy and the maintenance of nuclear deterrence, and cross-Service program efficiences. Checks and balances all come into play as critical resource issues are addressed at the Defense Resources Board. It is a finely balanced system under the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense which takes inputs from the Chairman and members of the JCS, the Service Secretaries, the Unified Commanders and independent DOD agencies. The result is a balanced force structure fully consistent with the national policy, a better force structure than one which could have been developed exclusively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in isolation. Our present resource allocation system supports civilian control by ensuring our civilian leadership has full participation in examining alternatives and determining final outcomes. In fact, where there is Service parochialism in force building, it is well exposed in today's process. This process demands that each Service program stand or fall on its own merits relative to the national military strategic guidance given to each Service. It likewise ensures that the civilian leadership has expert military advice from all military commanders in the decision process.

WHAT CAN BE IMPROVED

Does my response to the criticisms imply there is no room for improvement? No. There are always improvements which can be made, but we must not confuse reorganization with reform. Ι firmly believe that General Vessey and those of us who serve as the JCS today have made real progress.

We have a number of JCS and Service initiatives taking place within the existing legislative framework aimed at improving the performance of the Joint Chiefs and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a whole. Recent internal changes within the Joint Staff have been made in an effort to improve the quality of our written advice which, as a result, has been more sharply focused.

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One of the Pentagon's leading growth industries is interservice cooperation. We are aggressively examining all aspects of joint interoperability Navy, the Joint Staff, our Unified Commanders and the other Services have entered into positive dialogue to solve previous shortcomings regarding "jointness. We recognize jointness is not an end in itself, but overall combat effectiveness. Our Services are working effectively together as we accelerate efforts toward improving joint warfighting capability.

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My pride in our current JCS system does not blind me to its shortcomings. House Bill 3622 with certain modifications could, for example, form a foundation on which a stronger national security organization can be established. The House-sponsored JCS Reorganization Bill actually codifies many of the improvements which have already taken place under General Vessey and Admiral Crowe; all are aimed at improving our national security structure. These improvements have been substantive in some cases, albeit

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