implemented over the past three years without public fanfare. In addition, the JCS have already embarked on a review of JCS Pub 2. which addresses many of the SASC Report recommendations such as unity of command, authority, relationship among unified commanders, Services, and component commanders. We have set our sights on 30 June 1986 for completion of this first thorough review in many years. I could readily endorse the provision of the House bill in placing the Joint Staff directly under the Chairman of the JCS. This would strengthen his ability to complement the advice provided by other members of the JCS and fortify the JCS as a whole. I would suggest that the Chairman continue to provide not only his own views (which he should give), but both the consensual and divergent views of the other Service Chiefs in the many fora in which he represents the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this regard, I consider the legal requirement to present divergent views essential. Such views are often critically important, especially on the truly hard issues where unanimity is neither the objective nor, in many cases, even possible. Certainly, the Chairman should be required to attend National Security Council meetings as he does today so that military views of the JCS on key issues can be effectively presented without filter. - Streamlined Chain of Command Second, I believe we can improve and streamline our procedures for execution of military actions across the spectrum of today's crises, since those fall well short of the global conflict scenario for which the more complex unified chain of command was designed. United States military responses to lower level crises are invariably rather surgical in nature and highly sensitive politically. Therefore, while our organization for a major war rests on allowing the Unified Commanders great latitude under broad policy direction from Washington, chain of command procedures for the violent peace in which we live today can be different for each event. Flexibility in adopting chain of command arrangements to best meet each peacetime employment of forces can be improved to meet rapidly emerging events. Changes to the law are not needed to accomplish this objective. I intend to work with my colleagues over the next few months to address this matter. While all of the JCS should be involved in formulating a course of action, I believe the Chairman should have more authority in execution. Modern communications capability makes this possible while remaining coupled to his principal Service-unique advisors and other experts, as the Chairman recently did so effectively in executing the capture of the terrorists involved in the Achille Lauro piracy and murder. Such a streamlined procedure improves responsiveness, clarifies responsibility, and ensures optimum National Command Authority control in highly sensitive peacetime military operations. It is important to provide a more flexible approach to Command and Control across the set of peacetime-towartime chain of command issues. There is no one chain of command panacea for all scenarios across the spectrum of violence. Strategy Third, we can and should improve the effectiveness of the JCS in focusing more of our energies on the development and review of dynamic, integrated and cohesive military contingency plans in response to national policies. The JCS role is not only to provide strategic advice to the President, but also to ensure that a sound military strategy is developed, fielded, and understood by all key decision makers. The formulation, articulation and presentation of such a military strategy could then become a better standard by which others, like the Congress, would be able to measure our performance. This approach would elevate the Congressional debates to the high ground and avoid proclivity to micro-manage programmatic details as the Staff Report so correctly points out. I also believe that the provisions for a Directorate of Net Assessment within the Joint Staff could help the JCS in this regard. Acting Chairman Fourth, I would propose the system of "Acting Chairman" be codified. In this connection, we have learned important lessons from past practices. On occasions in the past, the senior Service Chief would become Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. As a result, as many as three Acting Chairmen in one day was not unusual. Continuity was lost. On assumption of General Vessey's assignment as CJCS in July 1982, however, the JCC immediately adopted a 3-month rotating regime. Continuity in leadership on relevant issues then extant was the objective. Experience has demonstrated conclusively that the objective was achieved. I was the first Acting Chairman under this new policy from July-September 1982. One particular beauty of this system may not be readily apparent to all. But the Acting Chairman concept allows each of the Service Chiefs the opportunity to learn not only the role of Chairman but to gain an increased appreciation of other Service points of view at the very highest level. It is a concept whose time has come. It is proven, and the concept should be included in any legislation you enact. I consider that it has made me a better CNO, far more sensitive to the Joint approach to strategy, interoperability, and allied and sister Service cooperation. Vice Chairman Fifth, I could support a concept of a Vice Chairman, principally because the Chairman's plate is overloaded. My support, however, is not for the concept envisioned in the House Bill, i.e., one of an alter-ego to the Chairman. Rather, I believe assignment of a four-star Vice Chairman is essential to relieve the current burden on the Chairman and his two principal assistants. Currently, the Chairman, along with the three-star Assistant to the Chairman and the Director, Joint Staff, carries a number of responsibilities which can best be discharged by a senior officer who has the full confidence of the JCS. A new Vice Chairman would represent the Chairman in the interagency process and would provide him with the same type of support in the internal management of the Joint Staff that the Service Vice Chiefs provide in the internal management of the Service staff. But I am quick to point out that egislation establishing the position of Vice Chairman should specify the incumbent will not supervise the JCS nor act as Chairman in the Chairman's absence. Beyond that, any legislation should allow the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, flexibility to make the most appropriate use of the Vice Chairman. I envision the Vice Chairman would have three bro areas of responsibility. Aided by the existing Assistant to the Chairman he would represent the JCS in the interagency process. Aided by the existing Director, Joint Staff, and his Vice Director, he would supervise the internal functioning of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman could provide continuity in dealing with the Unified and Specified Commanders on most issues on behalf of the Chairman. By strengthening staff management, improving the level of military representation in interagency matters and removing some of the existing burdens on the Chairman, a Vice Chairman would improve the quality of military advice while preserving the best features of the current system. CONCLUSION Our organization for national security is uniquely American. Perhaps it would not be appropriate for any other nation -- but then, most of the security organizations of other nations would not be appropriate for us. No other nation has our global commitments and far-flung responsibilities. Above all, no other nation has our unique political system, a system like none the world has ever seen, based on the concept of shared power and the freedom for public exposure to diverging views which then clash and compete in their resolution. The national security structure for this nation with its unique responsibilities must be based on checks and balances, civilian control, and on the joining of responsibility and accountability. It must reconcile the views of Unified Commanders, with their focus on regional needs and their emphasis on readiness today, with a global, long-term view. It must balance the competing needs of military readiness and political acceptability. It must merge the diverse capabilities of our different Services. The national security structure for America should offer true civilian control, in which the civilian leadership has access to a range of military views and is not limited to accepting or rejecting a single solution proffered by a single individual, no matter how competent. The national security structure for the United States must not separate responsibility for giving advice and accountability for implementing that advice. It must ensure that those who propose military policies do so in the full realization that it will fall to them to implement those policies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with their diversity of professional experience and their protected right of dissent, offer the President, the Secretary of Defense and the nation the best possible military advice. The fact that these same individuals, as uniformed heads of their Services, will be responsible for organizing and training forces to implement the policies they recommend helps ensure sound recommendations and realistic implementation. As I have indicated earlier, there are areas in which we can improve. I have suggested some of these areas. They are, by and large, problems which are being dealt with today but, perhaps, codification in law would help ensure long term stability. Since we have been responsive to suggestions and many significant improvements have already been initiated, I can support a number of the proposals as they have been put forth. Additionally, there are others which, with modification, could be adopted to improve the office of the Joint Chief of Staff and how we do business. Like all uniformed professionals, I welcome these hearings. Under our system of government our security ultimately depends on the wisdom of Congress which reflects the wisdom of the people. I am particularly pleased by the bipartisan nature of your examination and hope that it can lead further to a truly bipartisan national security policy for this nation. What is required now is the best efforts of each of us in the Congress, OSD, the JCS and other parts of the national security organization "to provide for the common defense." I urge this distinguished committee to work with Secretary Weinberger, members of the JCS and with the House committees to provide a bill that builds upon the substantial improvements of the last several years and continues the evolutionary approach to change. I have been honored to present you my views on how best to organize to preserve the liberties we hold so dearly. Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate the opportunity you and Senator Nunn provided to the Joint Chiefs last evening to discuss, in roundtable fashion, the draft bill on defense reorganization. I found our discussions candid and useful, and hope you did as well. Even so, I thought a letter outlining my position in a more cohesive form might prove of value as your Committee markup proceeds and debate continues on this critical subject. I have provided an identical letter to Senator Nunn. As I indicated during our discussions, I believe our nation would surely be standing into shoal water, with severe damage predictable, if we were to follow the course chartered for us in the current draft bill now before your Committee. In short, I consider the bill as drafted to be terribly flawed and certainly not in the best interests of national security. The proposal goes far beyond many of the recommendations made by witnesses heard by your Committee. It ignores effective work done over the last few years and attempts, instead, to address leadership and other problems of the 1970's. In this connection, and insofar as operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, the large majority of last decade's problems have been repaired and simply do not exist today. The draft bill specifically ignores views and recommendations of those most closely involved with the current organization-those responsible by law for sharing national security burdens with you. The power this draft bill would bestow on the Chairman would militate against providing the best military options and advice to civilian leadership. Potential is great for politicizing his position. The legislation inhibits timely and necessary provision of differing perspectives and views by experienced military experts. Advice from a single military individual will not ensure that the full range of effective military options, essential for true civilian control, are provided to the Commander in Chief. In radically restructuring the JCS, Military Departments and operating forces, the draft bill would eliminate the now-close and time-tested relationship between the Congress and the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. Additionally, the proposal would emasculate the role of experienced Service Chiefs in the defense planning process. The proposal would dilute the CINC's primary focus on warfighting. Becoming more deeply involved in the administration, training, and support of his Service components, each CINC would be distracted from his primary tasks of building effective deterrence plans in concert with national policy and doing the war planning which should be his undiluted responsibility. Our combat commanders would become bureaucrats instead of warfighters. Responsibility and accountability—now clearly defined for support, administration, training, and readiness-would be shared, diffused and sometimes lost. The current JCS and Service Chiefs global perspective and concern for future capability which counterbalance the CINC's natural emphasis on regional requirements and today's force posture, would be lost. Our national security planning over the long term would fast become warped. A detailed analysis of problems with the draft bill would be as lengthy as the bill itself. But, to be constructive, and in the interest of brevity, I have reviewed the response submitted to you by the Secretary of Defense on February 3, 1986, and endorse all points provided in his letter as they relate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the conbatant commands. You are correct, Mr. Chairman, when you say we need change. I, too, am for change. As you are aware, the Secretary of the Navy and I have made significant organizational changes within the Navy. Likewise, I have been a vocal proponent of change within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, rather extensive changes in previous ways of doing business have been made within the JCS over the past three to four years. All Chiefs take considerable pride in this aggressive, internal reform. We agree that even more changes are needed, and I have testified as to specifics in this regard. But, the draft bill before you is not change the country needs. Because of the foregoing, I am most concerned about passage of the draft bill in language even approximating its current form. For, unless its underlying philosophy-that which effectively destroys the corporate body strength of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and concommitantly dilutes independent military advice to the National Command Authority-is significantly altered, the Senate's bill would represents a dangerous starting point for compromise with its counterpart bill already passed by the House of Representatives. It is difficult to conceive of a compromise, somewhere in between these two, that would not gravely weaken the nation's organization for national security. Because we share the same fundamental objective for efficient management of a strong national defense, I know that you and your members will improve on the draft bill as you consider it in the days ahead. Nonetheless, because the consequences of this effort can be so far-reaching, I felt is important to reiterate to you in writing what I attempted to convey last evening in words. I urge major revision to the draft bill. Sincerely, JAMES D. WATKINS, STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. GABRIEL, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General GABRIEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to say thank you, for letting us come here to talk to you about this very important subject. I think it is, probably, about the most important thing I will testify on in my 4 years as Chief of Staff. This will be my last year doing this. I know that you have a very short fuse in getting this thing done. I am going to do everything I can to help, and I hope you will agree to ask me, if you do not have the best information, because we need to give you everything you need to make this decision. It will be a gross injustice if we do not cooperate because it will affect the military in the future, and the country. In all this talk about reorganizing the JCS and the DOD, I think there are some things that we have done over the last few years, some of the changes we have made and put in operation, that have not been recognized. I would like to just cover some of those with you, Mr. Chairman, if I can. Back in 1982, when Jack Vessey, Jim Watkins, and I came on board, Shy Meyer and Bob Barrow were here. A year later, P.X. Kelley and John Wickham joined us. We set some goals back in 1982. We said, first, we are going to improve the way we serve the Secretary of Defense and the President. Then, we said, we are going to improve the way we work with each other and with the CINC's. Now, if I can take those one at a time. First, the way we serve the President and the Secretary of Defense. Both have made statements about the JCS recently and I think they feel that they are well served. As Jim pointed out, we have met frequently with the President, about 13 times, and relatively speaking, that is a lot more than had been done in the 12 years before 1982. Those sessions are free and open. I think we have a good relationship with the President and Secretary. Of course, we see the Secretary of Defense about twice weekly. When we are the Acting Chairman, we see him every day. Also, when we are the Acting Chairman, we sometimes go to NSC meetings. I have been to about a dozen of them myself, and I have been the Acting Chairman for about 150 days in the last 4 years. So that, to me, is a real education; it gives me an insight on how the process works at that level, and makes me a heck of a lot better member of the JCS. I think this is important. |