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Now, of course, when we are Acting Chairman, we see the Secretary every day.

What we have done with the CINC's is my second point. In 1982, we called the CINC's in, one at a time, and asked them to tell us how they would fight the war if it started in their area, and how they would fight it if it started in another area. They would have a different set of forces in each case. They did that, and it was most revealing to us. Then, we got them all together with the Secretary of Defense, and had them brief, collectively how they would fight. We did that so they would all understand the shortfalls that we have, that they will all have, and so they would know the problems that we would have in the JCS in allocating resources in case you have a simultaneous engagement, so the examination was most useful.

What else have we done for the CINC's? Well, now they come in when we build the Defense Guidance every year. They take part in that. They have a definite part in the Defense Resources Board [DRB] process. As the budgets are being built, the components bring information back to the CINC's for review. After we meet in the Pentagon, and at each step of the way, as we are building our budget, the component commanders go back, open the book, and show the CINC's how their priorities fared in the service budgets at that stage. It gives them an understanding of why they did not get everything according to their priorities.

But, as John Wickham said, they are concerned with the "here and now." A CINC wants to build up that readiness now. He is regional in focus, and he is concerned about war-fighting—that is the way it ought to be. The services and the JCS have to be global and we have to arbitrate the total resources worldwide. I think that is understood by everybody. So, I think that part of the process works very well.

The way we chiefs get along with each other, I think probably has been at least as meaningful, if not more so, than any of the other things I have talked about. I think you all know the thing that John Wickham and I put together, the joint force development process. We had 31 initiatives to begin with, and as you know, were trying to build the most affordable, combined air-land combat capability we could. We have made terrific advances in this. We're doing exactly what you all have told us to do. I'd like to talk about three examples. I think you all know about the joint surveillance and target attack radar system [J Stars]. The Army had little aircraft along the front, with short-range radar, and we have bigger aircraft with long-range radar, to give the AWAC's look of the ground picture to the ground commander. So, we combined those two platforms and two kinds of radar, into one platform and one radar, and I think that is a great success.

Another example is electronic warfare. The Army had a series of vans along the front with some jammers in them doing one thing, and I had a series of jammers to attacking aircraft. And, they were being built by the same contractor in the same building with a partition between the two. So, I just cut mine completely. I took my black box and worked it into his, and there was a good cost savings in that.

These are two things that we did that way-when we add our cooperation in air base defense, these 3-out of the 20 that we have already completed-have already given us a cost avoidance of over $1 billion. I think there is more ground to be plowed out there. We have added four more initiatives to the process since it began.

The Marines and Navy had some observers in with us to begin with, and now the Navy has full-time people and we are trying to see what else we can do. I think there are about seven of these initiatives that are completely on board; things that we share, things we are going after-the joint programs.

I think the Joint Force Development process is one of the things that probably will last far beyond our time, and it is a good thing. Let me mention that we have a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Navy. I signed the MOA with Jim Watkins the first year we were on the JCS, in 1982. Since then we have had about a 250-percent increase in the tanker usage by the Navy. It is just routine now to go out and work with the Navy, with the tankers, the KC-10's, the AWAC's and sometimes the F-15's, to help them extend the outer-air battle around the task force. That has become routine. Also, we use tankers to extend the range of their attack force so they can project far beyond what they have been able to in the past, and that is most useful.

A lot has been done with the Navy in terms of the B-52's capabilities. We do, or we have been doing, sea surveillance and mining. We now have Harpoon missiles on board two squadrons of B-52's, for long-range ship attack which would be coordinated by the Navy. The first three Harpoon test shots were direct hits by the way, and that is all that have been shot to date. These things, all of them, these amount to a real breakthrough in terms of how we can work together to support the Navy.

Sometimes you may have combatants afloat without carriers and they might need air cover, such as the situation the British found down in the Falklands. We practice providing that cover and are able to do that now. We also have officer exchanges between the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. I have Army and Navy action officers on my staff-some of them brief me before I go down to the JCS tank. I think this is most useful in giving us all the flavor of jointness.

There are two other things that were done, that I would like to mention. There is an outfit called the Strategic Resources Plans and Analysis Agency (SRPAA) which is a resource allocation, I guess you would call it, that help the Chairman put together his preparation for the DRB. They come up with any war stoppers for the Chairman, and his words are golden before the DRB. He speaks up when it is really necessary, for example when a CINC, or the Chief or SRPAA tells him that a program needs his support, then he makes his pitch before the DRB and that works very well. So, that is a useful change that we have made.

We have the JRMB, which is the Joint Requirements and Management Board, that the Defense Science Board recommended. The Service Vice Chiefs perform that. The four Vice Chiefs get together and take a look at all Cross Service programs-those things that two or more services may be interested in. In one case, we had about seven Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) programs among the

services. We boiled that down to two or three. So, this has been a very successful approach.

We have not been standing still. We are being Joint. We have not been going off in four different directions. And, I think maybe some of you did not know that. The need to integrate joint warfighting capability and resource allocation is the best argument you have for the dual role, the two hats that I have. It puts me in the best position to do joint strategic planning and, in my service chief's hat, create the forces to meet that planning objective. So, I think it is obvious that we feel we are better Chiefs because we are members of the Joint Chiefs, and we are better members of the JCS because we are service Chiefs.

Let me say one other thing. With Jack Vessey as Chairman, and of course it has been endorsed by the new Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense and the President, we agreed on certain goals, and these continue today. One is to improve the ability to wage war. Others are to assure timely and useful military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President; better support the CINC's war-fighting capability; improve the ability to allocate resources efficiently and effectively; and to keep all of this consistent with civilian control. So, that was our bible, and it still is today; and, I think those are good goals to follow.

So, we are making good progress. More, obviously, can be done. I support a stronger Chairman as the principal military adviser, manager of the Joint Staff, and supervisor of the CINC's. But I think he should do these things on behalf of the Chiefs. I think, as was said by Jim Watkins, this is very important-that we maintain the corporate body of the JCS intact.

I think there is some merit in having a Vice Chairman. I do not think there is any question on this. But I think the Chiefs should continue to be the Acting Chairman because of those things that I mentioned. There is a lot of jointness in that, with the Chiefs rotating as the Acting Chairman.

I know there is a lot of momentum for structural change and I support some change, but I hope you are going to make it evolutionary and not turn things upside down.

In a new organization, no matter what you do, you are not going to be able to guarantee the kind of jointness that we have given you-these things that I have mentioned to you, the way we are working together and with the CINC's. You are going to have to have a personal commitment on the part of all of the Chiefs or the job is not going to get done, I do not care how you organize it.

That is my bottom-line foot stomper. I could talk to you about the five things mentioned in the Chairman's letter but I have talked long enough. I can get to that in the question and answer session. Generally, I agree with what John Wickham said. But if you want to get into more detail, we will talk later. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General Gabriel. General Kelley. [Prepared statement of Gen. Charles A. Gabriel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. GABRIEL

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

It is a privilege to appear today as you continue your review of Department of Defense management and organization. The current review by the Congress and the President's Blue Ribbon Commission is probably the most important process in which I will participate during my tenure as Air Force Chief of Staff.

Before I address specific issues relative to Department of Defense structures and relationships, I'd like to set a foundation for my remarks with a few comments on the subject of balance. As I stated to the full Committee earlier this month, it's a major factor in every decision and a fundamental organization issue. For example, in the planning process we must balance strategic modernization with conventional warfighting capability. We also must program resources to balance day-to-day readiness and sustainability with investment in future force structure. And procedurally, we balance centralized control with decentralized execution. We're proud of the balance we've achieved in each of these areas.

We're equally proud of the balance we have developed to carry out unique Service responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping the best attainable aerospace forces while keeping a joint perspective toward integrating these specialized forces in unified action. This balance allows the JCS to provide the President and Secretary of Defense with timely and accurate advice based on all available specialized expertise..

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But a sensitive and carefully constructed balance can be put off-center by over emphasis on a particular piece of the puzzle. We see proposals to adopt commercial procurement practices and put more emphasis on education in that area, but at the same time we are accused of creating a force of business managers instead of combat leaders. We're criticized for Service parochialism when we disagree in the JCS, but we're accused of logrolling when we reach a consensus. We're asked to centralize control, then we're accused of having a "bloated bureaucracy." And we're asked to be more cost-effective, then we're forced to stretch programs which results in uneconomical production rates. In isolation, many of these objectives and criticisms have merit, but each must be evaluated in proper balance with other demands. I ask that you consider this balance as you continue your deliberations.

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In the JCS, we follow some very valuable guidelines

criteria for decision-making

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that help us ensure a balanced

response. We developed these criteria under Jack Vessey's leadership, and under Admiral Crowe, we continue to make military decisions that meet the following objectives:

Improve the nation's ability to wage war

Assure timely and useful military advice for the

President and Secretary of Defense

Ensure we strive to meet the CINCS requirements

Improve our ability to allocate resources efficiently

And ensure any changes are consistent with civilian control

We've made alot of progress over the past several years by following this set of criteria. When Jack Vessey, Jim Watkins, and I joined General Shy Meyer and Bob Barrow on the JCS, we set some specific goals. One of them was to improve the way we serve the Secretary of Defense and the President. We also made a commitment to improve the way we worked with each other and the warfighting CINCS.

The key to improving the way we serve Secretary Weinberger and President Reagan has been our frequent meetings with each. We meet with the Secretary at least twice weekly, once at the Armed Forces Policy Council where we wear our Service Chief hats, and once in the "tank" where we wear our JCS hats. Our quarterly meetings with the President have proven most beneficial as we all take part in an exchange of ideas on defense issues. Additionally, when each of us serves as acting Chairman, we meet with the Secretary daily and the President as necessary during National Security Council meetings. I have personally attended about a dozen NSC meetings in the nearly 150 days I have served as acting Chairman.

I must add at this point that the jointness we get from being the acting Chairman and an open dialogue among the Chiefs has also helped us improve interservice cooperation. Cooperation in operational and programmatic efforts has led to substantial improvements in our combined warfighting capability. I know you are aware of the Joint Force Development Process General Wickham and I established two years ago. And as I pointed out during our recent Posture Hearing, we're continuing to make significant progress.

We continue to capitalize on each Service's inherent strengths to produce the most effective, affordable combat capability. Our objectives are to develop complementary rather than duplicative capabilities, to work together to fill voids in our warfighting

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