have corrected those problems by and large, and I think we are better off now because of it.

Some people have argued that everybody wanted to get their share of the forces in, and that we split it out, Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. That is total balderdash. From the very beginning, all of the services were involved, by the unified commander in his planning. The Marines were available on Navy ships; the Air Force would have to use its capabilities in terms of command and control and air lift; and the Army Rangers, two battalions, were on alert. But two battalions were not enough, and we flew in the 82d Airborne behind them as additional forces. That was the CINC's requirement. It was not a matter of "logrolling" among the four of us on a Sunday afternoon, saying, "I want a piece of the action or I am going to complain". That is, as General Kelley said, really a cheap shot.

Grenada, by and large, was an eminent success. It did have flaws, and we admit them. But operations that are pulled together like that are going to have flaws. We ought to count the blessings of the success instead of counting the warts on the hide of the operation.

General GABRIEL. Mr. Chairman, could I add one short story to put this in context?

Mr. HOPKINS. My time has expired, but I would like for these gentlemen, if they would like, Mr. Chairman, to be able to respond. General GABRIEL. This is, you know, a popular subject with all the Chiefs. When people bad-mouth what we did in Grenada, it kind of reminds me of Glenn Davis in his early days on the field at West Point, when Coach Red Blaik was teaching him how to play half-back. Glenn puts his hands on both knees and he shoves off, gets the ball handed off to him, runs 95 yards from scrimmage. Red Blaik says, "Now Glenn, listen. When you jumped off like that, you made a false start, your right foot went back first and it should go forward. When you got through the line, you should have turned left, because by turning right, you didn't have blockers over there and they could have tackled you. You should have turned left." There were about 3 or 4 things he did wrong. Glenn finally looks at Coach Blaik and says, "Well, how was it for distance, Coach?" [Laughter.]

Admiral WATKINS. Let me amplify a bit, too, Mr. Hopkins, because it has been a sore subject with us ever since-the accusations float around, and they feed on themselves. Some of the people are using them as the vehicle to stress their own points people frustrated from last decade's problems, if you will.

When that event took place, we had a battle group, the Independence Battle Group, and an Amphibious Ready Group of Marines, en route to Lebanon. They had no knowledge of any Grenada problems when they left port. They were 2 days out of port, and we gave them a "turn right 90 degree" signal. And they headed south. Two days later we told them what for. Four days later they were on the island.

Now, we had 1,800 marines embarked, that is 1,200 combat marines and some 600 support. They have five tanks; they have a limited-capability Marine Amphibious Unit in those five ships; they are not equipped for a major war with a foreign nation. They are a

small force that we deploy around the world primarily, for evacuation of American citizens in times of conflict, and that sort of operation. They were going over to relieve another MAU as we call it, an M-A-U. So, when we got to that island, we only had a handful of marines, as good as they are. What we wanted to do was take advantage of ready forces in being, with the 101st and the 82d Airborne, the Rangers, a few Seals added to make up the total force needed-we had to mix that pot together, because we only had 48 hours. We recognized the communication problems-they have been identified in every budget we have brought over to Capitol Hill. Sure we do not have enough communications equipment. But, we have a 5-year defense program and we are filling the bin slowly. When you ask us to move in 48 hours, we simply do not have the volume we need in place in every unit.

We have it now. There are lessons learned out of that operation. We moved very quickly, all of the services. We put several hundred million dollars of up-front dollars to fill known shortfalls more quickly. In this world of international terrorism, which this Nation has never dealt with before on the scale we are dealing with it today, we are now ready for immediate combat operations. We know we cannot fool around by waiting for a 5-year defense plan to come to fruition.

This is a change from normal procurement priorities. The Congress knew where we stood on communication equipment. For the Senate to all of a sudden use a known shortage as grounds for beating us over the head is irresponsible, in my opinion. We all share this burden of defense together, and we need to move together on it. That was a well-run operation. What is also not mentioned on the size of the force, is that we, the Chiefs, decided to double the size of the force. Why? Because the President's directive to us for this mission was to assure minimum loss of life.

When do you hear that in wartime? That is not a wartime directive, that is a peacetime directive. Why? Because where do terrorists operate from? They launch their grenades from inside a building on the upper floor of which are a bunch of nuns with some nursery kids; or similarly, they launch them from the marketplace. So, we have to surgically remove those snipers. We do not bomb from 30,000 feet or bring in Charlie's B-52's and level the island to mere sand. We had to go into urban guerrilla fighting. That is a different kind of a game. So, we went in large numbers because you have to double the size of the force. It takes two or three people to get that one sniper as opposed to authorizing a big blast to blow the building down, as the terrorists in Beirut do. We don't do that kind of thing.

We wanted to make sure enough force was applied. When we had inadequate intelligence on those students down there, we had to be very careful. We went in with "overkill" forces if anything. And why not? We could make them available. We thought it was an intelligent way to go. And as a result we only had a small loss of life on both sides-as was the directive-not just Americans, but Cuban and other lives as well.

We felt it was well-run. As a matter of fact we met on Saturday night with the unified commander from the Atlantic. We ironed out the differences in his plan and our plan on command and con

trol. We, the Chiefs, made the decision that we could not go with his command and control plan. We had to shift it and he agreed we should shift it. It made a lot of sense to us, because we all recognized he had communications interface problems between Army and Marine forces, the same problems that are now held up and being used to beat us over the head as a major deficiency as though we didn't know it was a problem ahead of time. We said, far better for the Marines to be North, and the Army to be South with the Special Forces so that when we met up in the middle of the island, there would be less impact from command and control interface difficulties.

So, we think it was a pretty good operation, well-run considering intense planning for only 48 hours. Once in awhile, in this country, we should be pleased with a victory. It has been so long since we have had one, we do not know how to deal with it.

Mr. NICHOLS. Anybody else want to be heard?

General KELLEY. I would be presumptuous after that; but, I would like to use the opportunity since I have some very strong feelings on the subject.

Mr. NICHOLS. It was a pretty good speech the Admiral gave. General KELLEY. Yes, sir. I was going to clap as a matter of fact

[Laughter.]

General KELLEY [continuing]. But, it's right on, Mr. Chairman. It needed to be said; because you can pick warts any way you want to pick them, but nobody seems to want to look at successes, which brings me to Mr. Hopkins' question.

You asked why other people have differing views than we have. I do not have an answer; I just find the process to be very frustrating. I find that I am confronted with a 645-page document I am supposed to read overnight, that is the most lopsided compendium of quotes from people who do not like the system. There is little in it from the giants like Lyman Lemnitzer and Tom Moorer who say they think the system works pretty damned well. It gives no recognition to a system that has served our country well for 40 years. And served it damned well.

Now, on the other hand, if you look at the language of the press release put out by the Senate Armed Services Committee after extensive hearings, you will see that Senator Nunn and Senator Goldwater directed the staff to prepare a bill which they thought represented consensus. I am going to submit publicly, privately, and everywhere in the world-if that bill represented consensus from the hearings, I'm a monkey's uncle. That bill was almost a direct translation from the 645-page lopsided staff report.

I do not know what the motives are, Mr. Hopkins. Lord willing, I wish I knew, because we're messing around with something that's quite sacred, and that's the security of the United States of America.

Mr. HOPKINS. General, let me say, I really appreciate the gentleman's response, and I felt that you need an opportunity for the record, at least, to be able to respond to some of the allegations that are coming, and I think the one thing that it certainly clarifies is why we did not have maps when we went in there, that is not where we were going when we left this shore. Is that correct?

General KELLEY. That's correct.
Admiral WATKINS. Correct.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much.

Admiral WATKINS. Let me just add to that, on that point, Mr. Hopkins. We are in a very serious period of what I call "violent peace" around the world. When we went into El Salvador, we thought we were telling some of our El Salvadoran friends the location where things were going on. We told them where to go. But that place could be 20 miles from where we told them, by the existing maps. You cannot imagine what that means worldwide.

Latin America. If you would break out the charts of Latin America and tell somebody to go find a drug-producing laboratory, as they call them in Colombia, on this particular point in that valley right there, they will discover that it is not there. It is not even close; it may be 60 miles away.

We are remapping the world, practically, in these hot spots that we have to deal with. We cannot do that on a moment's notice. Grenada was a quiet little island of tourists. Sure, it had been through a bloody coup and we had watched that, and perhaps we should have been more aggressive in contingency planning and mapped Grenada instead of Libya or some other country. But, we did not. We do not have maps available for every piece of land for every single conceivable operation. We do not have a map "for all seasons" on these various places. Grenada was not anticipated to be a center of this kind of activity. We have certain priorities in the Defense Mapping Agency to go around the world and provide these things. But we do not walk around with every chart we need in our hands.

A red herring was also thrown out about use of some credit card and that is the kind of trivia prevalent among self-appointed strategists. It's the toilet seat mentality of certain individuals-that do not even look into the facts or take the time to find out what they mean. In fact, the Army has a system whereby any time they go into an urban situation like this, their forces are told that the local telephone is a very legitimate thing to use. Why not use it? What's wrong with it? Do we have to have a fancy, all-spec military system for everything in the world? We didn't in World War II. If we analyzed World War II the way we analyzed Grenada, we lost that war very badly. That is the problem with dealing with the trivia and the superficial analyses that come from these people with Ph.D's and foreign accents that have never had experience serving their country. [Laughter.]

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. One of the amendments that we added, invited, in effect, the JCS to take a more active, affirmative role in, let's call it resource allocation, programmatic decisions and R&D and procurement. Could you illuminate me and possibly some of the others who do not know as well, and may know better than I, what your role is today in resolving procurement decisions, research and development, programmatic decisions, and particularly, it seems to me in this era of somewhat more scarce resources, we need more agencies to get involved in resource allocation. Do you think the JCS has a stronger role to play in this area?

General WICKHAM. As you know, Mr. Spratt, the service departments are charged by law with the provisioning, training and building of forces that are then chopped to the unified commanders so that they can fight wars. Having been one, I do not want to worry about the former, I want to worry about the latter.

Within the service departments, I think you are aware of how we go about building our programs on a global basis so that they are balanced across the world and for all services, they are balanced in terms of long-term and near-term needs, sustainability and readiness are near-term; force-structure and research and development are longer term.

We then have to justify that to the Congress in various form over here. Now, how do the Chiefs interface with that joint organization in terms of trying to assure adequate support for the unified commanders? Unified commanders participate, as we said earlier, in the Defense Resources Board process whereby the services, the agencies, defense agencies, and the CINC's have to defend their requirements against what is made available in terms of building the budget for that year.

For the 1987 budget, which is over here now, we had to go through that process last July and earlier with the CINC's. Out of that process comes some major redirection of funding. We may not, for example, have done adequately by one CINC or by another, and those adjustments are made.

The Chiefs and the Chairman, in particular, with this new analytical organization he has now, SPRAA, provide input to the DRB on joint matters where they feel, and the CINC may feel, the services have not done right in resourcing. All of the services here have in the past 2 years involved the CINC's. I send a team out to every CINC, three times a year, telling him what we are doing in resourcing his requirements. I know what their requirements are, they send them all to me, and, if I tried to fulfill every CINC's requirement it would be impossible. There are not enough resources. For example, we give CINCEUR about 95 percent of his needs, and if I gave him the other 5 percent, the other CINC's would get zero. The requirements for Europe are enormous in terms of sustainability. We try to balance all that, and, when the CINC is disturbed about allocations, that is reflected to the Chairman in the Defense Resources Board process. We talk about that among ourselves with the CINC's trying to bring some balance into how the resources are apportioned, and we debate it in the Defense Resources Board. It sounds not very precise, but I think it is like our system of government with checks and balances, and it works well. Mr. NICHOLS. Is this board a subunit of the JCS?

General WICKHAM. No, sir, the Defense Resources Board is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We are not even statutory members of that board; the Service Secretaries are. We sit at the table and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a statutory member. We have visibility in that board, where we spend roughly the entire month of July, virtually 2 or 3 days a week, full time, debating issues, listening to the CINC's, trying to make our case for why we have structured the budget this way and the program that way. Out of that process then come decisions by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the