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It either ought to be in the Joint Staff in Washington or with the unified command staff in the field. I think the key to making that work and to making officers want to do that and want to come back to that kind of a duty, and therefore to get very good officers from the services, lies in the following two proposals-and these are very important in my mind:

That the commanders of the unified command, the CINC's, should come only from officers with that joint duty specialty. Although I agree with Admiral Train on most everything he said this morning, that one I would disagree with. I think you have almost got to give this cadre of joint duty officers that kind of incentive, that if you are in that specialty, you can become a CINC, to make it attractive and to hold the services to the point that they are really going to get ahead.

Then I take the second step, which is in line with one of the things that Admiral Train was saying. I would say that the Chairman must be chosen only from the ranks of the CINC's. I have felt that for a long while, that you should arrive as Chairman, thinking in a joint way, having had to handle those joint problems that a CINC has to handle.

I would say that if you enforce those two practices, you will motivate top officers to joint careers, and I believe then that the individual services would want their best officers to qualify to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. If you instituted those two practices you would ensure the nominations of top officers for joint assignments, and it would also ensure that candidates for the jobs of CINC and chairman be those senior offices with a unified perspective.

Now concerning the unified commanders and commands. It seems evident to me that those officers who will command in wartime as CINC's have far too little say or control over the forces they command. Component commanders are beholden to their services for resources, and can in fact communicate directly with their service headquarters. The unified commanders, who are concerned with readiness and the training of their forces, as Admiral Train has said, have too little to say in resource decisions.

To me, unified command input on resource allocations would be best made to this newly strengthened Chairman and his Deputy, to be used when they consider how to integrate the service program objective memorandum that they get-the POM's. And a Joint Staff that was strengthened in its resource analysis capability, reporting to the Chairman and to the Deputy, as opposed to all the Chiefs, would be able to work with the unified command staffs, to ensure that those readiness and training requirements that they would put in, that they were given proper weight in the PPBS system. I would offer that as a way to get that unified command input into that system that you need.

JCS Publication 2, the Unified Action Armed Forces, is not consistent with the concept of unified command, and it should be revised. It restricts the authority of the unified commanders. The service component commanders should be required to communicate with their service headquarters on resource issues through their unified commander and not around them as they can do now.

The unified commander, in my opinion, should be authorized to select and replace his component commanders, and I think to specify his chain of command, which may or may not be through his component commanders as he sees fit. As it is now, he must put his chain of command through the component commander. I think he should have flexibility there.

Concerning the military departments, it is my opinion that the service Secretaries can, and do, contribute to the management of the Defense Department and that they should be retained. I see more disadvantages than advantages to creating Under Secretaries of Defense for land, sea and air.

I do believe that some consolidation of some of the service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs can be accomplished at a savings of people and a reduction in layering, perhaps. My candidates there for integration would be in the manpower and reserve affairs area, and logistics and installations, probably.

To conclude these prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman, let me reemphasize my initial statement of approval for H.R. 3622. I feel strongly that defense reorganization should be tailored to strengthen the joint perspective, and to redress the current imbalance between service and joint interests. To me, the key to that is JCS reorganization, and your bill accompanied by measures to improve the quality, experience level, and career patterns of joint and unified command staff officers and to strengthen the control and influence of the CINC's seems to me the catalyst needed.

I think these are the top priorities, and if they are accomplished some of the other suggested changes that we hear a lot about may not be necessary

Thank you.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Admiral.

I believe you said that your experience indicated that the Air Force and the Army, as a whole, sent better qualified officers, you thought, to the Joint Staffs than did the Navy?

Admiral HANSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Generalizations are always tough. Certainly they did send more sharp young officers at the major level, more than did the Navy and Marine Corps, to return those officers for a second tour, as colonels perhaps, than we did.

We used to get, fairly often, one- and two-star Air Force and Army officers who did come back for their second and third tours, so I would say that in that sense, yes, they certainly sent them more qualified in the joint arena. I think judging from looking back on how well they did when they went on for promotion, I think generally it must have been their sharper ones, because a lot of them got ahead much faster, it seemed to me, over the years, than a lot of the ones who came from the Navy and the Marine Corps.

Mr. NICHOLS. I would like you to explain as a Navy man, why that is. I believe I am correct, Mr. Lally, in previous testimony, maybe last year, as I recall-correct me if I am wrong-the Navy indicated to this committee that they are prohibited from sending their absolute best officers to staff duty, by virtue of the fact that they had to send their best officers, they felt, to man ships all over the whole wide world. Do you buy that?

Admiral HANSEN. I think it is true that in peacetime the Navy has probably a smaller pool of officers compared to the Army to draw from. The Army has a tradition, for example-and so does the Air Force, of course, have a larger pool of officers too. It is probably easier for the Air Force and the Army to find a qualified, very top qualified person. I am saying it is easier. I think, though, that the Navy certainly could do better.

It is a matter of priorities, and in my mind the Navy priority over the years has just not been considered as high. I would say it is a harder job, but I think it is far from an impossible job. I think it is a very key thing to do, and it is just a priority that they should fill.

Mr. NICHOLS. I found it very interesting that you recommended that before a man could become CINC that he had to have requisite joint staff duty.

Admiral HANSEN. Yes, sir, that is my feeling. I say that partly because I think he would be a much better qualified CINC if he had that experience. I say it also because I think you have to provide a viable career pattern for these officers who would elect to have that joint staff specialty, and I think it may take that kind of heroic effort to ensure and to convince young officers that that is a career pattern to follow. There would still be many other threeand four-star jobs for those who did not elect that joint designator. All of the component command jobs, the CNO, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, all of those jobs, the Joint Chiefs. There would be plenty of jobs for them. All I am saying is you ought to have some specific jobs that only these joint duty people can go to so that they can understand that there is a place to go. I would say it for both of those reasons. Better qualified people would arrive there and it would also give an incentive to young men to do that, for a career.

Mr. NICHOLS. I found it interesting that of all of our chairmen there have only been three with a history of the business.

Admiral HANSEN. That is right. I think that is very, very interesting.

Mr. NICHOLS. Do you have any figures on how many of the CINC's may have had joint staff duty before?

Admiral HANSEN. No, sir, I really would not have those kinds of figures at all.

Mr. NICHOLS. You talked about combining some position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel, and I have forgotten the other one.

Admiral HANSEN. Installations and logistics, manpower and reserve affairs.

Mr. NICHOLS. Would you comment on the proposal that is receiving a good bit of consideration, I would think, of combining the staffs of the Secretaries with the staffs of the Chiefs.

Admiral HANSEN. Well, that is what I am referring to in that statement, Mr. Chairman. Legislative affairs and public affairs, the staffs of those two functions are already combined, as I understand it, in all of the services. It is already being done, and it seems to work quite well. You have got one staff and the Secretary and the Chief rely on that same staff in those two areas. And I think in the Air Force and the Army, they also have combined their civilian

manpower staffs, so that the Secretary and the Chief turn to the same staff for civilian manpower staffing, in the Army and the Air Force.

I am just saying that I think a logical next step might be to combine manpower and reserve affairs, and also logistics and installations as well, and have one staff who would probably be headed by a military officer that both the Chief and the service Secretary call upon for their staffing. I have not included all the staffs, because it seems to me that there are reasons, perhaps, to have a separate staff in both R&D (research and development) and financial management.

I have not included those as ones to put together. There are those who would put them all together. I guess I am saying it is already working well in a couple of areas and I think we could save some layering and some people by doing it in a couple more, but I wouldn't do it too radically and do the whole thing.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. Admiral, I believe I understood you to say that you would favor going even beyond our H.R. 3622 in strengthening the position of Chairman by coming up with a single defense chief; is that correct, sir?

Admiral HANSEN. Well, if I had my druthers, I think a chief of defense staff, a chief of military staff, would be my proposal. I don't think it is too radical. It is the sort of thing that they have in Britain. It is the sort of thing the Canadians have. I think it is what they have as well in Germany and in France, and in the Soviet Union. It wouldn't be a radical thing to do, and it would seem to me that a chief of defense staff-and again very much on the model of what the British have, what they put in before the Falklands-would be a very good solution.

For this time in history, though, I am very pleased to see what is in your bill, and what we would hope would come out of the Senate bill is I think a marvelous step forward from what we have now. I just put that in to say that, if I had my druthers, I would have gone the other way.

Mr. LALLY. That would entail, of course, doing away with the present Joint Chiefs of Staff, though, would it not, sir?

Admiral HANSEN. Yes; in that case, you would still have the service chiefs running their services, which is a big job to do, and being responsible for the procurement and all that sort of thing. But they would not be members, would not be part of the Joint Chiefs, that is true.

Mr. LALLY. In view of your preference to the defense chief system, how would you respond to the usual criticism from your old service about creating the Prussian general staff?

Admiral HANSEN. It has always seemed to me that that worry has been exaggerated in this country. I think, for one point, the Germans never really did have a general staff. They had an army general staff, essentially, and in World War II that army general staff certainly did not hold sway over Hitler, and it had nothing to say about what Goering did with the Air Force or what the Navy did there. So I think when people throw up the German general staff as some sort of a strawman, it is not a very valid one.

I also believe that in this country, with our democratic traditions, it is not something that would really be a worry for us. It has never seemed to me to be that great a worry. I guess that is my

answer.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir.

Admiral Hansen, I would like to ask you some of the same questions I asked Admiral Train about specific provisions being considered by the subcommittee. You indicated that you agree with the joint subspecialty or specialty idea. What is your idea about the proportion of joint officers in such a specialty?

Admiral HANSEN. I don't have a firm feeling for the percentage from any one service. I am sorry, I just don't have that feeling. I would agree with Admiral Train that, on the Joint Staff in Washington or on the unified commander staff, you wouldn't want every staff officer to be one with that specialty.

I think you would like the leavening of some number to come in and out and one would go back to regular staff duties and be that much better informed, so I would like that leavening. But I think a significant number on the Joint Staff should be of those specialties. You need a strong cadre just for the corporate member we have talked about, and those who come back to that duty having had troop duty or fleet duty operational experience in their own services.

I can't really put a good number on it, because I think you have to be up to your ears in the personnel business to know what that is going to do to you and I wouldn't want to comment on what numbers they ought to be.

Mr. BARRETT. And your idea of the joint specialty, is it that they would go back from the staff duty out to line duty, almost rotating back and forth half their careers?

Admiral HANSEN. Yes; I would just say that if you have the joint duty subspecialty, my way, or feeling that that would work, is when you do staff duty you do joint duty. When you do fleet duty you go back to the ship. It would be the same kind of rotation now that a lot of officers do, except when they go to staff duty now they generally go to headquarters staff, the Navy staff in Washington, the fleet command, and that sort of thing, and they tend to shy away from joint staff duty. So I would just substitute joint staff for staff, and then back to the fleet, back to the troops whenever you did that kind of operational duty.

Mr. BARRETT. You were talking about giving incentives to young officers, and you had one proposal. What would you think about the idea of requiring that you have to have the joint specialty to become a CINC?

Admiral HANSEN. I thought I made that very strongly. I think the CINC should come only from someone with a joint designator, for the two reasons. It gives you a qualified person, a better qualified person, and also it gives that person the incentive of knowing he has got something to shoot for.

Mr. BARRETT. With regard to the Chairman, it has been indicated that the Chairman should have joint experience. Do you think that

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