cause separately produced and procured communications equipment or procedures prevent the interface. There is no alternative to this strategy, nor a substitute to a management system to make it work, and this is what we have charged the JTC3A to accomplish.

The current alignment of the aforementioned agencies with the Office of the Secretary of Defense is in direct response to the intent of Congress, which reestablished the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) position in 1984 and pressed for internal OSD reorganization to assure accountability. The ASD(C3I) now has direction, authority, and control over DCA, DMA, and JŤC3A, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing direction for military operations. Likewise the ASD (CI) provides staff supervision (on behalf of the Secretary of Defense) to NSA and DIA and is the focal point for Congress for all defense C3I programs. We think we're doing what is needed, and what the Congress has directed-effectively, efficiently, and economically. There is only one "magnetic north," and one set of global geodetic data; one frequency spectrum, and one best way to assure tactical communications interface; and a senstive condition for intelligence collection, production, and reporting that all services can share. Our current alignment is serving us well and we will continue to improve it. Thank you.

Mr. NICHOLS. General Powers, communications has had, of course, a great deal written about it in the recent Grenada situation. I wonder if you would give us your views as to what or what didn't happen in the communications area in Grenada?

LT. GEN. WINSTON POWERS, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE General POWERS. It is a pleasure to appear before you, Mr. Chair

man.

Mr. NICHOLS. What shortcomings did we have there?

General POWERS. With respect to the part of the system that I am responsible for, which is providing operational direction in coordination with the Joint Staff and with the services for the Defense Communications System, the strategic side, the long-haul side, sir; that worked. Those small problems that they had on the island, which was a successful operation, revealed some shortcomings. Any more specific details of what really happened, I think, Mr. Latham would like to answer.

The portion that I am familiar with, the one I have been working with day in and day out for 25 years, that is the Defense Communications System, which consists of the long-haul system, the longhaul satellite, the TROPO, microwave, the landlines; those systems worked. The intelligence to drive the mission functions for Grenada ride over the Defense Communications System; that worked.

The communications support, the planning for the Grenada operation; that worked. The connectivity from the Grenada Basin, Ĉaribbean Basin back to the CONUS over the Defense Communciations System; that also worked.

Mr. LATHAM. If I might add a little bit to that, sir. We have done a very, very thorough analysis on the Grenada operation regarding the command, control, and communications issues. As you know, Admiral Metcalf published a report and there is an annex to that which had several dozen actions. We have recently gone back and reviewed every single one of the recommendations, and did a followup to see whether or not the various procedural things that were recommended to be fixed; equipment, interoperability issues, were being addressed, and so on.

We wrote a special report on that which I just recently submitted to the Secretary on each and every one of those, and I have

given a copy to the Chairman. I can report to you that there has been positive followup to every one. There are some 26 items in there that we addressed.

The items and areas that have received the most publicity on the Grenada operation you really can put down to two or three things that were the cause. First of all, as you know, the operation was done in great secrecy, the planning for it. Frankly, the communications people were not brought into that planning process at an early stage, and as a result, there were very, very few people who were communicators and communications systems planners who were cleared for the operation until the very last minute, so to speak.

Mr. NICHOLS. Why were they not brought in?

Mr. LATHAM. That was an oversight, and that has been fixed, and there is now a generic, in fact a fairly detailed communications plan that has been developed for operations like Grenada in which the blanks, so to speak, have to be filled in for the next operation so that we will have a much better planning job done in that area. It was just a very tightly-held situation.

Second, as a result of that lack of ability to plan ahead, and only 48 hours to do it, there were certain equipments, communication nets, and COMSEC [communications security] materials that were not adequately distributed. We have taken steps to ensure that everybody has the right network and exactly the right communications security equipment in future operations. We have changed the distribution of COMSEC material for those types of operations so that that will not happen again. In short, there were some fairly minor interoperability problems-and I would emphasize minoras a result of those equipment and COMSEC maldistribution issues. There was one broken antenna, a satellite antenna, that was broken, frankly, on one of the surface ships that had to be manually rotated in order to keep line of sight with the satellite and things like that.

Mr. NICHOLS. Is this equipment that the Navy told this committee several days ago that they did not have or they lacked; and that they had now procured the equipment?

Mr. LATHAM. At the time, the Navy had a large number of UHF [ultrahigh frequency] satellite communication terminals deployed afloat, and they are buying more today, of course. The issue was not did they have enough terminals. The issue was whether there was adequate capacity on the satellite to handle the surge requirements. The broken antenna was the primary problem with the UHF satellite communications. These satellite terminals are also in the Army and the Air Force, and were used very successfully. Mr. NICHOLS. Let me turn to General Rosenberg for just a minute. You are Director of the Defense Mapping Agency. Ďid we have any maps of Grenada?

General ROSENBERG. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we did.

Mr. NICHOLS. Were they prepared by your agencies?

General ROSENBERG. Yes. Within 24 hours after the action message arrived at DMA, we withdrew from our stocks, copied, and distributed a map which has erroneously been titled in the historical record as a tourist map. It was not. It was a class A map, which means it meets DMA metric standards for accuracy. It had mili

tary coordinates. These are the kinds of coordinates that war-fighting forces require, and we immediately provided that.

Mr. NICHOLS. Did it have houses, streams, railroads, that type of thing?

General ROSENBERG. In the built-up areas of Grenada it did. Unfortunately, the map in fact was out of date. It did not have the latest features on it.

Mr. NICHOLS. How old was it?

General ROSENBERG. It was several years old, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Two or twenty?

General ROSENBERG. I will have to provide that for the record. [The following information was received for the record:]

The map in question, a 1:50,000 scale map, was current to 1978. Therefore, the map was approximately 5 years old. Additionally, a 1:25,000 scale map initially copied was 15 years old.

General ROSENBERG. However, within about 60 hours after the request came in, that map was updated by DMA with the most recent information that we could provide from our sources, which included the new runway and other critical elements that our warfighting forces were concerned about.

We also provided, within a 60-hour period, charts that are necessary for combined naval amphibious force operations which show the kind of shoals and obstacles near the shores that a landing force might encounter, and all those things were provided within less than 22 days after the request for them came in.

Mr. NICHOLS. General, do all the services depend on you for their maps?

General ROSENBERG. Yes, Mr. Chairman, they do.

Mr. NICHOLS. The individual services as such, they don't have any mapping section and so forth?

General ROSENBERG. In 1972 when the Defense Mapping Agency was formed, about 8,800 of the then 11,000-some mapping, charting and geodesy-oriented people were transferred from the Army, Navy and Air Force resources to the Defense Mapping Agency. Specific kinds of direct support elements such as the operation of the Navy's hydrographic ships, which collect survey data-that is map the bottom of the ocean for the Defense Mapping Agency-to produce hydrographic charts, as well as some Army Topographic Command people who were retained in the Army war-fighting elements to provide direct battlefield support were essentially the only elements that were not transferred to the DMA. Other than that, since we make almost all maps, charts, and digital data bases from a common reference, that is either the same imagery or the same cartographic source-that is, prior maps-whether it ends up being a topographic product-that is a land product-an aeronautical product or a nautical product, they really all emanate from the same data base, which has a lot to do with why they were all combined in DMA.

Mr. NICHOLS. How many people do you have in your command? General ROSENBERG. Right now, Mr. Chairman, I have about 9,500 people in the Defense Mapping Agency.

Mr. NICHOLS. Are those mostly civilians?

General ROSENBERG. All but about 500 are civilians, and most all of them are directly involved in the production of maps, charts, and digital products. They are not what one might refer to as bureaucrats. They actually are in the business of producing operational products for operational military commanders.

Mr. NICHOLS. General Powers, how many do you have in your shop?

General POWERS. Mr. Chairman, we have roughly 3,900 personnel. That is roughly 51 percent civilian and 49 percent military, and the military cut across all services, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Latham, just one final question. The agencies, of course, is one of the areas that we are looking at

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS [continuing]. For possible_changes, reorganization and so forth. If we did away with the Defense Communications Agency and Defense Mapping Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency-I believe that comes under you-in your judgment, would the various services be able to take up the slack and handle it by themselves without additional people?

Mr. LATHAM. I think it would require additional people, and I think it would bring chaos to the situation, very honestly. Let me take the Defense Communications Agency. We have worked very diligently for the last many years to build a system, a defense-wide global communications system, that has absolute insured interoperability and has as much survivability as someone can put into it. As a result of that, you have to work very hard in maintaining standards, commonality of equipment, and somebody has to be the manager. You could break it all up, I guess, and give the Air Force a piece, Army, Navy, and so on. But I will guarantee you, from what I have seen in my experience, and I have been in this job 5 years, that interoperability and making the services work together in C3, command, control and communications, is one of the most difficult jobs we have in the Department. I would hate to see this very, very well-operated defense communications system broken into pieces.

Now let's take the Defense Mapping Agency. One of the things that General Rosenberg does is set standards, and his products have to be built and sent out to very exacting quality control standards. The standards have to go between not only the services, but between other countries, such as the map that we might give to the British or like the map that he used-used by the initial operation in Grenada-so that we can understand what is on it, and they all speak from the same sheet of music. I can tell you when things are done in three or four different services you begin to lose that kind of commonality and standards of procedures very, very rapidly.

Today some 65 percent of the command, control, and communications programs in the department are cross-service, joint or allied in nature. It is just the nature of this area, and the same thing is true in intelligence.

Certainly you could break DIA back up and give a piece to each of the services, and you would still have an intelligence product. However, then I would ask, "To whom does the Secretary turn,

except the DCI, for a product that has been validated and agreed to and worked out by a group of analytical people?"

Mr. NICHOLS. I would just add that, with regard to your communications program, we had a member of this committee, Mr. Bob Mollohan from West Virginia—

General POWERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Who some 15 years ago as I recall, back in 1971-
General POWERS. Right.

Mr. NICHOLS. Was a very strong supporter of coming up with interoperable tactical communications.

General POWERS. Yes, sir; I have read much of his testimony. That was very helpful back in those days, frankly, in assisting us to pull this thing together.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, weren't some of the problems identified in Grenada almost identical to the problems identified by Mr. Mollohan back in the early 1970's?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; they were.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Latham, it has been suggested that busy OSD officials have little time to give the agencies the supervision that they need, and, as a result they are fairly autonomous and on their own. They don't experience a budget scrub on their budget and program proposals as rigorous as the services are subjected to. What is your answer to that?

Mr. LATHAM. Let me answer and then I really want you to ask these two gentlemen how much time they spend with me and what I do to their budgets. Basically, with the responsibility I have for these five agencies, I take it very seriously. I have admittedly a small staff to work through details on the budget, but we do carefully go over each of these agencies' budgets.

They are subjected to the DRB, the Defense Resources Board process in the building. They have POM's that are submitted, and the POM's are scrubbed and issues are raised to the Defense Resources Board just like the services, so they come under heavy scrutiny, and I spend a great deal of time personally meeting with these directors, having lunch with them and so on.

I go out to the Defense Mapping Agency, for example, once every month, and I eat sandwiches out there and we have a working lunch and we spend 2 or 3 hours going over a set of topics, and the same way with General Powers in DCA, and so on. It just takes a lot of my time.

Other persons in this job may not want to spend that much time on it, but I feel the defense agencies are so important, and play such a vital role, that I think it behooves me to take that kind of time. So I think they get adequate scrutiny.

Mr. BARRETT. I would like to hear their responses, and I also would appreciate the response to the question that was asked you by the Chairman on the breakup of the agencies-and what the implications of the breakup of those two agencies might be.

General POWERS. Would you like me to follow up? I can't say much more than what Mr. Latham has said, but I can call him at