this PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB It is indeed a pleasure and a privilege to appear before Subcommittee today to discuss the critical area of defense no subject that is more important organization. I can think of to the future health of our national security, and I commend the distinguished chairman of this subcommittee for his leadership in The organization of the Department of Defense is an area the subject from an academic that has concerned me most of my adult life. 1960's through 1981, I approached perspective. My research focused primarily on the JCS and the distribution of functions between OSD and the services. From Thus, Ι early 1981 through September of 1985, I served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense with responsibilities for the areas of Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installation and Logistics. was a participant in and a direct observer of the decisionmaking processes within the Department. Based upon my research and personal involvement in the process, Ι am convinced that the system is broke and that there It is significant that the Congress is is need for change. taking the initiative in this area. Too often in the past, Members of Congress have resisted efforts by the Executive Branch to fix the organizational problems of the DoD. The organization of the Do D has been defective since its establishment almost four decades ago. structure was a compromise between those who supported a unified department and those who wanted a bifurcated structure. Several Secretaries of Defense and Presidents have tried to remedy those shortcomings but have been thwarted by a combination of bureaucratic inertia and such inaccurate historical analogies, as the "man on horseback" and the "German General staff." What is surprising is not that the Department functions poorly, but that, given its organizational problems, it functions at all. If we were designing the Department from scratch, we would not have created such an organizational monstrosity. Indeed, it is a tribute to the management skills of many of the people who have occupied the post of Secretary of Defense that DoD has performed as well as it has. The basic problem with the Department of Defense is that it is not one department. departments each with its formal powers and constituencies that force the top civilian and military executives, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS, to act more like weak mayors The Department of Defense still is rather than chief executives. much more a confederacy than a unitary form of organization. a What any However, given the fact that the separate military departments have long histories and proud traditions, as practical matter, they cannot be eliminated. organizational reform must do is to increase the likelihood that the top executives in the Department the can manage DoD in spite of centrifugal tendencies caused by the existence of the separate departments and services. Given these tendencies, I do not believe that there can be too much formal power given to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman. However, my research and experience tells me that increased centralization must be done on an evolutionary basis if it is to have any hope of gaining the necessary political support. Therefore, I believe that two comparatively modest steps be taken during the second session of the 99th Congress. First, the Secretary must be reduced. formal powers of the Chairman of the JCS must be strengthened. Second, the span of control of the The se steps will not only alleviate the most critical problems currently facing the Department but they also have an excellent chance of gaining the necessary support. I applaud this subcommittee for taking the leadership in the area of JCS reform. As you may know, I was one of the several former high ranking defense officials who signed a letter in support of HR 3622, and, on December 11, 1985, I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in support of your JCS reform bill. It is my belief that HR 3622 will enable the Chairman to manage the OJCS more effectively and to provide the Secretary and the President with meaningful advice on operations, budgets, and strategy that transcends service viewpoints. However, by passing HR 3622 you have dealt with only half the problem. As the Senate report on DOD organization points out, the Office of the Secretary of Defense must be streamlined. Because of its centrifugal tendencies and because of the scope of its activities, the Department of Defense is extremely difficult to manage. If the span of control of the Secretary is too great, it is practically impossible. At the present time, the number of people reporting directly to the Secretary is far too numerous. In fact it is almost ridiculous. every time DoD has an actual ΟΙ perceived It seems like problem, a new Assistant Secretary level position is created. During my four and one half years in the Pentagon, the positions of Reserve Affairs, Command, Control and Communications, Acquisition and Logistics, and Test and Evaluation were added to the rolls of those reporting directly to the Secretary. Now nearly every problem in the DoD must be resolved by the Secretary seems to require the direct involvement of the Secretary. The situation is getting worse instead of better. Two years ago the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering was the acquisition while my office handled responsibilities have been shifted to the front office. czar readiness. Now both of the se The Secretary of Defense should control the Department through no more than eight individuals: a powerful chairman, the specifically research and engineering, readiness, policy, and financial affairs. All other officials, except for the secretary's immediate personal staff people like the general counsel, and the assistants for public and legislative affairs, ought to report to the Secretary through these eight individuals. If the 99th Congress can take at least these two modest steps it will have gone a very long way toward fixing the major problems that exist. However аб your February 11, 1986, letter to Secretary Weinburger notes, there are four other elements of the defense structure that you would like to focus on. Let me shift my attention to these four areas. (1) Defense agencies. I believe that the defense agency concept is sound, works well, and saves the department and the taxpayer money. During the years that I supervised the largest of the defense agencies, the Defense Logistics Agency, its availability rate for parts was higher than that of the individual services and it managed more items with fewer people per item than the individual services. tours in DLA. There are, however, two problems with the defense agencies. First, the individual services are reluctant to provide high quality flag or general officers to the top posts in the defense agencies or to leave them in place for a full tour. I was often dismayed by the rapid turnover in flag officers in DLA and the relatively poor promotion rates for all officers after their Second, the concept of the defense agency is often undermined by the creation of parallel organizations by the services after functions have been transferred to the defense agency. This was especially true in the intelligence area after the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It is no wonder individuals perceive that there are too many layers, but the problem is caused not by the defense agency but by the individual services. President Eisenhower noted over 30 years ago, we no longer fight as individual services. Ι believe we should not manage separately either. (2) Joint military duties and the military personnel system. By and large officers assigned to joint duty, especially the joint staff, are not the "best and the brightest". Nor are they as prepared as they should be for joint assignments. Finally, they are not as who have competitive for promotion as officers remained close to their services. This is one reason why the joint staff does not function as effectively as it should. A partial remedy for this situation is to make meaningful joint assignments an absolute prerequisite, for promotion to star ranks. Although such a requirement already exists, it is often definition of joint assignment construed too widely. Giving the Chairman of the JCS a role in selection of offers to joint assignments and their subsequent promotion and future assignments would also help. waived and the However, creation of a joint specialty is Given the increasing importance what is needed. of the joint arena, we need officers who spend a considerable amount of their staff assignments in the joint area. A useful model for this type of career may be the procurement specialty track recently created by the Secretary of the Navy. I have no philosophical or historical objective to an Armed Forces General staff. However, I believe that we should try the other steps first, and, if they do not succeed in bringing the "best and brightest" into the joint arena, only then should we look seriously at the General staff concept. (3) Consolidating the military department headquarters staffs. A service secretary should be entitled to organize his But, he does not need two staff in the manner he chooses. |