Mr. CARNEY. If you play the numbers game, then my argument seems to bear out. We have the same amount of general officers and O-6's as we did at the end of World War II.

Mr. KORB. You do have that. But if you take a look at where they are, you will find out the need for them is specified by things that they do that they didn't do before World War II.

When I was in office, Senator Nunn asked for a study on how many flag and general officers we needed. We went through and we took that thing from top to bottom and justified every position. One of the things we recommended-and, unfortunately, that legislation got bogged down-was that you have people just for the services and then you have another pool for what I call these nonmilitary jobs that the Defense Department is asked to fill, and then you can add people for those.

We had a terrible time here dealing with some of the military people in the CIA because we had no room for those particular billets. Admiral Poindexter is at the NSC. If you take a look at all of those billets for which people demand flag and general officers, I think you will find that that's where your addition has come, rather than in the armed services itself.

Finally, we would hope that when we go to war, when we expand the forces, we won't bring in more generals and admirals, that we will simply have more troops for these flag officers to command.

Mr. CARNEY. I know you have been very patient, but let me ask you this. If we are creating all these additional jobs, is that part of the problem? I mean, are we creating the jobs to justify the billets? Mr. KORB. No, I would say it's the other way around. Everybody in this town wants a military officer, because they're good, they're hard working, and they're smart. Lots of agencies that have a tenuous connection to the Department of Defense want them.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you.

Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Dr. Korb, the time is passing and I would appreciate brief answers so we can get you on the record in a couple of

areas.

First of all, you heard me describe to General Vessey the joint subspecialty and then the parallel proposal concerning the Chairman participating in promotions. Would you favor that? I know it was a very sketchy description.

Mr. KORB. I do. I favor that.

Mr. BARRETT. There is another area on defense agencies. They have been criticized, some of them, for not being sufficiently responsive to combat-related needs. There are five agencies including DLA, DIA, DCAA, with that sort of mission.

Without getting into whether they are sufficiently responsive, because people can disagree on that, the subcommittee is considering giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for reviewing agency charters, reviewing agency war plans, ensuring that agencies participate fully in joint exercises, and developing a readiness reporting system for agencies, to ensure that they are responsive to combat-related needs.

Could you comment briefly on that?

Mr. KORB. I think the time has come to take a look at them because they have grown like Topsy and nobody seems to have gone back and taken a good look at it. I think that now would be a very, very good time to do that.

Mr. BARRETT. Then you heard the Chairman describe the study that is also being considered. I assume that means you would favor that sort of approach?

Mr. KORB. That's right.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, Dr. Korb. We appreciate your patience with us in waiting 2 hours. We appreciate very much your testimony.

Mr. KORB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. The next committee meeting will be at 9:30 in the morning, in room 2218, which is just down the hall from this room. At that time we will hear from the Honorable Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense; General Meyer, U.S. Army, retired, former Army Chief of Staff; General Goodpaster, U.S. Army retired, former commander-in-chief of the U.S. European Command. I might add that at 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon, in 2118, we will hear from Admiral Crowe, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Thursday, February 27, 1986.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nichols (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order. This morning as we continue testimony concerning reorganization of the Department of Defense, we are pleased to have Dr. Harold Brown who served as Secretary of Defense in the administration of President Carter and has had previous experience as Secretary of the Air Force. He has recently written the book, "Thinking About National Security" which advocates many of the reforms that this subcommittee is proposing. He also joined five other former Secretaries of Defense in support of a number of reform proposals. Mr. Secretary, we are always glad to have you come before our subcommittee. You have many, many friends on this committee. We would be pleased to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to be here this morning. I want to make it clear that anything I can do to help the activities of the committee in trying to improve Defense organization I am most eager to do.

Rather than a long prepared statement, I thought what I would do is perhaps talk for 10 minutes or so about the general principles that ought to underlie Defense organization, my own views about some of the more important features of organization that I would suggest need improvement and how, and then, perhaps, give some brief comments on both the legislation that the House has already passed, H.R. 3622, and the staff discussion drafts that are now before you as the focus of attention by the committee. But mostly I hope that we could spend the time with me trying to respond to whatever questions you have.

Let me begin by noting that there are several overlapping but, nevertheless, separate, distinct goals involved in organizing for defense. We should begin, of course, by noting that organization won't do the job. You need the correct environment. You need good people. You need good direction to the Department of Defense by the President, the Secretary, and the Congress. But it's easier to make an organization work with good organizational arrangements

62-630 0 - 87 - 10

than it is to try to fight the organizational arrangements in order to make the organization work.

The functions of the Department of Defense include, first of all, the need to plan and execute military operations in support of U.S. foreign policy. In dealing with that, you are dealing with the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commanders, the Secretary of Defense, and those parts of his immediate office that deal with political and military matters, and the interface between military operations, diplomatic activities, intelligence activities, intelligence needs, and overall national security policy.

A related and overlapping, but separate, issue is the force structure, which of course connects the national strategy, the military strategy, the force posture, military plans, and military operations. And the force posture in turn leads to the question of what do you procure, how do you train, and so forth?

Choices of force structure and the setting of priorities are matters in which, principally, the JCS organization is involved. To a lesser extent the unified and specified commanders, who deal with this year, next year, maybe the year after, but not 10 or 15 years from now, have to concern themselves with this issue also. So, too, do the military departments and military services.

When it comes to actually procuring what has been decided on as a force structure, that has been, and, in my judgment, probably should continue to be the function of the military departments and the military services.

In the public mind these things all blur together: procurement of $400 hammers; success or failure in the Grenada operation or Iran rescue attempt; advice on arms control proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President. Those all get mixed together. But they need to be dealt with separately and with understanding of what their relations are.

In my judgment, what is most needed to improve the Department of Defense organization is to strengthen the procedures and the organization that will provide a unified strategy, and joint planning and execution for major military operations. The smaller military operations have more leeway; you don't have to be organized perfectly in order to be able to overcome the resistance of 100 Cubans in Grenada. Operations on the central front in Europe provide less leeway because the United States will not be fighting with an overwhelming preponderance of personnel and materiel; quite the contrary.

In my judgment, activities such as unified strategy, and joint planning and operations, need to be improved. The way to improve them in organizational terms is to change the balance of influence and change the preponderance of inputs from the military services to the joint activities, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commanders as opposed to military services, military departments, and the component commands.

In the case of force structure, budgeting, and procurement, I think some changes also need to be made, dealing with the relationships largely between the military services and departments on