Comment: It must be remembered that the Unified Commanders are not involved in all of the antics of the Defense budget experienced by those in Washington. The Unified Commanders are not responsible for research and development, for recruiting and basic training, for policy matters involving pay scales and retirement laws affecting military personnel or discipline and changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, etc. In short, the Unified Commander should be provided with budgetary support for joint exercises which are scheduled well in advance. However, it would be a mistake to involve the Unified Commanders in full-scale budgeting since during war he would not have time to concern himself with the budget-his job is to fight the forces he has been assigned. It is poor practice to establish an organization in peacetime that will not function well in a major war. I am opposed to this provision.

F. Provision: Places the Joint Staff under the authority of the Chairman and deletes the limit of 400 on the number of officers who may serve on the Joint Staff. Comment: The Chairman as a matter of practice does have authority over the Joint Staff. No officer can be assigned to the Joint Staff if the Chairman does not approve. He simply vetoes the assignment and asks for a substitute. With respect to the level of 400, I see no objections deleting this limit.

But I do think that the number of officers in the JCS as well as in several agencies is excessive. However, I do not think that a significant reduction can be made until reductions are made up the line in the staffs on Congressional Committees as well as the Secretary of Defense.

G. Provision: Authorizes the President or the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command runs through the Chairman to the Unified Commanders.

Comment: The National Command Authority is composed of the President and the Secretary of Defense. However, here again the normal chain through which orders flow from the NCA to the field commands, to my knowledge, has always run through the Chairman to the Unified Commanders. This is because a one-sentence decision on the part of the President can generate a multitude of messages involving active as well as supportive commands required to execute the President's directive. This procedure becomes simpler and simpler as scope of combat increases. For instance, during World War II the orders to commanders in the field stated simply "Seize the Philippines." If procedures by non-professional management people forced on the military during the McNamara regime in the conduct of the Vietnam war had been used during World War II, I doubt if General MacArthur could have seized the Philippines or General Eisenhower conducted the Channel crossing. However, I don't see how by statute one can control the imposition of ridiculous rules of engagement on those fighting a war if the civilians in control choose to force the use of such rules.

H. Provision: Directs the Chairman to submit to the President his evaluation of the Joint Service of an officer who has been recommended to the President for a three to four-star grade.

Comment: This provision is not practical. Very few Chairmen have had an opportunity to personally observe every officer recommended for three- or four-star grade. The Joint Service of such an officer could well have occurred long before the incumbent Chairman was given his present assignment. In such cases the Chairman would have no alternative but to detail his staff to summarize the Joint Service of the three- or four-star nominees. The way to handle this problem is to have the JCS submit nominations to the Secretary of Defense who would forward them to the President. If the Chairman does not agree, it can be handled in the normal way: he can so advise the President through the Secretary of Defense in writing.

I. Provision: Changes the Chairman's initial term in office from two to four years. Comment: While I do not have a particular objection because the Chairman normally serves four years I would advise against the provision, since the situation could arise where an officer was appointed Chairman a few months before the inauguration of the President, who would then be stuck with this officer for the majority of the President's first term in office. I believe the President should retain the flexibility provided in the two-year term.

J. Provision: Directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Chairman, etc.

Comment: I object to this provision. I firmly believe that in an executive pyramid the Chief-in this case the Secretary of Defense-should have the option of setting up his own staff the way he feels he will get the best support. I have had many staffs and would take very strong objection if I were told how I was supposed to be organized and how it was to function.

K. Provision: Establish a Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman.

Comment: In my opinion, this simply creates a four-star billet with staff, office, and other support and does not contribute to the operation of the Chairman/JCS's office. The present procedure, which ensures continuity for a three-month period, seems to me to be adequate. Furthermore, the procedure now in use ensures that each member of the JCS, other than the Chairman, will have an opportunity to observe the details of the duties of the Chairman. Since one of the officers will more than likely be Chairman later, this provides excellent training. Consequently, in my opinion a deputy JCS Chairman is unnecessary and simply contributes to bloating the bureaucracy.

L. Provision: Deletes the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations to be the principal naval adviser to the President.

Comment: I am opposed to this provision since it has been my experience that all Presidents involved in a major naval issue invariably call the CNO for his advice. He also does the same thing with respect to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If the JCS Chairman and Deputy Chairman (for instance, if this is approved) are from services other than the one involved in an issue in which the President is interested, no President would make a final decision without speaking to the Chief of the service concerned.

M. Provision: Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on how a series of matters could be implemented.

Comment: I do not think this provision serves any useful purpose, since it requires the Secretary of Defense to plow through the same ground over and over and adds to the burden or a plethora of studies thriving throughout the system.

In summary, since the reorganization of the Department of Defense and the JCS reform has gained considerable momentum due to various studies and media overkill, I recognize that some bill will be forthcoming from the Congress. As indicated in my comments, H.R. 3622 serves to codify several procedures that have been in effect for some time and consequently this may serve to educate many who seem to misunderstand how, the JCS system operates. However, there are some provisions of H.R. 3622 with which I do not agree and my opinions in this regard are clearly stated above.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Admiral.

I just cannot help but wonder if it took you 6 months to get all that writing done, how long it would take today?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I do not know. The debate would never end today. So, I would have a career, and I would probably make five stars before I quit writing.

Mr. NICHOLS. Let me ask you about the CINC's.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. I think we all agree that the CINC's do not have any primary responsibility in recruiting, training, and so forth. Their job is to get ready to fight the war, as you said so forcefully.

Are there any changes in the organization of the CINC's that you would recommend, other than the way that we currently are doing it? Is there any more authority, any more input that you feel the CINC's need?

Admiral MOORER. In your bill you state that the chairman will supervise the CINC's, although the law says at the moment that the CINC's report to the Secretary of Defense.

I think that what should be done would be to bring the CINC's back to Washington periodically during the year, have them explain their contingency plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretary of Defense, and then they can point up their require

ments.

Now, their requirements should be primarily in the support category. They should give their professional advise about the characteristics of weapon systems that are just starting, but should not be involved in the day-to-day development process.

The point is that the leadtime for developing a weapon is a lot longer than the tour of a CINC, and, so, you have got to have continuity, I think, that can only take place in the Pentagon, in the

services.

You run into a situation, you know, where the CINC's cannot dictate the kind of basic organization. Now, you have an argument between General Rogers and the Chief of Staff of the Army about the size of the Army divisions. General Rogers is insisting he needs a heavy division, and, of course, he is going to be relieved very shortly, because his tour will be up. So, you cannot reorganize each unit in the service just to please a CINC because the CINC's are going to have different ideas.

Let me say another thing about CINC's, and this is related to parochialism. The CINC's are always saying that they need more power and more forces; but the point is that the forces can only come from another CINC. So, I do not think that you need any transfer of power or transfer of staffs and so on.

The CINC's have plenty to do, and particularly if they are involved in combat. I could not imagine that CINCPAC would have time to do some of the tasks that are imposed on him in this bill, if he is in a war, because things are just happening too fast. So, I think that there should be more communication. I think the CINC's should be brought into Washington. I think the President should see the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more than he does.

In your other bill, H.R. 3622, you say, in effect, that the Chairman is the President's principal adviser. The Chairman is always going to be the President's principal adviser, if for no other reason than that he goes to the National Security Council meetings. These meetings break up, the President says to him, "Come over a minute, I want to talk to you awhile." The point here is that it is the duty of the Chairman, however, to inform the President and the Secretary of Defense if the other service Chiefs have different ideas. Now, when I went to the National Security Council meetings, Mr. Nixon invariably started with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Then he asked me what I thought, and the way I answered that question was to say: "Mr. President, in my view, such and such, but it is my duty to advise you that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or Army does not agree with me, and he wants to do this because of the following."

Now, I was meticulous about doing that, and I will tell you another thing that should be done, that I do not know is always done, but relates to civilian control. When I was told I was going to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I walked into the office of General Wheeler, my predecessor, and he was sitting at his desk with his face in his hands. He looked up to me and said: "You will never survive," and I said, "What is the problem?" Well, he had been over to the White House with the Secretary of Defense. The President had looked both of them in the eye and ordered them to do something, and he, Wheeler, had gone back to the office, and sent out the message because the Secretary of Defense did not come back to the Pentagon. When the Secretary of Defense saw the message, he just chewed Wheeler up one side and down the other. General Wheeler said: "But, the President said to do this," and the

Secretary of Defense said: "Well, he did not mean that." So, when you get that kind of relationship that you have to deal with in our democracy, you have just got to face it. The way I handled that from then on was that I never sent out a message to the forces involving combat that I did not get the Secretary of Defense to initial before I sent it out.

The Secretary of Defense will never know how to write messages to his military people. If the President approves an operation, like, say, the mining of Haiphong Harbor, and the Secretary of Defense approves it, it must take 15 or 20 messages to carry out that one sentence directive, by the time you line up all the people that have to know about it and have to be involved in it. So, whether the chain of command goes through the Chairman is a moot point. It will always go through the Chairman because a Secretary of Defense does not know how to write the message and he never will know because they keep changing.

So, the National Command Authority works, I think, in a commonsense way. It has to. But I think, in this bill, you have loaded the Chairman down with details about budgets and personnel selections and things like that, so that he is either going to have to have a very large staff or he simply will not be able to take care of his primary duty, which is to supervise and manage the strategic direction of the Armed Forces.

So, I would hope that these things in the Senate and House bills will be toned down, in both bills. I have resigned myself to the fact that there is going to be a major change because it has been picked up by the media and it is hyped through and through. All this hype about everything has gotten everybody's momentum going so that I do not think it can be stopped. But I do think that I would just caution you to apply some common sense and please take a real look at the impact of these changes on military people. Recognize that you cannot change the political system, and also that the relationship between the President and Secretary of Defense is very important.

It is not always hunky-dory, you know, and the Chairman has to deal with that. But, I think it is impossible to make a neat little package and, so, even though you pass this bill, word for word, do not be surprised that in less than a year, the thing starts falling apart again.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I want to thank you for your testimony today, and let me tell you, first of all, that I am not here to disagree with you. Anything that I might ask you is only an effort on my part to challenge your mind and your past and your history in an effort to come to a good conclusion myself. I have listened to probably 90 percent of the testimony before this subcommittee, and I must tell you that I have not signed on to any of the bills at this point. I may be looking for a combination of those bills. I may vote against it all. I do not know that. But, I am interested in some of the things you said, and I would like for you to use your experience in helping me come to a better conclusion. I remember early on that you said that you and Admiral Crowe and General Vessey and others disagreed with the basic thrust of this legislation. You also

said that young soldiers are not happy dodging bullets when they know that their leaders did not have much to do with the decision. I can appreciate that. I remember the testimony coming before this subcommittee on the hostage rescue attempt in Iran, where eight Americans died, and I remember the chain of command in effect during that operation. I remember the testimony that came before this subcommittee on the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the changes in the rules of engagement and the chain of command that they went through.

The point, I guess, that I am making, Admiral, is that these examples occurred. Under our current setup, I know that we do not live in a perfect world, and I do not have all the answers for those things. I do not want to imply that at all. But I would like to make it as perfect as I can for our world and for our people. To that end, that is what I am trying to do. What would you do to improve this situation, based on your experience? What would be your priorities? If you cannot change it all, knowing that it is not perfect, but based on your history and your experience, what would be your priorities for change to make it a better situation?

Admiral MOORER. Well, thank you, Mr. Hopkins.

I think, as I said earlier, that the organization as now set up, in effect, was put together on the basis of the requirements for World War III. The Beirut and Iranian incidents that you mentioned, and Grenada also, are the kinds of low-level confrontations that we have to deal with today with terrorism and so on. Remember, for instance, that when we intercepted the Egyptian plane during the Achille Lauro incident, which I think involved about seven aircraft, the President, during his press conference that night, could not even talk about the budget because the press only wanted to talk about that one incident.

Well, of course, in a real war, there are 15 or 20 such events taking place every hour. The press would not have enough paper, and the President would not have enough time, to talk about them because he would not even know about them. In answer to your question, in my view, I think we need a joint task force for these incidents, I call them, and I would have the joint task force report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and be allocated forces from the unified commands. The unified commanders should be kept informed as to what is going on, but you would have a direct chain because every President is going to be harassed to death, and he has to keep up with the details of little incidents like the ones that you have mentioned. They were not so little. But, nevertheless, I think that I have problems, for instance, with having a unified commander living in a country that does not approve of our policy. For instance, this happened in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The Germans were pretty difficult, and they did not even want us to take our own equipment out of Germany and take it to Israel, and not one NATO nation would let us land an airplane in the airfields because they did not agree with our policy.

So, I think, to answer your question, I am in favor of setting up a joint task force for small emergencies.

Mr. HOPKINS. May I just follow up on that, Mr. Chairman, just briefly?

Mr. NICHOLS. Sure.