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Suggestions that you bring the small and disadvantaged business operations underneath the Director of the Army Staff, in my view, is not going in the right direction. Indeed, the Congress in 1979 asked us to make it separate.

To do away with the Office of Civil Works would be going in the wrong direction because the establishment of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, which has a unique and nonmilitary function, is an endorsement of a study that was made in 1966 and approved by the Congress. This Office has a very special and unique relationship with Congress.

Likewise, to do away with the administrative assistant in the Army, as has been suggested, would not be an effective move. This office provides continuity when you have changes in administration. It also manages a host of duties that involve administration between the Army staff and the civilian Secretary's staff.

Finally I recognize that you have raised some questions about the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], and other services or functions that are coordinated at Department level.

I am of the view-and I suspect that the Secretary of the Navy would probably disagree-because the Army uses the Defense Logistics Agency more than any service. I think there are things that can be done that would be helpful to define the role and function of the Defense Logistics Agency, but I would say to you if you were to abolish it you will have to transfer back to the services an enormous workload, and we would need to have substantial additional resources to assume those responsibilities and increases in personnel.

The original concept of the establishment of the Defense Logistics Agency where you have one buying authority that buys_things like fuel, food, and items that are common to the services, I think is sound in principle. I think it has great merit to try to do it from the standpoint of efficiency and cost, and cost savings.

To do away with the Defense Contract Audit Agency for us would cause problems because currently we do not have the capability of monitoring or auditing contracts that are being performed by Defense. Consequently, we would have to have more auditors to do that, and they would have to be trained in order to undertake this very important and very necessary function. I think it also avoids certain overlaps.

In summary, I would say in reference to the service Secretaries, that the suggestion to have three Under Secretaries of Defense, one for air, land, and sea, is one I would strongly urge you not to pursue. If you look at the basic concept I mentioned, which is civilian oversight of our military establishment, one that is not constitutional in origin-not expressed, but implied-the question of how you achieve effective civilian oversight becomes an organizational one. You would have to determine where in an organizational structure like Defense you can best place civilian management in order to achieve that civilian control. To raise it to the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in my view, will not achieve either what you want or give the Department of Defense effective civilian oversight and control. I believe that you will destroy a very essential link that exists now between the services and the Department of Defense. You will lose a resource for the daily departmen

tal management of each of the services. You will lose policy spokesmen that I believe are absolutely essential for Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force policies. Finally, you will lose a proponent that you need to pass on to the various services the defense policies that are promulgated by the Secretary of Defense and by the President.

Consequently, to perform this very essential function of civilian oversight and control, I believe the role of the service Secretary is one that should be retained and, indeed, should be strengthened. PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today to discuss issues so important to our shared duties of providing for the common defense of the Nation.

Certainly we must continue to improve our organization within the Department. I would add that I think this has occurred more than the Congress or the General Public is aware.

I would also suggest we have had nearly 40 years of experience under the present organization of the Department, while cautioning that it is impossible to tell now what impacts some of the changes being proposed by various bodies might have on the long term operations of the Department and whether they would result in the economies and efficiencies sought.

My views on the operation of our Defense Department are drawn in part from my own personal experience. To summarize that experience:

I enlisted in the Army in World War II and was commissioned through infantry OCS, later serving in the Army of occupation in Germany. Upon leaving the service, I maintained my military interests by serving four years in the reserve and 25 years as a member of the Virginia National Guard, holding a series of positions from company commander to division of staff officer.

As you are aware, I served in the Congress for eight years, six of which were spent on appropriations committee.

Executive positions in our Government I have held in addition to the post I now Occupy, included:

Service as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in 1973;
The National Security Advisor to Vice President Ford; and

Counselor to the President with cabinet rank after President Ford assumed the Presidency.

In this latter post, I had occasion to work with the National Security council, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Defense. I chaired the President's internal task force for the reorganization of the American Intelligence Community. I participated in deliberations with the President and the NSC on the evacuation of Da Nang, Phnom Penh, Saigon, the Mayaguez situation, and the evacuation of American citizens in two crises in Lebanon.

I have served as Secretary of the Army for over five years. Prior to appointment to this post, I have lectured or taught at the infantry school at Fort Benning, the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Army's Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee.

My presentation will focus on that portion of the subcommittee's letter pertaining to the military departments headquarter's staffs. I will be pleased to respond to questions you might have on the other issues.

AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES (TITLE 10, U.S.C.) Secretary Weinberger has structured his office to his particular management style and has sought to shift more authority and accountability to the service Secretaries. He holds me accountable for his guidance and I think this should be the case. The Senate Armed Services Committee's staff report released last fall raised questions as to confusion about the role of the service Secretaries. However, there is no confusion as to the need for civilian oversight. I believe that the roles and responsibilities as set forth in title 10, U.S.C., are quite clear. Consequently, I see no reason to clarify or modify the statutes that describe these roles.

Another recommendation of that report was to repeal the authority of the service Secretaries to submit matters on their own initiative, directly to the Congress. In

this regard, I agree with the historical position of the House that this should be retained. Even though it may never have been used, I see no need to repeal it.

STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF SERVICE SECRETARIES IN DOD POLICYMAKING

In discussing the confusion of service Secretaries' roles, it should be pointed out that the Senate committee's staff report does urge that the role of service Secretaries be strengthened in DOD policymaking and other DOD-wide activities.

The service Secretaries role in my view can be significantly strengthened in defense-wide activities and in the uniformed services under the present statute simply by exercise of authority granted therein. Also, there must be a recognition of his duties currently imposed by law:

"Functions necessary for training, operations, administrations, logistical support and maintenence, welfare and preparedness, and research and development."

In fact, the duties are not limited to the above, but include other significant activities.

It is clear by statute that the uniformed Chiefs of service are responsible to the service Secretaries for the efficient operation of the organization and for operational, as well as war planning matters. This, if adhered to, assures military effectiveness and civilian oversight. Largely unnoticed, there has been in the last several years enhancement of the responsibilities of the Army Secretary in the field of intelligence which is an important dimension of his policy formulation and oversight responsibilities.

CIRCUMVENTING THE SERVICE SECRETARIES

Let me point out here that my relationship with General Wickham has been excellent. I can assure the committee that General Wickham keeps me informed and is very attentive to ensure that my views on key matters involving the military and questions of policy are communicated to the general staff of the Army and to the Army at large. He has been a strong supporter of initiatives I have undertaken. He also apprises me of the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I can also say I had a good working relationship with the former chief, General Meyer. The Senate committee's staff report raises questions as to "circumvention" of the service Secretaries by the service Chiefs of Staff.

The question of "circumvention" is addressed later in my comments; however, the situation that is most likely to occur is "non-involvement" of the Secretary. This occurs in large measure because of an inadequate understanding as to his role in operations. This non-involvement is not as much intentional as it is an unawareness of mutual roles. In operations involving the national command authority, the service Secretary is not intended to be a participant in these decisions. Consequently, over time, a perception has developed that assigns operational responsibilities exclusively to the JCS. When operational tasks occur involving the national command authority and the JCS arena, tasks may flow directly to operational elements in the Army without the involvement of the service Secretary. This does not occur because of an effort to bypass or circumvent him, but arises from a view based on custom that he is not involved. Ultimately the service Secretary will become involved inasmuch as logistics, training, and personnel will usually flow from the operational decision, but his participation may not be timely. Also, actions within the service in the area of operations can occur without his being aware of them.

In recent years, in the Army, there has been a gradual but significant remedying of this situation and a better understanding of the service Secretaries' authority. In large measure this has been due to the support of the office of the Secretary of Defense and to the leadership of the Chief of Staff who has made a concerted effort to establish a practice of awareness of matters in the JCS arena that will impact on Army units.

Intelligence matters by their nature are a gray area when defining the scope of operations. As noted previously, there have been significant changes in authority in the office of the service Secretary in matters that relate to intelligence. These pertain to identification of problems, corrective actions, controls-both operational and financial-as well as continuing reporting and oversight. All of these changes have occurred with the knowledge and strong support of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

It should be clearly stated that the Secretary of Defense has taken pains to ensure he does not bypass or encourage others to bypass the service Secretaries. The point is stressed that the statutory authorities are adequate and structural changes are not necessary in reference to non-involvement or circumvention.

Speaking to "circumvention" in the services, the possibility of some circumvention, while a practical reality, is not considered to be a problem. For example, the service Chief as a member of the JCS is authorized by statute to provide direct advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In fulfilling statutory responsibilities the Chief of Staff carries out three tasks. He presides over the Army staff and exercises supervision over the organizational elements of the Army, serves as the senior military advisor to the Secretary, and represents the Army in the joint

arena.

The common thread of all three roles is to keep the service Secretary fully informed, including joint matters. If the service Chief adheres to this principle, circumvention is not considered to be a problem. This is aided by the presence of written procedures in the office of the Secretary of Defense which require all taskings to the military departments flow through the service secretariat.

STAFF LAYERING AND DUPLICATION INTEGRATE SERVICE SECRETARIATS AND SERVICE STAFFS

The subcommittee's letter scheduling this hearing mentions an apparent redundancy in the three top department of defense management headquarters-the office, Secretary of Defense, the military department secretariats, and the service military headquarters staffs. The letter further states that the subcommittee wishes to explore the feasibility and desirability of reducing the management layers to two.

As pointed out in the letter, previous studies of DOD management have focused attention on the problem of layering. With the existence of three staffs the conclusion has been readily drawn that if layering is undesirable and is to be eliminated, the prime candidate is the middle element-the service secretariat. This conclusion fails to distinguish between the size of the individual staffs and the layering within each staff.

Study and examination indicates that the office of the Secretary of the Army is quite small and not heavily layered in any of the functional areas. Experience indicates that the service Secretaries' small secretariat performs a very useful function as a focal point for planning, coordinating, supervising, and expediting staff interface between OSD and the military services. The advocacy role of the service secretariat should not be overlooked. In my view, the service secretariat, in fact, expedites staff relationships and would be even more effective if strengthened.

To deal with the problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort. . . one proposal of the Senate Armed Services Committee's staff report consolidates the secretariat and the military staff, eliminating three of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and the administrative assistant. The two Assistant Secretaries that are retained are subordinated to the director of the Army staff. This is also true with the general counsel, the director of the small and disavantaged business utilization office, the chief of public affairs, and the chief of legislative liaison.

The general conclusion of the SASC staff report after lengthy study is there is a need to enhance and strengthen the position of the service Secretary. The recommendation to eliminate the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Installations and Logistics would not be consistent with this conclusion. There is no surer way to weaken a senior appointed official than to increase his workload while concurrently denying him key subordinates needed to assist in the oversight and management of the functions for which he is responsible.

Also proposed for elimination in the SASC staff report is the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works position. It was specifically directed by the Congress. This position is unique, having a special role and function with relationship to the Congress. It operates in a semi-autonomous fashion, with its budget being separately appropriated and not contained in the Department inasmuch as these funds are used for civil works as opposed to military endeavors. Within the Department of the Army, the responsibility for supervising the civil works program, for several years, had been assigned to the general counsel of the Army, who in this capacity acted as the special assistant for civil functions to the Secretary.

In January 1966, the Secretary of the Army released a report in which the Congress concurred. The report, prepared by the civil works study board, covered the civil works program of the Corps of Engineers and recommended establishment of an office of an Assistant Secretary of the Army with responsibilities primarily for the civil works missions. This recommendation was based upon the conclusion that the importance of the civil works program to the Nation and the Army warranted a higher degree of personal involvement at the secretarial level. Inasmuch as this office has special responsibilities and important tasks, its senior leadership should

be a dedicated office at the Assistant Secretary level. It should not be involved in the other operations associated with the military aspects of the department.

Positioning the research and development function at the Army staff level as proposed reduces or eliminates the Secretary's capability for independent analysis and evaluation of service research and development programs. It would also have a limiting effect on the service Chief's ability to influence important research and development decisions, thus diluting the effectiveness of military advice in the critical systems acquisitions process. Finally, with a civilian head, it could tend to divorce the research and development element from the remainder of the military staff thereby inhibiting the data flow between research and development and other vital military staff elements with which it must interface.

Under the SASC staff's organizational proposal, the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and Research and Development both report to the office of the Chief of Staff, specifically to the director of the Army staff, as is the case with the general counsel. I believe it would be extremely unwise to politicize the Chief of Staff by having him supervise Presidential Appointees and that it would be a disservice to the Senate who is asked to confirm the Assistant Secretaries. I also disagree with having the general counsel directly supervise the Judge Advocate General as proposed. The general counsel is my senior legal advisor on matters concerned with civilian oversight while the Judge Advocate General advises the Chief of Staff and through him, myself on legal matters of the military to include administration of military justice. It is important those two posts remain separate.

In 1979, the Army was the first of the services to remove the Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business from under the supervision of an Assistant Secretary after Senator Pell and others pointed out that the intent of legislation dealing with this function in Government was to have it answer directly to the agency head without being buffered by intermediate supervision. Continued interest is underscored by the over 200 inquiries to this office by Congress or others monthly. To change it would be contrary to the spirit and intent of that legislation, and would ignore the need for input, at the secretariat level, of the Departments responsibilities to support the national policy on small and disadvantaged businesses.

In reference to the question posed by the Senate committee's staff of the need for continuity and the observation that this is lacking under the current military and civilian leadership arrangement, the report would eliminate the administrative assistant position. This is a key post that not only provides essential continuity during transition of administrations and Secretaries, but performs a vital role in the administrative operation of the Department on a day-to-day basis, serving both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army in such areas as personnel, procurement, resource management, and departmental administative policy. The post, established by law, is historic and traces its origins to the early days of our Nation.

The chief of legislative liaison and the chief of public affairs are considered by many to be an example of an integrated secretariat and military staff element since they act as single staffs to serve both the Army staff as well as the secretariat. These positions are more aligned to my duties than to the Chief of Staff's. Consequently, they are organizationally placed at the secretariat level but have concurrent responsibility to the Chief. Conversely, the inspector general and the auditor general are at the Army staff level and report to me as well as to the Chief. I hasten to point out that these are specialized and technical positions with highly defined duties which do not have the same responsibilities for articulating administration policy as an Assistant Secretary, the general counsel, or the administrative assistant. In effect, this is in line with the option of the selective staff integration to counter the layering problem although it doesn't reflect the same choices for selective integration. It is my belief that further integration would be counterproductive.

CONSOLIDATION OF SERVICE SECRETARIATS WITH OFFICE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Your letter raises the question as to whether another way of dealing with the problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort is to eliminate service Secretaries and create under secretaries of defense for land, sea, and air. I firmly believe that under secretaries of defense for land, sea, and air would not be as capable or effective as service Secretaries in performing the five key roles of (1) civilian control; (2) essential link between detailed service programs and broader DOD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily departmental management; (4) political spokesman; and (5) proponent within the military department of decisions by higher civilian authority. In each instance, under secretaries of defense would suffer from their organiza

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