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of the JCS. I do not understand such guarded permissive language; I would establish that chain of command, not merely permit it it is too vital a link to subject it to transitory whim. Also, H.R. 3622 would establish a Deputy Chairman as the second-ranking military officer, and charge him with directing the Joint Staff. This has been the subject of strong disagreement, but my view is that the Deputy Chairman (or Vice Chairman, as I would designate this position) should be next in seniority to the Chairman, should be empowered to act for and as the Chairman in all respects when the Chairman is absent, and should not be the Director of the Joint Staff. The Director's job is even more than a full-time responsibility and should never be made an additional duty. Furthermore, the Packard Commission would place considerable acquisition advisory responsibility on the Vice Chairman; another important reason why this officer should not be the Director of the Joint Staff.

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such an important matter

There is a significant omission in H.R. 3622 that it deserves to be legislated and not left to chance; i.e. the Services and Defense Agencies must be charged with providing all necessary support and information to the Chairman, the JCS, and the Joint Staff in the performance of their functions.

I would ask you and your colleagues, Mr. Chairman, not to reject out of hand my suggestion that your legislation provide for the Chairman and his successors to be designated as five-star officers. This suggestion goes far beyond just a worthy designation and recognition of the Chairman as the senior uniformed officer of the U.S. Armed Forces though that is important. A

five-star designation insures that such officer remains on active duty for his lifetime

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not just until completion of his four-year tour as Chairman. After one or two Chairmen have served and relinquished the Chairman's role, the nation would be left with the best possible senior military advisory group; one that should satisfy all legitimate supporters of the "Joint Military Advisory

Council" school of thought. It costs very little, prevents any possible "suspicion of suspicion" as to parochial, commercial or "revolving door" motives of such officers, and makes them available at all times to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and the JCS. To me, the potential for creating such a seasoned, experienced advisory group of our nation's top military officers, who have held the responsibility and "walked in the shoes" of the Chairman is one we should not reject. I urge you to consider this five-star suggestion, as you continue your deliberations.

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And there is one other suggestion that I commend to you as key to the Chairman's role, if the intent of your legislation is to strengthen his authority, commensurate with his reponsibility; i.e. do not limit the Chairman's evaluation of three- and four-star nominees to joint performance have him give an unconstrained evaluation of their 3-4 star potential. Also, (and I consider this a key point), make the Chairman the nominating authority on all military officers to be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the President as Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands, as Directors of Defense Agencies and as the President of the National Defense University.

As you requested, let me offer my initial reactions to the four "Discussion Draft" H.R.s that you have provided for my review:

(A.) "Military Department Reorganization"

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In this draft, I think there is an

inherent assumption of problems that my experience cannot validate. In my opinion, the Air Force Secretariat and the Air Staff have not evidenced schisms and internal problems that would require such reorganization. Also, if uniformity is the objective and the legislative intent is to create the Services in a similar mold, I would suggest it be patterned more along the lines of the Air Force's staff structure, not that of the Navy. My defense of existing structures is not absolute, for I am sure efficiencies are possible; however, the guiding principal

of the Discussion Draft Bill on this subject seems to be in Section 2, (b), (1) "each military department shall have a single integrated staff for the executive part of the department". In my judgment, a single, integrated staff will improperly comingle service policy matters (the legitimate role of the Secretariat) with Service implementing actions. I would reorient this draft along the line of having single, integrated staffs serving the Departmental policymakers, but not attempt to extend that across the implementing levels of the Service staffs. Finally, I find the reorganization resulting, which would pair off the Presidentially-appointed or politically-designated policy officials with a uniformed assistant a "Deputy Chief of Staff who shall have the same functional responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary" patently excessive.

(Time constraints preclude my further preparation of written material but I will be glad to answer any questions as the Subcommittee desires.)

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OR a variety of reasons-including such emotional scare allegations as a Prussian-style general staff, an armed forces czar, or an irresponsible generalissimo bent on leading us to Armageddon the operational military forces of the United States have been saddled for four decades with a clumsy command structure in the Pentagon. The fact that it has worked is a tribute to the skill and maturity of the individuals who have occupied our top military positions over the years. The fact that it has not worked well under all circumstances is evidence of our failure to recognize and correct the organizational anomalies that tend to force a separation of military authority from military responsibility.

The House of Representatives has conducted hearings and passed legislation (H.R. 3718, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983") putting the Chairman of the JCS in the chain of command to the combatant commanders (the CINCs of the unified and specified commands) and making him a member of the National Security Council and advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense in his own right-and on the full range of military matters affecting the posture, readiness, and employment of combatant forces. The Chairman would be given control of the Joint Staff and the opportunity to comment on three and four-star nominees of the services. And, importantly, the House action would place the combatant CINCs under the supervision of the Chairman (who would speak for them in Washington) and would permit them to express their views on any matter the JCS had under consideration. As Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama said when proposing the legislation, the unified and specified commanders "are in a position to provide insight not elsewhere available concerning the proper structuring of US forces to meet national objectives."

The House has made a commendable start in proposing these corrective measures. The ball is now in the Senate's court, and its Armed Services Committee has the matter under consideration.

Though a relatively obscure issue for the American public, the legislation that results ultimately from this congressional action will be of extreme importance to the future efficiency and effectiveness of our armed forces. The full effect of the sorely needed military modernization and provisioning initiatives now under way will be diluted unless we make comparable improvements in the nation's archaic, Pentagon-level military command structure for our operational forces.

These legislative initiatives could founder on public and congressional apathy, notwithstanding their critical importance. The subject is esoteric and uninteresting to the body politic; some will charge it off as just another Potomac parlor game. Or it could be derailed by simplistic slogans, such as "If it ain't broke, don't fix it!" I submit that our current arrangements ain't broke, but they do need some legislative fixing and the House deserves kudos for tackling the problem.

Battle lines formed soon after the House initiated its hearings on this matter in 1982. Positions hardened as to what action, if any, was needed. Motives were maligned. Counterattacks were mounted to the public pleas for change from then-retiring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. David C. Jones (with more JCS experience than any other officer), and from the then Chief of Staff of the US Army, Gen. Edward C. Meyer. We can expect repeat performances during the forthcoming Senate hearings; however, the House action may have defuzed the most explosive issues.

We must recognize that it is difficult for a uniquely democratic society such as ours, fundamentally based on a division of powers, to come to grips with the essential command requirement for a clear-cut, cohesive military command structure-one in which operational decisions, authorities, and responsibilities are not divided, attenuated, or diluted. Also, it is difficult for our complacent body politic to recognize the presence of inimical threats and the essentiality of a relevant, responsive military establishment that can fight. Yet, forces that would deter must be designed and equipped with multiple capabilities to fight effectively, in varied circumstances of combat. Their command structure at Pentagon level must be equally capable and responsive and it must merge military authority and responsibility at this level. In a political or moral sense, it is commendable that we, as a nation, have difficulty with these conflicting requirements; but in a military context, this difficulty has caused us to postpone needed changes in our operational planning, posturing, and command lines. The legislative changes proposed by the House would improve our situation, could save much while costing practically nothing and would immediately enhance our worldwide military capabilities and responsiveness.

But there is at least one more key change that Congress should enact, one that will make clear the legislative intent to streamline command lines and to provide unfiltered military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense: Make the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff a fivestar position!

These changes will go far toward establishing a responsible, responsive Pentagon command structure for advising the Secretary of Defense and the President-and for carrying out their orders in a manner worthy of the fine military forces of the United States.

-RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY, EDITOR IN CHIEF AND PUBLISHER

AIR FORCE Magazine October 1984

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Mr. NICHOLS. Well, I was particularly interested in what you had to say about the CINC's. That is your ballpark. You have been there. Nobody is better qualified to talk about that issue than you are, and you have said you feel that it needs strengthening. This bill has been described by some as really a power struggle and as a change in power away from the Chiefs that sit on the JCS and toward an all-powerful Chairman. This Member does not care to do that. We are trying to strengthen the Chairman, and somehow the conception is there that when you strengthen the Chairman, you diminish the influence of the Chiefs. Now, I want them to have their say. I have said numerous times that I do not want to have the Chiefs put their light under a bushel. I think they ought to be heard. Have you looked at our bill close enough to make an observation on whether we have really taken a great deal of power away from the Chiefs in-

General DOUGHERTY. I think the only thing in your bill, Mr. Nichols, that would be perceived, as taking power away from the Chiefs is the Vice Chairman, making him No. 2 rather than leaving the present rotation in place. Now, that interposes another level of authority, but the Chiefs are not the Chairman. In fact, you may remember, Dave Jones said one time, right after he became the Chairman. "You know, when I was a Chief, I had a lot of authority, but not much influence. Now, I have got a lot of influence and no authority." I think that is right. That has been the problem with the Chairman, that he has influence and no authority. The Chiefs have had authority, and they have had some degree of influence during their role as Acting Chairman, and I can understand in humanistic way how very challenging and appealing that is. You have taken that away from them. You are going to interpose another No. 2. So, I would suspect that they would wince.

On the other hand, I worked at close range with the Chief and the Chief of a service is a very important and very responsible and very respected man, and there is a lot on his plate. You know, you could say he is not a Senator. He is not a Congressman, and he is not a Presidential appointee, either. I mean, not a Secretary. But, he is the chief of his service, and I think most reasonable men would be very honored and pleased to have that role, even if there were two people between him and the top of the military structure. Each of the CINC's is different. That is one of the unique things that a lot of people do not focus on. The CINC's are not amorphous. Every CINC is different. That is why you have got a CINC, because you have a different mission, you have a different area. They have different responsibilities. They are, each one, different. The Chiefs are service Chiefs, and they have a sameness about them. I do not think the CINC's are the challenge, but some make them that; By increasing the stature of the CINC's I do not think you are decreasing the status of the service Chiefs.

So, I come down to the fact that there can only be the Chair

man

Mr. NICHOLS. How do you view the recommendation of the Packard Commission that the procurement czar be appointed and that he be at the deputy secretary level?

General DOUGHERTY. Mr. Packard has not asked me on that, but I think it is wrong. If you are going to make a Vice Chairman, that

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