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means that he is going to act as an alter-ego to the Chairman. If you are going to make a Vice Chairman and then give him a 100percent responsibility-oh, by the way, I should say, I think you make a mistake to make a Vice-Chairman a director of the Joint Staff. I think you had better talk to the director. He has a full-time job. But, as Vice Chairman, giving him the responsibility for a particular thing that the Chairman does not now have, it seems to me that they have titled him wrong:
I think having a person in a joint role with advisory responsibility for procurement and acquisition is very wise. If you want to give the Vice Chairman that job, fine; but do not then say in the next paragraph "as to who will act for the Chairman in his absence, that will be up to the Secretary and the President”.
It seems to me that is completely inconsistent. I can only label that as a bugout. You know, they wanted to put the responsibility on the House or the Senate to make that decision so they would not have to. Also, it is an interim report. Maybe that subject was too tough and they are going to get to it next spring.
Mr. NICHOLS. Would you support the proposition of requiring in the law that a man would have to have Joint Staff duty before he could be a general officer?
General DOUGHERTY. No sir. As much as I support Joint Staff duty and, as Mr. Barrett knows, no one has supported joint training anymore than I, I think that would be a mistake.
Mr. NICHOLS. Would you support the proposition that before a man could become Chief, that he should have held the CINC position?
General DOUGHERTY. No, sir. I think those things are too rigid and too artificial; you are going to miss the best man. The Chief of service is a very special guy, and I do not think you ought to put constraints around him or her. I do not want to rule that out-the same way with the Chairman.
That is just like when people say, well, do you not think we ought to have a rotation policy in the Chairmanship, like the British have. I say no, sir.
Mr. NICHOLS. OK.
Mr. Kasich. General, if I could follow up on the chairman's question on this creation of a procurement czar.
General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kasich. I am not sure you let me ask it my way. Do you not think we should have an Under Secretary of Procurement? I do not mean one that will just affect joint kinds of things, but a procurement czar, somebody within the Pentagon who is accountable and who could help to build a professional procurement staff so that we could start to lick these procurement problems that we have had throughout our system ever since the Revolutionary War.
General DOUGHERTY. Your question, sir, takes me to a very flat answer. I do not like the word czar, though I guess I have used it, because I think it is sort of un-American. And, we have had that person that had primary responsibility. We have attenuated him into several people and three and maybe even four.
Mr. Kasich. Right.
General DOUGHERTY. And we have spread it between departments and services, military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I guess that the lesson from the interim Packard report is very real, we had not done it very well. While we have not done it so well that we can sit back and say, you know, it is perfect, we have got to do it differently, and I must agree with that. We cannot afford the weapons that we cannot afford. We cannot afford not to be without weapons that we need. We have got to find a better way to do it.
Mr. KASICH. General, all I am saying is I do not know how we can afford all this-how we can think we can have a manpower guy worrying about all the problems of manpower at the same time that he is worrying about procurement.
General DOUGHERTY. Oh, no. I certainly agree with you, and that is why I do not think you can have a naive person, or even an academic, in that job. That is a pretty case-hardened job, and it requires knowledge and it requires toughness and it requires almost a lifetime of conditioning. I have watched Air Force officers that I know very well, who were very successful in procurement. They came to it by diverse ways, but they all, when they were successful, had experience. I do not know a single one that just jumped into it without experience and they were successful. Because it is a tough league. There is big money involved, and there are great frustrations involved.
I think that Mr. Packard probably put his finger on it. We have got a top-heavy regulation and top-heavy procurement milieu. I worked in contracts. I used to be in charge of the contracts, appeals, and litigation division, getting into contracts that won't sour. Sometimes I just marvelled at how they did it at all, not that they did it very well, with all of the inroads. We have got to streamline that.
Mr. KASICH. The last area I want to ask about is whether the CINC's should get their own budget. One of the generals who came before us this morning said that he was afraid the CINC's were going to get sucked into the vortex of the planning, programming, and budgeting system.
General DOUGHERTY. PPBS, yes. I think that is a legitimate fear.
Mr. KASICH. So do I. You know what this debate is about? It means that different men can see the same thing in different lights. That sums up our hearings over the last 3 days.
General DOUGHERTY. Well, I think the kind of PPBS involvement that the CINC needs is far less than that that puts him into that vortex of the programming and budgeting.
Mr. KASICH. In other words, if we did joint exercises, force training, selected operations, special forces kinds of things-
General DOUGHERTY. Those are pretty good things.
Mr. KASICH (continuing]. And command and control: do you not see the CINC having to have 50 budget people
General DOUGHERTY. I think on the C2 [command control), you have to say just the adaptation of C2 systems because it is such a big money area and such a heavy procurement area. I would not put him into that business except by tweaking and tuning the C2 system to make it fit his situation.
Mr. KASICH. You do not think that, if you gave him maybe one or two or three areas of budgeting, that you would have to give him-
General DOUGHERTY. I think those in your draft bill are legitimate areas for a CINC to have some money.
Mr. KASICH. You do not have to have a big bureaucracy in order to put a budget in on those, do you?
General DOUGHERTY. If you have got that big bureaucracy, you would not be able to do the CINC's job.
Mr. KASICH. Last area, Mr. Chairman. I am very bothered and troubled by our bill that I am cosponsor on, with the chairman, about combining the departments, the military and the civilian sides, putting them together, and integrating the staff. Secretary Marsh testified that if you integrate the staff, he loses power and Secretary Lehman stated that if we integrate the staff, he gains power. Then we had some very, very good testimony this morning from General DePuy who said that if you integrate the staff, you are going to hurt our ability to do the job as we know how to do it in certain areas of the military. That brings me to my concern for this issue: What do we do in that area? I mean, should we limit our integration? In our bill, we fully integrate, and I wonder whether we go too far. Maybe we should integrate some things and leave other things out there. What is your view on that?
General DOUGHERTY. I watched the Air Force secretariat and the air staff work, and I have been a part of the interface. I have been four times a staff officer on the Air staff, and I was responsible for working with the secretary, who was then Dr. Seamans. I would say that you ought to ask Vern Orr, and I would say that Vern Orr is mature, and he has got his feet on the ground: Ask him.
My guess is that Vern Orr would say it is working very well because he tried to keep his secretariat focused on policy issues and to get them out of the day-in day-out implementation. If they start getting into that big faceless, seamless staff, they are going to get mired down in execution and implementation, just in personnel alone, and in budgeting alone, and the nits and nats of programming. Those things would just destroy a policymaker. He will not be able to focus on why and with what and how much. He is going to get involved in how to do it and how to make it come true.
I said earlier, and I really think it, sir, that policy in the defense area is the toughest thing in the world, and we should not gle that with a lot of busy work.
Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Let me get back to this deputy chairman again. It is a sticky point.
General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir.
Mr. NICHOLS. The Packard Commission sort of waffled on the thing.
General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir. You are charitable.
Mr. NICHOLS. Both this subcommittee and the Senate committee have created a Deputy Chairman. Both of us have made him the ranking man right behind the Chairman.
There must be some reason that I do not fully understand why the chiefs would just be unanimously opposed. They all say we they have no objection to a deputy chairman. There is enough work for him to do, so we should go on and appoint him, but make him No. 6. You say ask them their objections. Well, have you—
General DOUGHERTY. Well, I did not mean that tritely. No. I just cannot
Mr. NICHOLS. There must be something that I do not understand. They all seem to have great respect for the Chairman. It is "Mr. Chairman that,” “Mr. Chairman this," and he is the top cat and the boss and no question about it. But, the Deputy Chairman. There are a lot of reservations about him. What might happen if we create that deputy chairman and if we make him No. 2? Would you give us your views on that? What is really bugging them about this?
General DOUGHERTY. Mr. Chairman, I have asked myself the same question, and I asked General Gabriel the same question. You know, these are smart men, and they are very big men, and they are not picayune at all. And, so, I do not ascribe anything picayune to them. I just do not know. I do think that they have all found that they are better chiefs because they walked in the shoes of the chairman. They have seen his responsibility and they understand the situations which he can get into, they understand the necessity for very rapid advice, and they understand the difficulty of blending what is the corporate view of the JCS with individual opinion and keeping them separated.
I remember talking many times with Dave Jones about how difficult that was in a rolling discussion; how he always had to qualify this as his opinion and say, "We do not have a corporate view on this." You tend to get, in a rolling conversation, the idea that there is not any corporate view on many things, where there really is. I cannot answer that question, and I am punting because I do not know.
Mr. KASICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, if you leave this room right now, I do not want there to be a Deputy Chairman sitting out there in the crowd because if you leave this room and this hearing is still going on, the Deputy becomes Chairman. Even if it is only for a minute, Mr. Chairman.
General DOUGHERTY. Well, I think that, it would be like one of these chiefs or the commandant: if he were to say to the Air staff or the Navy staff, you know, “When I leave, instead of the the vice chief taking over, I am going to have the operations deputy down here take over for awhile and put him in charge." You know, they are going to eat up No. 6 or No. 3. They will respect the vice because he is the alter ego.
I worked for a long time with a vice commander, and we did not have one bit of trouble. When he had the con, he had it, and when I came back, I took it, and it was up to him to make sure that he was doing what I thought was right and in a consistent vein. But there was not any question by the staff that his decision was my decision, and it stuck. I went 3 years like that and we never had a ripple.
I do not know what I would have done if I had rotated the responsibility around through my senior staff. Also, I think the Nation deserves a consistency in its upper military advisory and execution echelons that you do not get with five people rotating the duty. I think that consistency can only come with the incumbent or the person who is designated and has the responsibility for acting for the company. There, you are going to get a clarity and a consistency of action that is part of the reason that I think we need to beef up the chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.
General DOUGHERTY. Arch and I have been good friends for a long time now. He is going to eat me up.
Mr. BARRETT. No, sir. But, I do want to ask you a couple of questions about your testimony.
First of all, I was not clear in my mind as to the implication of the example you gave about your leadership of the JSTPS.
General DOUGHERTY. Yes. I can answer that, I think.
Mr. BARRETT. Well, could I just add one thing? We did put in the law 2 years ago that the Chairman will determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided.
Now, that should factor, I think, into your answer because what you were talking about was something along that line. Perhaps we did not go far enough.
General DOUGHERTY. Maybe I misunderstood the bill, because I thought that any time it is requested, you can get the JCS advice on any issue.
Mr. BARRETT. Yes.
General DOUGHERTY. If that is so, and many issues come up like that, it is very useful to have the advice of the JCS. People who have not worked this do not understand what a wonderful institution the JCS is for getting things done and coordinating, which is the most difficult thing in this town. Coordinating well is especially difficult with diverse things like services. But with that provision in there, I would suspect that the Secretary is going to want a lot of advice like that. The President is going to want it, too. Now if you get in there and you begin to get dissent or you get a scizzle, and you get somebody saying stop, we are not going to go forward with this, we are going to split it, then I think you are suddenly left rudderless and it is at that point that I think you ought to have the power to resolve it. Now, if it is already in the bill, I missed it, Mr. Barrett.
Mr. BARRETT. We put it in. It is a part of the law now, but that particular provision that I read is a new part as of 1984.
On combining the service staffs, you brought up a couple of times about the distinction between the policy and-
General DOUGHERTY. I found the definition in the-where the executive level stopped in the bill was down through the DCS, was it not?
Mr. BARRETT. That is right.
General DOUGHERTY. Through the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that when you get down into DCS, you have got just acres and acres of implementing staffs.
Mr. BARRETT. But your objection was that you should have a policy level and an implementing level.
Now, I do not know of any other staff, military or civilian industry, where you have one staff on top of another for the purpose you say—that one has to be policy and the other implementation.
General DOUGHERTY. Oh,