« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »
ure or deficiencies in our military. As an example, the aborted rescue attempt in Iran, the bombing of our Marine barracks in Beirut, the rash of procurement scandals, and of the most recent vintage, the controversy in solving the chartered air transportation of our troops.
The Packard recommendations, in my view, give us the blueprint that we have been seeking to engage in reform of our defense management structure, so it can properly provide support for our armed services in the event of war, during the time of peace.
I thank you gentlemen for your contribution.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for chairing this. I want to congratulate the panel for their very good work. I think it is wonderful, because we are trying to shift the emphasis from not just how to spend more money, but how to spend money more wisely, and that is really where we ought to be going. I think we ought to get into the meat of it. There is a lot to do, and I thank them for their guidance because it is very complex. We do want to listen and do something, not shelve the report, but act on it.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Davis, do you have a comment?
Whenever we have two commissions of the magnitude that you have chaired, Mr. Packard, I think it is incumbent upon us on the Armed Services Committee and the entire Congress to listen to what you have to say. We are pleased that you have taken the time, all of you, to serve on these commissions; and, hopefully, out of your recommendations, and those of this committee and this Congress, we will in fact move on, save money, do a better job of defending our country. I thank you for the work.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Mavroules.
Today, in this combined hearing, the Acquisition and Procurement Policy Panel begins its review of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Defense Management.
I certainly welcome Mr. Packard and the other Commission members, and I know the members of the Procurement Policy Panel look forward to continuing to work with you as we examine Department of Defense acquisition procedures.
A sense of shared purpose must prevail in relations between the executive branch and the Congress, and between Government and defense industry,” your report begins. That is certainly our challenge and responsibility-to develop that sense of shared purpose. This is a discussion of attitudes and philosophy, and not a debate of specific laws and regulations.
Mr. Packard, I look forward to your testimony.
I would like to mention the presence of a member of the reform committee who is with us today, Mrs. Barbara Boxer from California. We have invited many others to come forward and sit in on the meetings, and certainly to put forth their ideas and thoughts so we can work for a better solution to the problem. Thank you very much for coming today. Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you. Mr. Courter, do you have any statement you want to make?
Mr. COURTER. No, thank you.
Mr. NICHOLS. I would be remiss if I failed to recognize the ranking minority member of the full committee, Mr. Bill Dickinson from Alabama, whose idea resulted in creation of the Packard Commission. At this time, I yield to him for any statement he cares to make.
Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I guess we have done enough talking as a preliminary matter here, and we are anxious to hear from the Commission itself.
I am very gratified at the first report that your commission has issued. I think it is inevitable that good will come from it. I don't know whether the New York Times editorial was good or bad, but at least it was complimentary in some respects. I think if we can get public sentiment behind your commission and the reforms that it would propose, it will go a long way to help us do our job when it comes to the authorization bill and the appropriation bill.
So, again, thank you for your product. We are looking forward to hearing from you.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Courter.
I have had the opportunity to look at the preliminary report, or maybe it is the final report. I understand that the Commission is going to continue to meet, however, and when they do-now, you can correct me if I am wrong-when they do, I would hope that the Commission will look at some of the offices that have been created, either by decree or by the Congress over the past 20, 30 years, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in DOD and in the various service secretariats, to find out what we can eliminate.
I am concerned that, over the years, what we have done is advance new proposals, new advocates, new requirements, new offices and new agencies, and they have expanded. What, we have to do from time to time is to scrape off some of the old paint. It is not that the reforms that have been proposed in prior years are wrong necessarily. It is just the fact that they have, over time, been superimposed, one on the other. To get anything done over there you have to go through so many different layers, and those layers are starting to bore a lot of people.
Mr. Secretary, I know you have a prepared statement. And, without objection, we will insert your prepared statement into the record, along with a copy of the interim report by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.
You may proceed at this time, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PACKARD, CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, AND FORMER DEPUTY SECRETRY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK C. CARLUCCI, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; GEN. PAUL F. GORMAN, USA (RET.); ADM. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY, USN (RET.); AND GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF (RET.)
Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I can say for all of us we are indeed honored to have the opportunity to appear before you, and especially the group of three of your panels and subcommittees.
As you know, we presented our interim report to the President last Friday, and we are very pleased to have this opportunity today to discuss our findings.
I want to particularly make one point: that this has been a joint effort. I have with me today four other members of our commission: General Scowcroft, to my right;
Admiral Holloway, also to my right; General Gorman; and Frank Carlucci. This has been a team effort, and every one of the commission members contributed to the development of the recommendations that are included in our first report.
Now, we may be a little bold to say this is the most comprehensive report since President Eisenhower's effort in 1958, but in a sense I think it is, because we are recommending a reorganization of the kind that has not been recommended in any of the previous reports since that time.
The key elements of our report are to get some effective, longrange planning beginning at the front end of the process, to produce a defense strategy and defense budget based on national security objectives. We are proposing to increase the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and get him deeply involved in this planning process.
I would like to emphasize here that what we are trying to encourage is teamwork-a team effort-between the uniformed military people in the department and the civilians in the Secretary's office. And teamwork, as you know, is an essential element of any successful organization.
We hope that the defense acquisition process can be run more like a successful commercial business. Of course, the big difference is the shareholders are the public at large and the American taxpayers, and the profit incentive is world peace, if you want to put it in broad terms.
I want particularly to emphasize that these recommendations which are included in our interim report are not a series of separate recommendations. But, together we have attempted to form a blueprint of what we think should be done to build on, and develop and manage the solutions to the problems of the Defense Department in the future. We are hoping that these recommendations can be implemented and that in doing so we will realize the kind of commonsense changes that must be made.
The President, the Congress, the Department of Defense, and the industry must work together as a team to improve long-range planning, to stabilize the acquisition process, to streamline the bureaucracy, and to align authority and responsibility in defense manage ment.
Now I have a more detailed statement that I would like to submit for the record, and I conclude these very brief remarks with the thought that you would probably like us to spend most of your time today in responding to your questions.
(The statement of Mr. Packard and the interim report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management follow:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID PACKARD
Good afternoon, thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee.
Last Friday, we presented the Interim Report of the
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management to the
President. Today, we are pleased to have the opportunity to
discuss with you our findings and recommendations on defense management. Our examination of defense issues has been the most comprehensive since President Eisenhower's effort in 1958.
I can assure you that this report takes a new and different
We have many approach to the problem of defense management. specific recommendations, but the key elements of our report
Effective long-range planning, beginning at the front
of isolated changes, but instead are a single overall blueprint
for better defense management.
In order to implement this blueprint and realize the kind of
common sense changes that must be made, the President, the Congress, the Department of Defense, and Industry must work