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Department has. And I would note that there are significant advantages in avoiding more specific statutory prescriptions which may limit flexibility, as long as, and this is an important proviso, as long as the congressional intent is reflected in the current practice. Of course, these hearings and the others that we've had before other committees, provide a good opportunity for assuring that our practice does reflect congressional desires.

On the joint military personnel system: we have shared the committee's concern with the personnel impacts surrounding joint duty for our military officers. In response to your direction, the Secretary forwarded on May 16, 1985, a report on our study to improve the capabilities of officers in joint activities. Among the actions that we have completed in this regard, the Secretary and the Chairman of the JCS have instructed the service Secretaries, and service Chiefs, to recognize the value of joint duty and its critical importance to national defense. We have increased emphasis on nominating highly qualified officers for joint duty, and we have increased the utilization, in joint duty assignments, of graduates of the three joint schools comprising the National Defense University. And we have also added a second course in joint activities for newly promoted flag and general officers.

The question of establishing a joint specialty was carefully considered in our report, and we believe a special experience identifier in officers' records is the best avenue to enhance the level of experience in joint activities. However, in response to your direction in this year's Authorization Act, an independent research organization is currently employed to conduct a study on the establishment of the joint duty career specialty and related issues. We will carefully examine the results of that study, and implement policy or procedural changes as appropriate.

On consolidating the military staffs and the service secretariats: while some consolidation has already been achieved, further steps may be possible on a limited basis. The Department does not believe, however, that the staffs of the service secretariats and the service staffs should be consolidated in a wholesale and complete fashion. The service secretariats participate in the formulation and implementation of policy within the executive branch. They respond to congressional requirements, and supervise compliance with legislation involving the Armed Forces. And they are the Secretary's line managers of their respective services with respect to administration, training, and support functions. In order to perform these roles, we believe each service Secretary should have a separate staff to provide independent analytic support and executive assistance. I believe this is an important aspect of assuring civilian control of the military departments.

It is important to note that the service secretariats are relatively small in size, and that the Department has made, over recent years, a concerted effort to keep their size to a minimum, consistent with mission and management requirements. There has been a total net reduction in the size of service secretariat staffs of 25 percent in the last 8 years; that is, since 1978. It's highly doubtful that operational efficiencies would result from further wholesale integration or consolidation of the secretariat and service headquarters staffs. We believe that the relatively minor personnel savings that might be achieved would not justify the corresponding loss of effective civilian executive influence in the administration of the military departments.

On defense agencies: The Reorganization Act of 1958, of course, is the beginning of this type of entity. It authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide for common support and service activities by agencies or other organizational entities such as single managers, where it is advantageous in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy. Over the years, under that authority, successive Secretaries of Defense consolidated activities, which involved more than one military department, under a single functional manager, leaving unique service functions in the military departments. In most instances these consolidations have resulted in increased efficiency, reduced duplication of effort, and improved resource utilization. There is, of course, still room for improvement in resource management and operating relationships between the military departments and defense agencies in specific areas. On balance, however, the defense agency concept provides, we believe, the most effective, efficient, and economic approach to the management of service and support functions that cross-cut the military departments.

There has been, Mr. Chairman, considerable effort addressed to the Department's organization in recent years. There have been many studies by outside groups, but we have reviewed these issues within the Department, and we have made some changes. There has been, also, legislation. More recently there has been a set of hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and many distinguished witnesses have appeared before you during the deliberations that led to the passage of H.R. 3622. The Packard Commission, our President's Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Organization and Management, will release its report in a few weeks time.

Even though differences remain, it does appear to us that, as a result of all of this activity, a consensus is evolving, both within and outside of the administration regarding a number of principles that should guide our determination of the method for implementing whatever changes we may settle on as desirable.

First, the Secretary's flexibility to manage the Department in a rapidly changing, complex, and dangerous world should be preserved. Neither the administration, nor the Congress, can foresee all of the circumstances that future Secretaries of Defense may face, and our feeling is that those Secretaries should not be so constrained that their organization cannot be readily adapted to whatever future contingencies and situations may arise.

Second, we feel that we should assure continued and effective civilian control of the military. This is a fundamental constitutional principle that must not be abridged.

Third, we should not only avoid, but actively discourage, micromanagement of the details of activities and operations, whether that comes from the Congress, or from top level DOD staffs, OSD staffs, or service secretariats.

Fourth, we should maintain the Department's philosophy of centralized policymaking and decentralized operations. This is a fundamental management principle of this administration, and one which I think has proven its value over the past 5 years.

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Finally, we should build on the accomplishments that have been made to date. These accomplishments have been substantial and have gone a long way toward improving past deficiencies in DOD operations. They should not be discarded, nor disregarded, but used as a foundation upon which to build further and more lasting improvements.

In the final analysis, it is essential that the Congress preserve, not just for this Secretary, but for all future Secretaries of Defense, an organizational structure which allows for diversity, and a balanced input from cognizant civilian and military officials, and the flexibility to adapt specific defense organization and management arrangements to meet the demands of ongoing national security requirements. We are confident that this can be accomplished through the joint efforts of the executive branch and the Congress.

Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by again complimenting you for the work that your committee has done over the years, and also for calling these hearings. I am the first of a number of witnesses, I know, many of whom will be from the Department, and we want you to know that all of our witnesses are available to you, any that you desire, to discuss these matters, and we want to help you understand our perspective, and work with you as you develop your own.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to take any questions you or the members of the committee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TAFT IV Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to appear before you and the members of the subcommittee today to discuss the organization of the Department of Defense. In this statement I will focus on those elements of the defense structure outlined in your invitation to Secretary Weinberger announcing this series of hearings. However, before proceeding, I want to recognize the leadership. exercised by this committee in the development of H.R. 3622, relating to the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although there are still a few aspects of H.R. 3622 with which we disagree, the bill does provide a basic framework which we support and about which a constructive consensus is developing

As noted in my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in December, defense organization is a matter which we take very seriously in the Department. This administration's commitment to seeking improvements in the Nation's military capabilities and its willingness to undertake management changes in pursuit of this goal have been clearly established over the past five years.

Although we have made a number of organizational changes, where required, during this period, we have primarily concentrated on improving management systems and processes. Generally, such changes accomplish substantive management improvements more quickly than organizational changes and achieve their objectives without the turbulence, disruption, and uncertainty which normally accompany a major organizational shake-up. We have demonstrated that we are in favor of change when it will provide a net benefit. By the same token, however, any proposed reorganization of significant scope should be subjected to a rigorous needs test and the implications of its implementation should be carefully considered. Furthermore, we favor an evolutionary approach to organizational change, which preserves that which is functioning effectively and modifies only that which needs fixing. My impression is that this committee also has favored this approach.

Let me now turn to the subjects in which you have expressed special interest for these hearings.

THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

We share your concern for improving the manner in which the combatant commanders prepare for performing their warfighting mission. The matters addressed in this area by your letter deserve genuine consideration, the issues are complex and change must be carefully fashioned to avoid reducing the current effectiveness of our capabilities. As you know, the JCS have initiated a review of JCS pub. 2, "unified action armed forces” which the Secretary directed to be completed by June 30 of this year. In our view, changes to the current combatant command structure should reflect the results of that study. The Secretary and I are committed to give genuine, aggressive consideration to these issues and to work closely with you and your colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee in examining them.

The thrust of the Senate staff proposals in this area was generally to enhance the authority of the CINC's over the components of their command at the expense of the military services. The Secretary and I have consistently supported expanding CINC opportunities for involvement in resource allocation matters and other significant decisions of the Department. We have tried to do this, however, in an absolute sense without reducing existing opportunities of the service Secretaries and service Chiefs to advise us. This is a delicate task. As a rule, any adjustments can be accommodated within existing statutory authority, and there are significant advantages in avoiding more specific statutory prescriptions as long as the congressional intent is reflected in current practice.

JOINT MILITARY PERSONNEL SYSTEM We have shared the committee's concern with the personnel impacts surrounding joint duty for our military officers. It was in response to your direction that the secretary forwarded on May 16, 1985, a report on our study to improve the capabilities of officers in joint activities. He promised “meaningful and substantial progress” at that time, which has been reflected in the actions already completed or underway. Among these are: (1) the Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have instructed the service Secretaries and service Chiefs to recognize the value of joint duty and its critical importance to national defense, (2) increased emphasis has been placed on nominating highly qualified officers for joint duty, (3) we have increased the utilization on joint duty assignments of graduates of the three joint schools comprising the National Defense University, and (4) a second course in joint activities is being added for newly promoted flag and general officers. The question of a joint specialty was carefully considered in our report and we believe a special experience identifier in officers' records is the best avenue to enhance the level of experience in joint activities. However, in response to your direction in this year's authorization act, an independent research organization is being employed to conduct a study on the establishment of a joint duty career specialty and related issues. We will carefully examine the results of that study and implement policy or procedural changes as appropriate.

CONSOLIDATING THE MILITARY STAFFS AND SECRETARIATS While some consolidation has already been achieved and further consolidation may be appropriate on a limited and selected basis, the Department does not believe that the staffs of the service secretariats and the service staffs should be consolidated in a wholesale fashion.

The service secretariats participate in the formulation and implementation of policy within the executive branch; they respond to congressional requirements and supervise compliance with legislation involving the Armed Forces; and they are the Secretary's line managers of their respective services with respect to administration, training and support functions. In order to perform these roles, each service Secre tary must have a separate staff to provide independent analytic support and executive assistance. I believe this is an important aspect of assuring civilian control of the military departments.

It is important to note that the service secretariats are relatively small in size and that the Department has made a concerted effort in recent years to keep their size to a minimum, consistent with mission and management requirements. In fact, there has been a total net reduction in size of service secretariat staffs of 25 percent since 1978. It is highly doubtful that operational efficiencies ild result from further integration/consolidation of secretariat and service headquarters staffs. The relatively minor personnel savings would, by no means, justify the corresponding loss of effective civilian executive influence in the administration of the military departments.

DEFENSE AGENCIES The Reorganization Act of 1958 authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide for common support and service activities by agencies or other organizational entities, such as single managers, where it is advantageous in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy.

Over the years, under this authority, successive Secretaries of Defense have consolidated activities, which involved more than one military department, under a single functional manager, leaving unique service functions in the military departments. In most instances, these consolidations have resulted in increased efficiency, reduced duplication of effort, and improved resource utilization. There is, of course, still room for improvement in resource management and operating relationship be. tween the military departments and the defense agencies in specific functional areas. On balance, however, the defense agency concept provides the most effective, efficient, and economic approach to the management of service and support functions that cross-cut the military departments.

There has been considerable effort addressed to the Department's organization in recent years. There have been many studies by outside groups. We have reviewed these issues within the Department and made some changes. There has been legislation. More recently, there have been hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committe, and many distinguished witnesses have appeared before your during the deliberations leading to H.R. 3622. The Packard Commission will release its report in a few weeks. Even though differences remain, it appears that, as a result of all this activity, a consensus is evolving, both within and outside of the Department, regarding a number of principles that should guide our determination of the method of implementing whatever changes we may settle on as desirable:

First, the Secretary's flexibility to manage the Department in a rapidly changing, complex, and dangerous world should be preserved. Neither the administration nor the Congress can foresee all the circumstances that future contingencies may arise.

Second, we should assure continued and effective civilian control of the military. This is a fundamental constitutional principle which must not be abridged.

Third, we should not only avoid, but actively discourage, micro-management, whether by the Congress or top-level DOD staffs.

Fourth, we should maintain the Department's philosophy of centralized policy. making and decentralized operations. This is a fundamental management principle of this administration and one which has proven its value over the past five years.

And finally, we should build on the accomplishments that have been made to date. These accomplishments have been substantial and have gone a long way toward improving past deficiencies in DOD operations. They should be neither discarded nor disregarded, but used as a foundation upon which to build further and more lasting improvements.

In the final analysis, it is essential that the Congress preserve, not just for this Secretary, but for all future Secretaries of Defense, an organizational structure that allows for diversity and a balanced input from cognizant civilian and military officials, and the flexibility to adapt specific defense organization and management arrangements to meet the demands of ongoing national security requirements. We are confident that this can be accomplished through the joint efforts of the executive branch and the Congress. I am prepared to answer your questions. Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

First let me thank you for your compliments on the JCS bill that we passed last year, which is presently being considered by the Senate.

I notice you say in your closing statement here on page 10 we should avoid and actively discourage micromanagement by the Congress and top-level staffs. Let me say to you-you can take this back to the Pentagon with you—that it's not the intent of this Congress or this committee, to micromanage the Department of Defense. But let me point out to you that the last substantial change in Defense management occurred back in 1958, some 30 years ago, and that doesn't necessarily mean that changes must be made simply because 30 years have passed. I'm not for making changes unless they can be justified. But I would just remind you that over the last three Congresses, this subcommittee has heard from between 50 and 60 witnesses, prestigious people, people who have been there, Secretaries of Defense, Chairmen, Joint Chiefs, Secre

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