Any form of organization that meets these paired goals will occasionally result in dissatisfaction from one perspective or another. There will always be some fundamental dichotomies between the demands of democratic government and the requirements of military superiority. But for as long as we are free and strong, we must organize for both. It is simply naive to propose dispensing with the apparent burdens of democratic choice by centralizing our defense system under a single military chief, or to propose dispensing with the military requirements of the armed Services by building more central bureaucracies, stuffed with civilians or socalled "purple suit" military officers, divorced from realworld operational responsibilities. Such efforts cannot succeed for us, because they do not meet the unchangeable goals of our defense structure. Meeting those goals is, however, at the heart of current American defense organization. The ability of civilian leadership to lead is strengthened through the role of the Secretary of Defense, who acts as the President's agent in the direction and oversight of the Department and in commanding our operational forces; and through the role of the civilian Military Department Secretaries, who serve as the Secretary's "chief executive officers" in managing the day-to-day requirements of defense. At the same time, the ability of our military to act, with expertise and professionalism, is strengthened through the armed Services, which train and maintain our forces to meet the demands of modern global warfare, and through the commanders of our combatant forces (CinCs), who are able to concentrate on their primary warfighting mission, free from the demands of maintaining and administering global forces. In addition, the requirements for sound civilian leadership and military professionalism are strengthened through several key institutions: The Joint Chiefs of Staff system strengthens the ability of civilian leaders to make wise, informed decisions about military affairs, by ensuring that the President and Secretary of Defense receive complete, balanced information and advice about our options from the military officers who know our capabilities best the Service Chiefs, who prepare and maintain our forces. · The direct chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Cincs, channeled through the Joint Chiefs, ensures clean lines of responsibility and accountability in military operations. The Defense Resources Board strengthens the ability of the Secretary of Defense to make sound resource decisions, by bringing the expertise of senior civilian officials, the Joint Chiefs, and the CinCs to deliberations on defense programs and priorities. Similarly, the Armed Forces Policy Council provides the Secretary with the advice of senior civilian and military officials on wide-ranging questions of strategy and policy. In sum, American defense organization provides a sound, workable, flexible framework within which policy can be formulated and executed effectively. Our system does not, of course, work perfectly. But where it has failed, it has failed not because of its basic organization but because of the accumulated layers of extraneous bureaucracy, the miles of micromanaging legislation and regulation, and the occasional crises of ineffectual leadership that have gripped the Department from time to time. ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVES To deal with the problems it inherited, the Weinberger administration undertook a series of initiatives to revitalize The new philosophy reflected sound defense management. business as well as military judgment: centralize policy formulation, but decentralize its execution. And, require the strictest accountability for the accomplishment of duties. There is very specific evidence of the success of this approach: Over the past five years, we have seen major advances in the readiness of our forces to meet the threat. Through improvements in personnel quality and retention, through a program of realistic re-armament, and through continuing, high-quality training and exercises, American forces today are better prepared than ever before. • In operations, we have seen most recently the successful mission to intercept the Egyptian airliner that carried the Achille Lauro hijackers and to bring them to justice. The flawless manner in which the operation was planned by the Joint Chiefs and carried out by forces under the European Command of General Rogers is indicative of the ability of our joint system to act swiftly and effectively. In defense management, we have seen authority returned to the Military Department Secretaries, who have been held accountable for achieving real reform in the development and procurement process. The barrage of horror stories in the press over the past few years is ironic evidence of our success in one field, uncovering spare-parts overcharges and requiring corrective action. But such reform is only part of the improvement that has been made in our effectiveness and efficiency. In the Navy, the disputes, litigation, claims, costoverruns and schedule delays that characterized shipbuilding in the 1970s have been eliminated. We have raised the percentage of competition in shipbuilding from 15.7 percent in 1980 to 84.3 percent in 1985. Among millions of dollars in savings that have resulted are those in the previously sole-sourced Aegis cruiser program, whose costs are now $382 million below initial budget projections. Other efficiencies have resulted as well. Cost-plus contracts are on the way out we have put all of our aircraft procurement programs on firm, fixed-price type contracts, and all of our ships on fixed-price incentive contracts with a 50/50 share line above and below the contract price. Delays are out time for ships in FY 82-84 was 31 The era of gold-plating is over average delivery months ahead of schedule. my signature, along with that of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is required for all contract or engineering changes submitted for negotiation. is on the way out Bureaucracy we have removed an entire layer between the operational systems commands and top management. Professionalism, however, is in we have established a new, innovative career path for Material Professionals, reserving approximately one-third of our flag billets, and ensuring that officers who are responsible for acquisitions management have equally strong backgrounds in both the operational requirements of the Navy and in the business the quality and retention of personnel, and other dimensions of naval preparedness that have resulted from our efforts to streamline management, allocate clear responsibility, and enable good people to do their jobs well, freed from pointed to by the other Military Department Secretaries, The Weinberger philosophy goes a long way towards reversing nearly three decades of centralization in the Department of Defense; a trend that had resulted in a significant diffusion of responsibility and loss of accountability. The concept of line management under the Military Departments, however, does more than restore accountability. It also takes advantage of the Services' unique capability to provide expert, informed administration of defense programs. Even while performing their responsibilities, Military Department Secretariats have been substantially reduced: declining 25 percent since 1973. At the same time, however, central and joint staffs have burgeoned: the JCS organization, originally 100 officers, is now some 1,400; the Office of the Secretary of Defense, originally 50 people, is now some 1,700. There are eleven central defense agencies with more than 80,000 bureaucrats. Congressional staffs, too, have risen, as the committees and subcommittees which Congress and in DOD, would be justified and useful. On the other hand, besides diminishing the effectiveness and efficiency of defense management, some recent reform |