proposals share a common characteristic: the imposition, by law, of static, rigid formulae in place of executive flexibility. That is the essence of micro-management, and it will hinder, not help, the defense reforms we all seek. what we should do is clear from the successes of modern, streamlined business organization as well as from the failures of big government. We should continue to decentralize: restoring the Military Departments' line management functions, and reducing the diffusion of responsibility among large central bureaucracies. We should end micro-management. And we should increase the flexibility of the Departments to accomplish their missions reducing the legislative and regulatory requirements which restrict innovation and initiative. COMBATANT COMMANDS As the Military Departments enable the Defense Department to decentralize the execution of defense administration, ensuring expert, knowledgeable management, the organization of the combatant commands allow us to execute military operations effectively, under the on-scene leadership of the operational Commanders in Chief (CinCs). Any "reorganization" involving the ten unified and specified commands must focus on their fundamental mission: in peace, to be ready to fight; in war, to fight and win. They must do so, moreover, with resources that are necessarily limited; against an enemy whose military reach is unsurpassed by any we have confronted in history; and within a framework of global priorities that cannot please all. This enormous undertaking is not advanced by proposals that would enmesh the CinCs in Washington politics, burden them with the creation of vast new bureaucracies, subject them to increasing direction by central staffs, and give them new responsibilities for military management and administration. Yet this is precisely what some recent proposals regarding the Cincs would do. For example, one recent proposal would define the CinC's operational command as including a variety of administrative and support functions now performed by the Military Departments. Dividing such functions among the ten Combatant Commands would have a serious negative impact on cost-effective procurement, long-term acquisitions planning, and global force development and administration. But equally important, such a reorganization would require the establishment of major new bureaucracies in the field to handle the resultant responsibilities. Such a development will critically detract from the CinCs' ability to fulfill their operational mission. Other proposals contemplate empowering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supervise the Cincs It does not take much experience to know that these supervisory responsibilities would be delegated to staff a staff likely to mushroom in size placing the CinCs under increasing central bureaucratic control. Moreover, while this proposal is apparently intended to increase the voice of the CinCs in resource decisions, it would, in fact, have the opposite effect. The current, direct lines of communication between the CinCs and the Secretary of Defense would be cut by the interposition of the joint staff bureaucracy. would be the CinCs' direct role in the PPBS process, as newly established by this Administration, which has required all Military Department program submissions to address Also cut Cinc priorities, and has given the CinCs a direct forum before the Defense Resources Board. Stripping the Cincs of that direct role will diminish, not increase, their impact. There are other positive steps we can take to improve the CinCs' ability to carry out their operational missions. Principal among them is a commitment to end micromanagement from Washington. In Vietnam, we saw repeated efforts, by military as well as civilian staffs, to dictate tactics to on-scene commanders. Such efforts have a devastating effect on the successful conduct of military operations. commanders; let them lead. We have We must also continue current efforts to provide a direct voice for the Cincs in defense-policy, without creating new layers of bureaucracy and paperwork that detract from operational command. The field of military history is littered with big bureaucracies that lost. We cannot afford to let this be our history as well. JOINT MILITARY PERSONNEL Finally, this Subcommittee is also considering various proposals to institute a joint military personnel system, including the establishment of an Armed Forces General Staff. I can think of few developments which would pose a greater jeopardy, to our national defense. In contemplating the creation of a General Staff, we must realize what is really at issue: the establishment of a single, uniformed Defense Chief at the head of our national military. Americans have rejected such an establishment, and for good reason. Modern, global defense entails complex requirements, strategies, and relationships. Responsible civilian leadership requires unfiltered military information and advice. The chief function of a General Staff, however, as the House Armed Services Committee noted its report on defense organization in 1958, is "the swift suppression, at each level of consideration, of alternative courses of action, so that the man at the top has only to approve or disapprove but not to weigh alternatives." Yet in our system of government, the "man at the top" is not a military Chief, but the President whose obligation as an elected leader is to weigh alternatives, none of which are more critical to our future than the decision to use or not use military force. Thus the primary function of any joint military system at the seat of government must be to provide not to suppress the options and alternatives which true decisionmaking demands. That requires a balanced, joint, deliberative process, such as we currently possess in the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff. A General Staff has numerous other flaws. Composed of officers whose careers are spent in staff billets rather than command, and who report to, and depend for promotion upon, a single leader, the Staff quickly becomes isolated from the broad range of operational experience and military knowledge that ensures objective, informed decisionmaking. History has shown that such staffs become rigid, adhering. to particular doctrines and eschewing innovation and initiative. We have only to look at the German General Staff experience, or even that of World War I Britain before 1918, to see instrument In pursuing the concept of a national General Staff, proponents have suggested a number of partial measures to achieve it in effect if not in name. These include a "joint military personnel system," in which a single career path is established for joint-duty, and selection, assignment and promotion policies are controlled by a single officer, typically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These proposals run many of the same dangers as those noted for a General Staff. Moreover, they fail to do what they are alleged to do: improve joint service. That objective requires the widening of joint experience among military officers; continued improvements in military education and training; and increased joint exercises. In all these respects, this Administration has made progress. Specific issues such as filling joint billets, or promotion rates for joint-service officers are also being addressed. In the Navy, promotion rates for officers serving in joint billets are now comparable to those for Service billets. And, despite demanding sea-duty rotations for Naval officers and a lower flag-enlisted ratio than other Services, the Navy is making a concerted effort to fill its joint officer billets; currently, for instance, we fill 100 percent of the Navy's officer billets in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should be clear, however, about the ultimate objective of joint service: not to create and enlarge central staffs, but to enhance the capability of our military forces as a whole. That requires both skilled Service expertise and |