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CONCLUSION

The principles of American defense organization are sound. The final measure of their success is this: throughout the decades since World War II despite changes in Administration, changes in military leadership, destructive vacillations in our commitment to adequate defense spending, debates over nuclear and conventional strategy, and, in

the background, the steady, ominous build-up of Soviet military forces despite all this, we have deterred Soviet

imperial ambitions and maintained global peace. The principles which such success reflects should not lightly be changed.

But anything that nourishes those principles and permits them to invigorate our defense should receive the most thoughtful consideration. That is what is required today. There is room to improve our defense system. We must decentralize, cut bureaucracy, and continue to restore the principle of line management. The answer to the stronger defense we all seek is not to destroy the current system in favor of a more complicated one of untested design. is simply to remove the obstacles that have been put in its path.

It

Thank you.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Rourke.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL A. ROURKE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might ask that my statement be made a part of the record in full. Mr. Chairman, I'll simply, if I may, sir, reflect on certain portions of it hoping not to be too repetitious, and hoping there will be less repetition as the presentations go on. I'm feeling almost like a referee in front of my two honored colleagues, one of whom I worked with so long and hard for some years, and another of whom I've come to respect and admire over the years.

Let me simply say, Mr. Chairman, now I see the major proposals. We've had the benefit of working with Arch Barrett and John Lally now for quite some time. They preceded many who are currently driving in this fray and who are enthusiastic about reorganization. I commend you, sir, and these gentlemen, for the extraordinary job they've done, and to the initiative they've taken.

It was suggested many times in the past that this is a day that would not come. I think it was something that I might have reflected on inaccurately, as I have been somewhat inaccurate on a number of other reflections. But the day is here, Mr. Chairman, and it is a privilege to work with someone like you, and the members of your staff, along with the members of the committee who are so sincere in this undertaking.

Let me suggest, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that the proposals that are embodied in some of the substantive legislation that has been proffered, would strengthen the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the expense of the corporate JCS.

The combatant commanders, in my view, would be strengthened at the expense of the components of the individual services. Legislation would force the integration, as my colleagues have described, and further reduction, of the secretariat and service staffs without proportional decrease in management responsibilities.

Let me begin, if I may, where Secretary Lehman almost concluded, and that is with respect to the unified and specified commanders, noted so forthrightly in your letter.

As Secretary of the Air Force, I do urge moderate changes here because much of the criticism of combatant commanders' authority is based on what we view as dated experience.

I know that several remarkable changes, and my colleagues have participated in that effort, have occurred under the current Joint Chiefs of Staff to redress the imbalances in the authority and responsibilities of combatant commanders.

For example, the unified commanders play a significant role in the formulation of the services' budget plans. Likewise, the CINC's are an integral part of the Defense Resources Board process. And it isn't only in the 4 to 6, days that Secretary Lehman accurately pointed out, in which they physically participate in that process at the Pentagon itself throughout the year. They're part of that process in terms of physical separate visits, telephone calls, and meetings, and correspondence, in which they forthrightly present their views, and properly so.

From some of the criticism I've read, Mr. Chairman, and about which we've spoken, one would think that if the services, or the corporate JCS, were removed from the resource allocation process for the combatant commanders, each of these commanders would somehow be provided those forces and equipment presently identified as shortfalls. That, as we know, just isn't the case. We're in a finite resource arena, and their views, with them participating, I think are clearly and accurately reflected.

The services and the JCS, we believe, perform a vital function in this area, balancing the combatant commanders' focus on today's regional needs against the perspective of global needs, and the future requirements of deterrence. The balance between readiness and modernization is indeed delicate but vital, and we have to make certain that decisions on the balance are broadly informed ones. That's the purpose and the function performed by, I believe, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Taft, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We should continue to move in that direction of insuring that the views of those combatant commanders are clearly visible in the resource process, but not to the exclusion of the services.

The commanders of the unified and specified commands are combat commanders who should and must focus on the security of their assigned regions and missions and on the threat to U.S. interest that they face today, along with the readiness and sustainability of the forces assigned to them. Therefore, I believe, as has been pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that it would be a tragic mistake to saddle them with the budget processes and burdens that we all go through in the city of Washington. To have them layer upon themselves a set of budgeteers. I don't think this would be in the best interest of the performance of their immediate duties, or, indeed, contribute to the process as we know it, as difficult as it is in Washington today.

Mr. Chairman, as I go through some of the proposals that have been made with respect to the joint command billets, I can point with great pride to the record of the Air Force in terms of joint billets. It has been viewed by some as a career graveyard. It's not that way in the Air Force, sir. We have a long and proud record of selecting those officers who have been performing consistently higher in the Air Force. Their promotion records indicate that they, on average enjoy better career patterns perhaps than any other service. Their professional military education levels are extraordinarily high, and their civilian education levels are high as well. Our officers are assigned to the joint arena tour for a controlled 3-year period, thereby increasing, we think, the stability and consistency.

Mr. Chairman, we all agree on the need for increased jointness in our military operations in the resource acquisition process. The provisions to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proposed in the name of improved, better, more timely advice, and improved jointness. I think all of the Chiefs have gone on record to support a strengthened Chairman, but they've all cautioned against separating him too far from the corporate JCS.

Our own review of the issue leads me to support that position. What good is done for national defense if we gain what we view as

a monolithic source of military advice at the expense of the essential expertise provided by the individual service Chiefs who can best match strategy and policy with capabilities?

Mr. Chairman, provisions to strengthen the Chairman should result in streamlining of the process to meet the needs of expedience when required, but at the same time observe the beneficial consultative relationship of the JCS.

Even in my brief experience as Secretary of the Air Force I have seen the benefits firsthand. I have, Mr. Chairman, for the last 5 years, as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, been able to see the contributions made by individual JCS members.

Mr. Chairman, I'm getting into an arena now in my statement where I do not take issue with my colleagues. I will save the time of the committee by not going through that prepared portion of my statement, if I may. Suffice only to say that in the arena of combining the secretariat and the air staff, I take issue with Secretary Lehman. I don't think we have a bloated fattened calf in the secretariat. Absent the participants in the legislative liaison and public affairs arena, we have 186 people total with which to perform, what I believe are very responsible and important functions. I think the balance of the civilian end of the arena is extraordinarily important when matched with our very capable and dedicated professionals wearing the blue uniform. It is a match that I think is well-balanced. It's a match that performs with a unity that I have not seen in my 27 years in government. It's one that I'm proud to be a part of, and I speak only for the Air Force. I think it would be a serious mistake to deprive us of that balance and that unity of dual operation.

One last specific concern is for the proposals for significant staff reductions in the military departments. I believe it would be counterproductive to identify new ceilings for the departments until new organization structures have been determined, and their impacts can be assessed.

Let me swing almost immediately, Mr. Chairman, to what I view as the biting parts of those items in the legislation that have already been passed by the House, the legislation that is currently being marked up by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and, indeed, in the legislation that you contemplate in the next week or

So.

There are seven or eight items, Mr. Chairman, which we strongly favor, and I say, we, I speak only for the Air Force. First, we do favor congressional interest, as I've pointed out, in DOD reorganization. We do favor strengthening the unified and specified commanders, pointing out, however, that we have made major improvements in integrating the CINC's through the PPBS process, and the unified CINC's do have a major input, as we've pointed out, in the budget process.

We do favor a balance of service interests that is worldwide, and CINC's regional interests in the areas of influence and resource application. We do favor the highest quality officer for joint military assignments. We do favor strengthening the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs while retaining the corporate JCS structure and advice process. We do favor establishing a Deputy Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, who is also serving as Director of the Joint Staff, who does not outrank the remaining members of the Joint Chiefs.

We do favor rotating the active JCS duties. We do believe it promotes joint awareness as opposed to service parochialism. We do favor maximum flexibility for the Secretary of Defense over the Defense agencies.

Mr. Chairman, there are four or five or six items that we are strongly opposed to, and if I may respectfully, sir, indicate those. The Air Force does not favor consolidating, as I pointed out, the secretariat and the air staff. We do not favor making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the single source of military advice to the President. We do not favor having a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who outranks the other service Chiefs. We do not favor the establishment of a full fledged Armed Forces general staff. We do not favor burdening the CINC's with additional responsibilities, and a complex budgeting process of which they are already an integral part, and we do not favor, Mr. Chairman, unilateral reductions in headquarters staffs without a proportionate reduction in their responsibilities.

That, sir, concludes my formal presentation. I'd be pleased, along with my colleagues, to answer any other questions you might have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL A. ROURKE

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and discuss this vitally important subject-the reorganization of the Department of Defense. Let me commend you, your colleagues and your staffs for your in-depth interest and willingness to sound out diverse views. As you well know, a well organized defense establishment is crucial to our nation's security and relates directly to not only our defense but the defense of our allies.

In these prepared remarks, I will address the areas identified in your February 11, 1986 letter to Secretary Weinberger and those defense reorganization issues which seem to be emerging as major concerns. Although my relatively brief tenure as Secretary of the Air Force may cast doubt on my status as "expert witness," I will rely on my 5 years of experience in the Department with this Administration and my involvement in the House passed reorganization bill along with my study of the developing proposals in the Senate.

As I see the major proposals, they are intended to result, to varying degrees, in shifts of the perceived balance of power or influence among various entities in the defense establishment. These proposals would strengthen the position of the Chairman, JCS, at the expense of the corporate JCS. The combatant commanders would be strengthened at the expense of the components and the Services. Legislation would force integration and further reduction of Secretariat and Service Staffs without a proportionate decrease in management responsibilities.

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS

Let me begin with the unified and specified commanders. I urge moderate changes here. In my view much of the criticism of combatant commander authority is based on dated experience. I know that several remarkable changes have already occurred under the current JCS to redress imbalances in the authority and the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. For example, the unified commanders now play a significant role in the formulation of the Services' budget plans. Likewise, these CINCs are an integral part of the Defense Resources Board process.

From some of the criticism I have read, one would think that if the Services, or the corporate JCS, were removed from the resource allocation process for the combatant commanders, each of these commanders would somehow be provided those forces and equipment presently identified as shortfalls. Given the finite nature of resources, that is simply not possible. The Services and the JCS perform a vital function in this regard, balancing the combatant commanders' focus on today's regional needs against the broader perspective of global needs and the future requirements of deterrence. The balance between readiness and modernization is delicate but vital, and we must ensure decisions on the balance are broadly informed. We

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