For example, the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska develops and maintains the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and its associated target list. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) is a Specified Command. This proliferation of the number and variety of support and service organizations has had the advantage of eliminating some duplicating support and service organizations in the Military Departments. On the other hand, the sheer complexity of the organization complicates management. For example, the PPBS is the Department's principal management tool. Yet in making broad budget allocations for the Departments it is very difficult for top management to know what portions of the allocations are for support and service activities as opposed to directly combatrelated missions. The funding of all these activities is contained within Service and other budgets. tenance of a central file of up-to-date listings of assignments of these types on an ongoing basis would appear to be desirable. Main COMMON SUPPORT AND SERVICES NOT INTEGRATED Many common support and service functions of the DOD have not been consolidated and remain the responsibility of the separate Services. These include such major functions as transportation, health and medical care, construction, and the chaplaincy. The transportation function was selected for review here as an example of such an unconsolidated activity. Resources precluded consideration of more than one unconsolidated functional area. TRANSPORTATION Problems in the transportation area were cited by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report in 1970, which recommended assigning the Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAS) to an umbrella "Logistics Command." The recently completed report on the National Military Command Structure raised the possibility of establishing a "Unified Transportation Command," but the approach was rejected by the study for lack of any clearly defined benefits. The House Appropriations Committee is currently planning to hold hearings on a proposal to consolidate two of the TOAS. The transportation functions of a strategic and "wholesale" nature are assigned to the three Service Secretaries, each having responsibility for particular functions under the single manager concept. The Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) provides traffic management service in CONUS [other than that provided by MAC and Military Sealift Command (MSC)] and operates ocean terminals. MTMC is a jointly staffed major command of the Army. The Commander, MTMC, is under the operational control of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations, Logistics and Financial Management (IL&FM). However, for resource matters, he reports to the Chief of Staff, Army. In addition to traffic management in CONUS and operation of designated ocean terminals worldwide, MTMC contracts for common user ocean terminal services and manages the movement of personal property traffic worldwide. The Air Force's MAC is both a Specified Command and a TOA. In his role as a specified commander, CINCMAC reports to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. In his role as a TOA, the Commander of MAC reports to the Secretary of the Air Force through the Air Staff. MAC operates common user military airlift aircraft and contracts for commercial capability to augment the organic fleet. MAC also provides global weather, search and rescue, and audio-visual services to the Air Force. The Navy's MSC is the transportation opera- ting agency for common user sealift. Our brief analysis concluded that the disadvantages of consolidating these three transportation functions appeared to outweigh the advantages. On the other hand, a lesser option of centralized traffic management for the TOA's, advocated by some DoD officials, did seem to have the potential for increased effectiveness and economy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (MRA&L) is planning a study of the transportation function, and we believe that this option should be considered in greater depth in that effort. ISSUES Since the first Defense Agencies were created, the world has become increasingly complex. Shifts in the world power structure have given the United States less capability to control events which influence its security and well-being. The Soviet Union has undertaken a long term military buildup which continues. At the same time, this country is faced with mounting economic and energy problems and multiple pressures for reduction of inflation, government expenditures, and taxes. A tension is always present between desires for reduced 62-630 0 - 87 - 21 defense expenditures and for increased security. At a minimum, this environment can be expected to require assurance that every avenue for increasing DoD effectiveness, economy, and efficiency is explored. The evaluation of the trend toward unification of central support and services by the principal officials of the Department differs widely. Many view the continued expansion of the Agency concept as no longer desirable. They consider that small functional entities have proliferated to the extent that organizational complexity impedes efficient management. Some believe the intense inter-service competition of the 1960s has matured and many functions should be returned to the Services. Many feel the span of control of high OSD staff officials, who have among the most responsible and demanding tasks in the Nation, inhibits effective oversight of this complex of organizations. Some also believe there is an upper limit to the effectiveness and efficiency which may be derived from consolidation. Others hold that the current organization is adequate to meet the needs of the Department. The unified support and service base of the Department has, in their view, enhanced efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. They feel the Services are still unable to accomplish unified support/service missions efficiently. They also believe that the importance of such functions requires management independence and doubt their adequate funding if returned to the Services. Our analysis of these opinions has identified one central and six significant cross-cutting issues. central issue can be stated as follows: The "What is the optimal future organization for support and services of the Armed Forces?" The six cross-cutting issues are: o The amount of efficiency and economy which has actually been achieved, The capability of the existing system to support the fighting forces in crisis or wartime, the effectiveness and accountability of the chain of command for the Agencies, O The adequacy of their PPBS procedures, The programs for development and management of specialist personnel, and O The division of authority and responsibility among the Agencies, the Services, OSD, and the JCS. These issues appear to warrant the attention of the Secretary of Defense and possibly the President. Although each Agency has different missions and methods of operation, we have found that various Agencies are related in the types of functions which they discharge. These can be roughly grouped into the following categories: Support of the operating forces. (DLA, DIA, DCA, DMA, and NSA) O Staff support. (DSAA, DARPA, DNA) O Audit and investigation. (DAS, DIS, and DCAA) This classification is useful in considering the various issue areas. The following briefly describes each issue area. CENTRAL ISSUE: THE FUTURE DOD ORGANIZING CONCEPT ISSUE: WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL FUTURE ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT AND SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES TO ACHIEVE DOD GOALS? We believe that the implications of the trend which has changed the system for support and services of the Armed Forces need to be better understood. treat the support and services of the Armed Forces as much less important than the combatant forces. Many Yet, |