should continue to move in the direction of ensuring that the views of the combatant commanders are clearly visible in the resource process, but not to the exclusion of the Services.

The commanders of unified and specified commands, as combat commanders, must focus on the security of their assigned regions and missions, on the threat to U.S. interests that they face today, and on the readiness and sustainability of the forces assigned to them. Therefore, I believe it would be a mistake to further burden these commanders with the administrative support and logistic functions that would further ensnarl their time in the already complex budgeting process. These responsibilities would distract them from their primary mission and would require duplication of staff for each of the combatant commanders. It would be more beneficial to increase the combatant commanders' authority to review and approve arrangements proposed by the Services for support within their commands.

JOINT STAFF

I agree with this subcommittee and those who voice the opinion that only those officers of the highest caliber should be assigned to joint duties. The Air Force is proud of the officers we assign to the Joint Staff and that pride is reflected in those officers having consistently higher than Air Force average promotion rates, professional military education levels, and civilian education levels. Our officers are assigned to joint arena tours for a controlled three years, thereby increasing stability and consistency. With this emphasis on officer quality, I see no need to establish a full-fledged armed forces general staff.

JCS REORGANIZATION

We all agree on the need for increased "jointness" in our military operations and the resource acquisition process. The provisions to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proposed in the name of improved "jointness" and better, more timely military advice. I think all the Chiefs have gone on record to support a strengthened Chairman. But, they have all cautioned against separating him too far from the corporate JCS. My review of the issue leads me to support their position. What good is done for national defense if we gain a monolithic source of military advice at the expense of the essential expertise provided by the individual Service Chiefs who can best match strategy and policy with capabilities?

Provisions to strengthen the Chairman should result in streamlining of the process to meet needs of expediency when required but, at the same time, should preserve the beneficial consultative relationship of the JCS. Even in my brief experience as Secretary of the Air Force, I can see the benefits of the Service Chiefs' accountability for the broader concerns of national defense as a member of the JCS. The dual-hatted nature of the JCS (same individual is Service Chief and JCS member) contributes to, rather than detracts from, the quality of military advice given to the President. Further, while the Chairman's duties may require the additional assistance of a four-star deputy, I agree with the Chiefs that significant advantages flow from their practice of rotating the Acting Chair during absences of the Chairman-the primary advantage being the improvement of joint awareness. This four-star deputy could strengthen the Chairman's management authority over the Joint Staff but should not outrank the Service Chiefs.

HEADQUARTERS STAFFING

I believe the integration of the Service Secretaries and military staffs would be a mistake. In the Air Force we have already achieved a great deal of integration, resulting in only about 160 people, exclusive of Public Affairs and Legislative Liaison, neither of which has any counterpart in the Air Staff, dedicated to supporting me in my responsibilities for independent policy review and civilian oversight. I deem it unwise to sacrifice the principle of civilian control for such scant savings and, consequently, oppose such a change.

DEFENSE AGENCIES

With reference to the various defense agencies, I would counsel moderation. The Secretary of Defense assigns supervisory authority for each agency and ensures a review of the agency's program and budget. I believe the Secretary of Defense should have maximum flexibility in the management and oversight of these defense agencies.

SENATE REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

After reviewing the Senate draft defense reorganization bill, I believe that some provisions of this bill would have very adverse consequences for our national defense. For example, the bill would repeal the Secretary of Defense's reorganization authority, paralyzing the DoD and making SECDEF dependent on Congress for any change. Such a provision would divorce authority from responsibility. The thrust of this legislation results in a diminution of the Service Chief's responsibility for structuring his Service's force. The proposed bill also directs the Service Secretaries to structure their defense programs at the suggestion of the unified commanders instead of seeking the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Another specific concern I have with this draft deals with the proposals for significant staff reductions in the Military Departments. I believe it would be counterproductive to identify new ceilings for the Departments until new organization structures have been determined and impacts can be assessed. The proposed ceiling of 2600 is 15.7 percent lower than our current ceiling of 3080. We have experienced a total net reduction to the Secretariat and the Air Staff of 34 percent since 1976. The combined reductions would result in an almost 50 percent reduction during a period of time when there has been increased emphasis on planning; fraud, waste and abuse; resource management; and procurement oversight. Further reductions may seriously erode our improved management capability and threaten our ability to carry out these programs. I have urged the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee to oppose these and other unnecessary and damaging provisions of this proposed bill along with the philosophy it represents.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe now is an exciting, challenging time for the Department of Defense. We see the opportunity for needed change and are anxious to work with the Congress to ensure that those changes which will result in real defense improvements are made. I am personally pleased to serve in my present capacity during this period of intense interest in national defense. In that regard, it is my fervent plea that you consider the vital nature of our mission and the complex nature of our responsibilities as you draft legislation for change. We believe the manageable, evolutionary improvement is preferable to the risks posed by revolutionary change with the potential for not yet understood effects on national security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Rourke.

Let me just start off by saying that I read not once, but twice each of you gentlemen's statements that have gone to Senator Goldwater in addressing, I suppose, the staff report on the Senate.

There's a common thread that seems to run through each of your letters, and I'll just mention two things. One is that you seem to express some concern that the Joint Chiefs would in some way be suppressed, and will not be able to speak their piece, and the word won't get up here.

It was not the intent of this committee to do that. We put some safeguards in there that we thought spell that out clearly and simply, and if you gentlemen feel like that's not sufficiently spelled out, I would appreciate it if you would further elaborate on it after the meeting in some way. It needs some report language. Certainly I think this committee intended, in strengthening the Chairman, not in any way to put these people's light under a bushel. And certainly we don't want to suppress their views.

The second comment that seemed to be in each of your letters, is your concern that in creating a deputy chairman, or assistant chairman, that you don't want him to serve in the capacity of the chairman when the chairman is not there, that you prefer that to be passed around among the Chiefs, that it gives them experience. I think you have a good point there, frankly.

But let me say to both of you that the mule is out of the barn. This bill is out of the House, and that's the way it was passed in the House. So you might want to address yourself on these issues to the Senate.

I just wanted to express that, because each of you seemed to have that concern in your letter to Senator Goldwater.

Let me ask Secretary Rourke and Secretary Marsh, just why combining of the staffs, military and civilian staffs, would seem to work for the Navy, but it wouldn't work for the Army, it wouldn't work for the Air Force? Is there some particular reason, the nature of your service, or some other reason? I realize it's different from that of the Navy and Marine Corps, but why would that not work? Mr. MARSH. Mr. Chairman, speaking for the Army, and I recognize what Secretary Lehman has said, I think that the division within the Department that you're seeking to achieve in order to exercise civilian control is best effected by a certain separateness of the staffs.

The staff of the Army's civilian secretariat is 368 or 370. The military staff is 3,100 or 3,200. From the standpoint of sheer size, the Army civilian staff is much, much smaller.

I believe that what happens by having a separate staff is that it has an opportunity to take a different view. It is frequently used as a sounding board and it provides unique insights. Issues come up to the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management from the Army staff and you get a civilian perspective-a different view. Issues then either go back to the Army staff where there may be some change, or they may be endorsed and come on up to me because the staffs are in concert.

I think that you get a better interchange of ideas and viewpoints if you keep that small civilian staff as a part of the Army Service Secretary, which he can call on to interface with the military. I think it is helpful in the long run to do that. To merge them, I think, is not helpful.

I would say to you that General Wickham takes a strong view about this, although some of his reasons are different than my own. I think his concerns in the bill are that there would be an encroachment of the military responsibilities by consolidation. I do not share that view. I think the separateness is important for other

reasons.

Mr. NICHOLS. Secretary Rourke.

Mr. ROURKE. I concur in what Secretary Marsh has said, Mr. Chairman. I have not, for the last several months, but the last 6 years, reflected on it and observed how it works in the Air Force, to which I would restrict myself. It's very healthy to have this second opinion, and the healthy prospect of, if you will, an almost outsider's view.

We have a tendency, all of us do, and I include myself in that, to get too close to the problem, too close to the corporate unity which we might be serving. This doesn't mean they're at each others' throats all the time. The secretariat and the air staff, as I indicated in my earlier presentation, work extremely well together. There is that freshness of viewpoint; there is the hope, as Secretary Lehman points out, we'll get an abundance rather than a paucity of bril

liant civilian talent to pass through this scene to mix and match with the already capable uniformed services.

But I really do think that you do not tend to fall in line, if I may say that respectfully of my service, if, indeed, you're not viewing the horizon with a 20- or 30-year career perspective.

It's been extraordinarily useful to us. Not that our uniformed personnel aren't outspoken; they are. they speak their mind. I find those on the civilian side of the House, especially the Presidential appointees, have an even greater habit of speaking their minds, sometimes to their detriment. But I think it's extraordinarily healthy for the system. That's why I like to see that duality of combat out of which good proposals result.

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, the reason I raise the question is we hearcontinue to hear reports from both junior and senior members of the military that your departments take a tremendously long time to get any sort of action because of just what Secretary Lehman has preached about for years and years-the layers of bureaucracy. Now, I spent half a day in my office yesterday trying to decide how I was going to manage my own staff without cutting somebody, or without cutting their salaries. And yet when we come up with the proposition that would seem to make some savings—and I am not preaching to you, please understand-we get all sorts of reasons why we shouldn't make reductions like that.

We are all bureaucrats, Mr. Secretary, and the Governor of my State frequently talks about pointy-headed bureaucrats with a briefcase carrying a peanut butter sandwich. But all of us are bureaucrats. And I listened very dearly interested in what you had to say, and I commend you on some things you've done in your department. Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS. Mr. Secretary, let me thank each of you for your appearance here today, and also extend you my appreciation for your testimony before the full committee a few days ago.

We have a situation here that-and I don't speak for anyone else, or certainly any member of this committee, any member of this staff. We are faced with a time constraint of probably around March 12 having to report on the bill.

I must say to you in all candor that I don't know that this one individual member is going to be well prepared as I'd really like to be to make a good vote, a right vote. At least what I consider to be the right vote.

And I've listened to you three gentlemen disagree, and I happen to think that that is fruitful. At least I know that you're not here all singing out of the same hymnal, if you will. And I think that bears fruit.

But I find myself trying to read and listen to what is being said by the other body: namely, by men whom I respect, and men whom I know you respect, Senator Goldwater, Senator Nunn, and I find them in disagreement with what you're saying here today. And yet I admire and respect all of you.

Anything that I might ask I hope won't be construed as being critical, but rather probing, and just trying to get to what I consider to be the best solution of this.

While I'm thinking of it, let me say to Secretary Lehman that I appreciate his mentioning the success of the F-18. Just as he said

that, I looked over his shoulder and I want the record to show that in attendance here today is Admiral Hogan, who had a great deal to do with that success, and whom I've had an opportunity to visit with on several occasions. I want to acknowledge his contribution to that particular program and to this country.

What is the number of personnel, Secretary Marsh, under your umbrella as Secretary of the Army? How many people do you have?

Mr. MARSH. You have 781,000 in the active force; you have approximately 790,000 in the National Guard and Reserves. You have 410,000 civilians. You have 1,800,000 dependents of active military and retired. You have about one-third of a million that are in the IRR. And then you have a retired figure of-you have half a million retired.

Mr. HOPKINS. Well, the responsibility of all this is run by you and the staff of what are we looking at there?

Mr. MARSH. The Army Civilian Secretariat is about 370 people. Mr. HOPKINS. OK. Secretary Rourke.

Mr. ROURKE. We have what amounts to, Mr. Hopkins, about 1 million people, something over 600,000 in the active Air Force; 264,000 civilians; 115,000 in the Guard, and some close to 76,000 in the Air Force Reserve. In my view, a service secretariat of 186 people over 1 million people is not too fat or bloated a bureaucracy to oversee over 1 million people.

Mr. HOPKINS. Secretary Lehman.

Mr. LEHMAN. We have about 565,000 active duty sailors; about 200,000 active duty marines; about 350,000 civilians; and about 160,000 reservists of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Mr. HOPKINS. And your staff comes to, did you say, 836? Is that correct, sir?

Mr. LEHMAN. Yes; but again, it's how you cut the pie. In the Department of the Navy the comptroller is part of the Navy secretariat, whereas, it's part of the uniformed headquarters in the other two military departments; similarly, the JAG Corps. All three of the military departments when we went through this last year, are about the same in size if you take function for function, if you put the public affairs, CINFO. It depends on what you count.

My chief deputies for building ships are over in Crystal City in the combined headquarters of the Naval Sea Systems Command with my Assistant Secretary. They're in the same building and, in effect, are using the same staffs. They're fully integrated.

So, do we count the whole headquarters of Naval Sea Systems Command of some 2,000 people? We have become so de facto integrated it's very hard to say what is functionally part of the secretariat and what is functionally some other part of the structure.

Mr. HOPKINS. As one who stated that you need less bureaucrats, and you need smaller staffs, with a staff-and, again, I'm not being critical, I'm only asking for my own knowledge-how do you justify 836? Has that grown since you've become Secretary of the Navy? Mr. LEHMAN. It's actually been reduced by 22 percent since I became Secretary. It has, over the last 20 years

Mr. HOPKINS. We had 175 more people than this at that time? Mr. LEHMAN. Yes, sir.