what was going on in the Joint Chiefs, and continuity of advice to the President and the Secretary.

I think that it is particularly important that in the Commission report that we sought to enhance the role of the Joint Requirements Management Board, which today is an organization which is chaired in rotating fashion by the Vice Chiefs of the individual services, which deals only with joint requirements, and then only with some joint requirements. We proposed a significantly enhanced role for that Board, and proposed that it be cochaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and by the new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, which we also proposed be created.

What we were trying to do was to get a very senior voice for the user commands-the commands which would actually use the weapons systems that were going to be developed-and a senior role for the technical and procurement side of the Department of Defense. We wanted them to cooperate to approve, I would hope, relatively short statements of military requirements for joint programs and for selected individual service military weapons system requirements and I think that these should be the important requirements. We felt that that role for the Deputy Chairman was an extremely important one, and could go a long way toward seeing that the user's, the military user's interests were represented better than they are now in the military weapons requirement process.

We also thought, I believe, that the Deputy Chairman would have an important role in assisting the Chairman in overseeing the needs of the CINC's-their inputs into the planning, programming, and budgeting system. And, as a general matter, he would have a hand in helping the Chairman with the enhanced role which we proposed that he be given.

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, if I might say so, I can understand the controversy that might surround the Packard Commission on various sides on the Deputy Chairman. And without being critical at all of your report, it looks to me like you may have straddled the fence a little on that issue, and passed it on to the Secretary of Defense. Now let me ask you, does the fact that with each changing Secretary of Defense you might have an entirely different setup for the Chairman, give you any concern?

Mr. WOOLSEY. Not really, Mr. Chairman. I think that any Secretary of Defense is going to rely very heavily upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. A new joint structure which would enhance the Chairman's role once it is in place, once it has its rules and regulations, will have a certain degree of solidity and permanence to it. My reluctance to embody the structure of the organization of the Joint Chiefs or the role of the Deputy Chairman and so forth in legislation is purely a matter of wanting to ensure if the need should ever arise, a Secretary of Defense could decide himself that he would use one senior military officer rather than another, that he could structure the command chain to the unified and specified commands as he saw fit, and the like. It is purely a philosophical matter of believing that the Secretary of Defense is the person who, in our system, is right at the cutting edge of civilian control of the military, and of not wanting to do anything to denigrate his

authority in a crisis or at any other time to command the Armed Forces for the President as he sees fit.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Woolsey, yesterday we had General Rogers. On this question of the Deputy Chairman as the Acting Chairman, he made an eloquent argument from his own experience as to why the Deputy should be the Acting Chairman-the continuity of the views of the Chairman, and also the bias of the service chiefs as they come into the Acting Chairman role. I would say that he convinced most of the people who were there yesterday of the merits of making the Deputy the Acting Chairman.

Mr. WOOLSEY. It is my personal preference as well. If you ask me the question, "if Secretary Weinberger were sitting here and the new legislation had passed, what would I advise him to do? I would say that I think you should make the Deputy Chairman the Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. The only question in my mind is whether or not that should be ensconced in legislation in such a way that a Secretary of Defense cannot change it. That is my only objection.

my

I know the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and I am sure if this legislation is approved whoever would be chosen to be the Deputy Chairman would be an extraordinarily able individual, and I have high confidence that the system would work well. But we are talking here about potential command arrangements in the event of war. People do behave differently, behave in ways in which sometimes you do not want them to behave. One could have a Deputy Chairman who did not work out as an Acting Chairman. I would rather have a Secretary of Defense and a President able together to decide-without having to go for legislation-that we are going back to a rotation, or we are going to have some other system for the next 2 or 3 years until we can change things. I would rather have that sort of flexibility exist in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. That is all that I am saying.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Woolsey, you talked about consolidation of the military headquarters staffs. We have had mixed testimony on that, as you might imagine. Two somewhat contradictory objections that have been stated. One is that if you consolidate the service secretariat with the military headquarters staff, then the civilians, the politically accountable civilians-the Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries-in the military departments will not have adequate staff serving them personally to run the military departments and to carry out their responsibilities under the law.

The other argument comes from military witnesses who have indicated, first of all, some concern about the quality of civilians who are placed over them from time to time, at least in the sense that these individuals do not know the military well enough to be put so closely into the operational matters handled by the military department staff. Second, they question whether civilians should be that closely involved with the workings of the military headquarters staff.

In light of your experience and your support for consolidating those staffs, can you comment on those objections?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I believe it depends entirely on the civilians, and it is one reason why in those jobs, I believe, one wants people with experience and background in military areas, procurement and the like. One wants both political Presidential appointees and senior non-Presidential appointees who are able to pull their weight.

In order to answer this question very well, I have to name some names and describe what I am talking about. It is to the credit of the individuals involved, and I think they will forgive me for using their names.

When we came in, in the Navy Department, as Secretary and Under Secretary, Graham Claytor and I looked around for career people who could serve at a senior level in the Navy secretariat, who had the very high regard of uniformed people as experts in their field.

Two of the people we found were Everett Pyatt and Jerry Cann. Both were career people. We put them in as Senior Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and it was not long before we had no difficulty at all having those people invited freely by the three-starlevel officers in the Navy to their three-star-level meetings.

The reasons were: They knew those sorts of people, knew a great deal about military procurement, knew about antisubmarine warfare and other technical matters; they were valued members of the community, at essentially the level just below that of the four-star officers and Presidential appointees, within the Department of the Navy.

Those sorts of people, I think, never create a problem. They are desired by their military colleagues as colleagues. They find no difficulty in serving both a civilian service Secretary and offering advice to a service Chief of Staff.

The problem arises because the personnel system, often both for Presidential appointees and also for senior civil service people, does not always produce the quality one wants in terms of background and knowledge and understanding of military matters.

The problem with respect to Presidential appointees is frequently a difficulty related to the conflict of interest rules and the like, which tend to get you a great many-if you will pardon me-lawyers and congressional staff members. Since I was one and am the other, I have no hesitancy in saying that. You have a dearth of people with industrial background and experience in some of those political appointment jobs in the Department of Defense. You also have, in the senior civil service levels, very few people who have benefited from the type of flexibility in being promoted quickly, based on ability, that could exist under something like the China Lake system. I think much of this problem would go away-much of the rivalry between civilians and the military in the military departments-if the civilian personnel systems, both for Presidential appointees and for civil service, were constructed in such a way that it was much easier to get people into those jobs who had the requisite background and experience and knowledge.

I think with those types of people, a relatively limited number of senior civilians are needed. I think you may have gone a little bit low in numbers here, particularly if you are including secretarial

I mean clerical people and the like-but, as a general matter, each of these service Assistant Secretaries, I think, needs a few able, civilian senior people working with him. And these sorts of people could be entirely integrated with the uniformed structure. I do not see any problem with that. It is the way Graham Claytor ran the Department of the Navy when I was there, and I think it worked well.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Woolsey-oh, excuse me, Mrs. Martin? No question?

Thank you very much. Mr. Woolsey.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. We appreciate your testimony very much.

Our next witness this morning is Hon. Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Richardson, has had a most distinguished public career. Following his graduation from Harvard, he served as a combat infantryman in Europe, participating in the D-day invasion in Normandy, and winning a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart. Following the war, and armed with a degree from Harvard Law School, he served in a variety of positions in the Massachusetts state government before becoming Under Secretary of State in the Nixon administration. He served that same administration successively as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Secretary of Defense; and finally as Attorney General of the United States.

President Ford appointed him as U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, an appointment that was followed by service as Secretary of Commerce.

During the Carter administration, he was appointed as Ambassador at Large, with special responsibilities for U.S. participation in the Law of the Sea Conference.

He is presently a partner in the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.

We are delighted to have you with us this morning, Mr. Secretary. You bring a wealth of knowledge to this subcommittee. We hold you in high respect, and we are honored to have your testimony and appreciate the benefit of your remarks.

Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Fine; we will look forward to your talking to the committee in whatever terms you desire.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, FORMER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very deeply those very generous words of introduction, and I hope I do not fail to fulfill the expectations that they reflect.

I am perhaps here as a better witness to the bureaucratic process in general than to the administration of the Department of Defense in particular, since my service there was quite limited. But, still, it was sufficient to give me, I think, an appreciation of the importance of the subject of these hearings and of the legislation that they have been convened to consider.

Most simply stated, I believe, we are seeing in the direction, command, and control of military forces, as well as the planning needed to assure their adequacy and appropriate deployment, the very same kinds of systemic relationships that are becoming so visible in all areas of human concern. The opportunity to deal with an evolving strategic situation on a global scale, or a regional threat, does not permit addressing it in a fragmented and uncoordinated way. The costs of acquiring adequate military capability are so high that there needs to be a coherent approach brought to the planning, not only for the acquisition of weapons, but for their integrated use. Mind you, there has been lag in the adaptation of the organization of the Department of Defense and of the military services to these realities.

I think the legislation that you are addressing represents a wellconsidered and urgent effort to overcome that lag.

Certainly, it has been evident for a long time that there needed to be some way of overcoming the inimical division of loyalties and responsibilities between the uniformed head of a military service, pulling in one direction toward a contribution to a coherent planning process, and in the other to the loyalty downward that is an inherent part of what it is to belong to a service.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, I served in an infantry division at a very lowly level in World War II. I was a platoon leader, and I owed, and felt that I owed, responsibility toward the men in my platoon. Our morale was a functioning part of our sense of pride in the unit itself. Certainly that was true of the 12th Infantry Combat Team in my division; it was true of the division itself, the 4th "Ivy" Division, so-called, which had had a distinguished record in World War I, and since World War II has served in Germany and Viet

nam.

That kind of pride, that kind of loyalty, is important to a military service; and a service chief would be remiss in his duty if he did not have in view steadily the best interests of the service, if he were not viewed by the people in uniform under his command as representing and fighting for their interests.

But to perform that role and also to serve as a member of a group without any controlling voice whose charge is to develop coherent strategies and planning processes has, I think, resulted in a weaker system, a less thoughtful system than we need in the light of the complexities of the existing geopolitical situation and in the light of the potential need to address a rapidly evolving military situation. with the most decisive, possible means of formulating plans and carrying them out.

The other things that are being addressed by the subcommittee are consistent, I think, with the same sort of approach that is needed to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff itself more effective in the context of the unified and specified commands and the administration of the individual military services.

These very general observations, Mr. Chairman, may, I hope, and will, I hope, tell you, as our children say, "where I'm coming from" I will be glad to respond to any questions that you or the members of the subcommittee may have.

Mr. NICHOLS. First, out of curiosity, would you tell me the division you served with in Normandy?