Mr. RICHARDSON. The 4th.

Mr. NICHOLS. The 4th Infantry Division?
Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

We called ourselves "the Fighting 4th."

I am sorry that my voice is not in too good shape today. I hope I am at least intelligible.

Mr. NICHOLS. We understand you, loud and clear, Mr. Secretary. Would you state to the committee the major things that you believe ought to be done in the way of reorganizing, making changes in the Joint Chief of Staff operation of the military?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think the most important thing, Mr. Chairman, involves the role of the Chairman himself. I think that the Chairman needs to be perceived as the first among equals as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; and I think that he should be responsible for the work of the Joint Staff, which should, in effect, serve a function common to the military requirements of the United States.

There is a need, certainly, for some provision whereby the other service Chiefs can assure that their views are communicated, where they differ to those of the Chairman, to the Secretary of Defense and the President. But I think that there should, nevertheless, be the opportunity for the Chairman to reach conclusions not requiring the concurrence of the other Chiefs.

I think that it would be appropriate to transfer to the Chairman some of the duties now performed by the JCS, which would include preparing strategic plans, advising the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the service's budget proposals conform with overall national security objectives, and advising the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths and force capabilities-in short, to serve in the capacity of a military professional who understands the roles and capabilities of each of the services, but looks at those roles from a perspective, having in view the necessity for coherent planning.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Secretary, having served in the role of Secretary of Defense and having sat on the National Security Council, what would be your views of stipulating that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs sit on the National Security Council?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would be in favor of it, Mr. Chairman. I think if he is going to have the kind of role that it seems to me appropriate for him to have, and which I have just briefly sketched, he would be a necessary participant in the deliberations of the Council. And it would follow, I think, that it was appropriate to recognize this by making him a statutory member.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mrs. Martin.

Mrs. MARTIN. Mr. Secretary, welcome, of course.

Do you have any feeling about the differences between what Chairman Goldwater and Senator Nunn are suggesting in terms of the future of the Joint Chiefs, and Chairman Nichols' proposal? Have you in any way-and I am not saying that you should havecompared them at all to what the-

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, I am afraid that I do not have a clear sense of what the differences in emphasis or priority may be.

Mrs. MARTIN. Well, would you like to comment in any way about procurement? Although the Joint Chiefs bill is not looking, obviously, specifically at procurement, we are looking at the relationship between the CINC's and who gets what.

Would you like to comment at all about procurement improvements that you in your vast experience could suggest?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I appreciate the flattering reference to my experience. But I really can only say about this that the American people are asked year after year, in the interest of their own security, to sacrifice significant amounts through taxes to support the armed services, which place demands on a very large fraction of the total national budget.

There is, in my view, an inseparable relationship between a clear perception of what is the responsibility of the United States toward the preservation of a stable, political, military balance in the world and what deployments, forces, missions, capabilities, and weapons systems are required to carry out these responsibilities. There can be no such thing, it seems to me, as a dichotomy, or a division between what it is that our military forces are charged with doing by way of deterring aggression, or having to respond to attack, on the one side, and the ability their weapons systems give them to do this.

Tough choices have to be made. So there should be a continuum between the planning processes of defined strategic roles and missions and the decisions required that are necessitated by deciding how these forces will be armed.

And so I have always believed that, just as you need a Joint Staff under a Chairman that can develop coherent military plans addressed to these responsibilities, you also need to address the acquisition process in a similar way.

I really regret, Mr. Chairman that I was drafted to go to the Department of Justice just when I was beginning to try to put into effect an approach to planning and weapons system acquisition that would have required the creation of combined teams from each of the services together with a civilian component, to address every step in an acquisitions process, or in the determination of what it is that we ought to acquire for a mission like close support, for instance-whose function it is and what weapons systems are needed to carry it out.

It is a question that cannot, by definition, be subject to intelligent determination by a single service. And yet, if you allow it to be addressed by channels that do not converge until you reach the level of the Joint Staff, you will set up a situation that invites logrolling.

So what I wanted to do was to create a process that subdivided the issues and created teams at the lieutenant commander or-I mean, commander or lieutenant colonel level with representation from systems analysis, or elsewhere in the Offices of the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense that would have to deal with each component of the problem in a manner that did not permit a political compromise. If you could not have a political compromise in the subdivided areas of the problem, then political problems would never have to arise at a stage at which political compromise could be made.

Now, this is all I know about acquisitions. I think that beyond what I have said, you are dealing with, essentially, administrative questions about the award and policing of the fulfillment of contracts and auditing and that kind of question, which really is quite distinguishable from the question of what you need and who you visit in what kinds of foreseeable situations.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. I have no questions.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your being with us very, very much, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. This concludes the morning hearing.

The Chair will announce that at 2 p.m., in 2216, we will hear from Gen. Larry Welch, U.S. Air Force, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command; Mr. Robin Pirie, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics; and Gen. Fred Mahaffey, commander in chief of the U.S. Readiness Command.

The subcommittee stands recessed until 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 10:04 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day, in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order.

This afternoon our first witness is Gen. Larry Welch, U.S. Air Force, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command. General Welch has been a fighter pilot since he entered the U.S. Air Force as an aviation cadet back in 1955. His distinguished record of assignments included duty spent flying F-4 Phantom jets in combat over North and South Vietnam. He has also served as commander of the Ninth Air Force, Tactical Air Command; as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Programs and Resources; and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

His current assignment as commander of SAC places him in command of a specified command which has the primary responsibility for the Nation's strategic nuclear forces.

We are pleased to have you as our first witness this afternoon, General Welch.

I notice you have a prepared statement and, without objections, that statement will be made a part of the official record.

You may proceed, sir, with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AND DIRECTOR, JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

General WELCH. Thank you, sir.

In consideration of the many witnesses that you have heard so patiently, I thought it would best serve the committee if I just

make a few initial comments on issues that I am most qualified by my own experience to address and then respond to questions. The most relevant of those experiences includes serving as the air component commander to the RDJTF [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force], now USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], serving as the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources, and then as Vice Chief. Those are relevant in that in all of those assignments I worked very extensively with all elements of the Air Force and OSD, and the unified and specified commanders in putting together the Air Force programs and budgets in support of those unified and specified commanders. And, of course, as Vice Chief, I spent much of my time working issues in the corporate JCS, and, as you pointed out, I have been in command of a specified command since August.

I have some comments on specific elements of reorganization proposals. To begin with, I support increasing the_authority of the Chairman of the JCS, not because I think either General Vessey or Admiral Crowe lack de facto authority, but because, in principle, I believe that very clear authority commensurate with responsibilities produces the best results. I would also caution, though, that the same principle has to apply to the Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Secretaries of the services. They, also, to be efficient and effective, need clear authority to organize their departments and run them as they see fit.

I believe strongly, in addition, that the very active participation of the service Chiefs in the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations and decisions and direction is absolutely essential. For one thing, the service Chiefs bring to those deliberations the depth of experience and up-to-date knowledge about the quality and the capability of forces that no one else has. In addition, once decisions are made, the active participation of those service Chiefs ensures that those decisions are carried out and executed. And they also do a great deal to ensure that all those deliberations and decisions come up against the hard realities of day-to-day force capabilities presented by people who are personally responsible for those day-to-day force capabilities.

Regarding CINC participation in the planning, programming, and budgeting cycle, I think that participation is vital. The earlier that it comes in the budget formulation process, the more useful it is. I believe the initiatives in both the Air Force and the OSD have gone a long way to provide for effective participation by the CINC's.

However, CINC participation must stop short of setting overall priorities, simply because no CINC has global responsibilities and no CINC has overall responsibilities for broad force issues. I would illustrate that with my own situation. I should and do have a great deal to say about the structure of strategic forces. But I am not the one that you should ask about priorities between strategic forces and tactical forces and airlift forces. Those priorities and those choices can only be made by the corporate Defense Resources Board serving the Secretary of Defense and advised by the CINC's. On the issue of military direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: As a specified commander, I have always considered myself under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. If there are those who doubt that relationship, then I think it would be useful to codify that relationship. I personally have never doubted it. I would point out, though, that the authority of the Chairman need not and should not interfere with service responsibility to provide the forces and training needed to support the mission responsibilities of the CINC's. The services provide the ready fighting forces, and it is extremely important that they have the mechanisms to do that well.

I will qualify at the outset my remarks on the relationship between CINC's and their components. I mentioned that I was a component commander to the Commander of the RDJTF, but at the present time I wear two hats as the Air Force component_commander and as the CINC. Therefore, obviously, I have absolutely no difficulty with my component commander. But I think I can say that, at least in recent years, Air Force component commanders have been responsive to the CINC's, and I have heard nothing to the contrary.

In addition to my responsibilities as commander of SAC, I am also the Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. As joint organization-my deputy is a Navy admiral-it is made up of people from all services, including representatives from all the CINC's who have nuclear responsibilities, and I am directed in that capacity to prepare the single integrated operational plan.

The result of all of that is a very fully coordinated plan for strategic forces employment. Consequently, I believe a unified command that would integrate strategic forces-that is the function of SAC and the Navy-to be unnecessary and redundant. The unity to effectively direct the employment already exists, and there are direct, clear lines of authority for employment that extend from the President to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and to the forces. Unlike other military situations, day-to-day direction-that is, decisions to employ forces and decisions on where and how to employ that forces-are not delegated to military commanders but retained by the National Command Authority. So there is very little to be gained by a unified strategic command for those rea

sons.

Regarding the division of responsibilities and relationship between the Air Force and the secretariat, I had much to do with that as the Vice Chief. I still do. I think the secretariat provides the required civilian oversight. At the same time, they have a considerably different function than does the Air Staff or the Service staffs. I think the current balance between direct civilian oversight and the duties of the two staffs is about right, and I have found that that particular arrangement is complementary; it is compatible; and it is effective.

Let me comment just a little further on that: Some proposals would integrate the air staff and the secretariat. I think that puts the oversight too close. I think to do this would stifle the Air Staff. Another proposal would remove the secretariat entirely and turn those oversight functions over to the Secretary of Defense. I think that removes oversight too far from the Air Force, and it would not be effective. So, the current arrangement is, in my opinion, the right balance.