is different than other military organizations is not a primary consideration, in my opinion.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Welch, you testified that you support making the Chairman the principal military advisor. In our House-passed bill, where we do that, we also indicate that the Chairman should himself seek advice from the unified commanders and from the other chiefs of service.

General WELCH. Yes.

Mr. BARRETT. I suppose that you agree with that also?
General WELCH. Yes.

Mr. BARRETT. But, in most cases, when there is time that he should seek advice, before he gives his own advice.

General WELCH. Well I agree. I agree the Chairman should be the principal adviser, but I also agree with the provisions that require that the other service chiefs' opinion, if they differ, be forwarded along with the Chairman's advice so that the best possible decision can be made. I find that the Chairman seeks the advice of the CINC's very regularly, certainly on strategic matters. I spend a lot of time in the JCS, and in my opinion, seeking that advice just happens. Whether or not it needs to be codified is another matter. Mr. BARRETT. I do not hold a particularly strong view about the Joint Commanders Council. But the JCS has made the point that the JCS should continue to be a corporate body and provide advice to the Chairman, so I do not understand why you make such a strong-have such strong opposition to the CINC's, as a corporate body, providing the same type of advice to the Chairman. You indicate that the service chiefs have certain responsibilities, and the Chairman should get their advice. Is it not true that the CINC's who would be responsible for fighting a war, have tremendous responsibilities, too? Why should they not have a voice like the service chiefs?

General WELCH. It is the matter of the corporateness of the body you are describing. The Joint Chiefs meet three times a week. They are together approximately 10 to 12 hours a week, at least. They discuss a wide variety of subjects every week, week after week, so they are a corporate body. They meet as a corporate body; they know each other as a corporate body.

I will see another CINC somewhere on the average of two or three times a year for a matter of maybe an hour and a half. So, the CINC's are not a corporate body. The CINC's are individuals who are responsible for individual forces or individual theaters, while the JCS is a corporate body that operates as a corporate body. It is a startling difference.

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir, but it seems to me that with modern telecommunications-teleconferencing-if this were a good idea, the fact that you are not physically together but three or four times a year would not be a major factor. You could have meetings from Omaha with other CINC's in their offices. It would cost some money, but if it were a good idea and if it were worth while, it could be done. So the question is not on, I think, physical contact,

but whether a Joint CINC's Council that could be a corporate body might be a worthwhile thing.

General WELCH. Well, what you are doing, when that happens, of course, is that you are forming a JCS of 10 rather than a JCS of 4, and, quite frankly, I am very busy running Strategic Air Command; and General Rogers is very busy running EUCOM. I cannot imagine that it would serve the interests of the Strategic Air Command for me to spend a lot of time worrying about Southcom or Pacom or Eucom. My responsibility as a CINC is to ensure that the strategic forces are ready and that the strategic forces can carry out their tasks.

So, certainly you could form a 9- or 10-man corporate body in lieu of or in addition to the 4-man corporate body or the 5-man corporate body that we call the JCS. I am not sure what purpose it would serve. I am able to get my input to the JCS to my total satisfaction, and the JCS responds to my inputs almost to my total satisfaction. If they responded to my total satisfaction, you should be suspicious and want to fix that system, because I cannot always be right.

Mr. BARRETT. Well, that gets to the question of priorities then, which you mentioned in your statement. You indicated that no CINC should be given all of his priorities, and you just reemphasized that.

General WELCH. Yes, I did.

Mr. BARRETT. But we do need some way to establish priorities for the CINC's. Now, you mentioned one way and that would be at the Defense Resource Board level. The bill-the JCS bill-and also H.R. 4234 that is before us-establishes another way. Mr. Kasich has added an amendment to the JCS bill that would have CINC's respond to the Chairman, and the Chairman prioritize their requirements. You did not mention that in your statement. Do you think that is a viable alternative, or not?

General WELCH. I do indeed. I think that is a very viable approach, and that goes on now in the form of priority lists, and it could be formalized. I think it is very useful for CINC's to submit their priorities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. BARRETT. I do not want to continue this much longer, but I would just say to you that if the Chairman starts prioritizing for the CINC's, and getting into your concerns and the concerns of the European commander, and the other CINC's, it might well be in your interest if you had a Joint Commanders Council, or something like that so that he could consult with you before he really took some, slashed resources from some of the priorities that you thought most important. That was the reason behind that particular provision. It probably will not succeed, but I think it should be given careful consideration.

General WELCH. We have such a process now. We have the CINC's meetings that take place before the DRB. I have frequent conversations with the Chairman when we have issues that need to be discussed. That process takes place every day now, and, as I said, I am content with the way that process works.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. I have no further questions.
Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, no questions. I just want to say that I happened to visit General Welch's command close to Thanksgiving and General Hatch was there. He did an outstanding job, along with other people accompanying us especially General McCarthy. It was really very good. I want General Welch to know how much I appreciate it.

General WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, General-we appreciate your being with us.

General WELCH. Thank you, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Our next witness is Gen. Fred Mahaffey, U.S. Army, commander in chief of the U.S. Readiness Command. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. FRED K. MAHAFFEY, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. READINESS COMMAND

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today, and to attempt to respond to your questions concerning my views on Defense reorganization from my perspective as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command and the Director of the Joint Deployment Agency.

As you may know, I have been in command a little less than 9 months, and therefore admittedly possess a limited base of firsthand experience. Nevertheless, during that time I have experienced no instance in which there was clearcut evidence of an inadequacy in my command authority to get my job done, nor of any overt resistance or stonewalling by my assigned service components. We are, of course, dealing with much more subtle issues, involving unity of command, the extent of command authority in both peacetime and war, clear lines of responsibility, and the relationships of the unified commands to the services.

In that regard, it is particularly important for you to understand that the unique missions assigned to the U.S. Readiness Command and the Joint Deployment Agency necessarily interface with, and in some cases overlap, both the services and the other regional commands in several important areas. For example, I am assigned the mission of providing a combat-ready conventional force, a central reserve for rapid reinforcement of the overseas theaters; and also, of providing contingency planning and a joint task force Headquarters for commitment worldwide. I have those two missions which have global applications. Beyond that, I have functional missions, including that of providing for the joint training of forces-that is the Army and the Air Force forces that are assigned to the U.S. Readiness Command, providing for the development of joint doctrine, or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for their employment. Finally, I have what might be construed as a regional mission related to the defense of those key assets, facilities and functions in the United States that are integral to the Nation's ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain forces.

For all of those reasons, and in connection with the ongoing JCS review of JCS Pub 2 and other pertinent DOD and JCS policy and

doctrinal publications-and, of course, in light of the national dialog on these matters-I have undertaken, with my headquarters, a more comprehensive analysis of the adequacy, or the inadequacy, of unified commanders' authorities as they exist in law, policy, doctrine, and day-to-day procedures, for the purpose of carrying out our respective assigned missions. I have also reviewed the adequacy and the clarity of my assigned mission statements, those which I paraphrased for you previously.

In that review, I found no instance of legal insufficiency. Consequently, most of my conclusions and recommendations fall into the areas of DOD policy, JCS doctrine, and day-to-day operating procedures. For that reason, I would prefer to share the results of my analysis, to include recommendations for change, with the JCS and the SECDEF first, as part of their ongoing review of JCS Pub 2, which I know has been mentioned before this subcommittee. But I am, of course, prepared to respond to any questions that you may have concerning the House bills at this time.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General.

I appreciate you being with us. You have had two combat tours. In Vietnam, you commanded a battalion. You have a wide range of experience, and yet you seem to come before this committee this afternoon and, contrary to a lot of the opinions that we have heard, I gather from you everything's hunkydory.

General MAHAFFEY. No, I did not mean to leave that impression, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. You do not have any problems?

General MAHAFFEY. Not at all. There are areas where I think clarification and change are warranted.

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, let me talk about the CINC's a little bit. We have been told that CINC's do not have sufficient authority to discharge their responsibilities. You do not seem to hold that view?

General MAHAFFEY. No, I think under the law I have adequate authority, including operational command of the Army and the Air Force forces that are assigned to me, to carry out the missions that I am currently assigned.

Mr. NICHOLS. Do you feel that you have sufficient authority to perform your assigned mission in the Readiness Command?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLS. No problem with that. Do you believe that the CINC command authority to hire and fire subordinates is a good recommendation?

General MAHAFFEY. Absolutely.

Mr. NICHOLS. You support that?

General MAHAFFEY. I do.

Mr. NICHOLS. What about court martial jurisdiction?

General MAHAFFEY. I have it. I am one of the few who do. Under the law, the Secretary of Defense is permitted to grant court martial authority to the unified and specified commanders, and in my case, particularly because I have oversight responsibilities for a multiservice organization called the Joint Communications Support Element, I have general court martial jurisdiction.

Mr. NICHOLS. Is your situation unique? Do you know of others who have been given that?

General MAHAFFEY. While I do not know for sure, I understand that authority has been granted to only a very few of the unified and specified commanders.

Mr. NICHOLS. How long have you had it during your 9 months? What about your predecessor?

General MAHAFFEY. He had it also. This is not new authority.

Mr. NICHOLS. OK. One final question. When General Meyer testified before this committee, he commented on the fact that the development of joint doctrine is a major weakness in the U.S. military. Would you define what is meant by "joint doctrine" for the record, first; and do you believe that General Meyer is correct in his assessment?

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Chairman, it is, I believe, true that there are different definitions attached to that term, by different Services.

Mr. NICHOLS. I want yours as head of the Readiness Command. General MAHAFFEY. I define "joint doctrine" as that set of proven tactics, techniques and procedures which are essential to effective joint war fighting; and I think that they have to be not only developed, and documented; they also have to be reviewed, validated and approved by the JCS in order to have that status. That is true joint doctrine.

Mr. NICHOLS. And what about General Meyer's statement? He said that he thought the development of Joint was a major weakness in the U.S. military doctrine. Do you share those views?

General MAHAFFEY. I do. I think that it is an area where we, the uniformed leadership, are most vulnerable to criticism, in the sense that the system by which joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed, validated through hands-on experience in joint training and joint exercises, documented, reviewed, and approved; that system is, by and large, not adequately defined.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman.

Your predecessor was General Nutting?

General MAHAFFEY. That is correct.

Mr. KASICH. In his response to these problems, it seems, he said that he did feel as though he did not have all the ability to impact resource decisions that he felt he needed. Now, why you do not tend to agree with that?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, since General Nutting left, of course, there has been substantial evolution in the role played by the CINC's in the resource programming and allocation process.

No, I do not agree with him. As a matter of fact, I think we have progressed to the point today where we have about the right balance between the CINC's ability first to identify his prioritized warfighting requirements; second to have those war-fighting requirements programmed by his service components; third, to be able to audit how those requirements fare in the Service program building process that occurs annually, or, at least, is updated annually and finally, to see how they are ultimately acted on by the Defense Resources Board. As a CINC, under current procedures, I have an entry at all of those points, including the DRB.