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command, but I do not think the American people want that, and I do not think we can afford that risk. I think the fact that we have such a large and powerful military establishment which has a great many commitments all over the world, far more than any other military establishment has ever had in history, and that we are able to manage that military establishment in this kind of a democracy without threatening the existence of that democracy, I think that is remarkable-an achievement that we do not often recognize, or it is something we take for granted perhaps too much. Now, the price we pay for the preservation of that democractic heritage and the substance of such a large establishment with so many commitments is a certain amount of inefficiency by not having an autocratic chain of command.
Well, as I said, I think the problem at hand is to examine these two chains of command and see if they work, to see if they are properly balanced, and raise the question of whether or not they converge again at the proper level. Now, in our system, as it is structured today—as you know—they converge again at the component level; the component level just below the unified commander, or the specified commander, as the case may be. I personally think that is the right level. At that level of course the component commanders look to two lines of supervision, one to the military department secretaries and one to the commanders in chief for each of the kinds of responsibilities I have just discussed. I think that can be done, and I think it is done with much more efficiency and more effectiveness than our critics give us credit for. I think it is unfortunate that the critics of the system are quick to grasp the exceptions in performance rather than the rule in performance to justify their criticism. To do these kinds of things, to measure the balance and so on-there really are not any easy ways to measure the intangibles of the effectiveness I have referred to. Nevertheless, even though I have suggested that evolutionary change is in order, I do think that some finite change is justified. I think much of that change would eventually take place on its own if the system were left to its own devices; but it is very clear that there is a momemtum in the consensus for some change. And it is caution about that that I would urge, and hopefully I can make some suggestions that would be constructive in that regard.
I do think a better balance than we have right now can be struck between the two chains of command to which I referred. As I stated in my prepared statement, the pendulum has hung on the resource management side of the chain of command ever since 1947. It has gradually moved toward the center, but it is still over on that side probably more than it should be, and needs to be, as mature as the DOD system is now. A lot of that motion has occurred recently because the momentum has picked up. I think the criticism that is directed at us in the Department of Defense about parochialism and other kinds of narrow viewpoints is largely traceable to the fact that the pendulum really is not quite in the middle. There will always be criticism, of course, because somebody would always like to see the pendulum on one side or the other; but I think if we can get it in the middle, we will be fairly insulated.
If we accept that the dual chain of command has to be preserved, in bringing them into the balance and preserving the distinctions as I said, this is the kind of reform we should seek.
The first and most important step in doing that in my view is to strengthen the position of the Chairman even further than has been done in the recent past. If I work for the Chairman as an individual, as my supervisor, rather than working for the JCS as a corporate group or in effect as a committee, I think that he is then in a stronger position to help me. Although he is now in an implied position-and that has been strengthened, of course, now-to be my supervisor; and in time of sensitive actions, he is clearly my supervisor by SECDEF direction and that has been institutionalized. But I think if the law institutionalizes his role as my direct supervisor, then it strengthens his position to advocate my needs, to express my concerns and requirements to the defense management structure here in Washington and to you here on the Hill.
I think the Chairman also needs full jurisdiction over the Joint Staff, and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OJCS and the Joint Staff are of course now tasked and directed to work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. They cannot help but be motivated to try to seek agreement on issues amongst the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is their role. It is what they are told to do.
Now, the system is criticized for the weakness in the positions developed because of the seeking of compromise; but that is the way the system is built. The unfortunate part about that is that the Commanders in Chief are not as well represented on the issues, and the resolutions of those issues, as they might be; and I think that can be fixed.
I do not think any other steps need to be taken if the Chairman has the responsibility to supervise the Joint Staff, and if the Joint Staff really is the staff of the Chairman.
Each of the Service Chiefs has his own staff. Each has people who work joint issues with the Joint Staff. All the staffs, as a matter of fact, work joint issues in one form or another, but the military departments generally have structured some element in their staffs through which those joint issues will be funneled to directly support the Chiefs. I am not sure it is necessary for the Chiefs-in light of all that-as a corporate body to have a staff to support them separate from their individual staffs.
But the Chairman does need a staff; he needs help. He needs somebody to help him express the CINC's concerns; to reduce the arguments to the precision of the written word; arguments that can be expressed and be influential here in the Washington arena.
I think many of the "reforms," and I use that word in quotation marks to a certain degree-many of the "reforms” that have been proposed can be achieved, can be accomplished just by this one step-strengthening the Chairman and giving him the supervisory responsibility and giving him a staff to support him rather than JCŚ corporate body.
Each of the Service components have a natural constituency or have natural advocates. Sometimes I call them the legations or the ambassadors to Washington to represent their concerns. For example in my own parent Service, in the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command has the logistics staff of the Air Force staff to look to, General Marquez and his people. Research and Development Command has General Randolph and his people to look to. The operational components look to the Deputy Chief of Staff of Plans and Operations and so on. But the CINC's really do not have a clearly identifiable "pocket” here in Washington to look to that understands their missions in detail and understands their concerns. The people who could support us in the Joint Staff are spread very thinly across a broad sprectum of issues and are really there trying to work for the corporate JCS.
So I think a lot of my problems as a unified CINC can be solved by having that Joint Staff responsive to the Chairman who can ensure that they work CINC's problems as well as the corporate joint problems of the entire joint structure. As I said, the Joint Staff is, in my view, the natural place for that kind of advocacy for the CINC's in Washington.
I would like to add, however, that in spite of criticisms and in spite of what I might have said, that the conditions that the Joint Staff always tries to seek the so-called least common denominator in the solution of problems or the resolution of issues—that condition does not always prevail. Generally speaking, when the Chairman gets involved, and deeply involved, and provides them with guidance, then they get back on line and start working the CINC's problems as well as the Service's problem. But what is lost sight of is that there are a lot of issues being worked in that joint arena day in and day out at the 0-6 level, at the colonel's level, at the junior general officer and flag officer level. There are so many of those issues that the Chairman does not have time to get involved in every single one. So the structure that I have suggested, I think, can help solve that problem. But the condition-again I emphasize-does not alway prevail.
The third point I would like to make is that the Chairman does need help. He need some of the help that I have just described with regard to the role of the Joint Staff and the responsiveness of the Joint Staff. But I do also agree that he needs help at the “fourstar” level within the Joint Staff. As you know, he is the only fourstar in the joint arena, other than the CINC's, I recognize that proposals abound in different forms for giving him a vice or a deputy.
Another way of solving that problem that I have thought about a lot-and thought about a lot when I was in the Joint Staff-is having a four-star (Joint Staff) director, still with a three-star vice director. That is another way of giving the Chairman some help. But the Chairman needs—that joint arena needs four-star representation here in Washington, not only with OSD, in working with the services, dealing with the number of issues that I just mentioned that the Chairman doesn't have time to get involved in, and as a conduit for the CINC's to get to the Joint Staff—to get support from the Joint Staff on issues—because of the “busy-ness” of the Chairman and the extent to which he is burdened by so many responsibilities and is spread so thinly. There are times that I am reluctant to call him on issues because I know that he has got a lot of other big problems on his mind, and I am not too sure whether I ought to elevate an issue to his level, but there is no other four-star in the joint arena for me to turn to. So, a vice, or a deputy Chairman, or an enlarged director, one of those options, I think, would be a significant improvement.
But whatever is done in that regard the officer must have the prestige that the kind of position he would fill deserves. It just cannot be a cosmetic solution to the problem.
I think that both of the chairmen that I worked for have worked very hard to represent, and work for the CINC's—and represent their views. But as I said, the Chairman is really spread too thin. The director is the closest thing he has officially to help. He does have an assistant to the Chairman. But within the structured position of the staff, the director is the closest thing he has to help.
But the director's office is grossly overburdened, and I point this out in my statement. There is no three-star position in the Department of Defense that demands so much of an individual as the director's position.
In a sense, that is kind of good because the fact that the director is so heavily burdened now is evidence of the fact that more and more issues are being worked in the joint arena and that the Joint Staff is, in fact, a significant factor in the defense management structure. So, while we need to fix that problem, we should not regard it in a pejorative context, because it is one more piece of evidence that a whole lot of progress has been made in recent years.
A strong, effective right arm for the Chairman who has the respect and influence that the position-whatever you establish by law-that has the respect and influence that that position deserves can really make a difference to me and to the Chairman-and can provide him with the capability to get the most out of the Joint Staff and make the Joint Staff support more jointness.
For example, as I point out in my statement, he can be the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Management Board, a system that was institutionalized recently under General Vessey's tenure, I think it is one of the most important-and major-and most dramatic steps forward that we have made in some time. But there is not a senior joint officer to chair that group. A deputy chairman or a four-star director could do that.
He could help the Chairman work the problem of operational supervision of the defense agencies, assuring that the defense agencies are playing the proper role in supporting the combat forces, executing combat support functions.
Those are just a couple of examples. There are many others in many areas in which a four-star helper for the Chairman can play a very significant role, and cause more acceleration to that momentum that I talked about in speeding up the movement toward the balance and the jointness.
I think it would be a mistake-and I think some proposals have suggested this—to establish a deputy chairman, and to call him the director of the Joint Staff at the same time, or alternatively, to take away the three-star director's position. I think you need a director for the Joint Staff and you also need somebody to help the Chairman.
An alternative, of course, is to make the director of the Joint Staff a four-star and then have a three-star vice director of the Joint Staff. That kind of vacates the middle ground between the deputy and a dual-hatted four-star deputy who is also serving as the director.
I guess what I am saying is I do not think it is a good idea to have a four-star in that joint arena who is referred to as the director, and the deputy or vice chairman at the same time. I think they should be two separate people. If you are going to have a deputy, make him a deputy and do not dual-hat him as a director. Have a separate director.
If you do have a deputy director or a deputy chairman or a vice chairman and preserve the director, as I suggest you do as a threestar, then you have really introduced a new dimension of balance in the system that hasn't been talked about, that I know of, before. I would recommend that you require each to be from a different military department so that you had a chairman from one department, a deputy chairman or vice chairman, whatever you choose to call him, from another department, and a director from another department. So you really have a nice purple-suited arrangement to strengthen the joint arena; a lot of balance there, a lot of opportunity.
Now, of course, in mentioning that the director is overloaded and overworked and really trying to stay on more icebergs than he can stay on top of, by creating a deputy chairman, even without saying that he is the director, you relieve a lot of the burden of the existing director's role to act as the number two person in the management and direction of the Joint Staff. So I think you go a long way toward solving that problem of relieving the excessive burden of responsibility and activity on the director himself.
The next point I would like to make is that getting the CINC's too involved in resource management, I think, is a mistake. There are some limited things that could be done and initiatives have already been taken. Some have been consummated and others have not. Actually, I am really only talking about two. But to get them fully involved to build budgets and get too involved in the resource management process blurs the distinction between those two chains of command that I talked about. And I think that would be a mistake.
If I am to build a budget for the U.S. Space Command and the activities of its component commands, I am going to need more people. I am going to have to have a lot more people than I have now.
Our staff is structured to participate in the resource management process and support me in my role, in the role that I play in interfacing with the Defense Resources Board; and I have an adequate staff, adequate manning to do that. But to go beyond that and to assume some of the responsibilities that are now carried out by the military departments in resource management is going to cause me to have to have more people and different kinds of expertise than I have now. And I think that that is one good reason for not doing that. But I think the most important reason is you tend to blur that distinction that exists between those two chains of command.
Now, initiatives like the CINC's initiatives fund-I was on the Air Staff when we started that—that process is for command and control systems, I think that is an excellent approach. We fought