fered with the proper number of port calls and overland training routes that I've wanted. And I think I've gotten the short end of the stick on occasion. But I'm not asking you to change the Constitution just because I've lost a few bureaucratic battles.

Mr. KASICH. Well, when a man in the Pacific says, Mr. Secretary, that he is dependent on component commanders, not only to compete successfully for sustained resources within their services, but also to represent him in balancing and distributing stocks, ammo, and petroleum, and so on, in locations and ways to support his theater strategy, we are suggesting that this man, who is out somewhere in the Pacific who has to perform a function in a time of crisis, doesn't have the tools at his disposal to be able to do what he thinks he has to do. He's saying the people inside the beltwaybureaucrats who you criticize who are inside the beltway-are making decisions that he has no impact over, and he's the one that's got responsibility.

Wait a minute. He says it. Rogers says it. Nutting says it. Everybody says it but Lehman.

Mr. LEHMAN. Not at all.

Mr. MARSH. No; not just anybody but Lehman.

Could I speak to that?

Mr. KASICH. Absolutely.

Mr. MARSH. Joe, put that chart up. [Laughter.]

Mr. NICHOLS. You're fixing to get the answer, Mr. Kasich. Mr. KASICH. Let me amend that statement by saying that those within the beltway don't agree.

Mr. NICHOLS. I believe you plowed up a snake. [Laughter.]

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Kasich, the way that we're organized today is shown here. Your operational command is shown here in black. Under the CINC's you have Army, Navy, and Air Force, and subunified commands.

Now, the Army in Europe is under General Rogers as the unified CINC and is shown, down here with General Otis as the component CINC. The 1958 act, in effect, put the CINC's directly under the JCS as your combat commanders, and it moved logistics and support into the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. That's our responsibility under 1958 law.

That's the way it operates now. We provide the CINC's with the logistical support for ammunition, equipment, and all the things that they need.

The change suggested in the Senate report would take the logistics, and a lot of these support responsibilities from the services and make them the responsibility of the unified CINC's.

Under this structure, instead of making his request to the Department of the Army, General Otis, the Army component commander in Europe, will have to submit his request to General Rogers. General Rogers, in order to manage these requests is going to have to develop budgeting, program analysis, and program evaluation capabilities. All those things are now being done either in Secretary Lehman's shop or Secretary Rourke's.

Now, what's happened, the CINC's have a parochial view, as they should have a parochial view. They see the problem of Europe, or the Pacific, and the assets and the resources that they need. When you're here in Washington, inside the beltway where you have to sit, and we have to sit, you do not see them as unique European and Pacific problems. We see them globally.

As suggested in the language in this bill, the CINC's want to move a logistics and resources function down into what you would call CINC components-service components. These logistics and resource functions are administrative, and, in peacetime, can best be administered centrally without creating a new bureaucracy.

Mr. KASICH. So that you're comfortable with that-all of you are comfortable and believe that we really take into account these resource decisions, and we're thinking about what somebody in the Pacific, somebody in the Atlantic, really wants.

These guys are saying-and I hope they're going to come inthese guys are saying we can't really affect it, that the services have their own interests in the beltway. Hey, I've just been doing special forces. I know about, at least in that area, the inability of the services to pursue what we all know we should pursue because of parochial interests-maybe some sexier programs in this area versus lift capability over there. You know that, Secretary Rourke. Mr. ROURKE. I'll get a nameplate in about another month, Mr. Kasich. You're absolutely right. Let me suggest, however, that everything that's been observed, and I think so brilliantly by Secretary Marsh, just points out the humanness and the freshness of this whole operation. You want General Rogers, you want Admiral

Crowe in his former capacity, to be fighting like hell for the resources for their individual areas.

When we had the great chemical weapons battle, which was not very popular here on Capitol Hill, wisdom prevailed with the help of some good people on this committee.

General Rogers fought like a tiger to get that program through because he knew how critical the deterrent force was in Europe. For almost 4 full years, the complaints and the agonizing, the frustration, and the flights back and forth to Washington were enormous because he needed that capability to perform his function. Perhaps more so, given the relative understanding of how things stand in the Pacific.

When we visited with Admiral Crowe when he was in his former capacity in Hawaii. we had the same registration of views, the same agonies, the same complaints. I didn't see anyone begging— and they're both brilliant flag officers-I didn't see anyone begging for that wiring diagram to include the entire budget process. They don't really want that. They don't really need it. They don't have that capability, and they don't want to pull a little beltway over their shoulders and get wrapped in this entire budget cycle we're into.

But, believe me, Mr. Kasich, the views of the CINC's and the views of these other individuals discussed on the diagram are taken into consideration They are part of our budgeting process. They do appear at the DRB cycles, as we've discussed here earlier. It's an indication more of frustration, of their inability to provide 110 percent for the troops, the sailors, the airmen they represent.

Mr. KASICH. But if I have in my own congressional office a group of people that I work with, for example, in Washington on a day-today basis, and four times a year I let my district office come in and testify before me as to what should be done out there—I'm working day-to-day with people in this office-where do you think the influence is?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Kasich, where do you think we build our budget from? What we have to do is resolve the competing demands of nine specified and unified commanders. Bill Crowe complained because he could never get the Air Force to give him the F-111's he wanted out there. But the Air Force knew it would have to take them out of Europe and Bernie Rogers would have been screaming.

We have to do the training and optimize the resources for all of the CINC's in the services. But the CINC's are where we get our requirements from. We don't have some secret fleet somewhere that the CINC's don't own. Everything that comes under my jurisdiction is owned by a CINC, and every requirement we have is to meet a CINC-generated requirement. Bernie Rogers doesn't quite sympathize with what I'm giving and allocating to the training requirements of CINCPAC. ČINCPAC doesn't quite appreciate how much CINCCENT needs, and the requirements of ship-days out there. We have to decide, with the Joint Chiefs being the principal uniformed military input, how to allocate scarcities. And of course they're going to bitch. Of course they're crying because they don't get everything they want. Nobody is getting everything he wants.

But to absolutize just one of the voices and say we've got to give him budget authority is just going to put interregional rivalry in the place of interservice.

Mr. KASICH. I'm not suggesting for a second, Mr. Secretary, that we give them all of this authority. We're talking about very limited authority in things like command and control, training, the joint training, probably maintenance, and maybe some MilCon. I mean, narrow areas. But you've got to understand that this isn't John Kasich that's saying these things. This is a report from Harold Brown, Clark Clifford, Melvin Laird, Robert McNamara, Elliot Richardson, Jim Schlesinger. Also, Sam Nunn, Barry Goldwater. This isn't something I'm pulling out of the air. This is something that we have seen consistent concern about.

But I appreciate what you're saying, all of you, because you're really showing that you want to take people into account, and you really want to be concerned about what they say. So I appreciate

your response.

I don't know whether that resolves it.

Mr. Chairman, can I ask a question in one other area? I'd like one other comment from Secretary Lehman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Not too long.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would just comment on this. You talked about the Beirut bombing. It was pointed out in the Goldwater-Nunn report in the Senate, as they read through and reported things they thought needed to be corrected. They said the report on the Beirut bombing discussed the problems inherent in the layering of commands, including the Joint Chiefs. There were eight existing layers between the Marines on the ground and the Secretary of Defense. The fact that we have a proliferation of headquarters and bureaucracies is evident in a bunch of statistics that talk about all these growing numbers.

Isn't that somewhat different than the argument you made up front about the problem that we had in Beirut? Maybe I got lost. Mr. LEHMAN. No; that's exactly what I was pointing to. As the results of the Long report, and the congressional report of the members here in this room indicated, what certainly helped to contribute to the disaster over there was the layering and the size of the bureaucratic side of the chain of command. There were too many layers. We moved to thin that out as far as the Navy side was concerned. We abolished one whole layer, CTF-60 [Commander Task Force 60] in Naples. We got rid of that.

We tried to eliminate the split between the NAVEUR [Naval Forces Europe] Headquarters and the Deputy NAVEUR Headquarters, but General Rogers opposed that.

We eliminated 200 people from the SACLANT [Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic] staffs. So we took the appropriate action. We don't want to go backward now and grow those staffs and add new layers to them.

Mr. KASICH. Did we have too much debate, too much friction, too much argument between all the services as to who, in fact, ought to be able to be in control?

Mr. LEHMAN. No; that was not a factor at all. It was simply bureaucratic delays and staffing. Interservice rivalry was a contributor to that.