lie between the Pillars of Hercules and Port Said are a vital link in the strategic chain of the Empire. The fate of nations has often been decided in these waters. After the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau' had escaped into the Dardanelles, no enemy warship that navigated the surface dared to show itself in the Mediterranean. The French and Italian Fleets, in conjunction with our own, kept control during the Dardanelles operations; it may at least be asserted that, whatever may have been the genesis and the political or other objects of the expedition, the enterprise would have been impossible without the Navy, though unfortunately it exhibited an original want of understanding and co-operation between the naval and military authorities at home which exceeded in its mischievous effects anything of the kind in our history. The expedition of Saunders and Wolfe to Quebec in 1759 and of Jervis and Grey to the West Indies in 1793, showed how such expeditions may succeed; the relation into which Byng and Blakeney were brought in 1756 indicated the causes which lead to failure. In the case of the Dardanelles, the failure was not at the scene of action. Naval and military officers and seamen worked together on the spot with the utmost zeal and in full comradeship. Sir Ian Hamilton said the Navy was the sheet anchor on which the elaborate operations at Suvla Bay hung. One tiny flaw in the mutual trust and confidence animating the two services would have wrecked the whole enterprise.' Sir Charles Munro, after the evacuation, said it was a stroke of good fortune for the army to be associated with a service 'whose work remained throughout this anxious period beyond the power of criticism or cavil.'

It was the good fortune of the British Navy in the Mediterranean to be associated in the closest co-operation with the gallant Navies of France and Italy. The Austro-Hungarian Navy has been condemned to inaction at Pola, though it is noteworthy that the Dalmatian fringe of islands presents immense advantages to the Austrian flotillas; and it is largely due to this situation that the Austrian hold on Cattaro is maintained. There have been a few enemy raids on the Italian coast, but the general situation has not thereby been affected. The enemy navy, notwithstanding its geographical

advantages, was unable to interfere with the delicate and difficult task of transporting the Italian army to Albania, or the withdrawal of the Serbian army from the coast, though attempts were made by cruisers, destroyers and aircraft. It was powerless also to check the advance of the Italians on the coast roads to Monfalcone.

Nor must we forget the influence of naval power in the reduction of the distant possessions of the enemy. It was by the service of the Allied Navy of Japan that Kiao-Chau was wrested from the Germans; and the Japanese took a part in the rounding-up of the enemy cruisers. All the German colonies have fallen to sea power. The Dominions have been with us from the beginning in this and other duties. The battle-cruiser 'New Zealand,' built for the Dominion, had already joined the British Fleet. The Commonwealth Government placed the Royal Australian Navy at the disposal of the Admiralty; and its cruisers were invaluable in sweeping the enemy commerce from the seas. It was the cruiser 'Sydney' that destroyed the Emden.' battle-cruiser Australia' joined the Grand Fleet.

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To conclude-many times has the Navy stood between the country and its would-be master. The island set in the silver sea' has always been in its care. It is fulfilling its historic functions once more. It is the safeguard against invasion, the protector of the food supplies and necessities of the country, the bond of the Empire, also the shaft to the military spearhead, the support of the Allies, and the guardian of all we have won in many hundreds of years. It has destroyed the enemy's floating commerce, ended his colonial empire, and forbidden him to make any stroke against the Allies by sea. Of some of the less-known elements in this great force, and of their work in our behalf, we hope to speak in a second article.

JOHN LEYLAND.

Art. 7.-DOMINION VIEWS ON IMPERIAL UNITY.

In view of the importance of ascertaining what is the state of opinion in the self-governing Dominions of the Empire on the question of Imperial Unity, an endeavour has been made to obtain contributions on the subject from distinguished and influential citizens of the Dominions themselves. It was suggested that these contributions should present, not so much the personal views of the writers, as their impressions of the trend of public opinion in the countries concerned. The following article comprises communications from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. -(EDITOR.)

(1) AUSTRALIA.

A LEADING article in the Melbourne Age' for July 3, 1915, opens with these words: 'It requires very little prescience to foresee that the British Empire after the close of the great war will undergo great changes. It is given to few if any to foretell what these changes must be.' This attitude, on the part of an organ not usually troubled with doubts and uncertainty, fairly represents the condition of Australian opinion. Political thought, whether we look to Parliaments, the press, or the electorate, has not yet proceeded beyond a general recognition of the truth contained in the Age' article, and the assumption that in some mode or other the Dominions will be consulted in the arrangement of the terms of peace.

Contrast with this mental inertia the penetrating survey of the present constitutional position by Mr Hughes, on the eve of his return to Australia:

"The consequences of war to the Dominions,' he said, 'were not limited to the contributions of men to fight the battles of the Empire, nor to their maintenance, but extended in such a way as in effect to reduce the self-governing powers of the Dominions, merely giving effect to the war policy determined by those who controlled it. And the effect of doing those things that had to be done would not cease when the war ended, but would remain for many years-in this case at least for a generation-to modify profoundly, if not actually to determine, the policy of the Dominions. It would hardly be denied that, if Britain had a right to compel the Dominions to incur such a tremendous burden of debt as this Vol. 227.-No. 450.

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war would impose upon all of them, it had, for all practical purposes, the power to compel them to impose heavy taxation upon themselves; and, if one nation had a right to tax another, it was perfectly clear that the sovereignty or quasisovereignty of the latter disappeared. The causes of war were numerous; certainly no nation had ever been at a loss for a pretext for war when its interests demanded it. The circumstances of each nation determined its foreign policy; and it was well to realise that the domestic policy of every country was profoundly affected by its foreign policy. Treaties were among the most prolific causes of war; and, since Britain entered into these without consulting the Dominions, it followed that the Dominions, for causes that they might not approve, might be launched into war. This was incompatible with democratic government. Every one must accept the Prime Minister's statement that it must not continue. What form the change should take, he would not attempt to say now; but there must be a change, and it must be radical in its nature.' (The 'Times,' June 24, 1916.)

Nowhere has the Imperial problem been stated more clearly, and nowhere has the pressing need for a solution been expressed more emphatically.

In some respects, the position of the Australian colonies has been that of the United Kingdom intensified. The economic and political development of Great Britain rested upon the security of her insular position. Both the development and the security on which it rested helped to turn the minds of the people from any close and continuous attention to European politics. In Australia, more remote from the scene of la haute politique, more fully occupied with economic development and economic problems, the political interest of the people even more naturally turned inward; and the instinct of self-government was satisfied with the control of internal affairs.

The emergence of industrial politics did not radically alter this point of view; but the enjoyment and improvement of Australian social conditions was found to call for measures of a protective kind. New local activities appeared, such as the growth of an extensive shipping trade, and the necessity of establishing 'Australian conditions' in them. The doctrine of a White Australia was formulated, partly as an economic, partly as a racial policy, and partly as a manifestation of democracy. All

must be excluded who could not be assimilated to our social conditions and our political life, or whose presence would threaten our economic standards. And this exclusion must apply in the case not merely of the settled parts but of the remotest parts of the Continent. No European Government, not even a British Government, could be trusted with guiding the development of any part of the Continent.

As soon as the establishment of federation called into existence a government released from the especial functions of 'colonial development,' the national interests as thus conceived began to receive more attention; and with the stimulus of events in the Far East it was realised that Australia had external relations of a vitally important kind, and a policy which might be challenged. In other words, the leaders of Australian democracy found that foreign policy was not the mere gold lace of court dress, but an essential phase of national existence. The result was the foundation of a system of defence on land and sea which, both in its political and its strategic character, has been built upon and to a great extent limited by these considerations. The Australian organisation and control of defence was a reminder to the Imperial Government and the people of Australia of distinct national interests forming part of the sphere of Australian government.

With this expansion of interests and policy, it is plain that the content rather than the meaning of selfgovernment has undergone a great change since 1855. It has meant, throughout, the control of those matters of which the people were conscious as affecting intimately their interests and aspirations; and the circle of such matters has constantly tended to widen.

A commonwealth of five million people claiming the exclusive occupation of a Continent capable of supporting a population variously estimated at from 50 to 100 millions, establishing rigorous conditions of admission to the territory and setting up its own citizenship, determining its trade policy, enacting shipping laws, raising its own defence forces and sending its navy out on the high seas under its own flag; treated for most of the administrative relations of independent states (e.g. postal conventions) as a distinct unit-such conditions require