The paralysing effect produced by this antiquated régime upon the administration of the central archives of the Empire is really responsible for the casual methods of the Government departments. Such a system is also obviously unsuitable as a model for the development of local and colonial archives. The present Records Commission had to consider an urgent demand for the establishment of a separate Record Office for Wales, to match the national institutions which already exist in Scotland and Ireland. The Commissioners also received valuable assistance from the State archivists of the Dominions or Dependencies of the Crown. It is already evident that the publication of the original sources of later colonial history has done much to strengthen the ties that unite the mother-country with her heroic offspring. We know, too, that the Canadian Record Office has collected many graphic illustrations and permanent memorials of the war services of the Dominion forces; and, after the war, a considerable development of archive economy may be looked for throughout the Empire.

We are indebted to the Royal Commission on the Public Records for the only complete or reliable information as to the state of the public records that has been published since 1837; and it is certainly to be regretted that the Commission has not been able to finish its appointed task owing to the war. Its published reports have dealt exhaustively with the condition of the State Archives immediately before the war; the subject has been handled with great ability, courage and discretion, and the conclusions formed by the Commissioners have not been seriously controverted. But present conditions are no longer what they were three years ago; and it is to be hoped that the Commission may have an early opportunity of expressing its views on the arrangements that should be made for the custody and description of the archives of the war. Some time must necessarily elapse before the reforms which they have recommended can bear full fruit, by bringing the archives into touch with historians as well as into line with the scientific methods that prevail abroad. If we are wise, we shall begin to learn something about the archives while they are still with us. 'To-morrow' may be, once more, too late.

Art. 14.-THE DARDANELLES REPORT.

Dardanelles Commission. First Report. March 1917. [Cd. 8490.]

In the general outburst of criticism which has followed the publication of the First Report of the Dardanelles Commission one could have wished that the dispassionate and judicial spirit which characterised the summary of the Commissioners had been emulated. This unfortunately has not been the case, and we have been treated instead to a sorry exhibition of spleen and vituperation. Even before the publication of this Report of the greatest epic as well as the bitterest tragedy of modern times, one could foretell what treatment would be meted out to the dramatis persona. They were either fools or heroes according to their politics. The Dardanelles fiasco must have rent many a heart, but the spectacle of this washing of our dirty linen for all the world to see occasions more lasting shame.

Before examining the evidence and conclusions which have been made public, it is, first of all, a duty and a privilege to express our warmest thanks to the Chairman of the Commission, the late Earl of Cromer, for so courageous and well-balanced a review of the circumstances which he was called upon to examine. The master-hand is always present in this important document. In point of style, utterance and forensic ability it is a remarkable achievement, fit to be the last work of a great man who died, as he had lived, in the service of the State. It is much to be regretted that he is no longer here to defend and to explain the verdict of the Commission over which he presided with such skill and judgment.

In the second place, it is permissible to express a hope that further publications of this nature may be postponed until after the war. It is difficult to conceive who gains, except the enemy, by this satisfying of idle and mischievous curiosity. We may be sure that the Wilhelmstrasse has already rejoiced at this world-wide advertisement of our shortcomings and our internal dissensions. Mistakes in this vast war have not been exclusively confined to this country. To realise that we have grievously erred

on more than one occasion, and to guard against committing similar errors in future, is well; but to drag to light all the regrettable details of such a story is needlessly painful to ourselves, discouraging to our allies, and helpful only to the enemy.

The First Report occupies sixty pages, but covers less than half of the field of enquiry for which the Commission was set up. The ten Commissioners were appointed in August, 1916, by the late Government,

'for the purpose of enquiring into the origin, inception, and conduct of operations of war in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment to the troops and Fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war.'

The Report now under examination deals only with the origin and inception of the attack on the Dardanelles. The period examined begins with the outbreak of war with Germany on Aug. 4, 1914, and concludes on March 23, 1915, when the original idea of a naval attack was abandoned and the operations assumed military importance.

All the chief actors concerned in the part of the operations under survey were called before the Commission with the notable exception of the late Secretary for War, Lord Kitchener, whose deeply regretted death naturally renders it difficult for us to accept with full freedom from doubt all the evidence offered as to the part he played in the proceedings. Lord Kitchener's motives were not always confided to his colleagues; he did not even commit his plans and opinions to paper, but memorised them. Therefore much of the evidence necessary to complete an examination of his conduct died with him. But, as the Report truly remarks, it is necessary to do justice to the living as well as to the dead; so that one is bound to judge upon the evidence which is so far available. The War Council seemingly was responsible for the conduct of the war during the period under review. Mr McKenna, in reply to the Chairman, stated that there was a general acceptance

by the Cabinet of the constitution and action of the War Council.' The War Council consisted of the following Cabinet Ministers': Mr Asquith, Lord Haldane, Mr Lloyd George, Sir Edward (now Viscount) Grey, Mr Churchill and Lord Crewe. The meetings were also regularly attended by Mr Balfour. While Mr Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey and the Marquis of Crewe 'exercised undoubted and very legitimate influence,' the main responsibility rested on three members of the Council, Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill.

The position of the expert members of the Council is of considerable interest and calls for particular comment. The military expert who regularly attended the meetings of the Council was Lieut.-General Sir James Wolfe Murray, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The naval experts who attended regularly were Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson. All these witnesses agreed in the assumption that their position on the Council was a subsidiary one, and that, unless asked, they were not expected to express an opinion. Sir James Murray stated that 'Lord Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of the Staff,' and that, as he (Sir James) was never asked to express an opinion he considered he was not entitled to do so. Lord Fisher emphasised the distinction between being a member of the War Council and merely one of the experts,' who were there 'to open their mouths when told to.' Sir Arthur Wilson's evidence clearly shows that he was in complete agreement with Lord Fisher in this attitude.

Now, it seems an extraordinary thing that a man of Lord Fisher's known strength of mind and purpose should have so far effaced himself as to be hardly more than an interested spectator at these important Councils. The plea that he and the other experts were not asked for their views is amazing, especially when coming from such a source. The publication of the Dardanelles Report has destroyed many popular illusions of men and things. It certainly has removed the impression that Lord Fisher is obstinate and insistent in making known and carrying into effect his individual predilections.

Mr Churchill, in his evidence, stated that he spoke in the name of the Admiralty when at the War Council. He was not expressing simply his own views but the

opinions agreed upon at the meetings of the War Staff Group, which took place daily at the Admiralty. If Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson were present at these meetings, as one may assume they were, they were fully entitled to correct the First Lord of the Admiralty at the meetings of the War Council if he misrepresented their views. That they did not correct him-if they disagreed-does not relieve them of the responsibility which they owed, not so much to Ministers, as to the Nation. The evidence of Mr Balfour, Viscount Grey, Mr Lloyd George, Lord Haldane, Lord Crewe, Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr Asquith is in entire agreement upon the point that the silence of the experts would be regarded as concurrence. 'If they feel their expert advice is not before the Council,' said Mr Balfour, that the Council are not aware of what their views are, they ought to take means of letting their views be known.' That was the most obvious, the most commonsense view of the situation.

So far as the military experts were concerned, it so happened that the Secretary for War himself, Lord Kitchener, was a military expert. One cannot agree that for this reason these experts stood upon a different footing from that of their naval colleagues; but it is easier to sympathise with the position of Sir James Murray than that of Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson. Lord Kitchener, rightly or wrongly, assumed the rôle of a military autocrat. He hardly ever accepted views which did not coincide with his own. In more normal times he was, perhaps, a little more indulgent, but these were days of feverish activity, and he therefore did not relish conversations which resulted either in disagreement or half-hearted acquiescence. By his methods he was able to get things done-very often rightly, but sometimes wrongly. It should have been clear to the country-it must have been clear to the Governmentthat, when Lord Kitchener was called upon to assume the rôle of Secretary of State for War, it was practically giving full control to one man. Any one who was directly or indirectly associated with the great soldier in the East was never in doubt upon this point. One can understand, therefore, that the personality, experience and knowledge of the late War Secretary may have, in