a

the arrival of the British Fleet would have produced revolution in Constantinople, replied, Oh yes; certainly it would. I feel no hesitation in saying that.' There is no doubt that help in the form of a revolt in Turkey was widely anticipated, not only at home but at Gallipoli. But it would be pure folly to base a tremendous undertaking on so uncertain a foundation.

So much for the supplementary report. Further contributions to the question from an authoritative source were the speeches of Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill in the House of Commons on March 20. However, beyond a sufficient answer to Lord Kitchener's critics and a most able oratorical effort by the two exMinisters, there is nothing which calls for particular comment beyond the points already noted above. One might have expected to hear a better defence than Mr Asquith was able to give of his not having summoned the War Council for two months. The conduct of the war was in the hands of that specially constituted body; and the excuse given, that the frequent meetings of the Cabinet were, in effect, the same thing, is entirely illusory. There is all the difference in the world between a War Council of six, all intimately acquainted with the facts, and a Cabinet of twenty-two, most of whom can have known little or nothing at first hand, and several of whom never had their hearts in the job.

Despite this, so far as one is able to judge from the evidence which has been made public, it is impossible to lay the responsibility for the mismanagement of the operations at the door of any particular individual. The reasons of failure are too deep, too multifarious, and as yet too little known, to be set forth in a Report, however able. There is the element of luck, the question of psychology, the diplomatic factor, military situations which might have developed if we had decided differently-all these must be reckoned in the ultimate weighing up, and there is no mortal who can now do this. The involved and complicated situation with which our leaders had to reckon in the period under review was one that changed every day; and the multiplicity of factors forms a difficulty which has beset and is still besetting the Allies and the enemy since the beginning

of the war. Sometimes, when there are mysterious elements in the case of a big reverse, investigation is useful; there have been instances in Russia when such an enquiry has resulted in the exposure of a traitor in the camp; and examples of pro-German influence and intrigue could be multiplied. But he would be a partisan blinded by sheer prejudice who could point to any leader in this country-military, naval or political-who has not done his best for the cause, according to his lights, during these trying times. Incompetence or at least inadequacy and misapprehension there have been; let us thank heaven that we have no worse charge to bring.

When Lord Kitchener refused to send the soldiers to Gallipoli, he may have erred-I think he did-but to accuse him of incompetence or of dereliction of duty is a shameful proceeding. Mr Asquith's responsibility in the enterprise is accepted by him. It was his duty, as Prime Minister, to coordinate the efforts of the Government departments and to see that the Ministers and their experts were working together. It must be admitted, however, that he had an unusually difficult team to guide. The country, at the time when the Gallipoli expedition was being discussed, demanded that the conduct of the war should be left in the hands of Lord Kitchener. It wanted no interference with the famous soldier; and it was this remarkable trust-amounting almost to worship-that may have induced Lord Kitchener to take a rather magnified view of the duties of even a modern War Minister. In regard to the Navy, the country wanted Lord Fisher, whose popularity was at all times beyond question, and Mr Churchill, who was credited with having mobilised the Navy just prior to the outbreak of war. Against such a triumvirate Mr Asquith could do little so far as actual strategy was concerned. He has justification in saying that, even if they had felt reason to doubt Lord Kitchener's opinion, as it was a purely military question, it would have been in the highest degree presumptuous for us laymen to have overruled him.' The Prime Minister, after all, may have welcomed the general confidence expressed in the heads of the Army and Navy. There were other matters, each in its way just as urgent and far-reaching, that

required his personal attention. It was not to be expected of him that he should interfere with the military policy of Lord Kitchener or the naval policy of Mr Churchill and Lord Fisher.

The primary fault at home was the want of coordination and the multiplicity of schemes. If, when a decision was ultimately arrived at, everybody had forgotten 'alternative schemes' and had put all their weight into the one accepted, we should have had the first condition of success at the Dardanelles. But no plans, however skilfully drawn, can succeed unless they are adapted to the means in hand-unless the coat is cut according to the cloth; and at Gallipoli there was not enough cloth to go round. Nor, again, can the most skilful commanders succeed in attaining a given object in the face of incomplete plans and insufficient men and materials. That was the fundamental reason for the Mesopotamia reverse. It was only after we had made the preparations which we should have made at first that we succeeded in driving the Turks before us. Without anticipating the judgment of the Commission which is still sitting on that event, it is permissible to say that a similar want of preparation was the cause of our failure at the Dardanelles, and that, given adequate support, the splendid heroism of our men would have been crowned with victory as well as glory.

SYDNEY A. MOSELEY.

Art. 15.--INDIAN COTTON DUTIES.

THE sudden revival of a bitter controversy, half forgotten in this country but ever present in India, is most unfortunate, although circumstances may have rendered it inevitable. The crisis of the greatest war in history approaches, and at such a time it was greatly to be desired that fiscal questions, involving a conflict of interests, should be postponed. On the other hand, the exigencies of the war entailed additions to the Indian revenue and led to a decision which instantly aroused antagonisms more powerful than the Government seems to have expected.

The issue presented to both Houses of Parliament on March 14 was the acceptance of a contribution of 100,000,000l. charged upon the revenues of India' for the purposes of the war. The resolution embodying this acceptance was, as Mr Asquith pointed out, not necessary. The measures involved had been already decided upon, and were to come into operation on March 1; but Mr Chamberlain rightly considered that the Government were bound in honour' to obtain the approval of Parliament, and any other course would have intensified the opposition. It is most important that the compelling circumstances should be clearly understood.

On the outbreak of war, it was arranged that India should bear only the peace cost of the troops in the field; and it seems to have been generally understood that the question of her ultimate share in the war expenditure as a whole should be deferred till the return of peace. So early as September 1914, however, a resolution was unanimously passed in the Viceroy's Council, 'which expressed the opinion that the people of India, in addition to the military assistance now being afforded by India to the Empire, would wish to share the heavy burden now imposed by the war on the United Kingdom.' This resolution undoubtedly represented the views of educated Indians, who felt that the arrangement under which the war costs of the army did not fall upon the revenues was inequitable, and did not correspond with the action taken in other parts of the Empire. The natural wish to help the Imperial cause, in which the vital interests of India were at stake, grew with the

clearer understanding of German aims in the East, and of the insidious efforts which had been made to create hostilities in Persia and Afghanistan, and to instigate a revolt in India. Associations such as the War League,' which British residents in India promoted, were formed with the object of urging the raising of a loan in India, and to secure contributions to the war loans at home. Good work was accomplished by these Associations in bringing the 'British War Loans and British Exchequer Bonds within reach of all in India'; and the Saving and Helping Bank' was established to 'issue war saving certificates for sums as small as ten rupees.'

Meanwhile, the Government of India gave no sign, and the Finance Member plainly stated that he regarded an internal loan as impossible. The recent decision that India should finance a loan of 100,000,000l., therefore, came as a surprise. The success of this loan will depend largely upon the methods adopted to tap the resources of India represented by the small investor, who is unaccustomed to transactions of this nature, and will need explanations and special facilities. Remembering the well-organised efforts made to attract working-class contributions at home, it is easy to realise the difficulty of persuading Indians over a vast area of country to give up to Government their hoardings concealed underground in accordance with time-honoured customs. If, in such conditions, the Indian war loan reaches 20,000,000l. of new money, the result would be very satisfactory; but the financing of the whole loan, as Mr Chamberlain stated to the Lancashire deputation on March 12, entails the imposition this year of another 3,500,000l. of taxation.' The whole charge of interest and sinking fund will amount to about 6,000,000l. per annum.

Here the difficulties of the Government of India began; and, although the measures adopted were such as to arouse strong opposition in this country, it is certain that any other measures would have provoked bitter and just resentment in India.

The Indian Tariff Act of 1894 imposed a general tariff, but excluded cotton manufactures in deference apparently to resolutions of the House of Commons in 1877 and 1879, which affirmed respectively that cotton